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
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THE  
REFORMED CHURCH  
REVIEW.

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE

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# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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No. 1.—JANUARY—1913.

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## I.

### ART AND SYMBOLISM IN CHURCH ARCHITECTURE.

A. V. CASSELMAN.

That there may be preciseness in our mutual understanding of the matters under discussion in this paper, it may be well, by way of introduction, to define our conception of the meaning of the various terms of the subject as above stated. When one attempts to find a definition of the word art, he is confronted by a bewildering maze of answers which convinces him, at least, that he has in mind a word of tremendous human interest. While we are thoroughly conscious of its inadequacy for every occasion, yet, for our present purpose, we are quite content with one of the simpler definitions of art as "the embodiment of beautiful thought in sensuous forms." By symbolism we understand "something that, not being a portrait, stands for something else and serves either to represent it or to bring to mind one or more of its qualities; especially so used to represent or suggest that which is not capable of portraiture." Architecture, according to the matter-of-fact dictionary, is "the science and art of designing and constructing buildings, especially with reference to adaptation to their ends and to beauty of form and proportion"; but according to the

finer conception of Ruskin, in his "True and Beautiful Art," architecture is "the art which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man for whatever uses that the sight of them contributes to his mental health, power and pleasure." The only definitive word in our subject, and for us just now the most important word, is church. Architecturally, what is a church? By way of answer let us remind ourselves of three words, very familiar words to us as pastors, by which in our thinking, preaching, and talking we describe our churches. They are temple, sanctuary, and auditorium. They are mentioned in the order of their importance. A church is first of all a temple, a house of God, a place where God in a special, indefinable, and mystic way dwells, and a place where man in that same special, indefinable, and mystic way may, in company with his brethren, find and see God. A church is also a sanctuary, a holy place—holy in the old biblical sense of the word as separate and apart—where may be celebrated, solemnized, and performed in sacrament, prayer, praise, and communion the solemn mysteries of the Christian faith. And a church is also an auditorium where people may congregate with comfort and convenience to listen to the instruction of their spiritual leaders.

Now, with the proposition intelligently before us, we may ask ourselves the question, "Shall our churches be enriched by art and symbolism?" The answer is easy. We are not satisfied with unadorned meeting houses that are mere shelters from the elements. In earlier life as the son of a minister and in later years of special service for the church at large, I had exceptional opportunities of visiting many churches in every section of the church; and, east and west, north and south, country or city, rich congregation or poor, I have never seen a Reformed church that was deliberately and determinedly left unadorned, albeit I must confess that some of the things with which some of them were bedecked would not have passed everywhere for adornment. Nevertheless, the intention was there and it was good. As to symbolism, I have



never known a Reformed church where water was not used for baptism, where bread and wine were absent from the Lord's Supper, where the word of God was not elevated by special furniture, where some special portion of the church was not set apart by special construction for holy things. By doctrine and deed we stand committed to symbolism in our churches.

I have asked the preceding question, and answered it with such glibness that I may be emboldened for the question which must inevitably follow: "If we are to have art and symbolism in our churches, shall we have all of each that is possible for us, or shall we limit ourselves?" If the house of God is to be made beautiful, then, surely, it ought to be as beautiful as it can be made just because it is the house of God. If the church is to speak to us in symbol of holy things, then surely it ought to be for us an architectural Bible giving us its message at every vision. So, having boarded this train of architectural symbolism and art, some of us find out to our alarm, upon examining the schedule, that it is a through train, a limited express, and that the only consistent stop is at the end of the line; where, upon arriving, we know that we shall find ourselves in company with those from whom we parted some four hundred years ago. Seemingly the only thing remaining for us to do is to pick out some spot enroute, where the country looks good to us, and deliberately jump off, trusting to our skill to make as dignified a landing as possible.

While there is some truth in this reasoning, there is a bit of sophistry there also. Because some is good, it does not necessarily follow that more is better. The exact opposite is not infrequently true. Rain is a good thing, but a flood is a calamity. And besides this, art and symbolism are languages, and as such are the expression of life. So we may well ask ourselves what is the architectural life of our church for which we desire expression in art and symbol. Briefly, the disjointed skeleton of that life is this: We build churches of wood, brick or stone. On the exterior, these churches consist of walls covered by a roof, and, if means permit, the whole is dignified



by an imposing tower. These walls are pierced for doors and windows. Within the space is divided for the accommodation of the people and for the ministrations of the clergy. The former space is filled with dignified seating and the latter with those articles of furniture necessary for ministering in the holy things of the faith. The walls are decorated and the window openings filled with stained glass. The ceiling also receives decorative treatment. Generally, there is accommodation for the more ornate forms of church music. The question now is, how can we organize and articulate these bones, put flesh upon them and breathe into them the breath of life? The answer is by art and symbolism in church architecture.

Now we will take the liberty of adding a little ecclesiastical verbiage to Ruskin's definition of architecture afore-mentioned and say that church architecture is the art which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man for Christian worship that the sight of them contributes to his spiritual health, power and pleasure. We will likewise take the liberty of changing this sentence from Ruskin, "All good architecture is the expression of national life and character," and specialize it into this: "All good Christian architecture is the expression of Christian life and character." Permit one more quotation from Ruskin: "While manufacture is the work of the hands alone, art is the work of the whole spirit of man." We have too many churches that are manufactured. We must get the whole spirit of our life into our churches.

The first question is, "In what style of architecture shall we build?" There is only one answer and that is, "Gothic." There is only one answer because there is only one type of architecture distinctively and essentially Christian, developed completely and absolutely from the Christian life, and that is Gothic. All other styles, Greek, Roman, Egyptian or Oriental, with their modern copies and modifications, are historically and essentially pagan. Given a building in any of these styles and it may be almost anything from a parthenon to a postoffice. Given a building in pure Gothic and it can be

nothing but a church or one of its adjuncts, essentially Christian. It is a wonder to me why any one should want to build a church in anything but Gothic. It is not necessary for us to use pagan architecture as a visible expression of the Christian religion. "The absolute beauty of Gothic line, moulding, details, ornament, proportion, mass and composition have no parallel in any form of artistic expression yet devised by man; while the greatest qualities of all architecture—structural organization, development and the coördination of parts—are found in their perfection only in the Christian art of the middle ages." Not only is it unnecessary for us to use pagan art for the visible expression of the Christian religion in our churches, but, indeed, we ought not to do so. Are we pagan or Christian? Is Ruskin right when he says, "All good architecture is the expression of life and character?" As one of the great church architects, perhaps the greatest of our land, has said, "The vital principle of classical art transmigrated into the new body which the church had brought into being, and so came Christian art, the same in essence, infinitely diverse in outward seeming. The laws held, the forms only were new, and they were forms that belonged to the new epoch of development with which pagan forms had, and could have, nothing whatever to do. . . . Not in the name of art, but in the name of God must the church accept and employ the art of Christianity, refusing all others; so will she stand frankly and explicitly before the world, using art as a language and as a missionary influence."

Of what material shall we build our churches? Of course, the first and finest choice is sawed stone. Nothing is more beautiful, dignified, or more fitting the house of God than this choice material and it is a cause for keen regret that more of our people cannot see their way clear financially to use this material. Other varieties of stone come next, the smoother the face the more dignified the result. The use of rough field stone is utterly incongruous. Good, honest, hard, red brick, laid in white mortar, is the next best material. One of the



most foolish customs obtains here in our midst,—that of building of red brick laid in white mortar and then painting the bricks red and painting on a white streak for the mortar. Let us build honestly of good material and such shams will not be required. Wood should be used in church building only when other material is unobtainable. However, if we must build of wood, let it be of such substantial proportions as to speak at least of some dignity in the house of God. These huge bird-houses, built of shingles and labeled churches, ought to be forever impossible. A sentence from Dr. Gladden is apropos: "It is a lasting pity that our laboriously pious and piously laborious New England ancestors did not build their churches of stone and their fences of wood, instead of the reverse, provided, of course, the buildings had been in their way as well constructed as the fences were."

A word as to the church for the location may not be amiss. The church for the open country should grow as a religious shoot from the soil. It should be made, and can be made, a real religious part of the country. The church for the village or small town should be designed for the place. But our chief error these days is in building churches in cities that rightfully belong in villages. My own church, for instance, is not more than half as high at the eaves as the three-story dwelling house next to it. The city church should absolutely dominate its surroundings.

When we come to the interior of the church we face a serious question. No minister has a right to build a church unless he has first deliberately and conscientiously decided for himself what is the chief object for which he is to build a church. Upon this decision hangs the whole ordering of the interior. A church must be built around one central idea for which it exists, to which everything else is subordinate, and toward which all else points. A church thus constructed is an organized, an almost living thing; without it all is confusion.

Some of our greatest preachers fail here. No less a person than the one quoted above, Dr. Gladden, speaking of this sub-

ject in his book, "Parish Problems," says on one page, "Divine worship is the essential purpose for which churches are built"; and, on a succeeding page, says, "The auditorium should be of such a shape that the most remote listeners should not be farther from the pulpit than the width of the main body of the church, and the nearer the body of the seats approaches the form of a sector of not more than seventy-five degrees, the pulpit being the center, the more successful will be the gospel dispensation." Evidently, in this instance, worship consists in being near the preacher. If it is decided that the church is primarily an auditorium, then the little dinky, skimpy, cozy-corner chancel, and one wall opening into the Sunday School room and filled in unsuccessfully with unsightly rolling partitions, may be allowed; but such a place can never be a sanctuary, and it lacks absolutely all the symbolism of a temple. If the church is to be primarily a sacred concert-hall, then put the pipe-organ and choir in the most exalted position, high above lecturn and pulpit and Lord's table. If the prophetic functions of the ministry are to be the most important, then frankly exalt the pulpit and combine it with the lecturn. If worship is to be primary, then exalt the Lord's table as a Christian's altar. However, let it here be understood that, while a Gothic church may be as perfect an auditorium as can be desired, it can never be an auditorium simply and live to speak in art and symbol.

Having definitely decided upon the one thing that symbolizes the reason for the existence of the church, then lavish upon it and its setting in the chancel all the wealth of really artistic adornment of which the congregation is capable, in such a way as to make it absolutely dominate the entire structure. The money for this purpose cannot be divided with other objects for adornment. If there is not enough for both, let the other go for the present. Many a church has been ruined by too much misplaced decoration.

In regard to chancel furniture, let a refined dignity characterize all of it. The beauty and quiet refinement of ecclesias-



tical wood-carving is being once more recognized as essentially fitting in chancel furnishing. A marble altar is a beautiful thing, but would seem to require a stone or mosaic floor, as wood is not a consistent foundation for stone. Beware of lacquered brass. It is a glittering temptation. A little bit of brass is good, if it is good; but, if you allow it, it will run through your chancel with all the bold blandishments of a circus parade. Dignity and strength should characterize the pulpit and this is best secured by the use of wood in good design with appropriate carving as decoration. The brass pulpit is almost always gaudy. The trade pulpit of onyx, bound together by brass, to complete its frivolousness needs only a bowl of cracked ice and a soda-water spigot. The word of God must be central in the chancel. Where the pulpit is central, of course, it is there. But where the lecturn is used, one wonders how the mistake of pushing aside the word of God ever came to be made; and it is a cause for genuine rejoicing these days to see its restoration to the center of the chancel, where it stood for centuries. Clergy seats should be dignified. Those great cushioned sofas, in which ministers used to lounge with crossed legs and watch their flocks, are happily being relegated to the lobbies of hotels. A baptismal font is made to hold water and should be made of material that will do so. Everybody knows that a stick of wood set up on end will not do it.

And this leads to remark that sham, and trickery, and consciously cheap imitation are utterly forbidden in the house of God. It is real sin. We may be incapable of what we desire, or we may be stingy; but here we dare not be dishonest. And yet how we ministers must hang our heads at the thought of the many things in our churches that are not what they pretend to be! Since we are talking about the chancel, for instance, I wonder how many little back stairs I have crept up and how many little frescoed canvas doors I have come through to get into the chancel of some church. Now a piece of painted canvas in the middle of a wall, with a diminutive little knob on

one side and a pair of shamefaced little hinges on the other, in the back part of some chancel, is not a door. It's a lie. Our people do not expect us to get into our chancels like Jesus got into the upper room that first Easter night. They know we must come in through a door. Then let us make it an honest door and come through like honest men. And thus must we carry that principle right through our churches.

When we come to decoration, we cry, with apologies to Madame Roland, "O Decoration, what crimes have been committed in thy name!" Oh, those fat baby cherubs with legs and arms that don't hook on right, and those grown angels walking on the clouds with their big feet, and those apostles with their prize-fighter jaws—all painted by Professor Daub, of Daubersville! Far better let us keep our walls perfectly plain in some unobtrusive tint in harmony with some well-defined color-scheme for the whole interior. They are walls, at any rate. They were not made to be looked at, but to hold up the roof and keep out the rain. Let the richness of decoration be kept for the chancel walls that with window, or painting, or mosaic they may form a fitting canopy for the sacred things transacted there. Above all, let no one but a master attempt to symbolize the face of Jesus. The very best ceiling is one of wood panels, with exposed trusses filled in with tracery and cusplings.

In the matter of stained glass windows, it must ever be remembered that "a window is a portion of a wall made translucent for the admission of light," and that the characteristics of the wall must ever pertain to it. It may be beautifully decorative, but must never attract attention to itself for itself. It must lend its aid to the accomplishment of the real purpose of the church as symbolized in the chancel. A window that compels attention for itself is a failure, no matter how beautiful it may be. It must also be remembered that a window may very properly contain symbols, but never a portrait. The lead in a leaded glass window is as important as the glass. To minimize it to the least possible amount in



order to have a riot of color in glass is a mistake and weakens the window in material, symbol, and spirit. If it is possible to have really worthy figure windows, well and good. But these are wonderfully expensive. A poor and cheap figure window is an abomination to be thrust out of the sanctuary. Good symbolic windows of geometric design are beautiful and far safer. If nothing more can be done, have the windows of plain cathedral glass, preferably antique, set in diamond quarries with heavy leading. The result is at once beautiful and churchly.

The seating of the congregation should be dignified and nothing is more so for this purpose than straight pews with ecclesiastical ends. The man who invented circular pews has a lot to answer for.

✓ Only in the last few years have we of the Reformed Church given any attention to the symbolism of the choir. Nine out of every ten ministers have never attempted to answer the question, "What is a choir?" In the Episcopal Church the choir is the symbol of the church triumphant, seated beyond the rood, in special vestments, singing the songs of the redeemed. We do not presume to judge Episcopalian choirs; but in the Reformed Church choirs are not composed of angels and have very distinctive characteristics of the church militant. ✓ Now, a choir is a portion of a Christian congregation fitted, either by talent or training, for the more ornate worship of God in song. ✓ Their duty is not to sing to the congregation, but for the congregation to God. This being true, the seating of the choir should be of the same dignified kind as the congregation, but with greater adornment as a symbol of their more ornate worship. Their position should be elevated, but should not face the congregation. Half the frivolousness of choirs is due to this thing. The best arrangement for the choir, with reference both to art and symbolism, is one of choir stalls with beautifully carved ends, placed laterally in front of the congregation, preferably within the chancel, facing the minister and his ministrations. An example in thoughtless-

ness in this respect is presented in two of the most thoughtfully built churches in our denomination. These churches are built on absolutely right principles. They are churchly to the last degree—or rather, to the next to the last degree. The seating is dignified and ecclesiastical for both congregation and clergy; and then the choir in both instances is seated on dining-room chairs. If the choir can sit in church on dining-room chairs, would it be inconsistent for a faithful and patient congregation to be accommodated with rockers?

✓ However, after all has been said, Christian worship is simple and spiritual, no matter how great, or ornate, or symbolic the temple. “We are tempted at times to despise the ordained simplicity of Christian worship, and to escape from its demands for spirituality. There is a place for things beautiful in the worship of God, for the best and costliest and most lovely we can procure. But in Christian worship with its supreme regard for liberty and spirituality, simplicity is a necessity, and the sensuous is always a peril. There is danger, proved by experience, that the very means innocently and honestly devised to bring all heaven before our eyes, the solemn, pealing music, the thrilling voices of the well-trained choir, the stately pillars, the vaulted roof, the windows with their pictured emblems, may shut out the sense of the presence of God.” The hunger after the formal things of art and symbol may be only a sign that spiritual things have ceased to satisfy. Forms—and in religious life they are either art or symbol—are not evil if they can be filled with spiritual meaning; but the more elaborate the form in art or symbol, the greater is the devotion required to spiritually fulfil them. It is possible to have the form of godliness, or of worship, without the power thereof; but it is also impossible to have the power without the form.

READING, PA.



## II.

### THE LORD'S SUPPER.

R. LEIGHTON GERHART.

While the subject of the Lord's Supper is by its very nature an exceedingly difficult one, it is rendered doubly so at the present time by the vast change that has come in the views of the theological world with reference to every fact and doctrine of the Christian faith.

With regard to myself, if you will kindly pardon the reference, I have for years had my attention directed to the study of Christianity in its universal aspects, as these are brought to light by the study of the great religions of paganism, and by the study of the moral and intellectual nature of man. This study has opened my mind to a much clearer perception than I had before of the organic relation of Jesus to mankind and to all history.

Instead of antagonism, there is an underlying spirit of unity binding Christianity to all other great faiths. In all the great pagan religions there are to be found lofty conceptions of what constitute true righteousness. Not a few, discovering that many things taught by our Lord were to be found less perfectly expressed, but still expressed, in pagan literature, imagine that Christianity lost some of its intrinsic excellence. As a matter of fact, the reverse is true. It simply brings home to us with renewed force the truth, so often reiterated, that Jesus is the universal man, the one desired of all nations. The Christian faith, in fact, presents nothing radically new, but what are in reality, in their most complete form, universal conceptions; and nowhere is this more fully and clearly shown than in "The Lord's Supper."

We not only find a world-wide belief in a future life, but

belief also in the resurrection of the body. The offering of sacrifice to propitiate the gods is as universal as religion itself. Further than this, we can clearly discern among different nations an anticipation of the incarnation, the coming of a redeemer and intimations also of the doctrine of the Trinity.

From suggestions such as this some may be disposed to revolt. Their conception of Christianity implies something so radically new and original that to acknowledge any such vital bond between paganism and Christianity would tend to weaken their faith in the value of the revelation made us in Christ Jesus. If, however, we rest on the fact that man was made in the image of God and for God; that God is and always has been present and active in his world; that the coming of the Lord is in response to deepest human need; and that the whole movement of history is redemptive, having no spiritual significance apart from such a consummation—faith in the eternal worth of Christianity gains immensely.

That there are forecasts of the sacrament to be found in paganism may be traced to the fact that the sacramental pervades the whole of life to such an extent as to become well nigh, if not altogether, a natural form of expression.

This appears, first of all, in human speech and in the general use of signs and symbols as means of communication. It then reveals itself in solemn ceremonies, sometimes purely political, at other times social, in which by outward signs binding relations are assumed. We then find it entering the sphere of religion, and see the pagan employing material emblems as media of spiritual transactions; illustrated by the Hindoo, who associates divine grace and redemptive efficacy with the use of the waters of the sacred river Ganges.

We approach the most sacred Christian rite more closely in the feasts of communion with the dead, to be found among different pagan nations. At these feasts a portion was set apart for the deceased who was believed to partake of it in some purely spiritual way. We come, finally, to the sacrificial feasts of communion with the gods. Among no less



intelligent a people than the Greeks and Romans eating of the flesh of animals sacrificed to the gods was very distinctly of a sacramental nature, as it signified fellowship with the god to whom the sacrifice had been made.

St. Paul sees this, and writes (1 Cor. 10: 18–21): “Behold Israel after the flesh; are not they which eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar? What say I then? That the idol is anything, or that which is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? But I say that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils and not to God: and I would not that ye should have fellowship with devils. Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord’s table and of the table of devils.”

So universal is the sacramental idea, so strong the impulse that has impelled men everywhere to make use of it, so profound has been the need felt for the sacrament, and in such full accord with human impulse and aspiration was the Lord in instituting the sacrament of his own body and blood, that I feel constrained to say;—had he not of his own option instituted this sacrament, in after times the church would have been irresistibly led to the creation of such a rite in order to meet the deficiency. And I am so convinced of the reality of this need as to believe that the church will suffer an irreparable loss to the extent that the sacramental in worship is omitted or neglected.

But what is the meaning of the “Lord’s Supper?” the sacrament of the communion of the Lord’s broken body and shed blood? Jesus himself makes no interpretation. He simply says, “Take eat, this is my body broken for you.” “This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins.” “This do in remembrance of me.” Paul gives us no explanation, but contents himself with re-uttering the thoughts of the Lord in a modified form. “The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?” (1 Cor. X: 16). This

certainly is not what we should designate an explanation of the meaning and significance of the sacrament.

We see very plainly, however, that the Lord's words raise his death to a position of eminence that imparts to it transcendent importance. However men may now regard his death, it seems beyond all question that Jesus himself never classed it among the incidents of his life. It was the supreme event in his life. He does not say: "Take eat, this is my body," but "this is my body broken for you." Not simply, "this is my blood," but "this is my blood shed for many."

But why "my body" and why "my blood"? Body and blood are words expressing the physical in man. Man is not primarily a physical being; he is not first of all a material body. He is primarily spiritual. It was man as a spiritual being that distinguished Jesus; and while the Lord clearly recognized the place of the physical and material in the economy of human life, yet the physical and material was always held subordinate to the spiritual. Here the material corporeity is given supremacy. What interpretation are we to place on this surprising reversal?

In the first place, the physical and material are the garment of the spiritual and the instrument and means of divine revelation, cosmically considered. In the higher realms of revelation and communion it is always through the corporeal nature of man that God makes himself known. It is through the physical corporeity that God makes himself known in Jesus Christ, and through this corporeal nature that men draw near to God. It is in the body of Jesus and the blood, which is the life-giving energy of the body, that God and man meet. This is the temple, the true temple, the Holy of Holies.

Sundered absolutely from the flesh Christ could not have been even a dream or a vision. For dreams and visions must come in semblance of material things. It was by the corporeal that Christ walked the earth, came in conflict with his enemies, resisted temptation, suffered and died. It was through the body that Jesus gave life to men, and through the body that



death could temporarily reach him. Without the body, there could have been neither grave nor resurrection. The body, then, while still subordinate to spirit, is the avenue by which men approach God, and it is through the physical corporeity that God communicates with men. It seems altogether reasonable, therefore, that, symbolically set forth, the Lord's body and blood should be made the medium of communion with him in the sacrament.

But why his body broken and his blood poured out?

As the Lord's Supper commemorates the death of Jesus, it must be interpreted in the light of the significance of that event. If the death of Jesus is an incident of his life, it holds very little meaning for us. To my own mind the death of our Lord is the complete and full expression of the principle of sacrifice which gives meaning to every high moral act; of that principle of sacrifice without which human life would be deprived of all dignity and worth; without which moral and spiritual progress is inconceivable.

Sooner or later every one discovers that moral progress is nothing less than a dying to every impulse in his nature which tends to selfishness in all its innumerable forms, from gross self-indulgence to the most refined spiritual pride; he learns that without self-sacrifice there is no moral freedom. As we go on in life we scarcely seem to have any will for ourselves alone; we come under the dominion of the demands of love and duty. Love and duty rule us imperiously, because they are the expressions of the moral imperative.

Along the whole path of human life the principle of self-subordination to the welfare of others is the ennobling, elevating force in history. Without this self-subordination, which inevitably and invariably takes the form of self-sacrifice, all things of moral worth would be destroyed. The patriot, lover, the friend, father, mother, sister, brother! What is the worth of these words if they cease to express self-forgetting, self-sacrificing devotion?

And when we turn from the world of men and women to

that of beasts, birds and fishes, trees, plants and creeping vines, we find even in this world of the unmoral reflections of this same law of self-sacrifice. The devotion of the savage brute to its young, the wild stallion fighting in defense of his dame, the bird lining its nest with the feathers torn from its own bosom, the plant living to nourish man and beast, the elements finding their meaning as they lose themselves to sustain the vegetable. Everywhere in the whole cycle of nature and everywhere in the world of the moral this law of self-subordination at the cost of pain and death for the benefit of others reveals itself as the life of the world. Without this there would be neither vegetable, animal nor human life; there would be no organized society; no moral growth, much less moral freedom.

The death of Jesus is the fullest and most complete expression of this universal law; the fundamental law of life. Wherever we find it, it is by its very nature redemptive.

All are familiar with the saying that men help one another by their lives, while Jesus, in distinction from all others, saves us by his death. I decline to draw such a broad distinction between the sacrificial death of our Lord and the service of love and devotion exhibited by men and women. The redemptive efficacy of the cross is in accord with every high act of self-sacrifice on the part of men in this: it is always in the act of self-sacrifice that the highest benefit is conferred by men upon one another. It is never in what they do dissociated from what they suffer. It is the blood-tracks in the snow left by Washington's barefooted soldiers; the disease, starvation and famine of the army at Valley Forge, and scenes and events of similar nature that stimulate high patriotism. In the death of Warren at Bunker Hill devotion to the cause of civil and religious liberty plumed itself afresh. It is in the father sweating and toiling for his family, in the mother pale and wan from her night vigil by the child's sick-bed, that parental devotion shines out. Faint and far off may be the reflection in ordinary human life; but men and women give their highest and best the nearer they come to the broken body and shed



blood—a truth that has passed into a proverb: “The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.”

From the many theories advanced in the effort to interpret the cross, and especially from that embodied in the creeds of 300 years ago, there has been a widespread revolt. I sympathize very sincerely with the revolt, but I have no sympathy with the extreme to which many have gone in their revolt. They have so far revolted as to reduce the death of our Lord to an incident in his life, and an incident practically devoid of all significance.

This may last for a time, but it will only be for a time; for the cross is too profoundly an expression of the deepest law of the world's life to remain submerged. It is too profoundly the expression of the divine will; too real an expression of holiness and love; too clear a revelation of the sin of man; too forceful in its every varying power to interpret the human heart; too richly and adequately the need of the world—too much of all this ever to lose its significance. It is the explanation of more moral and spiritual problems than aught else. I have realized this so deeply as to come to believe that the secret of the universe is bound up with the understanding of the cross—for the cross is the expression in its fullest form of the fundamental law of all moral and spiritual life, without which moral and spiritual life is inconceivable.

Jesus gave us his body broken and his blood poured out because he could not give himself as the food of man in any other way. There is no such thing as the giving of moral nourishment, spiritual food, except by the way of sacrifice. It is always by the body broken and the blood shed. The mother must grow pale and wan in her heavenly mission that she may save. The father must labor in pain with fidelity and courage in order that he may truly serve. The patriots of '76 must leave their blood-tracks in the snow; Washington must agonize in prayer at Valley Forge—the price of liberty must be paid or true liberty cannot be won. Jesus must die on the cross or the world cannot be brought to God and so redeemed.

Therefore, it was not simply his body and blood that he gave, but his body broken and his blood shed.

"Take eat," he said. Eating is by its very nature a communal act. Custom has not made it so; it is so by its very nature. No normal man loves a solitary feast. The family eats of the same food at the same table. Among certain nations to break bread with a stranger places him under the shield of the house. With us association with our friends seems to be incomplete until we break bread together. So when we meet for intellectual and spiritual communion, we are not satisfied unless we meet one another at the banquet.

This act of eating, communal by its very nature, Jesus lifts up and transforms into a sacrament of communion. In this, as in all that he was, in all that he said and did, Jesus avoids the exceptional. He is a unique personality, we say. He is the only mediator between God and man. Very true, but his uniqueness consists in this: in him everything truly human finds fulfillment. He disjoins himself from nothing human—human life, human thought, human experience—everything normal to human life finds its fulfillment in him.

Even when he gives his body and blood, simply himself, to be meat and drink for men, he links himself with the existing order of the spiritual and intellectual progress of the human race. He solemnly consecrates the great principle of human progress, that all live by virtue of the sustenance received from the good, the noble, the great of all past ages. Destroy this source of intellectual, moral and spiritual nourishment, and the world would be reduced to savagery, and what is worse, it would remain savage. We are to-day what we are because we are feeding continually upon the truth, the wisdom, the heroic example of the saints and sages, heroes and martyrs of bygone times. The very lives of the great and good, their ideals, enthusiasms, are humanity's most priceless nourishment. The very power of God reaches us through them. Says Phillips Brooks: "Ever out of the past, from the old saints who lived in other times, from Enoch, David, Paul and John, Augus-



tine, Jerome, Luther, Leighton, there comes down the power of God to us."

To this great law, this greatest law of human progress, this law of universal application, Jesus links himself, or rather, he enters into it, fulfilling its highest purpose and meaning. In a way he makes it distinctly his own by interpreting it in terms of the new dispensation, in terms of the divine-human order of life.

He gives himself crucified as the food of the world, and the communicant, partaking of this food, consecrates himself to Christ to live the Christ-life—to love the things that Jesus loved; to hate the things Jesus hated; to live for the purpose for which Jesus lived; to be one with him in bearing the cross, in making his whole life a spiritual sacrifice. He enters into this fellowship with the Lord that through the Lord he may come into communion with God. Jesus came as the mediator between God and man, and the Lord's Supper is complete just to the extent that through it the believer enters into communion and fellowship with God the Father.

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### III.

## THE MORALITY OF THE EARLY CHURCH.

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For the sake of clearness and convenience church history is divided into epochs or periods. By almost universal consent these periods are spoken of as Apostolic, Post-Apostolic, Mediæval and Modern. When our subject speaks, therefore, of the early church we assume that it is the first period of ecclesiastical history, viz., the Apostolic, that is implied. The time that is usually comprehended under this period is the latter seventy years of the first century of the Christian era, extending from the day of Pentecost, A. D. 30, to the death of St. John, A. D. 100. That it was an epoch-making time for the church as well as for the world, no one will dispute. It was the era of beginnings, of foundation-laying, and the times when things and movements originate and take their rise are always significant and laden with consequences. They are the promise of that which is to follow. To use the words of another: "The Apostolic age was preformative and contained the living germs of all the following periods, personages and tendencies. It held up the highest standard of doctrine and discipline; it was the inspiring genius of all true progress and suggested to every age its peculiar problem with the power to solve it." Certain times may be rich in memories and interest for certain ecclesiastical bodies, but the opening century appeals to all sects and denominations. It was a time when there was neither Catholic nor Protestant, when distinctions which are now made of such paramount importance were undreamed of, when spirit instead of form was the controlling factor in worship. If to-day we draw comfort and inspiration from the Gospels and Epistles, it is because in the Apostolic age



holy men spoke and wrote as the Holy Spirit gave them utterance, giving literary form to truth which is not merely profitable for reproof and exhortation but can make us wise unto salvation as well. And if to-day we are pushing the frontier of Christian civilization and enlightenment ever forward and ever onward until the day will come when there will be no frontier, it is because the Apostle Paul had the courage to break the fetters of traditionalism and racial prejudice and invite the Gentiles to sit down to the feast prepared, from whom even the crumbs of the table had been withheld in former days. If we speak of the evangelization of the world in the second century, it is because one man in the first century had a world vision and addressed himself to the almost impossible task of making all men see and understand the mysteries of the kingdom.

Now when we make the attempt to portray and to characterize the morality of the early church, there is one thing that we must be careful to guard ourselves against, and that is misrepresentation. It is never an easy matter to say just how bad or how good a person, or an institution may be. Probably it was for this reason that the Master said, "Judge not." The temptation is always strong whenever it comes to the morality of either persons or things to make it either better or worse than what it is. It seems to be contrary to human nature to give morality the benefit of sanity or of moderation. Men are either hopelessly bad or they are absolutely perfect, whereas the truth of the matter may be that those whom we are in the habit of calling hopelessly bad have many good traits while those whom we are in the habit of placing upon a pinnacle are not angels by any means. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency so apparent as in the judgment of the early church. There have been and there are various opinions with respect to its character and its value. One opinion is that there was little or no good in it. This was the opinion of the rulers of that time, of contemporary satirists and historians. Those in authority were distrustful and suspicious of the early Christians

and allowed no opportunity to pass by to vex them and exterminate them. They regarded them as the enemies of the human race and looked upon them as belonging to a seditious kind of religious fraternity. The historian Tacitus makes frequent allusion to the early Christians but never is the language used very favorable or complimentary. He speaks of them as "men hated for outrageous deeds and popularly styled Christ's faction." His description of the persecution under Nero gives us some interesting sidelights on his opinion of this new sect. "But not all the relief of men," he says, "nor the bounties of the Emperor, nor the propitiation of the gods, could relieve him [Nero] from the infamy of being believed to have ordered the conflagration. Therefore to suppress the rumor, Nero falsely charged with the guilt and punished with the most exquisite tortures, those persons who, *hated for their crimes*, were commonly called Christians. The founder of that name, Christus, had been put to death by the procurator of Judea, Pontius Pilate, in the reign of Tiberius; but the *pernicious superstition*, repressed for a time, broke out again, not only through Judea, the source of this evil, but also through the city of Rome, whither *all things vile and shameful* flow from all quarters and are encouraged. Accordingly, first, those only were arrested who confessed. Next, on their information, a vast multitude were convicted, not so much of the crime of incendiarism as hatred of the human race. And in their death they were made the subjects of sport; for they were wrapped in the hides of wild beasts and torn to pieces by dogs, or nailed to crosses, or set on fire, and when day declined were burned to serve for nocturnal lights. Whence a feeling of compassion arose toward the sufferers, though justly *held to be odious* because they seemed not to be cut off for the public good, but as victims to the ferocity of one man." We must confess we grow just a trifle indignant when we read that the early Christians were men hated for their crimes, that Christianity was a pernicious superstition, that it was one of the vile and shameful things that showed itself in Rome, that it would have been for



the public good had all Christians been cut off and put out of the way. Charges and judgments like these simply go to show superstition, that it was one of the vile and shameful things that showed itself in Rome, that it would have been for the public good had all Christians been cut off and put out of the way. Charges and judgments like these simply go to show to what extremes prejudice and hostility to a cause or a movement will go; and yet it is no doubt near the truth to say that those who made them were sincere. It was not merely misrepresentation they were bent upon, but rather the expression of their convictions and their point of view.

As over against the opinion of the enemies of the early church we have the opinion of its friends, and if the former went to the extreme of underestimating and even of slandering it, the latter go to the extreme of unduly glorifying and of idealizing it. How often is it the case that the church of modern times is compared with the church of early times and always to the disadvantage and disparagement of the former. The reason why the church of to-day is no longer as potent and as much a factor in life as it should be is, it is said, because it is no longer true to the Apostolic ideal. To hear some talk, the church of to-day is a mere shadow of the church that once was. And as a protest against modern church life and church polity, periodically new sects are brought into life which make the claim that they alone are Scriptural and are fashioned after the church of primitive days. Somehow men seem to have the idea that the early church was perfect, without spot or blemish or wrinkle. Because a high standard of holiness was set up in doctrine and example by the evangelists and the apostles, they seem to think that every member of the church realized it. And because there was the presence of spiritual gifts, the power to work miracles and the speaking with other tongues, it is commonly believed that the spiritual level of individual believers was infinitely above that we find in the church of our day.

Now were we to abide by the decision of either the enemies

or the friends of the early church, so far as its morality is concerned, it is easy to see that we would not come to a satisfactory conclusion. Our conclusions would be at once both defective and incorrect. We must get to the facts in the matter and to satisfy ourselves along this line we have a record that faithfully and accurately sets forth conditions as they actually existed in the church of early times. We have the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles and the Book of Revelation. What concerns us then at this time is not so much what says this person or that person, but what sayeth the record. Given the facts in the case, we are the better able to make our deductions. Undoubtedly the facts warrant us in believing that there was much about the early church that was ideal. It was a time when there was love, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. Not to soberness and self-restraint were men given so much as to enthusiasm, ecstasy and spiritual abandonment. The feeling of human brotherhood was very pronounced and there was a vivid realization of the presence of the Holy Spirit. It was under His influence and guidance that they spoke and wrought. Little wonder is it then we find a Stephen in the early church whose face shone with a strange light reflected from another world, who was not afraid to lay down his life for the Master; little wonder that the brethren sold all that they had and had all things in common, that they were as one family endeavoring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. One thing especially was characteristic of the early church and that was the application to its life of the New Law of Christ. Great stress was laid upon conduct and upon ethical ideals. While much that Paul wrote was doctrinal in content, yet he never failed to emphasize the ethical. Almost every epistle he wrote has a chapter or two of admonitions and exhortations. The writings of early times were largely ethical, as for example the Didache or the Teaching of the Twelve and the Apostolical Constitutions. The date of these documents has not definitely been determined, but it is probable that they have a very primitive basis. Their purport was to teach Christians how they



should conduct their lives upon Gospel principles and what they were to impress on the newly won brethren. In book I of the so-called Apostolical Constitutions Christians are warned against the "overreaching temper, against the spirit of retaliation, against a spirit overcurious as to the doings of worldly society and against seeking admiration by personal adornment." An illuminating hint with reference to the temper of the early church is given to us by Pliny. In his official report as governor of Bithynia to his master Trajan, he tells us that the Christians had been wont to assemble on a stated day (the Lord's Day) before dawn and recite responsively a hymn to Christ as to God, and bind themselves with a religious vow not to the commission of any crime, but against theft, robbery, adultery, breach of trust, denial of a deposit when claimed. This over, it was their custom to separate and again meet for a meal of an open and innocent nature; "which very thing they had ceased to do after my edict, in which by your orders I forbade club meetings." Now it is true that profession is one thing and practice is another, still we must believe that many in the early church "walked circumspectly, not as fools, but as wise," that whatsoever things were true, and honest, and just, and pure, and honorable, that they thought on these things; and that these things which they both learned and received, and heard and saw in their teachers they did.

But if the facts as they come to us from the early writings warrant us in believing that the early church in many respects was as a bride adorned to meet her Lord, they, on the other hand, almost against our own will, force us to the opposite belief that it was by no means perfect. While the note of moral triumph resounds again and again in the Acts and the Epistles, yet how often too do we hear the lamentations of moral failure. There are many things in it which are like bands of darkness over what was intended to be a shimmering and a radiant surface, things which we cannot reconcile with Christian confession and Christian consistency. How quick the scoffer at things holy is in these days to seize upon the

defects of the church and the moral lapses of church members and to use them to bolster up his contention that Christianity is a sham and the church is an imposition upon credulity and ignorance. Were such an one to look into and study the history of the early church, he might well talk, for he would have something to talk about. Hardly had the early church begun its existence than something went wrong. Where there should have been honesty and openness, there was pretense and deception, and God showed his displeasure by bringing the lives of Ananias and Sapphira to a very sudden and unexpected ending. The looseness of life that prevailed among some of the early Christians was really alarming, and gave the religious leaders of that day no little concern. How often does Paul in his epistles sound the note of protest against some prevalent vice or form of immorality. When in his epistle to the Galatians he says, "The works of the flesh are manifest which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, envyings, murder, drunkenness, revellings and such like," he does not imply that works such as these are manifest only in the world at large, but is referring no doubt to a condition that he found existent in some of the churches. Even the leaders themselves sometimes forgot themselves and indulged in quarrelings and rivalries which were hardly conducive to growth in Christian character. The letters to the seven churches as contained in the opening chapters of the Book of Revelation afford us a glimpse into the condition of the early churches. These churches we may say fall into three groups: (1) those predominantly good and pure; (2) those predominantly evil; (3) those whose character was mixed. To the first group belong the churches of Smyrna and Philadelphia, of whom it is said: "I know thy works and tribulation and poverty." "For thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word and hast not denied my name." To the second group belong the churches of Sardis and Laodicea. Their works are spoken of as not having been perfect before God and there were only a few names in them which had not defiled their garments. They



are counselled to buy white raiment so that the shame of their nakedness might not appear. To the third group belong churches like those of Ephesus, Pergamum and Thyatira. They are good but the head of the church speaks as having something against them. One is reproached for having left its first love, another is called to account because some of its members hold the doctrine of Balaam and the Nicolaitans, and another because it suffers that woman Jezebel to teach and to seduce its members to commit fornication and to eat things sacrificed unto idols." Now what was characteristic of the churches of Asia, no doubt, was characteristic of the church universal of that day and with good reason may we say that these churches were only a miniature of conditions prevalent over a larger territory.

While conditions such as these were unfortunate, there were reasons for them. There were contributing causes, among which we shall note only a few. In the first place, *there was the influence of heathen customs and life*. The early church was established in centers like Rome, and Corinth, and Ephesus. Let Seneca, who lived during the opening years of the Christian era, tell us what Roman society was like. "All things," he says, "are full of iniquity and vice; more crime is committed than can be remedied by restraint. We struggle in a huge contest of criminality; daily the passion for sin is greater, the shame in committing it is less. Wickedness is no longer committed in secret; it flaunts before our eyes and has been sent forth so openly into public sight and has prevailed so completely in the breast of all, that innocence is not rare but non-existent." As for Corinth, it seems language is hardly graphic enough to convey an impression of its wickedness and licentiousness. Usually when we wish to speak of types of depraved and corrupt cities we refer to Sodom and Gomorrah. We do not think that any place can be worse than they were. And yet if there was one city in ancient days that deserved and richly merited obliteration by means of fire and brimstone, that city was Corinth. On the stage the Corinthian was usually represented drunk. It was a veritable cesspool of iniquity.

If anything should be pure and undefiled, we think worship should at least be accorded that distinction, and yet worship among the Corinthians was nothing less than a hideous orgy. We are told that to the temple of Venus more than a thousand harlots were attached and that under the guise of religion things were done of which we must almost hesitate to speak. When, then, such a debased ethical tone was prevalent in the community in which Christian churches had been established, it was only to be expected that it would be reflected in the lives of their members. The influence between church and community is reciprocal and interactive, and while the church may and should be as salt in the world, it sometimes so happens that through influences foreign to the life of the church the salt loses its savor. No doubt many that came into the churches were earnest and sincere enough, but their moral ideals were rather low and immature, and it followed only as a matter of course that they would consider harmless what others were free to condemn. The Corinthian was in the habit of regarding fornication as the gratification merely of a natural desire, why should he not continue to hold that view even after he joined the church? That he did hold this view, even as a church member, we know, for the Apostle was under the necessity of resorting to strong language and repressive measures. To get him to think differently, not a little anxiety was given the Apostle, just because so many of his converts looked with indifference upon the sins of the flesh—a point of view this for which their past life and the conditions under which they were accustomed to live, more than anything else, was to blame. Another factor that contributed to immorality in the early church was *the perversion of Christian truth*. Another name for this is heresy. One of the earliest heresies was that of Gnosticism, a complex and rather fanciful system this of philosophy, but a most dangerous system of ethics. Like most speculative religions, it failed to establish a safe basis for practical morals. Under its influence some were led to asceticism, to the most rigorous process of self-discipline and to the



practice of a most austere regimen of self-mortification because they went on the assumption that the body was the seat of evil. Such were the ascetic Gnostics, who felt rather uncomfortable in a sensuous and perishing world. As over against these, however, there were the licentious Gnostics who went on the principle that sensuality can only be overcome by indulging in it. The consequences of such belief may well be imagined. To this class belong the Nicolaitans of whom St. John speaks in his letters to the churches of Asia. The fact that Paul taught that the regenerate were not under law but under grace, and the fact that he said of himself, "So then I of myself with the mind, indeed, serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin," seemed to cause almost an endless amount of confusion and misunderstanding. It led to not a little looseness of life. Many seemed to find in such teaching a justification for their evildoing. Another factor that effected the morality of the early church unfavorably was *the feeling of otherworldliness*. The fact that Christ had departed so mysteriously and so unexpectedly led his followers to cherish the hope of his early return. There is enough evidence to believe that even the Apostle Paul cherished this belief, not only indulged in it himself but encouraged others to share it with him. Undoubtedly it was under the inspiration of this hope that the early Christians determined upon the method of having all things in common, voluntarily parted with their possessions, a method of procedure this which hindered rather than helped those who practised it and can never result in the highest form of life and of character, no matter where, when or by whom it is practiced. Communistic society never has been successful and it is doubtful if it ever will be. It was not long, however, until it was discovered that the feeling of otherworldliness was rather of doubtful value. Men began to cease from their wonted avocations and not only became a burden upon the resources of their fellows but a scandal to the church. To use the words of Paul himself, they walked disorderly and were busybodies. Especially was this the case among the Thessa-

lonians, to whom Paul felt the necessity of writing a special Epistle on the subject. Idleness never is conducive to the highest development, even when it is indulged in under the cloak of religion.

We see, then, that the morality of the early church was not a fixed but rather a variable quantity. It partook of a mixed nature, which, of course, was only to be expected. It had its strength and it had its weakness, its glory and its shame. It is not for us, then, in these days to look back and say, Let us be as was the church of Paul and of Peter and of John. That would simply mean unwittingly to make a wish to be even as we are now. That the church of to-day has its faults and its shortcomings, we must all admit, but it has them for the reason that the early church had them. It is constituted of human beings and people will always be what their name implies—they will be human. Certain weaknesses and failings cling to the race; we know they do; we find them in ourselves and we are not at all surprised if they appear in others. We sit in our pews, but we are still the same men that at other times dig in the ditch, work at the bench, or till the soil; we are still the same women that at other times teach in the public schools or attend to the management of the home and the supervision of the family. We become Christians, but we still remain men and women and do the things that men and women are in the habit of doing.

Then too we must not overlook the environment of the church of today. In many respects, its environment is quite favorable. If anything can cripple the church, it is when there is outside interference, when pressure is brought to bear upon people to have nothing to do with it. But the times are singularly free from such a hostile tendency. The church is free to pursue its mission, and the wish that is expressed by those who are not even identified with it is that it may succeed and prosper. So also if a nation is at war with some other nation, or if there is internal disorder and strife, what can the church do at such a time? How can it arouse interest in things spirit-



ual, when those who should be its most ardent supporters are bent upon bloodshed and destruction? So, too, if a people be constantly on the verge of famine or in a state of chronic poverty, how can they think of the bread of heaven when the supply of earthly bread is so scant, or how can they think of a higher life when they are kept more than busy caring for the lower? But nothing like this applies to our nation today. We are neither at war, nor are we poor, nor famine stricken. In many respects the church of today in America, at least, is most happily and fortunately situated. In some other respects it is not. How large a percentage of our people live in cities and those who are in a position to know tell us that morally they are not the safest places to rear children in. If living is high, is it not possible that the cost could be reduced, at least somewhat, if only some men cared to make the effort? Is it not true that the home is to a certain extent disappearing and that old fashioned morality is on the wane? Is it not true that the feeling is all too common, if a man has this world's goods, that he has all he needs? Is it not true also that some people can't get enough, and that about every other man we meet is bent upon getting rich so that he may enjoy the luxuries of life? Now if the church of today is not what we think it ought to be, we should stop to think on these things. It is dealing with people that are under the influence of the modern spirit; they sit in its pews, and while many of them try hard to forget what is going on in the world outside and try to mend their ways, they do not always succeed.

And yet with all its faults, much is to be said in favor of the modern church as over against the early church. Were we to take a spiritual inventory of the modern church, the result would be most gratifying. We should find that the laity are taking a more active part in the practical work of Christianity than ever before. Can we think of any time in the history of the church when its men were more busily engaged in the Father's business than now? Years ago it was considered good form for the minister to do all the work of the church. Business

men were rather slow to take an active part in church work for fear that their business and religion would not mix, and partly for the reason that it seemed hardly the proper thing to do. Furthermore, we should find that the modern church is a liberal church. Before a man can be really liberal, he must have something to give. How poor the early church was, how rich the church of today is. We should find also that there is on the part of the people in the church a deep concern for the welfare of women and children and for the unfortunate in life. When has the church contributed more to missions, when has it maintained more hospitals and orphanages and asylums for the aged? How many of these did the early church support and maintain? Does Paul or Peter make mention of any? Every year the amount contributed for benevolence and philanthropy is made public, but it does not require close analysis to see that the bulk of the amount has been contributed by church members. Finally, we should find many organizations which have grown out of the teaching and spirit of Jesus Christ. When did the church have as many societies as now? When was there so much organized effort at work for the moral uplift and social improvement of individuals and communities as now? Did the first, the second, or even the third century of the Christian era know anything about such forces?

It is not for us, then, to say that the modern church must go back to Apostolic days and become as the church was then. That would be unfortunate. It would be a step backward. The great Paul would not have it so, nor would Christ, the great head of the church, consent to such an arrangement. The ideal church is in the future, not in the past. As it has grown and advanced, so may it continue to grow and advance until it shall be as a "bride adorned to meet her husband."

WATSONTOWN, PA.



#### IV.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES.

PHILIP VOLLMER.

As a matter of history, the dialectical or inductive method was discovered by Socrates, developed by Plato and Aristotle and perfected by Bacon.

#### *Objections to the Socratic Authorship.*

Many writers, however, are after the laurels of Socrates. (1) Some of them contend that *induction needed no discoverer*, as it has been practiced as long as the world stands by the wise and ignorant alike. It rests on the common faculties of human nature, they say, and men have always inferred the unknown from the known. Macauley,<sup>1</sup> *e. g.*, writes: "A plain man finds his stomach out of order. He never heard of Socrates or Lord Bacon, but he proceeds in the strictest conformity with their rules, and satisfies himself that mince pies have done the mischief. I ate mince pies on Monday and Wednesday, and was kept awake by indigestion all night. I did not eat any on Tuesday and Friday, and I was quite well. I ate very sparingly of them on Sunday, and was very slightly indisposed in the evening. But on Christmas Day I almost dined on them, and was so ill that I was in some danger. It cannot be the brandy which I took with them; for I have drunk brandy for years, without being the worse for it. Thus he reaches his conclusion, as surely as Socrates, without ever having heard his name." The answer to this is obvious. Induction being the process of all reasoning, of course, so long as men have reasoned they have reasoned inductively. But there is instinctive

<sup>1</sup> Macauley, *Hist. of England*, II, 60.

induction and there is methodical, scientific induction, and of the latter Socrates is undoubtedly the father. (2) Others assert that Socrates had *borrowed his method from the Eleatics*. Now we fully agree with Hegel<sup>2</sup> that "Socrates did not grow out of the earth like a fungus, but stands in definite continuity with his time." No doubt a man of his earnest and active intellect was likely first to manifest his curiosity as a learner; "to run after and teach the various discourses of others, like a Laconian hound,"<sup>3</sup> before he struck out any novelties of his own. And as a matter of record, Socrates appears in Plato's dialogue, "Parmenides,"<sup>4</sup> as a young man, full of ardor for the discussion of the Parmenidean theory, looking up with reverence to Parmenides and Zeno, and receiving from them instructions in the process of their crude dialectical investigation. From this very dialogue we are led to infer that he owes in part the powerful negative vein of his dialectics to "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno."<sup>5</sup> But what a great difference exists between the methods of the two schools! There a crude method dealing with the most abstract notion, that of being, here a method beginning with the concrete, the particular and inductively leading up to abstract conceptions; with Socrates, a method purposely adapted and exclusively applied to *Man*, with the Eleatics, a crude method applied to *Nature*. (3) A third-class of critics denies that the Socratic method is strictly inductive in its character. Tissot<sup>6</sup> regards it as more properly a process of pure generalization, "What is called his induction is nothing else than the preliminary operation of grouping around an idea all those ideas with which it

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, *Theæt.*, 263.

<sup>4</sup> Parmenides, 4. Here, in Soph. 127 and from Diog. L., II, 18, we learn that Zeno and Parmenides were among the teachers of Socrates. That he heard Archelaus is attested by Cicero in his *Tusc.*, V, 10. He also read Hieracitus, for Diog. L., II, 22, makes him say of that *σκοτεινός*, "What I did understand was excellent; I believe also that to be excellent what I did not understand."

<sup>5</sup> Plato, *Parmenides*, 58.

<sup>6</sup> Tissot, *Histoire de la Philosophie*, p. 93.



might be confounded, so as the better to distinguish it from them or to bring to notice what there is in common to them all." Lewes<sup>7</sup> regards the Socratic method merely as reasoning from analogy. He says: "Many, from Socrates downwards, had insisted on induction, but the induction they conceived was that which Bacon<sup>8</sup> calls 'inductio per enumerationem simplicem,' and which consists in 'ascribing the character of general truths to all propositions which are true in every instance which we happen to know of.'" This is an induction perpetually made in the loose latitude of common talk, and in the less pardonable laxity of common literature. It is the natural and instinctive action of the mind, and is thus distinguished from the circumspect, orderly method of science. This may be true; but "what is in a name?" Whether the Socratic method be properly called inductive, with Aristotle; or generalization, with Tissot; or reasoning from analogy, with Lewes: there can be little doubt as to what the chief peculiarity and value of that method really was. Socrates saw that to understand a thing it was necessary to grasp its essential idea, to make sure of having seized definitely and exactly that idea, and this could be done only by sharply and accurately defining it. In order to do this he compares and contrasts it with all similar ideas, notes the difference and resemblances and having the idea thus clearly before the mind, he proceeds to analyze it, to separate the individual and accidentals from the essential; thus he gets at its true nature and essence, what it is in itself. (4) Still others point to the undisputed fact that the distinctively Socratic method has little value for modern times. It is true that dialectics, or induction, as applied by Socrates, has been completely superseded by the processes of scientific investigation of to-day. Yet we can never be in communion with the vast and penetrating intellect of the great Athenian without acknowledging our indebtedness to him, and the question is surely pertinent: without the Socratic foundation, would we have to-day that mighty superstructure of science erected by

<sup>7</sup> Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, I, 151.

<sup>8</sup> Bacon, *Novum Organum*, II, 171.

our improved methods based on his? Of our induction he was undoubtedly (to accord to him the very least credit) the pioneer, creating the raw material for it, even if some will not regard him with Aristotle and the majority, as the real discoverer. Therefore, the majority of students do not think that Grote<sup>9</sup> is going beyond the truth when, in his description of the death of Socrates, he exclaims: "Thus perished the 'parens philosophiæ,' the first of ethical philosophers; a man who opened to science both new matter, alike copious and valuable, and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculating philosophers, historians, etc., yet other countries, having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Socrates, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such matchless effect and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison; for even his great successor, Plato, was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. His life remains as the only evidence of how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation, how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire; how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Socrates made war; there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association, resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together disparities or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which

<sup>9</sup> Grote, *Life of Socrates*, 360.



he has never rendered to himself account; there is no man, who, if he desires vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyze and reconstruct these ancient mental compounds; and who has not been driven to do it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since the giant of the colloquial elenchus no longer stands in the market place to lend him help and stimulus." Beautiful words, indeed, and what is more, true words!

*Plato's Doctrine of the Ideas.*

While Socrates discovered the new world of philosophy, it was reserved for his two great pupils, Plato and Aristotle, to conquer and explore it. Speaking first of Plato, it is evident that not only the basis but also the logical and objective unity of his system is found in his famous and unique hypothesis of the ideas. (1) The reasoning which led Plato to his idealistic method was as follows: In his endeavor to systematize the profound thoughts of his great teacher, Plato soon perceived that scepticism would envelop the human mind if it were not possible to find some foundation for absolute affirmation, for without this everything in our conceptions would be subjective, and therefore fluctuating. But all that we find in our minds are merely: (a) *Sensations*, which in themselves are purely relative to the individual who experiences them, varying with individuals and with different successive states of the same individual. Also the objects to which they relate vary perpetually. (b) By generalizing these impressions of sense we form *notions* representing the summary of a whole class of sensations and perceptions. But also these notions partake fundamentally of the character of variableness essential to the sensations in which they have their root.<sup>10</sup> Hence, in order to arrive at objective truth and certainty we must find for our reasoning a basis of eternal realities which alone are true existences, because they are independent of human reason, external to it and merely manifested in it by their being imprinted, by

<sup>10</sup> They are *εἰδωλα* of true being. See Plato, *Republ.*, VI, 508.

the eternal architect, on crude matter and recognized by human reason in all concrete forms, actions and words. The *instrument* by which the ideas are apprehended is the method of dialectic; not, however, that simple discipline it was with Socrates, but by "the Science of the Immutable." We apprehend the Immutable, Plato says, through the instrument of division, analysis and definitions. By division we separate the genus into its species, the whole into its parts; *analysis* rises from the objects of sense to "intelligibles," from demonstrable propositions to axioms, from hypotheses to experiences; the *definition*, finally, expresses the genus of the thing to be defined, thus distinguishing it from all others by adding to it its specific difference. To these definitions, which alone, according to Platonism, were "true existences" and the "only realities," Plato gave a separate existence and called them ideas, as Aristotle testifies.<sup>11</sup> The paradox, how an objective existence and true reality can be predicated of mere definitions separated from the thing defined, will vanish if we remember that definitions were to Plato what "universals" or "general ideas" were to later metaphysicians.<sup>12</sup> In this important point, then, Plato separated himself completely from his master, Socrates. For Aristotle, after speaking of the Socratic Method of Induction and Definition, says: "But Socrates gave neither to General Terms nor to Definitions a distinct existence."<sup>13</sup> We must, however, bear in mind that it required simply one small step from the Socratic notion that true being belonged only to conceptions to the Platonic objectivizing of these true beings into things.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Besides *ιδέα*, Plato employs a number of other terms to designate his famous principle of philosophy, such as, *εἶδος νοητόν*; *γένος*; *ὄντως ὄν*; *λόγος*; *οὐσία*; *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*; *ὁ τὸ ἐστίν*, etc.

<sup>12</sup> Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, 212.

<sup>13</sup> *Metaph.*, XIII, 4: ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς.

<sup>14</sup> See Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, 51. In this sense Aristocles in *Euseb. Praep.*, XI, 3, could assert that Socrates himself began the investigation of the doctrine of the ideas.



*Definition of the Platonic Ideas.*

The uniqueness and difficulty of the conception itself, as well as the fact that the ideas form the basis, the inner life and the outward form of the Platonic system of philosophy, necessitates a more minute description of what Plato regarded as the essence of the ideas. "They are," writes Schwegler,<sup>15</sup> "the common element in the manifold, the universal in the individual, the one in the many, the fixed and permanent in the mutable. In a subjective sense, they are principles of cognition, certain in themselves and inderived from experience, the inborn regulatives of all our knowledge. In an objective sense, they are the immutable principles of existence of the world without; incorporeal, indivisible, simple unities; that are present in whatever may in any way prove itself self-subsistent." These Universals exist *per se*. They are not mere conceptions of the mind, they are entities; and our perceptions of them are formed in the same manner as our perceptions of other things. Thus Plato transformed our conceptions into perceptions—*i. e.*, he projected our ideas out of us, and then looked at them as images, as objective entities. These he maintained to be the only real existence; they were the noumena of which all individual things were the phenomena; they were the real things, and the visible objects were only copies of them. Aristotle, in a memorable passage emphasizes this peculiar view of Plato, saying: "Plato followed Socrates respecting definitions, but, accustomed as he was to inquiries into universals,<sup>16</sup> he supposed that definitions would be those of intelligibles (*i. e.*, noumena), rather than of sensibles (*i. e.*, phenomena); for he regarded it as impossible to give a general definition to sensible objects, because they are always changing. Those intelligible essences he called ideas; adding that sensible objects were different from ideas, and received from them their names; for it is in consequence of their participation *κατὰ μέθεξιν* in ideas that all objects of the same genus receive the same

<sup>15</sup> Schwegler, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 95.

<sup>16</sup> διὰ τὸ ζητῆσαι περὶ τῶν καθόλου.

name as the ideas.”<sup>17</sup> Reducing Plato’s exuberant language to our present modes of philosophical expression, he means to emphasize that, *e. g.*, there existed somewhere the abstract man no less than the concrete men; the latter were men only in as far as they participated in the ideal man. No one will dispute that we have a conception of a genus—that we do conceive and reason about man quite independently of Smith or Brown, Peter or Paul. If we have such a conception, whence did we derive it? Our experience has only been of the Smiths and Browns, the Peters and Pauls; we have only known men. Our senses tell us nothing of man. It must, therefore, be reason and reflection which enables us to contemplate man in the abstract. Following this method we find certain characteristics common to all men, and not only common to them but necessary to their being men. These we abstract from the particular accidents of individual men and form them into universals, which according to Plato are the ideas of the group and have an existence separate from the particular instances.

One of the clearest illustrations of what Plato understood by the term “idea” is found in his *Republic*.<sup>18</sup> There he represents them as the models or archetypes according to which the deity fabricates all things. He says: “There are many chairs and many tables; but there is only one idea of a chair and one idea of a table. And the artificer who makes each of these pieces of furniture looks to his idea of a chair or a table, and so makes the chairs and the tables which we use. The man does not make the idea, he only copies it. Then there are painters; but also they do not make the real chair; they make an apparent chair, a painted chair, a copy of the carpenter’s copy. We have, then, three kinds of chairs. The first is the essential ideal one, which God himself makes; then the one which the carpenter makes, and then the one which the painter makes. The one made by God is single, unique; there are not and will not be more than one. There cannot be two or more.”

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 6.

<sup>18</sup> Plato, *Republic*, X, 50.



And where are all these various ideas? In heaven, answers Plato, in the presence of the gods.

*The Main Object of the System of Ideas.*

From the previous discussion it is plain that the ideal theory originated in Plato's desire to express the essence of things, what each thing veritably is, and to comprehend the real world as an intellectual world organized within itself. Aristotle expressly assigns this desire of scientific cognition as the prime motive of the Platonic theory of ideas. "Plato," he says,<sup>19</sup> "came upon his ideal theory because he was convinced of the truth of the Heraclitic view of the things of sense, and regarded them as in an eternal flux. But if, Plato reasoned, there is to be a science or scientific knowledge of anything, there must, together with the things of sense, exist other entities possessed of stability; for there can be no science of the fleeting." The Platonic ideal theory is according to this the common product of the Socratic method of notional foundation (universalization) of the Heraclitic principle of an absolute becoming, and of the Eleatic doctrine of an absolute being. Plato owes to the first the idea of notional knowledge; to the second the conception of the sensuous world as mere becoming; to the third the assumption of a sphere of absolute reality.

*The Illustration of the Cave-Dwellers.*

For the purpose of presenting the entire Platonic system of philosophy clearly before our mind, we cannot do better than cite in extenso the celebrated similitude in which Plato himself allegorizes "the conversion of the mind from the world of sense to the world of ideas." It contains the most exalted conception of the true object of philosophy, expressed in the most beautiful language. "Suppose," he lets Socrates say,<sup>20</sup> "a set of men in a subterraneous cavern, which opens to the day by a long straight wide passage, and that they have been kept in

<sup>19</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XIII, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Plato, *Republic*, VII, 527.

this cavern from childhood, fettered so that they cannot turn even their necks, but with their heads fixed so that they can look only towards the lower end of the cave. Suppose, further, that there is a great fire lit opposite to the mouth of the cavern (so as to throw the shadows of objects on the lower end of the cave), and that there is a road which runs past the cavern between the fire and the captives. Suppose, too, that along this road runs a low wall, like the partition over which puppet-showmen exhibit their figures. And now suppose that along this wall, and so as to be shown above it, pass men and other figures, some silent, some speaking. These captives exactly represent the condition of us men who see nothing but the shadows of realities. And these captives, in talking with one, would give names to the shadows as if they were realities. And if, further, this prison-house had an echo opposite to it, so that when the passers-by spoke the sound was reflected (from the same wall on which the shadows were seen), they would, of course, think that the shadows spoke. And, in short, in every way they would be led to think there were no realities except these shadows. Now, if one of them were loosed and made to walk towards the light, he at first, would be pained by the glare, and unable to see clearly. He would be perplexed if he were told that what he saw before were nonentities, and that now he saw the reality; and even if any of the passers-by were made to say what he is, he would still think that what he saw before was more true than what was shown to him now. "But if he were dragged to the light he would be still more pained and more angry, and be at first so blinded that he would not be able to see real objects. At first he would be able to see shadows, then the reflected images of objects, and then objects themselves; and when he recollected the illusions of his first abode, he would naturally congratulate himself upon the change, and pity those he had left there. And if there were among them any honors and rewards given to him who was most sharp-sighted in scanning the passing shadows, he would not be likely to covet these honors and rewards. He would rather say with



the shade of Achilles in Homer, that it is better to be a day laborer in the region of life and day, than the greatest monarch in the realm of shadows. He would rather suffer anything than live as he did before. And if such a one should redescend into the cavern, his eyes would be purblind, coming out of sunshine into darkness. And if he had to discuss those shadows with those who had always remained there captive he would be laughed at, and they would say that his eyesight was ruined, and that it was not worth anybody's while to go up out of the cave. And if any one tried to set them at liberty, and to lead them to light, they would, if they could get him into their power, kill him. We must liken the visible world to the dark cavern, and the fire which makes objects visible to the sun. The ascent upwards, and the vision of the objects there, is the advance of the mind into the intelligible world; the idea of the Supreme Good is seen last of all, and with the greatest difficulty; and when seen, is apprehended as the cause of all that is right and excellent. This idea produces in the visible world light; in the intellectual world it is the source of truth, and of the intuition of truth. It is not to be wondered at that those who have advanced into that higher region are not willing to be involved in the affairs of men; their souls wish to dwell forever in the upper region. Nor is it a wonder if any one coming down from divine contemplations to the wretched concerns of men blunders and is laughed at; before his eyes are accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled, it may be, to fight in courts of justice, or elsewhere, the battle, not about justice, but about the shadows of justice, or the images which make the shadows; he is compelled to wrangle about the way in which these shadows are apprehended by those who never had a view of justice herself."

The influence of Plato's notion of the ideas has never completely died out. From Hebr. 9: 24, we learn that it even crept into the reasoning of the Alexandrian writer of that epistle. The tabernacle in the wilderness was to him simply

“a pattern of the true,” *i. e.*, the ideal which was shown by God to Moses.<sup>21</sup>

*Criticism of Plato's Ideas.*

Plato's hypothesis of the ideas is open to two principal objections. (1) It is vague in conception and his statement of it lacks scientific precision. In spite of all his efforts, Plato did not succeed in making his meaning quite clear. Besides the main difficulty inherent in that grand conception itself, there are several other reasons that partly account for this obscurity. (a) All of Plato's works are written in the form of dialogues, often figurative and mythical in expression.<sup>22</sup> He is the most exuberant of all philosophical writers, “the myriad-minded Shakespeare of Philosophy.”<sup>23</sup> Cicero<sup>24</sup> says of Plato's language: “If Jupiter were to speak in the Greek language, he would borrow the style of Plato.” Aristotle says of his teacher's language, that he wrote in “a middle species of diction between verse and prose.” (b) Moreover, this concealment seems to have been partly intended for the purpose of stirring up his pupils' minds to clear thinking. He writes<sup>25</sup> “It would be to no purpose to lay open to mankind at large the doctrines of philosophy which are adapted only to the comprehension of a few intelligent persons who from imperfect hints are capable of conceiving their full import. Similar expressions are recorded in Mt. 13: 9–18, and Luke 8: 10, where Jesus says that one of his reasons for speaking in parables was to hide the truth from the unreceptive hearers. (2) But the gravest objection is that *Plato materialized his ideas*. Dr. George Fullerton says:<sup>26</sup> “When Plato looked for the object of the general name, for the *x* contained in a class of similar objects, he

<sup>21</sup> Farrar, *Cambridge Greek Test* (Hebr.), p. 122.

<sup>22</sup> Brandis, *Socrates*, p. 53: “Darauf beruht das Mythische des Platonischen Systems, dass es das Verhältniss des Sinnlichen zum Uebersinnlichen zwar formell festzustellen, real aber nur der Phantasie, nicht aber dem Verstande zu verdeutlichen fähig ist.”

<sup>23</sup> John Marshall, *Greek Philosophy*, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 1; *Epistolae*, VII, 3.

<sup>25</sup> Plato, *Republic*, X, 5.

<sup>26</sup> Geo. Fullerton, *Sameness and Identity*, p. 92.



created a new object, distinct from and apart from all the others. He is very vague in his statements, and he was probably quite as vague in his thought; but I cannot see how any one familiar with the *Phædrus*, the *Republic*, the *Timæus*, the *Symposium* and the *Parmenides*, and familiar with Plato's concrete way of thinking in images, can avoid coming to the conclusion that the idea was to him predominantly an object, an individual—a vague and inconsistent object, if you please, but still an object. But an  $x$  is in no sense a universal. . . . If the idea may be considered as apart from objects, it is an object in so far not essentially differing from the others. Again, the Platonic idea is an object but not to be put upon the same plane with other objects. They suffer change, while it is immutable; they are perceivable by the senses and it is not. The objects of sense and the idea are in different worlds; and though we cannot accuse Plato of drawing the distinctions of the modern hypothetical realist, he has certainly given us a suggestive parallel to the Lockian ideas and “real” things. The trouble has arisen out of his difficulty in keeping an abstraction abstract; he has turned it into a concrete, and finding in the world of sense no place for this concrete, this new individual, he has given it a world of its own. Whatever this object in this world apart may be, it is certainly not what is common to individuals in the world of sensible things.”

### *The Method of Aristotle.*

Aristotle was a philosopher whose extensive and penetrating genius entitles him to immortal fame and whose doctrines have been transmitted through various channels to the present day and have been surprisingly interwoven with almost the whole circle of the sciences. His motto was: *amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, magis tamen amica veritas.*

The best way to arrive at a true understanding of Aristotle's own method is to consider first his criticism of Plato's principles. He strenuously objected to the doctrine of ideas on the following grounds: First, such a doctrine is a mere doubling

of sensible existences; the ideas are conceived as merely attenuated material objects. Aristotle calls them *αἰσθητὰ αἰδία*, that is, everlasting sensibles. Secondly, the ideas, not being in the things, cannot be the causes of motion or change, and therefore serve no purpose as explanatory of the phenomena of change. Thirdly, not being in things, they cannot help us to any knowledge of things, and are therefore of no use as explanatory of the phenomena of knowledge. Fourthly, they are contradictory, inasmuch as they are represented as the essence of things, and yet as existing separate from things, as if it were possible that the essence of a thing could be separated from the thing of which it was the essence. Fifthly, the doctrine of ideas is a poetical fancy, and that it is merely by a metaphor that things are said to be copies of ideas. And, sixthly, supposing the ideas to exist, they and the things which are their copies would require to be subsumed and reduced to unity under a higher idea, which is absurd; for example, if the idea man exists as something apart from actual men, we must have a higher idea to embrace both, the ideal man and the actual men. This objection is called the argument of the *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, the third man; the other two being the idea of man and the reality of man. This argument, however, had been foreseen and stated by Plato himself. All these objections are offshoots from Aristotle's leading objection to the Platonic assertion, that the ideas are existences apart (*χωρίς*) from the things of which they are said to be the models.

*Statement of the Aristotelian Method.*

But although Aristotle contested the Platonic doctrine, he advanced an ideal theory of his own. He was far from holding that ideas were mere subjective conceptions, the fabrications of our own minds. He held that there was a correlative reality in the object answering to the conception in our minds, and this correlative reality he calls the form or essence—*μορφή*. This essence is not an object of sense, but of intellect. It is, in fact, the Platonic idea under another name. So that we



may say that Aristotle adopted the Platonic doctrine, with this modification, that whereas Plato promulgated a doctrine in which ideas were represented as existing by themselves, and apart from things, Aristotle represented them as implanted in things and as forming their most essential constituent. The idea, for example, considered as the "one" does not exist together *with* the many, but it exists *in* the many. Unity is essential to multiplicity. If we view ideas as laws, we might say that, while Plato regarded the laws as subsisting by themselves, and as constituting a world apart, Aristotle regarded them as inseparably united with the things of which they were the laws. The genus has no existence apart from the individuals, yet although the genus or universal has no existence in and for itself, but only an existence in individuals, it is nevertheless the most significant, and in its nature the most knowable, and the proper object of knowledge. There can be no knowledge without it. Summarizing Aristotle's position, then, we find that he follows the posterior method, beginning with the sensible, the individual, the many, in order to proceed to the *one*, from τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα to τὰ καθ' καθόλου. He agrees with Plato in the principle that there is no science except of the general, the concept; but he insists that this general, sought by Socrates, is found only in the individual, *in re*, not *ante rem*.<sup>27</sup> The universal for him is simply that which is common to many and can be predicted of them all. He thus founded the ideal on the concrete, the universal on the individual. Pointing out the difference between the two men, Schwegler<sup>28</sup> says: "He proceeds, not synthetically and dialectically like Plato, but almost exclusively analytically and regressively, that is to say, passing over backwards from what is concrete to its ultimate grounds and principles. If Plato took his stand on the idea, in order from that position to elucidate and explain the data of experience, Aristotle on the contrary, takes his stand on these data in order to discover in them and demonstrate in them the idea. His method, therefore, is induction, that is, the

<sup>27</sup> See also Aristotle, *Metaph.*, I, 9; XII, 14, 7.

<sup>28</sup> Schwegler, *History of Philosophy*, p. 96.

derivation of general inferences and results from a sum of given facts and phenomena, while his exposition is the usual *raisonnement*, a dispassionate estimate of facts, phenomena, circumstances, and possibilities. He bears himself mostly only as a thoughtful observer. Renouncing any expectations of universality and necessity in his conclusions, he is contented to have established an approximate truth, and is satisfied to have reached the greatest possible probability. He frequently declares that science relates not merely to the immutable and necessary, but also to what generally happens; beyond its province, he says, there is only the contingent. Philosophy has consequently for him the character and the value of a calculation of probabilities, and his mode of exposition assumes not infrequently only the form of a dubious counting up. Hence no trace of the Platonic ideals.<sup>29</sup> Hence, his dislike to imaginative flights and poetic figures in philosophy, a dislike which on one hand led him, indeed, to a fixed philosophical terminology, but was the occasion, on the other, of a frequent misinterpretation of those who had preceded him. Hence, too, in the sphere of action his invariable submission to the existent fact.

#### *Objection to Aristotle's Method.*

One of the most important objections to Aristotle's position is stated and answered by Dr. Fullerton<sup>29</sup> as follows: "It may be objected that putting  $x$  in a place individualizes it as much as putting it out of a place. This is quite true if the 'in' is taken locally, taken as it is when we speak of a man as being in one room, rather than in another. The  $x$  in one object is not identically the  $x$  in another object. We do not get the universal  $x$  in the abstract until we lose the distinctions 'in the one object' and 'in the other object.' If, however, by the statement that the universal is in the objects, one mean merely that the universal is that element  $x$  which, combined with certain others, forms a total which is known as that, but taken by itself, contains no distinction of this and that; if this

<sup>29</sup> Geo. Fullerton, *Sameness and Identity*, p. 93.



is all that is meant by the 'in,' there is no objection to the use of the statement, and it is strictly true. The  $x$  element is a part of each of the objects, but, until some addition is made to it, it is not the ' $x$  in this object,' or the ' $x$  in that object'; it is what they have in common. The 'in common' means just this."

*An Orderly Development of the Dialectical Method.*

Our discussion has enabled us to trace an unbroken progress in the development of the inductive method. *Socrates* was the first who asserted that the standard of human thought and action lay in a knowledge of conceptions and he taught his followers to acquire this knowledge by dealing with all notions critically. Plato concluded at once that objective conceptions were alone real in any true sense, and that consequently only a derivative reality belonged to other things. This view, as we saw, he upheld by a more searching analysis than *Socrates* pursued and developed it into a real science. Aristotle arrived at the conclusion that conceptions are *in* things constituting their real essence and cause of motion. By an exhaustive analysis of the scientific method he showed how conceptions were to be formed and applied to things and by a most comprehensive inquiry into the separate parts of the universe he examined the laws of conceptions and their connections. "It is thus one principle," says Zeller,<sup>30</sup> "represented at different stages of growth, by *Socrates*, Plato, and Aristotle." *Socrates* may be called the swelling germ, Plato the rich blossom, and Aristotle the ripened fruit of Greek philosophy in general and of the scientific method under consideration in particular.

A still more lucid résumé of the achievements of these three great men on the special field under our present consideration, is found in Dr. Fullerton's<sup>31</sup> often quoted work, where he says: "The object of the general term or class name is in question. Plato, distinguishing between the universal and the individual,

<sup>30</sup> Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 390.

<sup>31</sup> Fullerton, *Sameness and Identity*, p. 23.

between man and men, thought it necessary, according to Aristotle, who has not, I think, done him injustice, to assume an object for the universal outside of and apart from all the individuals forming a class. The ideal is a real thing, the real thing in which the individuals participate, or of which they are copies; but it is not itself to be found in any or all of them, except, so to speak, in a figurative or metaphorical way. Aristotle, finding no reason to assume a new individual, for so he regarded the Platonic idea, placed the universal in the individuals composing the class. Certain of the schoolmen emphasizing the distinctions between real things and mental representations, maintained that only individuals have real existence, and asserted either that universals exist merely as peculiar combinations of mental elements which serve to think the objects forming a class, or that the universal is the word, which may be applied indifferently to many individuals of one kind. In these views we have the *universalia ante rem*, the *universalia in re*, and the *universalia post rem*; or extreme realism, moderate realism and nominalism in its two forms." Here, then, is the birth of the world-famous and never-dying fiery dispute between realism and nominalism in philosophy. The realists maintain that every general term, such as man, virtue, love, etc., has a real and independent existence, quite irrespective of any concrete individual determination, such as Smith, benevolence, etc. The nominalists, on the contrary, maintain that all general terms are but the creations of the mind, designating not distinct entities, but being merely used as marks of aggregate conceptions.

*The Perfecting of the Inductive Method by Bacon.*

Though Socrates and Lord Bacon lived nearly two thousand years apart, yet they have much in common. Both open new periods in the history of philosophy; both look back on centuries of sterility in the search for truth and forward to the awakening and quickening of the spirit of investigation; both derive their eminence in philosophy not from any positive content but



from a scientific method; both employ as their method induction. For our present purpose we deem it sufficient (1) to give a brief outline of Bacon's method; (2) to indicate the points of resemblance; and (3) to mark the differences of both methods.

*An Outline of the Baconian Method.*

"Whence can arise," Bacon says,<sup>32</sup> "such vagueness and sterility in all the physical systems which have hitherto existed in the world? It is not from anything in nature itself; for the steadiness and regularity of the laws by which it is governed clearly mark them out as objects of precise and certain knowledge. Neither can it arise from any want of ability in those who have pursued such inquiries, many of whom have been men of the highest talent and genius; it can therefore arise from nothing else but the perverseness and insufficiency of the methods which have been pursued. As things are at present conducted, a sudden transition is made from sensible objects and particular facts to general propositions, which are accounted principles. But the way that promises success is the reverse of this. It requires that we should generalize slowly, going from particular things to those that are but one step more general; from those to others of still greater extent, and so on to such as are universal. By such means we may hope to arrive at principles, not vague and obscure, but luminous and well-defined, such as Nature herself will not refuse to acknowledge."

Bacon further explains his method in these words: "A syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of notions; therefore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confused, and overhastily taken from things, nothing that is built upon them can be firm; whence our only hope rests upon genuine induction." He objects, therefore, to our proceeding to deduce from an axiom not accurately and inductively obtained, consequences which may very well be contained in the axiom, although having no relation to the truth of things.

<sup>32</sup> Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 1.

Bacon enumerates as the causes of error a number of "idols," as he terms them, *i. e.*, false appearances (*εἰδωλα*), which must be discarded. There are, first, the idols of the tribe,—the causes of error founded on human nature in general; secondly, the idols of the den,—those which spring from the peculiar character of the individual; thirdly, the idols of the forum,—those which arise out of the intercourse of society and from language; fourthly, the idols of the theater,—the deceptions which have arisen from the dogmas of different schools. After this, Bacon proceeds to describe the nature of induction. In the first place, a history of the phenomena to be explained must be prepared, including all their modifications, varieties and the experiments instituted for the sake of discovery. In the next place the cause of these phenomena must be discovered, which Bacon calls the form. But in order to inquire into the cause of anything we must begin with the exclusion of things not belonging to it. This is the first part of the process. Negative instances, or those where the form is wanting, must also be collected. After many exclusions and only a few principles being left, one of these is to be assumed as the cause and by reasoning from it synthetically, we are to try whether it will account for the phenomena. There is, however, a great difference in the value of facts. This led Bacon to his consideration of "prerogative instances," or the comparative value of facts as means of discovery. He enumerates twenty-seven different species, the most important of which are: first, *instantiæ solitariae*, which are either examples of the same quality existing in two bodies, otherwise different, or of a quality differing in two bodies otherwise the same; secondly, the *instantiæ migrantes*, which exhibit some property of the body passing from one condition to another; thirdly, the *instantiæ ostensivæ*, which are the facts which show some particular property in its highest state of power and energy; fourthly, *instantiæ comitatus*, which are examples of certain qualities which always accompany one another.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, V, 2.



*Resemblance of Both Methods.*

Notwithstanding the differences of principles and tendencies, the Socratic method is closely akin and homogeneous to the Baconian. In much the same manner, *e. g.*, does Socrates find his "concepts," as Bacon the "laws" of things. The Socratic method derives the mental conception from immediate representations and Bacon, from natural phenomena, derives his "law." In both cases the course of reasoning is inductive, beginning with particulars, and ascending to the universal. In both cases the induction is of a kind that proceeds slowly and gradually ("per gradus continuas") to the universal—with Socrates to conceptions, with Bacon to laws; with Socrates to the original, with Bacon to the copy of nature; with Socrates to the final, with Bacon to the efficient causes of things. Also, the course of induction is in both cases pursued in the same way, namely, through negative instances. Socrates applies the test of a negative instance to all definitions, so that these are continually rectified and purified by contradictory instances, which in his case are not natural phenomena, but definitions or propositions. In the same manner, Bacon uses the negative instance as a test, to discover whether the conditions of natural phenomena that present themselves are essential or not. Socrates makes experiments with conceptions, as Bacon with things. With both of them, the mode of proof consists in so testing that which is to be proved as to ascertain whether, in every respect, it will agree with their hypothesis; in other words, whether it will endure the ordeal of negative instances. Thus, both make experiments; the one logically, the other physically; the one to discover the true concept among our notions, the other to find out the true laws in nature. They proceed by similar roads, viz., per veram inductionem, to opposite goals. Bacon himself perceived this affinity, and it made him prefer Socrates and Plato to Aristotle. "An induction<sup>34</sup> that is to be useful for the discovery and demonstration of the sciences and arts should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions,

<sup>34</sup> Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, p. 80.

and then, after a sufficient number of negatives, come to an affirmative conclusion. This has not yet been done, nor even tried, except by Socrates, who certainly makes use of this form of induction to some extent, for the purpose of sifting definitions and ideas."

The Socratic induction leads to a world of ideas, which is formed by the way of continued abstraction, the Baconian induction leads to a copy of the real world, by the way of continued experience. The Socratic abstraction consists in the analysis of conceptions; the Baconian in the analysis of things, —an anatomical dissection of bodies, the "*dissectio naturæ*," which Bacon requires in lieu of the Socratic abstraction.

*Wherein Both Methods Differ.*

While Grote,<sup>35</sup> in his admirable sketch of Socrates, and Kuno Fischer<sup>36</sup> point out the resemblance of the Socratic and Baconian methods in spirit and aim, Lewes<sup>37</sup> denies it almost in toto. A middle path between the extremes is the safest, namely, to acknowledge certain points of resemblances and concede vital differences. Of the latter three may be pointed out. (1) There is a difference in the *aim*. The aim of Socrates was confessedly to withdraw the mind from contemplating the phenomena of nature and to fix it on the mind's phenomena. Bacon's aim was just the reverse of this; he exhorted men to the observation and interpretation of nature, and denounced all attempts to discover the operations of the mind. If Socrates pushed too far his contempt of physics, Bacon pushed too far his contempt for psychology; the exaggeration was, in each case, produced by the absurdities of contemporaries. Most readers will agree with Grote in this, that Socrates "sought to test the fundamental notions respecting man and society in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics," and that the idea which Socrates described in his way as the "conceit of knowledge without the reality" is identical with

<sup>35</sup> Grote, *History of Greece*, VIII, 612.

<sup>36</sup> K. Fischer, *Fr. Bacon*, p. 162.

<sup>37</sup> Lewes, *History of Philosophy*, p. 214.



what Bacon designates as “the aberrations of the intellect left to itself.” Exactly so! But did it escape Grote that he, in trying to show the resemblance of both, established the great difference with respect to their aim? There it was man and psychology; here it is nature and physical science. (2) There is a difference in the *process*. We may assume three kinds of induction: natural induction carried on instinctively by every reasoning being; the Socratic induction, which was a very simple discipline—merely a reasoning by analogy; the Baconian, strictly scientific induction. It was, says Lewes,<sup>38</sup> Bacon’s constant endeavor, as it has been the cause of his enduring fame, to teach men the real object of science, and the scope of their faculties, and to furnish them with a proper method whereon the faculties might be successfully employed. He thus not only stands clearly out in history as the exponent of the long-agitated antagonism to all the ancient and scholastic thinkers, but also as the exponent of the rapidly increasing tendency towards positive science. Bacon may rightly be called the father of experimental science, with its elaborate system of gradual verification. (3) There is a difference in the *results*. The Socratic method is seen developed in Plato and Aristotle, the Baconian in Newton and Faraday. Systems so metaphysical as those which came out of the Socratic teaching must have been the product of a very different method from that which led to modern science.

#### *Hegel’s Estimate of Bacon and Socrates.*

In his lectures on philosophy<sup>39</sup> Hegel presents the following interesting comparison of the two great men under consideration. He writes: “As Bacon has always had the praise as the man who directed knowledge to its true source—experience, so is he in effect the special leader and representative of what in England has been called philosophy, and beyond which Englishmen have not yet quite advanced; for they seem to constitute

<sup>38</sup> Lewes, *Hist. of Greece*, VIII, 4.

<sup>39</sup> Hegel, *Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, 95.

that people in Europe, which, limited to understanding of actuality, is destined, like the huckster and workman class in the state, to live always immersed in matter, with daily fact for their object, but not reason. But Socrates stands before us, a finished work of classic art, who has brought himself to this height. In a work of art every feature is designed to bring out one idea, to represent one character, that it may constitute a living and beautiful creation; for the highest beauty consists in the most complete development on all sides of individuality according to one inner principle. Through his principle Socrates gained an influence still active in religion, science, and jurisprudence."

DAYTON, OHIO.



## V.

### MATTHEW ARNOLD.

C. N. HELLER.

Any attempt to summarize the life and work of Matthew Arnold is embarrassed by the circumstance that there are so many of him. First, there is the Matthew Arnold known to relatives and friends and to readers of his published letters, tender, unaffected, gay, depressed, brilliant, commonplace, communicative, reticent. Then, there is the school inspector and educational reformer, chafing under the incessant grind of his office, importing brightness into the lives of pent-in teachers, persistent advocate of great reforms, expert on continental systems of education. Again, there is the Matthew Arnold known to readers of his theological, or *anti*-theological writings, disbeliever in miracles, immortality and a personal God, enemy of creeds and dogma, communicant member and staunch defender of the Established Church, promoter of Bible reading and professed follower of Jesus of Nazareth. There is, also, the critic of society and politics, keen observer of "the state and prospects of civilization," untiring prescriber of "sweetness and light," acute detector of the idiosyncrasies of nations, confident judge of men and of movements. Another and a greater Arnold is the literary critic, a critic (according to Frederic Harrison) without a superior and with scarcely a rival, whose canons were always right, if his particular judgments were sometimes wrong, who was "open-minded to the defects of those whom he loved and to the merits of those whom he chiefly condemned," whose fundamental tenet was, that "poetry is at bottom a criticism of life." And, last, is Matthew Arnold the poet, a poet sincere and grave, uniting severe thought with beauty of form, restricted to a sad and melancholy strain, yet

consoling by a mysterious buoyancy of spirit, pervaded with discontent and skepticism, but never passing to revolt, indifference or subjection.

Matthew Arnold formally prohibited a biography. All of himself that he chose to reveal to the public is contained in the volumes that bear his name. When, in 1888, sudden death overtook him, he was only on the threshold of old age, but we may be sure that a longer life would not have added materially to the self-revelation his writings exhibit. Of the letters published after his death the first was written in 1848; the first entry in his *Note-Books* was made in 1852. But of the years from his birth in 1822 to the time when the division, or multiplication, of himself already noticed became his striking and puzzling characteristic, very little information is accessible.

Of course, it is something to know that he was a son of the great Rugby headmaster, and that he had a full share of the Arnoldism of the Arnolds, as Mr. Gladstone called it. That is, he had the family propensity to behave as intellectual paterfamilias to his age, being imbued, like his father and his brothers and his niece, Mrs. Ward, with a benevolent didacticism, and the consciousness of a message to deliver. Superficially, it is true, father and eldest son were in some respects opposites. Thomas Arnold had an undisguised moral earnestness, a total absence of self-consciousness, was vehement in argument, a stern combatant, fond of conversation on serious matters, was wholly devoid of humor, depreciated social polish, was first an historian, and lives in his prose. Matthew Arnold had a disguised moral earnestness, a naïve self-consciousness always, was bantering in argument, a smiling combatant, gay in conversation, had a versatile humor that rarely deserted him except in his verse, shone in elegant society, was a born poet.

In many essentials, however, the two strongly resembled each other. Partly because of what the son inherited from the father, partly because of what he learned from him, and partly because the intellect and taste of both were subjected to the same domestic and the same external and academic influences



during the period of youth, their mental and spiritual development proceeded along similar lines. Matthew Arnold's consciousness of a mission, the energy of purpose that so often made him a teacher or a preacher, his instinct for literary form, his Hellenism, his Hebraism, his interest in practical life, all are a direct bequest from his sire. If many regarded the son as a heretic Matthew, the father mournfully called himself a Doubting Thomas. In his now almost unknown sermons Thomas Arnold frankly recognizes the difficulties in understanding the Bible. He counted happy the uncultivated man, who honestly if ignorantly reads the sacred volume and finds there all he wants for life and conduct; but alas for the educated, because their difficulties in mastering the Old and New Testament increase in proportion to their knowledge. In a discourse on the text, "Thy Kingdom come," he asks, "Can we do anything towards helping on that Kingdom by living up to the Sermon on the Mount? We do not know, but, none the less, it is our duty to try. . . . We can only hope the doing of our duty will bring us not ease but light." In such passages appear the same perplexity and unrest and lack of religious confidence that distressed the son in a doubting age, which are the burden of many of his poems, and for which he propounds a solution in *Literature and Dogma* and later writings.

Besides transmitting his own literary taste, intellectual temper and moral seriousness, the elder Arnold supplied the younger with some of his central ideas. Dr. Arnold's "pleasure in contemplating so perfect a management of so perfect an instrument as is exhibited in Plato's language" is the germ of Matthew Arnold's constant praise of the "grand style as exhibited in the Hellenic masters." The father used the word Philistine to rebuke the want of enlightened charity in clerical brethren long before the son employed it to indicate the want of sweetness and light in the English middle classes. And for the higher culture of young clergymen the one recommended habitual converse with great souls and noble thoughts long before the other enjoined upon a wider audience a knowledge of "the

best that has been thought and said in the world." If the later Arnold rejected traditional religious dogma, repudiated a metaphysical theology, and busied himself with reading the Bible in five languages, the earlier insisted that "all Christian study should begin not with the doctrines of the churches, but with the view of Christianity deduced from the Scriptures." The one learned from the other to value and use the work of German masters at a time when the knowledge of German was sufficient to arouse in England a suspicion of heresy. Again, it was the father's description of the Germanic races as the most moral, with the soundest laws and the least violent passions, from which the son derived the doctrine that the Teutonic stock must supply the "remnant" that should save occidental civilization from the "unsound majority." The son himself liked to believe that he was "papa's continuator," though he affectionately admitted that "dear Dr. Arnold was not infallible."

At fourteen Matthew Arnold was sent for one year to the great Winchester school, in which his father had been a pupil. Here he found school work "too easy," and, owing to his irresistible charm, was immune from rough treatment at the hands of his mates. His intimacy with the historical aspects of Shakspeare's plays and of Scott's novels produced an extraordinary impression upon the headmaster, Dr. Moberly.

In the strenuous and stimulating life of Rugby, where the four years following were spent, the young student displayed an unusual cleverness and irrepressible gaiety that caused his somber father some misgivings. It is said that Dr. Arnold had no sympathy with boyishness. Certainly he failed to discern beneath the boyishness the strong vein of seriousness in his eldest son. On the other hand, how deep and true an impression the latter received during these years of his father's character as leader and teacher appears in the late poem, "Rugby Chapel."

In 1841, at the age of nineteen, Matthew Arnold went into residence at Oxford, where he had won an open scholarship in



Balliol College. Here he had the good fortune to be one of an undergraduate set as brilliant as the company to which Thomas Arnold had belonged at Corpus Christi, or as the little group of Cambridge "Apostles" in which Tennyson moved at the sister university. Amongst even such remarkable men Arnold was "something of a social lion," though, as one of them sings, they "knew not then the undertone that flows, so calmly sad, thro' all his stately lay." During these years he "was cultivating his poetic gift carefully," in 1843 winning the Newdigate prize with a poem on "Oliver Cromwell." While undoubtedly a good scholar, he took full advantage of the lax discipline to satisfy other tastes of his versatile nature. In Clough's diary there is an entry, "Mat has gone shooting to-day when he ought to be reading." Indeed, on many days Mat must have been scouring the Oxford fields and hills, whose every flower and stick he learned to know, as readers of "Thyrsis" and "The Scholar Gipsy" need not to be told. He probably played as hard as any of all the "young barbarians," but a present-day college student would hardly accuse him of stinting his reading. English, German and French authors, in addition to Latin and Greek, were his constant companions. Amongst them all Goethe and Emerson claimed his first allegiance. In the former he recognized not merely the greatest poet, but "the clearest, the largest, the most helpful thinker of modern times," "by far our greatest modern man"; in the latter he discovered a temper "hopeful, serene and beautiful," and found the "friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit."

In 1845, three years after his father's death, Matthew Arnold was elected to a fellowship in Oriel College, a distinction achieved by Thomas Arnold also in his student days. Oriel was the center of the celebrated Oxford Movement, but Arnold seems to have felt no interest in violent religious disputes that, to his mind, had little connection with religion. He disliked noisy discussion in intellectual contests, and this loud controversy sorely troubled him.

He was troubled still more by the war of thought in the greater intellectual world about him, and deeply interested in the issue. A new criticism was re-examining the old foundations of the Christian faith, and claiming to find in them much that violated love, and intellectual and moral truth. German scholars were impugning the historical accuracy of the books of the New Testament. Physical science was attacking traditional conceptions of plenary inspiration. The authority of creeds and councils, the infallibility of church or book was being fearlessly denied. Arnold had too open-eyed an intelligence to be inaccessible to the new ideas, but he was too much of a Hamlet to exult in a whirling movement whose goal was unknown. He was too much a modern to accept Newman's "impossible solution," of too religious a nature quietly to embrace infidelity, not yet strong enough to overcome the spiritual and intellectual difficulties of his time, too sensible of the past not to feel bitter regret for the faith and peace which the present took from him. No "unclouded joy" was his "before this strange disease of modern life, with its sick hurry, its divided aims," no "unconquerable hope" in face of the strong "infection of our mental strife, which, though it gives no bliss, yet spoils for rest"; but in matters of faith he was ever searching, unquiet, speculating, now sitting aloof from the currents of his world in a stoical isolation, now seeking strength from nature's "quiet ministers" or from the "clearest-souled" of Greek men, now overcome with human sympathy for all those who, like himself, saw in far-off hopes for men only the "sophistries of comfortable moles."

In his Oxford days young Arnold was already, says his friend, Chief Justice Coleridge, an orator and debater who wanted only "practice and the hardening which comes of friction to hold his own either in Parliament or at the Bar." Probably it was an inclination for public life that induced him, after teaching the classics at Rugby for a short space, to become private secretary to Lord Lansdowne, then President of the Council and leader of the House of Lords. If now "the moun-



tain tops," as he has sung, shone "bright and bare," and "short the way appeared to the less practised eye of sanguine youth," yet soon his "sad lucidity of soul" brought him, on this new path, face to face with the "something that infects the world." On the continent he saw political and social turmoil; insurrections and a rising tide of socialism and revolution in all the great states of Europe. At home the Chartist mutterings and riotous mobs in Trafalgar Square made him fear an advance of turbulent democracy. In an upper class materialized and a middle class vulgarized he could not discover the needed counterpoise to a lower class brutalized. Therefore, he apprehended blind movements of the masses leading to plundering and destroying and to a period of "more than American vulgarity, moral, intellectual and social." While he had no faith in the "proud prospect of hope" which animated the French people, yet in the mere "proclamation of an ideal city," as he calls it, he saw evidence of "the *intelligence* of their *idea-moved* masses"; on the other hand he was struck with the utter insensibility of the English people to "the number of ideas and schemes now ventilated on the Continent—not because they have judged them or seen beyond them, but from sheer habitual want of wide reading and thinking." "I am not sure," he wrote at this time, "but that one hundred years hence the Continent will be a great united Federal Republic, and England, all her colonies gone, in a dull, steady decay."

The principal burden of Matthew Arnold's earlier verse is this personal trouble and the trouble of his distracted time. How anxiously he searched amongst the flickering lights for some steady beacon to guide his way, and how he hesitated to make the plunge into active life before he had found the clue to the labyrinth, he has revealed in these impressive poems. They are full of his struggles to know the truth of things, his cries, his questionings, his certainties and his doubts, his hopes and despairs, his likes and dislikes, his anger, his sorrow. They show what resources he had to combat his distress, what expedients he found by means of which to put it by, in how

many ways he turned over the problem of life, in how many moods he opposed or responded to the pressure of his age.

Considering the personal and literary influences with which the young poet had always been surrounded, his original force is noteworthy. His self-containment is almost unfailing; his critical sense, already strong, never wholly deserts him. Not often does he take the common way of venting indignation against the gods, as in "Mycerinus"; even less often does he, as in "Stagirius," cry to them to save. If his old faith, with its certitude and inward peace, was for him now "but a dead time's exploded dream," he was not subjugated by any of the new gospels proclaimed by his contemporaries. In none of the current isms did he discern the "high, white star of truth" shown him by the rigorous teachers of his youth. Meantime he sought for help to endure the pain of

Wandering between two worlds, one dead,  
The other powerless to be born,  
With nowhere yet to rest *his* head.

And he did find help in the power of stoicism to fortify the soul against the pressure of outward and inward evil. A nature morally strong is braced and uplifted by the stoic appeal to the real self, and is thereby supplied with the fortitude needful for quiet endurance or calm resistance. Arnold had this strength and it has passed into much of his poetry. If, he says,

this vale, this earth, whereon we dream,  
Is on all sides o'ershadowed by the high  
Uno'erleaped mountains of necessity,

if this "dead, unprofitable world" is

Scornful, and strange, and sorrowful, and  
Full of bitter knowledge, yet the will is free;  
Strong is the soul, and wise, and beautiful;  
The seeds of godlike power are in us still;  
Gods are we, bards, saints, heroes, if we will!

He could not know romantic

Moods of fantastic sadness, nothing worth;  
Glooms that enhance and glorify this earth;

rather he sought the calm



of stoic souls, who weigh  
 Life well, and find it wanting, nor deplore;  
 But in disdainful silence turn away,  
 Stand mute, self-centred, stern, and dream no more.

But mixed with the strength which says, "I am I, and everything else is indifferent," there is error and weakness. One weakness is that it thinks itself so strong and is proud. Of this there is less in Arnold's poetry than the quotations just made suggest. In his prose one can see how he felt it as an obstruction of the mind, and how his own mental need drove him to preach humility as indispensable to seeing things as they are. Nevertheless, there is a tincture of pride in nearly everything he wrote, and its presence often produces a gnawing self-consciousness and arouses his distrust.

Again, the fortitude of stoicism is for the strong and the few. The mass of mankind have neither force of intellect enough, nor force of character enough, to be stoics either in theory or in practice. The stoic is therefore isolated from his fellowmen, severed not merely from the noise and restlessness of common humanity, but also from its loves and hopes and joys. As a poet Arnold did too much sit aloof from his kind; as a critic he felt a touch of contempt for the common man. He felt the isolation, and it filled him with a "longing like despair," that finds expression in some of his finest poetry:

Yes! in the sea of life enisled,  
 With echoing straits between us thrown,  
 Dotting the shoreless watery wild,  
 We mortal millions live *alone*.

In "A Summer Night" he sings:

the calm moonlight seems to say—  
 "Hast thou then still the old unquiet breast  
 Which neither deadens into rest  
 Nor ever feels the fiery glow  
 That whirls the spirit from itself away,  
 But fluctuates to and fro  
 Never by passion quite possessed,  
 And never quite benumb'd by the world's sway?"—  
 And I, I know not if to pray  
 Still to be what I am, or yield, and be  
 Like all the other men I see.

Matthew Arnold had times of partial yielding. He was too human, too worldly, to maintain the stoic attitude of indifference. But, when he abandoned it, it was not to embrace the joyous acceptance of life characteristic of the old pagan world unconscious of sickness and sorrow, nor to follow the imperious call of youth to gather rosebuds while one may. In "The New Sirens" and "The Voice" he reveals that he had heard this appeal of the "princely heart" like "strains of glad music" and had resisted it.

In vain, all, all in vain,  
They beat upon mine ear again,—  
Those melancholy tones so sweet and still;  
Those lute-like tones which in the bygone year  
Did steal into mine ear;  
Blew such a thrilling summons to my will,  
Yet could not shake it;  
Made my tost heart its very life-blood spill,  
Yet could not break it.

Indeed, it was not only stoicism, reinforced by congenital Hebraism and Puritanism, that enabled him to resist the thrilling summons, but also the fact that for him such yielding would not have been an escape from the isolation that he felt so keenly:

now the old is out of date,  
The new is not yet born.  
And who can be *alone* elate,  
While the world lies forlorn?

The only way in which a Matthew Arnold, writing poetry, could have the sense of human companionship he craved was by melting into sympathy with the trouble and sorrow of men, and by uttering his and their common pain. This he did. That natural act proved the weakness of the stoic, but was the strength of the poet. It imparted the emotion which made it possible for him to speak to the feelings of all spiritually minded men who are conscious of

the heavy and the weary weight  
Of all this unintelligible world.

And the knowledge that men, feeling themselves understood,



explained and helped, would send back to him their gratitude and sympathy, afforded him the solace and strength that come from the consciousness of reunion with one's kind, for sympathy in trouble is a stronger bond of brotherhood than sympathy in times of joy. The sense of this, if it could not carry Arnold to the highest levels of song, has made him the friend and aider of all those in this modern time who are burdened by the confusion of their world and have need of ease at intervals in the struggle to understand it all.

The poet himself could find only momentary ease either in stoicism or in the denial of stoicism. Hardly had his inward pain driven him out of himself into imaginative union with his fellowmen, until their sorrow and tumult forced him back into the solitudes of his own soul. This constant indecision filled him with disappointment and discontent. To escape these fluctuations he sought inspiration and discipline from those men, those books, those aspects of nature, that represented to him something fixed, constant, serene. Whatever he thought of the choice of Mycerinus or of the aim of the Duke of Wellington, he praised the clearness and the steadiness of their purpose. In the poems of Homer; "clearest-souled of men," he contemplated settled principles of the highest literary art, as well as the instructive figures of Odysseus, steadfastly facing the unknown, and Achilles, steadfastly facing the known, the one at last triumphant over hard circumstances, the other content with such gifts "as hearts heroic oftenest win; honor, a friend, anguish, untimely death." But he owned a special obligation to Sophocles,

whose even-balanced soul  
Business could not make dull, nor passion wild;  
Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole.

From nature, too, he tried to learn the one lesson of

Toil unsevered from tranquillity,

of tireless perseverance without stormy revolution. He could feel, like Wordsworth, the intimate relationship between man and the external world, and the soothing influence of com-

munion with nature, but he could not, except rarely and when overcome with weariness, put himself in an attitude of mere receptivity. Neither Wordsworth's cloudy pantheism, nor the alluring preachment to live in harmony with nature, nor the newer scientific conception which declared both man and nature subject to the same mechanical laws, could lull him into forgetfulness of the duty to think and will. For he saw the seamy side of nature, saw that, while silent, strong and cool, she is also cruel, stubborn, unforgiving; and that if man is not to be all these things, he must refuse to follow nature, "must begin where nature ends."

Man hath all which nature hath, but more,  
And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good.

Thus, when confronted with the crucial problem presented by the modern scientific conception of the universality of law, Arnold maintained the uniqueness and independence of man, and in defense of the spiritual life asserted his freedom and responsibility.

It was not, however, an austere and distressed Arnold that his friends beheld in those years, but an elegant, fashionable young man of the world, enjoying the society he adorned, full of levity and wit and raillery. "A very brilliant person was Arnold in those days," writes one who knew him, "but of a sweet and winning manner; as an especial mark of eminence he was singularly urbane and gracious. 'Exquisite was he in dress; and his black hair and fine eyes, his easy bearing and pleasant talk, made him altogether fascinating.'" His airs were almost proverbial. He speaks of them himself with amused self-knowledge, and of his "invincible insouciance," without which he would have been quite helpless in active life.

In 1851 Matthew Arnold married Frances Lucy Wightman, and in order to marry accepted from Lord Lansdowne an appointment as Lay Inspector of Schools. He felt no natural inclination for the work of his office. Its burdensome details and the ways of the Nonconformists, to whose schools he was assigned, were not congenial to him. Here and there in his



letters are descriptions of the unwelcome drudgery which consumed much of his time, and of the hardships which his official tours over one third of England imposed upon him. In spite, however, of occasional light grumblings, he applied himself with conscientious diligence to his exacting duties, and for thirty-five years labored faithfully in a comparatively obscure and unremunerative position that afforded no opportunity to realize any worldly ambition. Remembering his early inclination for public life, his pamphlet on *England and the Italian Question*, and his unremitting interest in social and political problems, one can understand why, when he saw old Oxford friends risen to eminence in church or state, he should speak half-seriously of himself as a Balliol man who had failed; and, perhaps, why he did not wish his life to be written.

Few, however, of those who observed him inspecting dismal English elementary schools ever thought of questioning his success. One who knew him well reports: "His effect on the teachers when he examined a school was extraordinary. He was sympathetic without being condescending, and he reconciled the humblest drudge to his or her drudgery for the next twelve months." Mr. Russell has preserved a specimen of the manner in which, while testing a class, he brought smiles to the faces of frightened children and peace to the mind of an anxious teacher. "Well, my little man, and how do you spell *dog*?" "Please, sir, *d-o-g*." "Capital, very good indeed. I couldn't do it better myself. And now let us go a little further, and see if we can spell *cat*." (*Chorus, excitedly.*) "C-A-T." "Now, this is really excellent." (*To the teacher.*) "You have brought them on wonderfully in spelling since I was here last." Another glimpse of Matthew Arnold, the government official, is given in a letter to his mother. "What I like best is such a letter as I saw the other day to the Council Office, not meant for me to see, from a teacher defending his school against a severe report of mine: he finished by saying that he had not a word against the Inspector, whom he would rather have than any other he had ever come in contact with, 'as he was always

gentle and patient with the children.' The great thing is *humanity*, after all."

Soon after entering upon the duties of the inspectorship, Mr. Arnold wrote to his wife: "I think I shall get interested in the schools after a little time; their effects on the children are so immense, and their future effects in civilizing the next generation of the lower classes, who, as things are now going, will have most of the political power in their hands, may be so important." He did quickly get interested, gave much study to the problem of popular education, and in his annual reports, written with the greatest care, in open utterances and by private counsel strongly influenced public and official opinion. In 1859, in 1865, and again in 1885 he was sent abroad as Special Commissioner to study continental schools. He spent immense labor in preparing reports of these investigations, and in formulating the recommendations and philosophic views which they contain. The preface to the first of these special reports is the "Democracy" of his *Mixed Essays*, wherein he preaches the then unpopular doctrine that greatly enlarged state action was necessary in order to establish an efficient system of public education in place of the existing chaos. Other matters, such as educational values, correlation of studies, enrichment of school courses, professional training, superintendence, national and municipal arrangements, etc., he frequently treated in other writings long before they became stock topics of discussion. In educational controversies he is still appealed to as an authority, and only recently his *Thoughts on Education* were collected and published in a separate volume.

With excellent opportunities to observe the affairs of his world, Mr. Arnold soon perceived its great defects and valiantly strove to discover the means of satisfying its needs; and, when he was convinced that he had reached the root of the whole matter, he toiled early and late to deliver his message to his countrymen. In the performance of this self-imposed task his critical attitude, almost inevitably suggesting an assumption of superiority, his unflinching utterance of the *unpopular* truth,



and the satirical banter in which he often indulged, offended those whose stock notions were examined with imperturbable impartiality or whose prejudices were stronger than their sense of humor. If, to-day, a like unfavorable impression of Matthew Arnold's spirit and purpose is received from his criticism of society and religion, it is possible to correct that impression by means of the two volumes of his letters published after his death. The sympathetic reader will cheerfully agree with the editor, Mr. Russell, that this correspondence presents abundant evidence of Matthew Arnold's "constant unselfishness, his manly endurance of adverse fate, his loyalty to old and humble associations, his boyish appreciation of kindness and admiration, his satisfaction in the most commonplace pleasures of daily life, his love of children, his freedom from bitterness, rancor and envy." A few specimens will tell their own tale.

"You will receive this, my dearest mother, on the morning of your birthday. Accept every loving and grateful wish from a son to whom you have been such a mother as few sons have. The more I see of the world, the more I feel thankful for the bringing up we had, so unworldly, so sound, and so pure. God bless you, my dear mother, and believe me your truly affectionate child" (1852).

"[Margaret Fuller's] address to the poor women in the Penitentiary is really beautiful. 'Cultivate the spirit of prayer, I do not mean agitation and excitement, but a deep desire for truth, purity and goodness, and you will daily learn how near He is to every one of us.' Nothing can be better than that" (1853).

"With the pure in heart one feels—even I feel—that for their purity's sake, if for that alone, whatever delusions they may have wandered in, and whatever impossibilities they may have dreamed of, they shall undoubtedly, in some sense or other, see God" (1854).

"If the opinion of the general public about my poems were the same as that of the leading literary men, I should make more money by them than I do. But, more than this, I should

gain the stimulus necessary to enable me to produce my best—all that I have in me, whatever that may be—to produce which is no light matter with an existence so hampered as mine is. . . . To attain or approach perfection in the region of thought and feeling, and to unite this with perfection of form, demands not merely an effort and a labor, but an actual tearing of one-self to pieces, which one does not readily consent to . . . unless one can devote one's whole life to poetry" (1858).

"The great thing is to produce nothing of which, if it comes into broad light, you will be ashamed; and then whether it *does* come into broad light or no need not much trouble you" (1861).

"The treatment of politics with one's thought, or with one's imagination, or with one's soul, in place of the common treatment of them with one's Philistinism and with one's passions, is the only thing which can reconcile, it seems to me, any serious person to politics, with their inevitable wear, waste, and sore trial to all that is best in one" (1864).

"One cannot change English ideas so much as, if I live, I hope to change them, without saying imperturbably what one thinks and making a good many people uncomfortable. The great thing is to speak without a particle of vice, malice or rancor" (1863).

"In the long run one makes enemies by having one's brilliancy and ability praised; one can only get oneself really accepted by men by making oneself forgotten in the people and doctrines one recommends. . . . I really want to persuade, and I have felt how necessary it was to keep down many and many sharp and telling things that rise to one's lips, and which one would gladly utter if one's object was to show one's own abilities" (1864).

"The *Spectator* does me a very bad service by talking of my contempt for unintellectual people. It is not at all true, and it sets people against one. You will laugh, but fiery hatred and malice are what I detest, and would always allay or avoid, if I could" (1868).

"No one has a stronger or more abiding sense than I



have of the 'dæmonic' element . . . which underlies and encompasses our life; but I think, as Goethe thought, that the right thing is, while conscious of this element, and of all that there is inexplicable round one, to keep pushing on one's posts into the darkness, and to establish no post that is not perfectly in light and firm" (1865).

"I am convinced that as *Science*, in the widest sense of the word, meaning a true knowledge of things as the basis of our operations, becomes . . . more of a power in the world, the weight of the nations and men who have carried the intellectual life farthest will be more and more felt. . . . That England may run well in this race is my deepest desire; and to stimulate her and make her feel how many clogs she wears, and how much she has to do in order to run in it as her genius gives her the power to run, is the object of all I do" (1865).

"I am glad to have an opportunity to disclaim that positive admiration of things foreign, and that indifference to English freedom, which have often been imputed to me, and to explain that I do not disparage freedom, but take it for granted as our condition and go on to consider other things" (1866).

"The conclusion of the whole matter is, *men* are wanted everywhere; not wealth, freedom, institutions, &c., so urgently wanted as *men*; and we have all to try, in our separate spheres, to be as much men as we can" (1865).

"I have always insisted that the only right way to an outward transformation was through an inward one, and that the business for us and our age was the latter" (1872).

When Matthew Arnold was made professor of poetry at Oxford in 1857, he was not quite thirty-five years old. He had already published nearly three fourths of the poetry he has given to the world, all his later pieces, excepting "*Merope*," being short and occasional. No one had taken any notice of his earlier effusions, but "*Sohrab and Rustum*" (1853) and "*Balder Dead*" (1855) established his reputation amongst cultivated readers. The preface to the volume in which the former appeared was his first published prose. Therein he sets forth

his conception of poetry—a conception at variance with what he believed to be the false views current at the time, and in accord with the methods and principles of classical art. One pronouncement in this luminous essay is so indicative of his interests and attitude throughout his career that it deserves quotation. “The Poet,” he says, “has to select an excellent action; and what actions are the most excellent? Those, certainly, which most powerfully appeal to the great primary human affections: to those elementary feelings which subsist permanently in the race, and which are independent of time.” Matthew Arnold always valued most, and tried hardest to make useful to himself and others, those ideas and affections that are elementary and universal, fit “for the most ordinary wear and tear of life.” For, the truth is, he cared nothing for knowledge for knowledge’s sake, nor for art for art’s sake. His supreme desire (and he believed it should be the supreme desire of every man) was to understand himself and the world, not for the mere satisfaction of establishing a theory, but in order to know how to live. And having come to some understanding of himself and the world, and having learned how to live, it was not in an Arnold to refrain from instructing his generation in these high matters.

Yet a dozen years were to elapse before the *direct* instruction of his countrymen became his chief business. Gradually his occupation with poetry and pure literature became less and less, and he yielded more and more to the temptation to deal directly with social, political and religious problems. The professorship required only an occasional visit to Oxford, but afforded him a position of honor and authority, from which to address the public. During his ten year’s tenure of the Oxford chair he continued his work of school inspecting, made two sojourns on the continent, as already noticed, and published his *England and the Italian Question*, *Popular Education in France*, and *A French Eton*. The immediate fruits of the professorship were some addresses that have not been issued in book form, as well as his familiar *Lectures on Translating*



*Homer, Essays in Criticism, and Study of Celtic Literature.*

A review of these productions here is not possible nor necessary. They exhibit, however, one significant characteristic which it is important for our present purpose to notice, and that is Matthew Arnold's invariable interest in an understanding of the problem of life.

For instance, his *Lectures on Translating Homer*, although concerned very largely with matters of form and emphatic in their commendation of "the grand style," yet insist that the most essential part of poetic greatness consists in the noble and profound application of ideas to life, the ideas "On God, on Nature and on human life" which poets have acquired for themselves. This is the substance of his later definition that "poetry is at bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life—to the question: How to live." And when he went on to explain that by ideas he meant moral ideas, the disciples of art for art's sake were loud in their denunciation of any such injurious limitation. Arnold could not admit that the limitation was injurious, "because moral ideas are really so main a part of human life. The question, *how to live*, is itself a moral idea; and it is the question which most interests every man, and with which, in some way or other, he is perpetually occupied." Taking "criticism" in the sense which Matthew Arnold means it to have, not as something consciously didactic or obtrusively ethical, but as something that, with clear discernment and firm grasp, interprets the realities of life and the whole of human nature—taking the word in this sense, the poetry that is such a criticism of life the world will not willingly let die, if it is really poetry. For it contributes to the intellectual strength and moral vigor of humanity; its matter furnishes the sustenance which the self-preservative instinct of a healthy society seeks, to support human nature at its best. At another place and in another form Arnold claims for all the greatest poetry the same "grand virtue" under the name of "high and excellent seriousness." Therefore, he says, "the

best poetry will be found to have a power of forming, sustaining, and delighting us, as nothing else can"; "truly excellent poetry can do us most good."

Again, in "Spinoza and the Bible" he contends that a philosopher, to be great, must do more than "throw into circulation a certain number of new and striking ideas and expressions"; "he must have something in him which can influence character, which is edifying." Consider, also, his final judgment of Heinrich Heine: "Heine had all the culture of Germany; in his head fermented all the ideas of modern Europe. And what have we got from Heine? A half-result, for want of moral balance, and of nobleness of soul and character." Joubert he holds up, "not as a very astonishing and powerful genius, but rather as a delightful and edifying genius," "whose peculiar beauty is not in what is exclusively intellectual, but in the union of *soul* with intellect, and in the satisfying result which this union produces." In another place he writes: "A merely sensuous man cannot either by promise or by performance be a very great poet, because poetry interprets life, and so large and noble a part of life is outside of such a man's ken."

Mr. Arnold insisted with nearly equal energy upon the intellectual element in poetry. "I do not . . . much care for poetry," he says, "unless it can give me true thought as well. It is the alliance of these two that makes great poetry, the only poetry really worth very much." "Poetry is thought and art in one"; "I do not much believe in good being done by a man unless he can give *light*." Accordingly, much of the poetry he wrote intellectualizes *too much*; and some, *e. g.*, his later sonnets, moralizes *too much*. Inevitably the time came when neither poetry nor literary criticism was an adequate medium for the accomplishment of his mission as teacher and preacher. The view of many, that Matthew Arnold now neglected that which he was best fitted to perform, is not inconsistent with the judgment that at last he undertook what he had long most wanted to perform. Only this can be the meaning of his declaration that the *Lectures on Translating Homer* and *Essays*



in *Criticism* were not quite the work he liked, and of the fact that he spent the best ten years of his life in writing *Culture and Anarchy*, *Literature and Dogma*, etc. In the cool critic one passion was constitutional, the passion for intelligent goodness. With an overmastering desire to make this prevail he now labored with voice and pen to impart to his countrymen an understanding of themselves and the world, to assign the causes of the intellectual and social confusion of the time, and to convince them of the efficacy of his two remedies, culture and religion.

Now, to Matthew Arnold culture means so much that he has given a dozen different descriptions of it. To imagine that he identified it with a smattering of Latin and Greek, or with a polished veneer of polite manners, or with an aimless intellectual curiosity, or a sickly sentimentalism in the contemplation of objects of beauty, is to misunderstand him entirely. The dandiacal designation, Apostle of Sweetness and Light, by which he is generally known, has harmed him more than it has helped him; for in all his cultivated raillery, in all his entertaining playfulness, there is a robust common sense and a manly earnestness. He has been called an amiable trifler. He was amiable, but no mere trifler makes of culture a serious "study of perfection," or conceives of "human perfection as a *harmonious* perfection, developing all sides of our humanity; and as a *general* perfection, developing all parts of our society." His is the Greek notion of a harmonious perfection, "a perfection in which the characters of beauty and intelligence, the two noblest things, sweetness and light, are both present. When the moral and religious fiber is once braced and developed, it is impossible to have the idea of beauty, harmony and complete human perfection too present and paramount." Further, aiming at a *general* perfection, culture is not something exclusive, but is the promoter of genuine equality; "it seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere"; "to divest knowledge of all that is harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional; to

humanize it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the *best* knowledge and thought." Its propelling force is the force not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good. Its desire is "to render an intelligent being yet more intelligent," and "to make reason and the will of God prevail." It sees beyond machinery, beyond material wealth, railroads, population, bodily health and vigor, political and religious organization, beyond freedom itself, to a perfection which consists in becoming something, rather than in having something, "in an inward condition of the mind and spirit, not in an outward set of circumstances."

The inwardness of this perfection results from the method by which culture is pursued—the method of reading, observing, and thinking, in order to know the best that can at present be known in the world, to come as near as we can to our best self, which is right reason, and as near as we can to the firm intelligible law of things, that is, the will of God. To know by reading, observing, and thinking the best that has been thought and said in the world, is not, for Matthew Arnold, a frivolous and pedantic sort of culture, a superficial humanism. It means, for ancient nations, knowing the people, their life and genius, what they were and did, what we get from them and what is its value; for the modern nations it means not merely knowing their *belles lettres*, but knowing also what has been thought and said by the great observers and knowers of nature. The effect is an internal transformation, a detaching ourselves from our stock notions and habits, a more free play of consciousness, an increased desire for sweetness and light, a higher sense of the universal order in, and the essential movement of, the world. The something that a man has after such reading, observing and thinking, is not a mass of erudition nor the mastery of a formal logic, but a certain temper and attitude, the tact that comes in a clear mind from a wide and weighty experience, the judgment that forms itself insensibly in a fair mind along with fresh knowledge. The ordinary self has been effaced,



the higher, impersonal, permanent self has been strengthened, an objective and authoritative standard of definite excellence has been established. This is Matthew Arnold's Hellenism.

Culture, in this sense, was, Mr. Arnold believed, the only efficient means of introducing order into the intellectual and social confusion of the time, the only power that could counteract the anarchical tendencies of the English people. The situation, as he saw it, was something like this. The old bonds of society had dissolved; the strong feudal habits of subordination to a ruling aristocracy had been superseded by a fanatical disposition to do as one likes; industrial expansion had centered interest in the external machinery of civilization; intense absorption in local achievement and in particular pursuits was adding to British inflexibility; immense inequalities of class and property divided Englishmen into materialized barbarians, vulgarized Philistines, and brutalized populace; traditional notions respecting life, its conduct, and its sanctions were breaking up; nowhere was there any powerful authority to govern practice.

To cure the diseased spirit of the time, Mr. Arnold, as the advocate of what he calls culture, felt it his duty "to spread the belief in right reason and in a firm intelligible law of things, and to get men to try, in preference to staunchly acting with imperfect knowledge, to obtain some sounder basis of knowledge on which to act." For the inward transformation he so earnestly recommended, it is not enough that the individual should, alone and unaided by society, pursue right reason and the effort to extricate and develop his best self. The action of the state, the nation in its collective character, must be an expression of right reason. Right reason will have more power to act on individual inclination if given public recognition and authority by embodying it, as far as possible, in the state. Translated into present-day phraseology, this means that modern democracy, in which the many have something to do with government, demands widely diffused intelligence and public spirit, in order that there may be clear thinking and disinterested doing; and also that the conduct of great men

and the practical operation of great institutions derive their power and authority and sanction from setting an example of right reason and justice. Progress towards perfection, personal and social, is most rapid when enlightened mind and free conscience, individual and collective, endeavor to make the will of God prevail.

But, besides Hellenism, the spiritual discipline which lays main stress on clear intelligence, on comprehensively knowing the grounds of one's duty, Matthew Arnold recognizes another discipline, which lays main stress upon conduct and obedience, upon becoming conscious of sin and ceasing from it, upon vigorous acting rather than clear thinking. This second is Hebraism. The two have appeared in history as in some sense rivals. The world has been attracted at one time more by the one, at another time more by the other. There ought to be, though there never is, an even and happy balance between them.

The final aim of both is the same, man's perfection or salvation, yet they pursue very different courses. "The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; with Hebraism it is conduct and obedience. The Greek quarrel with the body and its desires is that they hinder right thinking; the Hebrew quarrel with them is, that they hinder right acting." Both arise out of the wants of human nature and seek to satisfy those wants, but they call into being such different activities that they produce different types of civilization. The Hellenic conception, when it ruled the pagan world, was unsound at that particular moment of man's development, because the indispensable basis of conduct and self-control was lacking. To Hebraism, the discipline which braces all man's moral powers and founds for him the indispensable basis of character, the priority, therefore, naturally belongs. And, consequently, it is justly said of the Jewish people that they were intrusted with the oracles of God, as it is justly said of Christianity that the wisdom of the old pagan world was foolishness compared to it.



Neither of these two forces has, by itself, sufficed for the complete evolution of humanity, but the human spirit has thus far proceeded by alternations of Hebraism and Hellenism, of man's intellectual and moral impulses. For fifteen hundred years after these two forces came together at the beginning of the Christian era, Hebraism dominated. When Hellenism re-entered the world at the time of the Renaissance, though it produced splendid fruits in art, in literature, and in physics, it had, like the earlier Hellenism, a side of moral weakness, which in England provoked the reaction of Puritanism. This form of Hebraism, at first a wholesome and necessary check to the moral relaxation of the early Renaissance, grew into a mechanical and stereotyped attention to only a part of human life—the most important part, no doubt, even three fourths of it, but not all of it. This reaction, outlasting the need for it, separated England from the main stream of the world's progress, from the intellectual movement of modern Europe. The great success that followed walking steadfastly by imperfect light was threatening to blind Englishmen to the new light which was appearing in an age of expansion and of ideas. The most essential task, therefore, was not to talk about the strength and virtues which the discipline of Hebraism had cultivated disproportionately, but, for the sake of balance and completeness, for the sake, even, of the end which that discipline had in view, to emphasize the other discipline, Hellenism; and, by the transforming power of the free intelligence and spontaneity of consciousness which are its characteristics, to rejuvenate the prevailing type of religion and make religion a pervasive influence in national life.

Matthew Arnold's religious writings are, therefore, an attempt to make the Bible and the religion of the Bible an authority for thinking men. He believed that this could be done by putting a right construction upon the Bible and by giving religion a real experimental basis. His labor in criticizing a mechanical and materializing theology, his rejection of transcendental metaphysics, his refusal to be bound by the sci-

entific statements of unscientific ages, were all an effort to separate the essential from the unessential, the verified from the unverifiable, the spirit from the letter, the inward from the external, the plain from the sophisticated. He had no desire merely to tear down; he was anxious to establish religion on grounds which the current scepticism could not undermine. He never claimed for his conclusions the support of logical demonstration. Rather it is culture, in his sense of the word, that supplies the foundation for his convictions, *i. e.*, the fine sense for truth that comes, in a fair mind, from observing one's inward experience and from knowing the history of the human spirit; the justness of perception which considers the way in which men have thought and spoken, and which can trace God in history.

After discarding all metaphysical definitions of God, the doctrine of literal inspiration, the argument from miracles, and after denying any scientific value to the testimony of mysticism, what did Arnold accept as indubitably attested by the actual experience of mankind? A very short answer to this question must suffice. Experience has demonstrated the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness, the reality of the distinction between right and wrong. Likewise anyone who attends to his inner states becomes aware of two selves, one higher and real, the other inferior and apparent. Individual consciousness and human history verify the fact that the higher self is helped by a power, not itself, and that coöperation with this power is the only way to righteousness, life, happiness, salvation. All that we know, or need to know, of this power, is known by its effects, its operation, upon us and the world. Of its constitution and attributes we know nothing, but we do know that it is the Eternal Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness. So far we know God, that he is "the Eternal that loveth righteousness"; and the farther we go in righteousness, the more we shall know him. The Jewish people perceived this Power with extraordinary force and vividness. Their feeling that they did not make it, that it was discovered



to them, that it existed whether they so willed or not, was the *revelation* to them. In the presence of this power their prophets were filled with awe, and reverence, and love, and they spoke, properly, of God in the language of the feelings. They used concrete and anthropomorphic terms, approximate terms thrown out at an object too vast for comprehension and definition, language literary and figurative, not adequate and scientific. The immense misunderstanding of theology has been to take the former for the latter. But, read as literature, the Bible communicates irresistibly a sense of the reality of the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness, it reveals the all-importance of righteousness and the method by which alone righteousness is possible; and, thus read, it is enjoyed and becomes the great inspirer of conduct.

When religion became, for Israel, too much an affair merely of national and social conduct, and had developed into a mechanical, exterior performance, Jesus revealed the only true and perfect way to righteousness. With incomparable power and attractiveness he exemplified in his own practice the truth that religion consists in the inward feeling and disposition of the individual himself; that the counteracting of the ordinary self and the saving of the best self require self-renouncement and mildness; that righteousness has its essence in inwardness, mildness and self-renouncement. "God is the author of righteousness, and Jesus is the Son of God because he gives the method and secret by which alone righteousness is possible. And that he *does* give this we can verify from experience. It is so! try, and you will find it to be so! Try all the ways to righteousness you can think of, and you will find that no way brings you to it except the way of Jesus, but that this way does bring you to it." And righteousness is happiness, life, the fulfilling of the greatest law of man's being. But a far stronger motive than this fact is "personal devotion to Jesus Christ; believing that he was indeed the Christ come from God; following him, loving him. And in the happiness which thus believing in Jesus Christ, following him and loving him gives, his doctrine finds the mightiest of sanctions."

So far Matthew Arnold has been thinking of God as related to conduct, to three fourths, or four fifths, or even five sixths of life. He goes one step farther and conceives of God as "the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by which *all things* fulfill the law of their being"; by which, therefore, we fulfill the law of our being so far as our being is æsthetic and intellectual, as well as so far as it is moral. He, therefore, believes that, as man progresses, the time will come when he will think of serving or dis-serving God in the regions of science and art; that these will then be treated with the same kind of seriousness as conduct, and thus man's two great natural forces, Hebraism and Hellenism, will no longer be dissociated and rival, but will be a joint force of right thinking and strong doing to carry him on to perfection; and that then will be seen a civilization in which all the powers that make the worth and dignity of human life will exist in their highest state—the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners.

Thus Matthew Arnold reduced to order the confused ideas of his age, and came to his understanding of God, of man and of the world. The metaphysician and theologian may label him and demonstrate the defects of his interpretation of the great realities. Still there will be wonder and gratitude that, in a time when many fine spirits took refuge in silence and when others loudly renounced religion, he proclaimed its supreme importance and honestly tried to aid its necessary development. If he lacked the sense of the supernatural which is the gift of the religious genius, the emotions of his heart were yet an "answer of the human soul to the appealing nature and life of Jesus Christ," so that his life exhibited distinctively Christian virtues and his teaching halted many in their progress towards disbelief. That his personal religion was real and vital will not be denied at the present day, when religion is ethical rather than dogmatic. His kindness to all, his spiritual strength in the presence of sore and repeated bereavement, his devotion to duty and to the service of others, were all



consciously founded upon loving appropriation of the "secret and method" of Jesus, and nourished by communion with the wise and good of all ages. The sources from which he fed the springs of emotion and conduct are shown plainly in the *Note-Books*, in which he copied from the world's literature the things he would live by. No humor here, and little poetry, but a great many passages of Scripture, many utterances of saints and stern moralists. These selections, in various languages, show how earnestly he meditated in secret on all those things that are lovely, and how sincerely he preached to himself the way of self-denial, though out in the world the word never crossed his lips. Even those who are most offended by the manner and the results of his criticism of traditional orthodoxy, will at least acknowledge, after reading these *Note-Books* and examining his life, that what he said of Bishop Butler is true of himself: "The power of religion which actuated him was, as is the case with so many of us, better, profounder and happier, than the scheme of religion which he could draw out in his books."

Except for the second series of *Essays in Criticism*, a few poems, and *Discourses in America*, Mr. Arnold's writings on social and religious questions were the last products of his industry. These made him a great force amongst readers of English. Few English authors have been more talked about and more written about. Judging from the frequency with which his name and his phrases appear in all sorts of places, his books are still widely read and he is still an intellectual force to be reckoned with, while all those who are passing through, or who observe with sympathy, such a spiritual experience as his, will, for a long time to come, find aid and comfort in both his prose and his poetry. For much of his teaching has permanent value and all is uttered with charm of style. His clear call to the manly performance of duty, his sense of the inwardness of true culture and true religion, his emphasis upon "humanity" and character, his enthusiasm for intelligence and goodness, his instinctive love of the pure and beau-

tiful, are a powerful inspiration for the forming of ideals which can be drawn into the service of life. This—to help men to live, by showing them how to be sensible, simple, and to see the plain truth about things—was doubtless Mr. Arnold's greatest desire, and in this the verdict of many is, that he is not "a Balliol man who has failed." Those who own no personal debt to him of this kind will acknowledge that as the best school inspector England ever had, as a literary critic of the first rank, as a poet second to others but unlike any other, as the champion of civilization, as the "friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit," Matthew Arnold earned the peace which was his in the assurance that he was helping to make the will of God prevail.

LANCASTER, PA.



## VI.

### THE PROBLEM OF THE WILL.

RAY HARBAUGH DOTTERER.

The long-standing dispute about the "freedom of the will" may be regarded as a duel between psychology and ethics. Natural science is based upon faith in the universality of causation. Like faith in general, this faith of the scientist is not the result of demonstration. Even investigators of meteorological and seismological phenomena, although obliged to admit that almost nothing final has been accomplished in these "sciences," nevertheless devoutly believe that storms and earthquakes are as law-abiding as the members of the solar system. The psychologist, professing to be a natural scientist, carries this scientific faith into the realm of mind, and is inclined to assert that even the "free will" of man is included in the kingdom of natural causation.

To the ethicist, on the other hand, it is not so important to achieve a unified view of the world, as it is to make place in his world-view for the fact of moral judgment. The ethicist, therefore, is as much disposed to insist upon human freedom<sup>1</sup> as the psychologist to insist upon the universality of causation.

The conception of responsibility implies that of freedom. The standing excuse for wrong-doing is, "I couldn't help it." The inference is that some things I can help, others I can not help, and it is only for the former that I can be justly blamed. If a man be necessarily impelled to perform a certain act, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to explain in what sense he can be responsible for it. If, as determinism teaches, each act is

<sup>1</sup> The term "freedom" is sometimes restricted to unconstrained *choice of the good*; but it seems to be more conducive to clearness to employ it as a synonym of *indeterminism*.

the necessary result of precedent causes, then it is altogether meaningless to say that the agent "could have helped it."

The determinists have attempted to define responsibility in such a way as to overcome this difficulty.

The argument of J. S. Mill, as summarized by Bain,<sup>2</sup> may be quoted as a typical expression of the determinist view.

"Is it just to punish a man for what he cannot help? Certainly it is, if punishment is the only means by which he can be enabled to help it. Punishment is inflicted as a means towards an end, but if there is no efficacy in the means to procure the end, that is to say, if our volitions are not determined by motives, then punishment is without justification. . . . To punish a child for its benefit is no more unjust than to administer medicine. In the defense of just rights punishment must also be just. The feeling of accountability is then nothing more than the knowledge that punishment will be just."

It is to be observed that Mill and Bain assume the distinction between just and unjust punishments. If a magistrate punishes a man unjustly, we are agreed in blaming him for his injustice. Now it is precisely this quality of *blame-worthiness*, apart from any question of punishment, which constitutes, in the opinion of most of us, the essence of responsibility, and implies freedom. In order that I may be justly blamed for an act, two conditions must be fulfilled: It must be *my* act; and it must be *wrong*. Whether we assume that the act is completely determined, or that an ideally complete analysis of my motives in performing it would reveal an unknown *x*, which has no place in the order of causation, the first condition is fulfilled,—it is *my* act. But on determinist principles no satisfactory meaning can be given to the statement that the act is *wrong*.

For when we condemn an act as wrong, we imply that the agent might have acted otherwise. Respecting the result of the act we assert, in effect, "It is, but ought not to be." But if everything that is be assumed to be the necessary conse-

<sup>2</sup> Bain, *Mental Science*, page 427.



quence of antecedents, which, in turn, were themselves determined, then the proposition, "It is," becomes identical with the proposition, "It ought to be," and the distinction between right and wrong becomes empty and meaningless.

Determinism must treat the problem of sin in one of two ways, either it must regard the sharp distinction between right and wrong as an illusion of the moral sense, and call moral evil a stage in the development of the good; or it must postulate an eternal dualism. The latter hypothesis is beset with the difficulty of explaining upon what ground we draw a line between the two orders of phenomena, approving the one and condemning the other, when both are necessary elements of being; and, furthermore, the dualistic hypothesis is repugnant to the monistic presupposition which underlies the whole determinist fabric. Determinism is therefore shut up to the view that sin is a "blessing in disguise," that it is, in fact, not sin, but good in the making. In this, however, determinism runs foul of our moral intuitions, according to which good and evil, righteousness and sin, are different not only in degree but also in kind.

Ethics, then, needs indeterminism. If we would frame a workable hypothesis of life we must assume that the power of choice which we seem to possess is not an imaginary but a real possession. Let us not hide from ourselves what this means. It means not only that my future or your future is not yet known, but that it is not yet determined. Be it said, in all reverence, it means that God himself knows not what it will be.

There lie before each one two possible futures, possible not merely in seeming but in reality. Our moral judgments imply that acts, themselves undetermined, or determined by a self, which in determining them is undetermined, enter into the complex of causation, and help to determine the course of the phenomenal world.

Will the psychologist permit the ethicist to employ such a theory of the will? The determinist argument from psychology may be stated as follows: We are able to modify our sur-

roundings only through the medium of our physical organism. Accordingly all our acts are essentially bodily movements. Now, no one will say that all our movements are voluntary. In some, as for example, the beating of the heart and the peristalsis of the intestine, the "will" is clearly not involved. Between these movements of which we are ordinarily blissfully unconscious and those which are called "voluntary," there is an intermediate class, which may be called *conscious reflex* movements. We are aware of them, but scarcely conscious of ourselves as performing them. At any rate, no *fiat* of the "will" is required; consciousness is a spectator rather than an actor.

It is clear that there is no trace of "freedom" in unconscious or reflex acts. If it exists at all we can find it only in "voluntary" acts.

But between reflex and voluntary acts it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line. We can not tell where one class leaves off and the other begins. If, then, in the reflex act, consciousness is merely a spectator, the principle of continuity furnishes a presumption that it is not really an actor in the so-called voluntary act. No one can locate a boundary line between the passive and the active consciousness. We may, therefore, conclude that no such boundary exists.

This conclusion from continuity seems to be confirmed by an analysis of the voluntary act itself. I am prone to imagine that I first have an idea of the movement to be made, and that then, by a *fiat* of my will, I produce the movement previously thought of. I wish my hand to be in my pocket, and then I put it there. This is an erroneous view. A closer scrutiny reveals the fact that "consciousness is in its very nature impulsive."<sup>3</sup> Every feeling or idea tends to find expression in movement and does find expression unless hindered by the opposing tendency of some other feeling or idea. If, then, an idea has undisputed possession of the mind, the corresponding movement takes place without any intervention of the "will." Most

<sup>3</sup> James, *Psychology*, page 526.



of our so-called voluntary actions do in fact take place in this "ideomotor" fashion.<sup>4</sup>

There are cases, to be sure, in which I "deliberate" and finally "make up my mind." But indecision during deliberation, the determinist assures us, is only the equilibrium of contending forces. Different ideas are struggling for the mastery. The fear of unpleasant effects in the event of a wrong decision may delay the triumph of the strongest; but in the end the idea which for me possesses the most impulsive force is sure to prevail.

To this the indeterminist interposes the objection that the argument depends upon physical analogies, like the "parallelograms of forces," and the weighing of material things—analogies which are not applicable to a purely mental process. The determination of the will by motives differs *toto cælo* from the compounding of mechanical forces; and we have no right to think of a weighing of motives, since their *weight* does not remain constant during the process. Whether an idea have much or little impulsive force depends upon the degree of attention bestowed upon it. To say that the strongest motive prevails means nothing; since the only evidence that the motive was the strongest is the fact that it did prevail. Let it be conceded that when once the idea has filled the mind the corresponding movement takes place automatically. The problem is then to learn how the idea comes to fill the mind, how the motive comes to be the strongest. Now the course of ideas is determined by the attention; that is to say, is subject to the control of the will. Consider the distinction between the dream thought and the waking thought. In dream and revery the will is passive; in ordinary thinking it controls the course of ideas. Some of the outworks erected by overzealous champions of freedom may have to be surrendered, but the indeterminist citadel remains secure. The will, as *attention*, determines what idea shall fill the mind, and thus permits the favored motive to *become the strongest*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, page 522.

The determinist replies that it is entirely erroneous to suppose that we can think "what we please."<sup>5</sup> The flow of ideas is controlled by the laws of association. My present thought was determined by the thoughts that preceded it; and unless the stream of ideas receives a tributary from the world of sense-impressions, my present thought will determine my future thought. As for the "faculty of attention" to which the indeterminist appeals as the inexpugnable citadel of "free will," the determinist holds that there is no evidence of anything undetermined in so-called voluntary attention. Attention is *reflex* when it is a function of external objects; it is *voluntary* when it is controlled by some dominant idea of purpose. What we called effort is only the feeling of constriction in various muscles, which always accompanies voluntary action.

The determinist, therefore, concludes in the name of psychology that effort is an illusion, attention a resultant rather than a force, and "free will" a myth.

It is to be observed, however, that the whole argument is really a "begging of the question." The determinist shows that certain phenomena are invariably followed or accompanied by some other phenomena. From this he makes the valid inference that the former are related to the latter as cause to effect; but also the invalid inference that the latter are *completely* accounted for by the former; and insists, furthermore, that even where the causal nexus cannot be traced, it must be assumed to exist. Psychology is immensely *simplified* by this view of the matter; but what if this simplification has been effected by ignoring some of the data of experience? If we begin differently, by assuming that some events may be uncaused, or, at least, that they could not be *completely* accounted for, even if our knowledge of causes were perfect, the case takes a different aspect, and freedom is *possible*.

It is objected that such "absolute beginnings" are inconceivable. And let this be freely granted, if by "to conceive" is meant to account for, to assign a place in the web of cause and effect. But let it also be conceded that a completely deter-

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dubois, *Self Control and How to Secure It*, pp. 32 ff.



mined act is, in the same sense, also inconceivable. It is true that we cannot assign a cause to that which by the hypothesis is uncaused; neither can we go back in the imagination to an ultimate cause (as we must do to "conceive" the completely determined act), when by the hypothesis such an ultimate or uncaused cause cannot exist.

A completely determined event and an undetermined event are thus alike inconceivable. Nevertheless, we know what we mean by them. Causation and freedom are ultimate data of experience. To employ an old distinction, though we cannot comprehend them, we can apprehend them. They are ultimate, as color-sensation and sound-sensation are ultimate. A man blind from his birth knows nothing of color, however good his hearing may be; for color cannot be thought of in terms of sound. In like manner, freedom cannot be thought of in terms of causation, or *vice versa*.

This suggests a curious argument of the indeterminists, which the determinists have never satisfactorily answered.

It has just been said that causation and freedom are ultimate data of experience.<sup>6</sup> The determinist does not, of course,

<sup>6</sup> This statement is not meant as a denial of the Kantian view that the relation of cause and effect is a "category" of the understanding. All that is meant is, that freedom is just as *original* as causation, but unless he means to assert that the entire dispute has been a barren logomachy—that the theory of determinism is only a better expression of what the indeterminists really mean, unless the determinist means to make this assertion, he must at least admit that freedom is an *imaginary* experience. But if freedom has never been experienced really, how came we to imagine it? The dilemma of the determinist is like that of the Eleatics. With a great show of logic they demonstrated to their own satisfaction, and to the confusion of ordinary minds, that Becoming was an illusion, that eternal changeless Being was all in all. But having gone thus far they came to a dead halt before the unanswerable query, "If Becoming is an illusion, whence proceeds the illusion of Becoming?" The determinist must meet the same demand. If the sense of effort is *in every case* an illusion, whence proceeds the illusion? An illusion is a wrong interpretation of the data of experience. Certain appearances of light and shade may be interpreted by the excited mind of a child as a man, when if rightly perceived they would be interpreted as a stump. One who has experienced both sound and color sensations might conceivably interpret a sound as a color, or *vice versa*; but if one has never experienced color, he can not interpret sound as color.

admit this. He attempts to explain our apparent freedom in terms of hidden causation.

To be sure, if I have experienced both causation and freedom, I may misinterpret as freedom *some* experiences which are purely causation; but if I have never experienced freedom, I cannot thus misinterpret. It is no doubt true that many a time, when we flatter ourselves that we have put forth effort, we have misinterpreted our experience; but in order that such a misinterpretation may be possible, we must *sometimes* have had a genuine experience of the putting forth of effort. An apparent consciousness of freedom in some cases is impossible unless there has been a real consciousness of freedom in some other cases.

The only answer to this argument, which is at all plausible, is the claim that freedom is a *negative* conception. Strictly speaking, as every one admits, we are constrained by nothing external to ourselves. "You can take a horse to water," says the old adage, "but you can't make him drink." The only way in which a horse or a man can be "compelled" to perform a certain act is to make the not-doing more painful than the doing. Now, the determinist holds that the so-called consciousness of freedom is the result of wrongly attributing to inner relations what is only felt to be true of outer relations. We are conscious that as far as other men are concerned, with reference also to our material environment, we are, strictly speaking, "free" in the sense of *unconstrained*; and then we assume that we are also *free from ourselves*. We are *ignorant* of the causes of our acts, and therefore, says the determinist, we fancy that our acts are free.

The determinist's reply is very plausible, but not quite satisfactory. Few men will admit that their consciousness of freedom is a merely *negative* consciousness. Most of us are conscious of self-activity, of a real putting forth of effort; and we feel that the psychologist is not justified, even for the sake of simplicity and to bring his science into line with the monistic view of the world, in ignoring a genuine datum of consciousness.



The utmost that can be claimed for the argument from psychology is that neither side can prove its case. The decision always rests upon preference rather than demonstration. If indeterminism is a fact, it is fitting that the first act of the free will should be to affirm its own freedom. On the other hand, the realm of science is coëxtensive with the domain in which the determinist assumption is valid. Psychology, as a science, must assume the universality of causation *within its own realm*; but this does not justify the denial of limits to that realm. In the words of Herman Lotze, "If ethics believes that it needs freedom of the will for establishing its views, then psychology must at least not be misused in the attempt to decide about the possibility of such an assumption, on grounds of so-called experience."<sup>7</sup>

Let it not be supposed, however, that ethics demands unlimited arbitrariness. Recalling the two marks of an act for which I may justly be blamed,<sup>8</sup> ethics requires that the act be at least partially determined in order that it be *my* act. If all actions were indeterminate, the conception of character would be meaningless, and moral education would be impossible. A thoroughgoing indeterminism is even more fatal than a thoroughgoing determinism. Ethics requires that some actions be thought of as not completely determined; but also that the great majority of human actions be thought of as the result of necessary causation. Thus it is possible to predict *approximately* the number of suicides, murders, births, marriages, etc., which will take place during the coming year. It is possible to have a *science*, or a philosophy of history. It is possible to write the biography of a man, and to account for him, in part, as a product of heredity and environment. But because events are not *completely* determined, because of the unknown indeterminate *x*, which confuses our calculations, it will never be possible to prepare our statistics, and write our history and biography *in advance*.

<sup>7</sup> *Outlines of Psychology*, page 152.

<sup>8</sup> See above, page 89.

The question at issue is really in its widest aspect a phase of the conflict between two world-views. According to one view, causation is absolute and universal; sin is a form of goodness; everything that is, is right; the sole existent is blind, unmoral force. According to the other view, causation and freedom exist side by side; sin is a dreadful reality; mechanism is the instrument of intelligence; personality is an ultimate fact. The first view is more pleasing to the intellect which demands, above all, unity; the second is more pleasing to the heart. Neither view can be proved. The acceptance of either is a decision of faith.

BALTIMORE, MD.



## VII.

### THE NEW THEOLOGY, A MESSAGE TO THE TIMES.

A. T. G. APPLE.

The view of the new theology which we propose to take regards it as an attitude of mind rather than any doctrine or set of doctrines. It is a method of dealing with the results of investigation rather than the results themselves. The new theology, as we conceive it, consists in the application of rational methods to ascertain the contents of Christian knowledge and to construct from them a consistent system of thought for the use of a living age. It is, therefore, the scientific spirit rather than any finished science.

In applying scientific methods the new theology is entirely frank, fearless, and free. Its reverence for truth is such that it believes the truth contains within itself its own self-authentication, and needs no support from tradition. Traditional beliefs are of high account as witnesses of what was thought and believed in past times. But new times have new needs, new problems, and that which may have been a useful weapon at one time may become an intolerable incumbrance at another. The new theology, therefore, proclaims the complete emancipation of human thinking from anything like enslavement by the past. The beliefs of the fathers are, indeed, precious things; they are the formulas and systems in which was once expressed a faith for which men were willing to die; and as such they brought to countless thousands encouragement, consolation, and peace. But we yield them the true reverence they deserve only when we employ them just so far as they have the power freely to express our own convictions; when we refuse to be bound by them when they prove inadequate; when we, the moment they prove inadequate to express the needs

of the age, remove them to the place reserved for honored relics of the past where they can be more truly revered than when they stand around in the avenues of activity hampering free progress. The beliefs of the fathers are even more than this. They are the soil out of which spring the beliefs of the children; and every true scientific method links itself to the past, takes from it its point of departure and steps forth into its place in the march of progress which represents an unbroken succession from the beginning to the end. But while the new theology joins itself reverently to the past it is not bound to it. While it realizes that there is but one torch of truth to be passed on from hand to hand, it is not particularly concerned as to *how* the former hands wielded it, having full confidence in its own superior knowledge to handle it in such way that it may be of highest service to the only age for which it is concerned, the present.

With its true reverence for the past, the new theology joins a deep concern for the present and its needs. It sees going on one of the most far-reaching reorganizations of methods of thought and investigation the world has ever witnessed. It finds the astronomer with new conceptions of the earth's relations in space, going on to deeper inquiries as to the relations of the solar system to the universe of suns, with questionings as to the origin, development and destiny of these suns; and it realizes that there is need to go over anew the older forms of belief as to the doctrines of origins and of last things. It finds the physicist and the chemist pushing further and further the investigation of the nature of matter, and the biologist bringing forth unsuspected facts as to the behavior of living things and the working of the laws of life; it has its attention pointed to the significant fact that wherever we look in the domain of life, we see the law of evolution of the complex from the simple, the highly differentiated organism succeeding the primitive and formless; and it sees that it would be recreant to its trust not to go over again the age-old questions which even the child begins to ask—"Whence am I and whither do I go?" And



the answers of the fathers are found to fail adequately to answer the questions in the light of our new knowledge; while the methods of the fathers are found in many places to be strangely out of touch with these new methods that have brought us so much light in the fields of nature study.

Again, the new theology has an amount of material given to it by the investigator in the fields of history and archæology that well might of itself alone be embarrassing in its very richness. The historical viewpoint has changed; the character of the past has been reconstructed. Ancient cities once unsuspected have been rehabilitated with almost the vividness of Pompeii. Old civilizations entirely unknown at one time have been unearthed to supply missing links in the story of the race. And, now, just as the older theology shaped itself at different points to answer to the historic knowledge of that time, so now the necessity is upon it for the new theology to reckon with the new light that is falling upon these fields.

But if such challenge comes to theology from the fields of physical science much more clearly and insistently does it sound from the fields of metaphysical research. Here a degree of activity no less intense is to be seen on all hands. The nature of mind, its relation to the bodily life, its waking concepts and its slumbering dreams, the question of personality, single, double, or multiple, the varied conditions of the soul, normal, abnormal, supernormal—the investigation of these is bringing to light a body of truth which theology must take note of as vitally effecting her viewpoint, or she must retire from the field as a factor helpful to the race.

In the presence of all this marvellous advance of modern thought and investigation along all lines of human knowledge, the new theology is not only free from the entangling trammels of outgrown tradition, but it is perfectly frank and fearless in facing all truth from whatever source it may come. It knows that truth cannot contradict itself, and so if any dogma fails to square with the new light, "So much the worse for the dogma," is its only reply. The truth cannot receive hurt from

complete evidence; it is only strengthened, even though the evidence come from sources heterodox and hostile.

In following this brief sketch of what we believe the new theology to be in its relation with current human life, we have not had in view particularly our own present or the theology of the twentieth century. True theology is ever new. Each age has had its own new theology. Each age has had its men who were so loyal to the living truth that they would allow no influence of traditional dogma or intrenched authority to stand in the way of that which they sought. And these men were also overborne by a passion for human-kind so deep that they would have no theology that was not equipped in best manner possible to minister to the needs of souls, to make life more livable, to help to higher, broader ideals, and to strengthen against the trials and sorrows of life. In finding this they have utilized everything discoverable by human investigation, whatever its source and whatever the character of the investigator. In their loyalty to truth and their passion for humanity, they have placed their lives in pawn and many have sealed their testimony at the martyr's stake.

The Reformation age had its new theology, and the world still thrills with the vibrations of its new life. The age of Augustine had its new theology, which had not grown so entirely old but that Luther and the rest of the reformers felt its compelling power. In fact, I believe we can truly say that Paul was the first new theologian, preaching a new theology for which not only the old theologians of the Jewish Christian church anathematized him and his unbelieving compatriots would have stoned him to death, but which even his fellow-apostles did not at first comprehend in all the fullness of its world-wide scope.

The new theology of the Reformation has in turn given birth to the new theology of the twentieth century. There are many questions the former either did not settle at all or answered only partially and equivocally. The Reformers were not all entirely in sympathy with the Renaissance. Shocked by its



occasional abuses, alienated at times by its lack of moral earnestness, or out of sympathy with its workers, they were often inclined, if not openly to condemn, at least to belittle its importance. Luther, for instance, rejected the Copernican theory, and the investigations of Galileo and his associates were considered beneath his notice; while a growing estrangement with Erasmus prevented what we believe might have been a broadening and softening influence in the general movement. The all-important doctrine of justification by faith, at times, when wrongly stated, led to an undervaluation of reason and an extravagant exaltation of a caricatured faith which seemed to consist chiefly in a blind acceptance of the irrational.

The new theology of the twentieth century we believe represents in the first place the attempt of earnest minds to take up and complete what the sixteenth century was unwilling, or afraid, or too indifferent to attempt; and in the next place it is a sincere endeavor to establish an outlook upon the Christian verities that is in advance of what would have been possible in the Reformation time.

In coming to an understanding of the new theology in its relations to the questions of the day, there are four great facts which the Christian world will ever have to deal with; and the clearness with which she reasons her way to them and the firmness with which by faith she grasps them, will ever act and react the one upon the other to produce a new theology for each age as the world moves on. These facts are the Scriptures, the Church, and human Society, the three centering in the fourth, Jesus Christ the revelation of the Father and the mediation of His love.

The chief characteristic of the new theology in its relation to these four facts is its disposition to discover and emphasize the human element. This we believe is due in part to a present-day reaction against a one-sided and therefore false emphasis that in former days was placed upon the divine. When the Scriptures were believed to be one book mechanically bestowed upon its authors by a Holy Ghost that moved them to write

inerrantly and exhaustively everything, history, science, ethics, psychology, as well as spiritual and religious truth, then the human element in them was strangled. Then they must be treated in an entirely different manner from the way we treat other works of men. They are not amenable to the laws that govern other writings, and therefore they are not subject to any principles of criticism. But the moment we look upon them as human documents, vibrant with genuine human experience, pulsating with the full red tides of human life, full of the hope, the despair, the fear, the triumph of the ages; when we find in them the story of what men and women actually thought and dreamed, and suffered in their endeavor to be true to what they knew of God; when we find their very imperfections and incompleteness telling the simple story of its genuineness; when we see in them a body of literature stretching through centuries, developing from conditions bordering savagery out into the loftiest and purest conceptions the world has ever dreamed, then we see a new meaning in their humanity, while their divine nature is just so much the more exalted as the union with the human is transferred from the merely mechanical to the truly inward and vital. Then the Scriptures do not scorn to court investigation on the same footing with other human productions, and there is no lime-light of science they need shun.

What is true of the Scriptures is true of the church. This is found to be also a truly human institution. It is formed to meet a specific need of the time, freely, naturally. It commences in simple spontaneous forms of worship, and its form of government is a reflection of the times. It develops and changes from age to age to meet the changing requirements of succeeding generations of men. It is as far as possible from what it was once thought to be, a perfected organization divinely ordained and sprung full-fledged from some Jovian brain, with an apostolic succession of office bearers to preserve it intact, unchanged and unchangeable, to the end of time. And as the viewpoint changes the divine presence in the church is



seen in clearer light from the very fact that the human element receives its due recognition. The fulfillment of the promise that the gates of Hades shall not prevail against her is seen, not in the preservative power of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, but in the abiding power of an inner life; and when these gates would close upon it to shut it in as they have heretofore imprisoned all the sons of men, the divine life that is also human cries in the triumphant note of the resurrection, "Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and the King of Glory bearing home His ransomed ones, shall come in to His consummated kingdom."

Still more clearly does this note of humanity ring in the new theology in its attitude toward human society with its endlessly varied problems. It is hardly possible in these days to have an adequate understanding of theology without a knowledge of sociology. Man is being studied not so much as an individual, isolated and distinct, as a member of a social organism, encompassed by mutual relations and obligations—with duties toward the body social, as well as to individual associates, resting upon him at every turn. Men seek more and more in these days to further the welfare of the individual through the promotion of the community's welfare. The genuineness of a man's orthodoxy is being tested more and more by the kind of neighbor he makes, whether he is decent in his treatment of his wife and children, and whether he is honest in his business relations. Not that these practical virtues were not emphasized of old and enforced, but a new emphasis is being placed upon them, a new relative importance is being given them, the center of gravity has been shifted. The particular form which is taken by the statements of a man's beliefs, while it is still given its due importance, is not so keenly scrutinized as formerly. In addition to this the importance of the church is being emphasized as an institution existing not only to point men to heaven, but to help them to make earth habitable while they are here. Eleemosynary institutions, sanitary measures, and the many resources by which the "ounce of prevention" can be applied in the way of restraining vice and protecting the unsuspecting

from temptations, these are coming to occupy the attention of the ministry and the consecrated membership of the Christian church to a greater degree than ever before. These, we believe, are some of the results of the new theology and its practical workings in relation to the social weal, and in its new emphasis upon the importance of humanity and human life.

But above and beyond all this, and binding together this substance of our belief and practice is the Christology of the new theology. In its view of the Person of Christ, it is the human element that has received emphasis. More than ever in the history of Christianity is the person and life of Jesus of Nazareth looked at and studied from the human standpoint. He is a man; the Perfect Man; the Man above all men; encompassed by infirmity as the result of his taking the form of a servant; hungry, weary, sorrowing, suffering, dying; entering with interest and even enthusiasm into the affairs of men and of the nation; thoroughly sympathetic with everything concerning the true welfare of his people Israel, so that he bursts out in strong crying when he finds them obdurate to his last appeal, and the bitterness at the very bottom of his cup is the fact that it is they, "his own," that are compassing his destruction.

This emphasis upon the human enters into the conceptions of His Person. And here, at the same time and in consequence, a new conception of the divine emerges. There is no chasm between the divine and the human. Still less are they incompatible. But the human is the image of the divine, and humanity is from all eternity involved in the nature of God as his own proper self-expression. God did not take humanity upon him in the Incarnation as a something alien to himself, so that a change came over him who is unchangeable and he became, two milleniums ago, what he had never been before; but God had been human from all eternity for the very reason that he has always been God and it was only the assuming the flesh and blood of the Virgin Mary on the part of Jesus that constituted the change which it is the chief function of the Gospels to describe and celebrate.



This doing away with the wrong distinction between the divine and the human, we believe, lies at the very heart of the movement we call the new theology, and in this we believe it is doing such a service for the world, that were there nothing else to be attributed to it, this alone would constitute a sufficient reason for its being. From the time when the Nicene Council placed the doctrine of the Person of the Son of God where it should have been left, throughout all the dreary years of the monophysite and monothelite controversies, there was a distinction and a contrast deepening and broadening in men's conceptions of the relation of the divine and human. And this wrong antithesis was handed down through the Reformers to modern times as a blighting heritage. Manhood and Godhead were looked upon as almost mutually exclusive entities that were held together in the Person of Jesus by some miraculous power by which they were brought to work together on special occasions, and by which they are held together on the throne of God. Instead of this the modern view is looking upon the relation of the divine and human more and more as the relation of the terrestrial and celestial spheres with their centers from everlasting to everlasting one, though the former is bounded by the finite and the latter has no bounds this side of infinity.

As the result of all this the image of a real Savior is brought to confront the soul of every man. So long as the wrong distinction between human and divine was kept up, the church had little better than a gnostic Christ to present to the world. He was in the world but not of it. He was girt with the weakness of our nature but yet he was not. The expressions in the Gospels telling of his human limitations were weakened or explained away. He was ignorant, in distinction from divine omniscience, powerless in distinction from divine omnipotence, only because for the time being, for some specific purpose he chose to be so. It would need but the removal by his own will of these self-imposed restrictions and he would stand forth there in the streets of Jerusalem or on the strand of Galilee in all the irresistible power that at the first spake the worlds into being.

But now he is to every penitent suffering believer the merciful and faithful High Priest, who can be touched with the feelings of our infirmities, and having suffered being tempted (albeit without sin), he is able to run to the help of those who are tempted.

It is impossible to do more than sketch in the briefest possible manner the Christology of the new theology. And we fear the very sketchiness of the sketch may prevent its becoming a correct portrait. But the point we wish to make is that the theology of the twentieth century is making the human Savior more real to the minds and hearts of men than he has ever been since the first glad inspiration of his presence blessed the primitive Christians with its spiritual gifts.

And in all this the divine nature in Christ, in the church, in the Bible, in society, is receiving a recognition such as it has never had. For an insufficient view of the human nature cannot but result in a perverted conception of the divine; and, on the other hand, it is only when we truly accept the merciful Savior advancing in the infirmity of his humanity to the perfection destined of the Father, that we can truly understand the mystery of his godhead with which he is now enthroned at the right hand of the Father.

The new theology has come to stay. In fact, it has never been absent from the world, but in every age it has represented the reverent, rational, passionate endeavor of the Christian intellect to give an answer to every man that asketh a reason for the faith that is in him with meekness and with fear.

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## VIII.

### THE NEGLECTED FACTOR IN PHILOSOPHY.

S. S. HEBBERD.

In my *Philosophy of History*, it is shown (pp. 254–269) that the creation of the several sciences has mainly hinged upon the discovery of some neglected factor in the phenomena. In chemistry, *e. g.*, the long-neglected factor was the oxygen of the atmosphere, although that was the most potent and widely diffused of all chemical agencies. And so with all the other sciences.

I seek here to show that the principle of causality is just such a neglected factor in modern philosophy. Unable to solve Hume's famous problem, subsequent theorists have simply ignored causation, or have only used the word robbed of all its real meaning. For Kant, causality was merely subjective, a figment of human fancy. For Hegel it was a self-contradiction. For them both, and for all the rest, it meant nothing but sequence. Through this neglect and depreciation of what is really the very essence of all thinking, philosophy has become—instead of a science—a mere chaos, a wild tangle of idle disputes.

From this unhappy situation, there is, I think, but one possible way of escape. That way is presented at length in my *Philosophy of the Future*, and here briefly outlined. It starts with a proof that *the one essential function of all thinking is to discriminate between cause and effect*. If that can be proved, then evidently Hume's problem has at last been solved. For his denial of causality is seen to logically involve the utter extinction of thought. Thinking is certainly absurd, if its sole function is to affirm what is false.

1. This then I have to prove. Let us begin with thinking in

its ordinary and simplest form—judgments concerning substance and its attributes. Substance, I maintain, is the *partial* cause of its attributes, and no one will dissent from this when he grasps the significance of the italicized word—the *partial* cause. It is a scientific commonplace that no finite thing can be the complete cause of any effect. Any effect, however trivial, is the product of many coöperating agencies. How vast the complex of factors by which even a speck of color is produced! But in this complex, the thing to which we attribute the color has a peculiar and privileged position. The other factors—the æther, the nerves, etc.—give only color in general. But the thing determines the specific color, red, green or other hue.

Furthermore, the thing is *the* cause in another sense, inasmuch as it is the center on which the many causal processes converge, whereby the many attributes of the thing are produced.

Again, it has been urged by Hegel and many others that if you take away from the substance all its attributes, nothing remains: therefore the thing is nothing but the group of attributes. But they forget the counter-truth that if you take away the thing its attributes become impossible. Thus this objection is really a new proof of my thesis. For if all thinking is a relating of cause and effect, then plainly a cause without any effects and effects without any cause are both equally unthinkable, equally unknowable.

2. Beyond this first form of thinking—that of perceptual judgments—there is a second form, that of universal or conceptual judgments. The essential difference between the two forms is this: in perceptual judgments we predicate one or more attributes of a particular thing or substance; in universal judgments we predicate one or more attributes of an indefinite multiplicity of things. Primarily then the universal judgment is a multiplied form of the perceptual judgment. The essence of them both is the affirmation of substance and attribute. And, as we have already seen, the relation between substance and attribute is a causal relation.



Again, there has been an age-long dispute between Nominalists and Conceptualists, the former insisting that primarily a concept means an imaginary collection of like things, the latter that it is a bundle of abstract attributes. Their dispute is unending because—I think—neither is right; both are one-sided, superficial views. The concept has a deeper, wider meaning which harmonizes these conflicting inadequate ones. Every true concept is the expression, in the last resort, of some one among the many immutable processes of causation whence the phenomena of the universe result. In Chapter VII of my *Philosophy of the Future* (pp. 93–112) I have tried to present the full proof of this new view of the concept that may be drawn from the history of logic, of language and the physical sciences; and to that the reader must be referred. But even the bare suggestion of such a view, I think, will go far towards convincing clear-eyed, unbiased thinkers.

Thinking, then, in both its forms—perceptual and conceptual—is always a relating of cause and effect. Therefore the denial of causality means the extinction of thought—utter nihilism. That is the answer to Hume. I seek now to further corroborate this view by showing that the perplexities and self-contradictions enveloping philosophy's three great themes—the World, God and the Soul—seem to vanish *when we consider these themes in terms of cause and effect.*

### *The World.*

Idealism, whether subjective or objective, is rooted in the denial of the reality of space. For, by such a denial the mind is so bewildered and confused that any paradox becomes plausible. If there is no space, it is indeed impossible to distinguish between ideas and things. All distinctness, all clarity of thought fades away into one vast blur. Hence I am justified in confining myself here to the question of space.

I contend then that the key to the problem of space consists in *clearly distinguishing between space and the spatial relations of things and in recognizing that the latter are related to*

*the former as effects to their partial cause.* Mark that I say their partial cause. The spatial relations of things—distance, direction, shape, etc.—are effects resulting from the synthesis of space and things. Neither space alone, nor things alone can give rise to a spatial relation.

1. Note now how the many difficulties imagined by idealism disappear before this view of space in terms of cause and effect. Take first Kant's objections. Study them and you will find that they all—both in the analytic and the antinomies—rest upon the assumption that space is divisible into an infinite number of parts. But the truth is that space is absolutely indivisible. The proof thereof is as simple as it is perfect. When we say that objects are separated we mean that there is space between them. If there is no space between them they are not separated. It is impossible then to even think of space as separated into parts. For, if they are separate, *there must be space between them*, and, therefore, no separation. Thus the Kantian antinomies fall to the ground.

2. Lotze would substitute for the Kantian antinomies what he deems a sounder argument against the reality of space. But really it is only Kant's fallacy in a more exaggerated form. For not only does he assume the divisibility of space into parts, but adds that there is no force or power in space whereby *these separate parts could be held together and their unalterable positions determined* (*Metaphysics*, I, pp. 249 seq.; my italics). Comment seems needless.

3. Lotze also urges the more common objection that space is inactive, does nothing, therefore is nothing. But that too vanishes before my view of space in terms of cause and effect. It is through this absolute immobility that space becomes the chief factor in those causal processes whence result the spatial relations of all things. Cancel indivisible space and the whole sensible universe collapses into nothing.

4. Berkeley devised a still more preposterous objection. "It is a pernicious and absurd notion," he says, "that there is something besides God which is eternal, uncreated, indivisible and immutable." But is space, conceived as a universal factor



in all physical processes, thereby made equal with the God who established and maintains those processes?

5. A favorite objection with more recent idealism rests upon an alleged discrepancy between perceptual and conceptual space. But study this objection as given, *e. g.*, in Taylor's *Metaphysics*, and you will see that it is nothing but my distinction between space and the spatial relations of things. And these two, instead of being discrepant or contradictory, we have found to be related as cause and effect.

6. So far back as 1770 Kant gave, as one of his main reasons for rejecting the reality of space, the fact that space and spatial properties, although so closely united, are yet very different. But that fact is but another proof that old perplexities vanish when we interpret space and spatial properties in terms of cause and effect. For it is the very essence of a causal relation that it at once differentiates and unites.

### *God.*

The method already pursued will also give us, I think, an impregnable proof of God's existence. We have seen that the cancelling of causality is impossible inasmuch as it logically involves the extinction of thought. It remains then to discover what attributes necessarily attach to the conception of a sufficient cause; and then how far these attributes coincide with the theistic view of God.

*Infinitude* is one necessary feature of a complete self-sufficient cause. For whatever is finite is limited by something else and to that extent is an effect; it may be a partial cause in natural processes, but can never be a complete cause. But note further that self-limitation for the sake of others is no impairment of infinitude; on the contrary it is the very crown of divine excellence.

*Freedom* is another indispensable element in a perfect cause. All would see this at a glance, if it were not for a great and fatal error engrafted into our modern ways of thinking. We take our ideal of causality from its lowest, most imperfect forms—those mechanical sequences with which physical science

is mainly occupied. But to know anything aright we must study it in its most perfect types. How can we expect to learn the real nature of anything if we confine our study of it to its most defective and therefore obscurest types? This error avoided, it becomes plain that a complete cause must be free. Not that which is necessitated to act, but that which freely necessitates it, is the real cause.

*Unity* is another unfailing mark of the perfect cause. We all know how many dark perplexities modern philosophy has heaped around the problem of the One and the Many. But heretofore it has escaped attention that these perplexed philosophers, though differing so much in other respects—pantheists like Spinoza and probably Hegel, personal idealists, panpsychists, etc.—have all been infatuated by a false ideal. They assume that the universe must be interpreted in terms of self-consciousness, meaning thereby the identity of subject and object. Therein they doubly err. For, self-consciousness is *not* the identity of subject and object; nor can the world be interpreted in such terms. By such a process no problems can be solved. But substitute *causal* terms for this chimera of “subject and object.” As already noted, the supreme aim of a causal relation is to unite and yet to differentiate. Thus the One and the Many are fully reconciled as one cause and many effects. God and the World are not pantheistically identified, but distinguished and yet united as Creator and created. The truth imbedded in personal idealism is also vindicated; God by a free act of self-limitation and sacrifice creates other free beings. Even panpsychism is not wholly wrong; for the atoms, ions, etc., although *not conscious*, are yet partial causes, means whereby the Absolute Cause achieves His purpose. And just so other perplexities vanish when the relation of the One and the Many is interpreted in causal terms.

*Action for the sake of others* is another mark of a complete cause. But it is needless to repeat here what I have presented in a previous article in this REVIEW (Vol. XIII, 576 *seq.*). Suffice it that an Infinite Being lacks nothing; therefore if it acts at all, it must act for the sake of others.



Now, a Sufficient Cause having these four attributes—infinity, freedom, conscious unity and love—is the theistic God. Consider now Kant's famous criticism which is generally supposed to have annihilated all logical proof of God's existence. Its gist is that we "cannot form the slightest conception of a thing which, when annihilated in thought with all its predicates, leaves behind it a contradiction" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 449). I answer that that is true of every conception *except the conception of a Sufficient Cause*. For I have shown that since the one essential function of all thinking is to affirm causation, therefore the annihilating of the concept of a Sufficient Cause does leave behind it a tremendous—an infinite contradiction. Namely, the contradiction of all thinking and all knowledge—in fine, utter nihilism.

A thousand Kants cannot impair that proof of God's existence.

### *The Soul.*

Apply now this same method to the question of the soul's existence. Instead of trying to imagine the soul as a perceptible thing—asking absurd questions about its location, size, shape, etc.—let us interpret it as *the very nature of thought demands*, to wit, in causal terms.

1. Note first of all that thought, in its essence, is a revelation of the unseen. Hume based his denial of causation upon the ground that it was imperceptible to the senses. But I have shown that such a denial is logically impossible, since the sole function of thinking is to affirm causation. Furthermore, all modern science asserts this duality of the seen and the unseen—visible matter everywhere pervaded by super-sensuous force or energy. And in this I find the clue to the real relation of soul and body—two distinct forces or finite causes coöperating in one causal process.

2. But it will be objected that I thus hypostasize mere abstractions; that Force is nothing but an expression for the different ways in which phenomena behave. Lotze especially insists upon this; but he gives no proof; his view is but one phase

of the idealistic paradox which reduces everything to a mere grouping or sum of attributes.

3. Or it may be urged, as Spencer does, that force, even if real, is unknowable. But that has already been explained as due to the duality of thought which knows causes only through their effects; and conversely effects only through their causes. Forces apart from motions and motions apart from forces are equally unknowable.

4. We come finally to the star objection, that of the parallelist. We have distinguished between spiritual force and physical force on the ground that the former cannot produce motions nor the latter produce psychic effects, such as thought and volition. Their effects being so absolutely different and incompatible, it follows that mind and body must also be essentially different. But now the parallelist intervenes. How, he asks, if their effects are so entirely different, can the two causes interact? How can mind affect the body, or body affect the mind? That very old and very momentous problem has never been solved. But starting from our causal point of view, the solution does not seem far to seek. The fatal error of the parallelist consists in this: *he makes no distinction between the relation of a cause to its effects and the relation to each other of two partial causes coöperating in the same causal process.* All experience shows that definite results are attained only by the conjoint action of dissimilar, even opposing agencies. Without both space and things, all spatial relations—distances, directions, etc.—would be impossible. It is the same in chemistry, mechanics, everywhere. In fine, the parallelistic argument simply ignores the constant experience of all mankind.

So brief a survey of so vast a field must, of course, be very imperfect. Still it has shown, I think, the neglected factor, neglect of which has brought philosophy to its present plight, made it a mere chaos of paradox and academic wrangling. But surely this absurd condition cannot last much longer. By and by, thinkers will see the folly of ignoring and depreciating what really forms the very essence of all true thinking.

MASPETTA, N. Y.



## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE OF OUR TIMES. The Guiding Principle in the Human Development: Reverence for Personality. By Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1911. Pages xviii+ 393.

This volume contains a penetrating analysis of the forces and tendencies of western civilization. The author's purpose is to show how the conditions of our age are a direct challenge to moral and religious living. Civilization itself can be maintained only through morality and religion which find their motive and their highest expression in reverence for personality—independent, true and free.

Both the external and the internal characteristics of the present age are enumerated and described. Among the former thirty main movements are mentioned, such as the progressive conquest over the forces of nature, the stupendous economic development, the inevitable growth of cities, the foreign missionary movement, etc. Among the latter, which he terms the factors of the new inner world of thought, are natural science and evolution, the historical spirit, the new psychology, sociology and comparative religion.

The conditions which have resulted from the operation of these factors and forces must be controlled, lest they will work harm rather than good. Here is the moral and religious challenge of our times—to transform our new resources and attainments into abiding blessings by the exercise of moral virtue rooted in religious faith. The qualities demanded for this task are self-control, greater simplicity of life, the social virtues, grappling with race-prejudice, and unselfish leadership. For the proper use of the new forces in the world of thought, we need clear insight into the difficult problems of this transition period, discriminating breadth of view, and qualities of the social consciousness.

The challenge in our own national life must be met by a new puritanism, which contains the substance of the old and takes up the best in the new. He lays down certain ruling principles which are to control the races in their relation to one another, and pleads for democracy in its truly religious sense, seeking the development of the individual and at the same time the advance of the community. "In the specific questions", he says, "now be-

fore us and certain to arise—in the family, in household management, in industry, in education, in charity, in politics—the guiding clue is quite certain to be found in that fundamental reverence for the person as such, that is basic to any true democracy. . . . Where the spirit of reverence for personality thoroughly permeates all policies, and all conditions, and is accompanied by scientific study of conditions, neither the individual nor the nation can fail.”

In the concluding chapter the author outlines the program of western civilization in its spread over the world and states the guiding principle in international life. If the western world would accomplish its mission among the nations in the East, it must combine the economic and the religious factors in its propaganda. These two forces have been the formative agencies in the world's history in the past, and they will remain its hope in the future. A mere extension of commerce from the West into the East is by no means a spread of civilization over the Orient. From the West must come more than things,—manufactured articles and utilitarian inventions. The religious world movement must accompany the economic. The East must be inspired with the inmost spirit of the religious ideals and aspirations of the West.

“But all this,” he says, “we shall not be able to do, unless we hold this principle of reverence for personality not only as an ethical, but as a deeply religious conviction. In this world-task we need peculiarly an unshaken faith permeating our whole life. We need the conviction that ‘the universe is on the side of the world,’ that God wills that which we seek; and we need this not merely because this principle of the priceless value and sacredness of the individual person first came into the world, as a matter of fact, from Christ; but because for Him it did, and for us it must, root in the sense of God as Father of all.”

This volume is a powerful argument, based on sound premises, for foreign missions. It serves, also, to clarify the mind of the statesman and the churchman as to the great problems of our age, moral and religious, and will widen the scope of vision of any reader so far as the relation of America to other nations is concerned. Only one who has read widely, travelled extensively, observed keenly and thought profoundly could have written such a work. It will probably rank as the masterpiece among the publications thus far issued by the author. It is a model of clear-cut analysis and compact statement. It is in line with the writings of Kidd, Strong and Eucken, and yet it is an original production, with a fine blending of the scientific method, philosophical insight and religious faith. One feels that the author impersonates what he demands,—respect for personality, the rights, the convic-



tions, the beliefs and hopes of others, whatever land or clime they may live in. This spirit of respectful toleration is characteristic of the highest type of manhood produced by modern education and culture.

The book will appeal with equal force to members of every profession, yea, to every intelligent citizen of the English-speaking world. In form it is so simple that it may be read with ease, and yet the principles which are set forth are so far-reaching that it requires prolonged meditation to comprehend them in all their bearings.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

THE GLORY OF THE MINISTRY. By Professor A. T. Robertson, D.D., LL.D. Fleming H. Revell Co., New York. Cloth. Pages 243. Price \$1.50 net.

It is a great reproach to the spiritual life of the churches and their seeming indifference to one of the supreme needs for their advancement, that they fail to recruit a requisite number of candidates for the Christian ministry. In classis after classis in most, if not all, our synods, the progress of local and general church work is suffering because ministers are not available for all the charges. Many reasons of a negative sort have been given to account for this lamentable situation. The sacred office does not appeal to young men in this money-loving, pleasure-seeking age, so strongly as do the honors and emoluments of civil office, or the larger freedom and fuller purse of a business career. The required struggles and disappointments, hardships and sacrifices of the ministry do not invite, they rather repel, those who are observant of the experiences of ministers and their families. The supposed intellectual restrictions demanded of ministers, in the interest of maintaining doctrinal views and ecclesiastical conventions which the progress of scientific and philosophical, scriptural and religious thought has put out of court, does not allow men of light and leading to devote themselves to the pulpit. Other avenues along which to render Christian service demand less and offer more to attract and hold intelligent and wideawake young manhood. But merely to point out the fact and folly of such hindrances is not an effective method to bring about their removal. Merely to insist that it is an error for a young man to allow himself by such hindrances to be turned away from the claims of the ministry, can never accomplish the Church's purpose of winning larger and more adequate numbers of them into its service as ministers.

A much more forceful, influential and fruitful method of approach and appeal resides in placing emphasis upon the joys and satisfactions which come to the preacher of the Gospel,—in set-



ting forth in a positive way the surpassing glory of the Christian ministry. This is the purpose which Dr. Robertson has undertaken in the discussions of this masterful and invaluable treatise. Primarily it is an expository study of Paul's exultation (2 Cor. 2: 12-3: 6) in being counted worthy to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ, but it is at the same time an application of that exultation to the work of the ministry in our own age. The study of Paul's utterances on the subject, together with the observations and reflections on them of a man of rare spiritual attainments and talent for lucid literary expression, combine to make this work one of remarkable timeliness and value, of great importance and luminous power. In his preface, Dr. Robertson tells that it was the close study of the Greek text that first gripped his heart with Paul's noble panegyric on the ministry of the servants of Jesus Christ; that it is not a mere rhapsody on Paul's part, but a magnificent exposition of the preacher's task from every point of view; and that he finds it a duty and joy to present Paul's lofty spiritual conception of the minister's office and work as a source of cheer and hope to the hearts of all that are called to be toilers for Christ.

Attentively to accompany Dr. Robertson through the several chapters of his book is for the minister what travelling in the bracing atmosphere of mountain altitudes is to a tourist. It makes the heart beat firmer and brings new vigor to the whole being. The author's love for preachers, his desire to assist them to a fuller appreciation of the ministry as the highest calling, and as affording the greatest opportunities for rendering service to others, makes him often impressively eloquent in his contentions and pleas, and at the same time effective in bringing his readers to see eye to eye with him the validity of the conclusions he has reached. "Some one," he trusts, "may find tonic and ozone, as he comes close to the heart of his mission and life, in Paul's bracing words. Some, who have been disposed to speak unkindly of ministers as a class, may be led to revise their judgments. Some young men, who look out on this wonderful modern world, may catch a glimpse of the light in the face of Jesus, as Paul did, and yield to the appeal in that Face for a world lost in sin, a world that calls for interpreters of Jesus." Never, since Paul wrote, has this appeal and the privilege of responding to it been more simply and sincerely, more winsomely and impressively, presented than in the pages of this great book, and, wherever read, those pages will perform a service of untold importance.

The glory of the ministry belonged not to the age of Paul alone; it is a glory that attaches to the calling in every age, whether duly magnified or not by ministers themselves, or whether others are for the time being blind to it. And as its glory is per-



petually enduring, so it is essentially related to all the ideas and needs of successive generations in history, and throws light upon, and helps to solve, all the problems and perplexities of human life, bringing encouragement and cheer, inspiring faith and hope, to human life for its guidance and support. The success with which these views of the ministry are justified by Dr. Robertson, the spirit in which he has written, and the power of his arguments and illustrations, entitles this book to a general welcome and careful study. If welcomed and studied, the Spirit will use its timely and needed message in heartening ministers already in the service, and in winning others who are willing to be led into noblest paths of usefulness, with joy and gladness of heart to answer the Lord's call to the ministry of the Gospel. Parents who have sons, ministers who have young men in their congregations, whom they should like to prepare for the office of preaching, will do well to secure this volume and place it in the hands of such for their inspiration and instruction. If any better work for this purpose is available, my attention has not been called to it.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

THE PREACHER AND HIS WORK. By Rev. J. H. Jowett, D.D. George H. Doran Company, New York. Cloth. Pages 239. Price \$1.25 net.

One competent to speak with authority regards Dr. Jowett as "the man who is at present the most popular and influential preacher in the English-speaking world." Were there no other reasons for special interest in this year's course of Yale Lectures on the Lyman Beecher Foundation, such an estimate from such a source, of the man who delivered them several months ago, would be sufficient to turn one's interested attention to the volume in which those lectures now appear in printed form. Through a private channel one has come to know that Dr. Jowett, with characteristic modesty and self-distrust, felt somewhat uncertain whether he had a real contribution to make to a series of lectures with which so many names of distinguished American and British preachers of the past and present were associated. One need not go far into the pages of his book before being convinced that the author's uncertainty and self-distrust were entirely gratuitous. His lectures will easily take their place among the very best, the most illuminating, and the most richly rewarding, of all that bear the name of Yale.

No young preacher can afford to neglect the study of them, and older and experienced ministers will find in them new light for the successful pursuit of their pulpit and pastoral duties, and most helpful counsel for the cultivation on their own part of needed, spiritual, ministerial character. The present writer has upon his shelves no less than twenty or twenty-five of the published vol-



umes of the Yale series on preaching. He owes a great debt of gratitude to men who have made earlier contributions to it,—among others, to Burton and Brooks, Horton and Dale, Watson and Jefferson,—but he feels constrained to acknowledge that none has stirred him so deeply and elicited such grateful reverence and regard for benefits received, as the author of the present volume. Very few, one imagines, can read the searching and informing lectures, for instance, on *The Perils of the Preacher*, *The Preacher's Themes*, and *The Preacher in His Study*, without self-reproach on the one hand, or without receiving new impulse to higher aspirations on the other. For a double service of this character, one must be lastingly and deeply thankful.

And, so likewise, for many other things here met with. What a wealth of suggestive counsel, practical information, inspiring instruction, is crowded into most of his paragraphs! What an irresistible pull upon the heart is made by his manifest joy in proclaiming the Evangel of Christ, by his buoyant happiness, and by his contagious cheerfulness,—all the direct result and frank expression of his personal experiences in the holy ministry! What a desirable and helpful effect it would have upon the life of churches everywhere, could their leaders be brought to live in the tonic atmosphere which pervades the thought of this delightful book! Every theological student, every unfossilized preacher, owes it to himself, to the people whom he is called to serve, and his Master, to avail himself of information and stimulus for mind and heart, to be gathered from Dr. Jowett's message. One entrusted as God's steward, with the necessary means to do so, could render the church a great service by purchasing a large edition of the book and presenting a copy of it to every one of the preachers in the denomination. Some generous-hearted member of the church *should* secure a sufficient number of copies to put one in the hands of every young man now preparing for the ministry in our several seminaries. From such a sowing very gratifying harvests would surely grow in enriched lives and increased ministerial usefulness.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

THE PILGRIM CHURCH. By Percy C. Ainsworth. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York. Cloth. Pages 252. Price \$1.25 net.

Volumes of published sermons often fall stillborn from the press. Comparatively few of them, even though the sermons they contain were useful and acceptable when preached, command general attention upon their appearance in print, and fewer still continue alive for any length of time afterwards. The explanation of the fact is perhaps easily made. It was the living preacher, the needs of the particular congregation hearing them, and the circumstances or the occasion to which they were adapted, that gave



them vitality and value. The absence of these, when the sermons are read in cold type, robs many of them of special interest and importance. But there are exceptions to this rule, as everybody knows who has read Newman or Lyddon, Hamilton Thom or James Martineau, Stopford Brooke or Dean Stanley, Horace Bushnell or Phillips Brooks. All these have in a large way dealt with the timeless elements of the Gospel, with the eternal principles underlying it, and speak therefore with perennial freshness to constantly increasing and instructed audiences. They will never be neglected or forgotten.

To this class of preachers the lamented Mr. Ainsworth belongs, as one readily comes to see in reading this collection of discourses, posthumously published. They bear many of the marks necessary to insure sermonic immortality. They show a profound grasp of what is spiritually ever-enduring and everywhere needed and welcomed by the Christian public. One of his intimate friends mentions "the purity of his spirit, the depth of his faith, the strength of his loyalty to God, and the delight with which he rendered service to man," as the secret of his pulpit power. Readers of these sermons cannot fail to discover these traits of noble character as having belonged to their author. His skill in the use of words, his remarkable power of apt illustration, his poetic genius of interpreting the Scriptures, his mystic insight into the relation between God and man as revealed by Christ,—all are subordinated to, or lost sight of, in the presence of his manifest sincerity and singleness of purpose to speak for God and of his personal goodness and character. Hence the spiritual uplift one feels in reading these sermons which he has left as a legacy to the Church,—a legacy many will wish to keep within easy reach for repeated reading and spiritual refreshment. Sermons capable of performing this office abundantly merit the wide attention which Sir Robertson Nicoll, in his brief introductory "Appreciation" to the volume, confidently predicts it will receive. "This book must inevitably find its way into the hands of every preacher worthy of the name, and multitudes who are not preachers will find in it help that they need. It is truly a golden book."

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

INTELLECTUAL RELIGION. By Thomas Cullan Ryan, Esq., of the Wisconsin Bar. Sherman, French & Co., Boston, Mass. Cloth. Pages 165. Price \$1.25 net.

The quest after wisdom ascribed by Paul to the Greeks has its equivalent to-day in the desire of that mental temper which is in search of an intellectual grasp of religious truth and an intelligible interpretation of it. What this temper craves in religion is such a light upon its nature and purport as will alleviate the burden



and dissipate the mystery which constitute the so-called intellectual difficulties of Christianity. Evidently it is to this type of mind that the author of *Intellectual Religion* belongs. He is a Greek in spirit, having not only an intuitive passion for a knowledge of facts, but a discriminating genius for penetrating to the heart of their meaning. "To know facts," he observes, "is to be learned; to know their meaning is wisdom." He is in search of the latter in this volume, and many sharing with him his mental type will welcome his findings as here set forth. What Paul did for those contemporaries of his who sought after "wisdom" by directing them to "Christ, the power and wisdom of God," that Mr. Ryan does, of course in another way and in language suited to our day, for the perplexed and restive classes now searching wisdom capable of satisfying mind and conscience when face to face with present-day religious difficulties. Mr. Ryan recognizes such quest after wisdom to be perfectly legitimate and just, and thinks that Christianity is fully able to vindicate itself as the supreme fountain of what is wise and true. Two facts unite in giving special significance to this volume: It comes from the pen of a layman, a trained lawyer. It owns what modern science has established, criticism achieved and historical investigation disclosed, and yet concludes that the eternal verities of religion stand secure and that it is the part of true wisdom to think and act in the light of its behests. The author is a logical thinker, in command of a vigorous style, and in possession of philosophic and scientific facts in learned abundance, all of which adds to the interest and value of this discussion.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

THE PILOT FLAME. By Kelley Jenness. Sherman, French & Co., Boston, Mass. Cloth. Pages 268. Price \$1.50 net.

Those who look to the title of a book to convey some information about the nature of its contents will not be likely to find this volume entirely to their satisfaction. The author is described on the title-page as "a practicing pastor, engaged in lighting pilot flames," and in the initial chapter of the book explanation is given of "the title analogy." A knowledge of certain automatic apparatus used for heating water in regions where natural gas is abundant is required to understand the analogy, which is applied to the study of "the uncomprehended depths of the personality of normal individuals" dealt with by ministers of the Gospel in their pulpit and pastoral labors. The lighting of the "pilot flame" is the awakening of the soul to religious experiences; practicing the presence of God is to keep the flame burning. This analogy provides our author with four aspects under which to discuss Christian experience in "The Child who Conforms," "The Child who



Varies," "Illumination," and "The Perception of the Presence of God."

Once he has gotten away from his fanciful analogy, which must have seemed far prettier to the author than it will appear to most of his readers, he becomes really interesting in his study of particular instances of religious experience, and of approved methods of dealing successfully with such instances. His examples are gathered out of a twenty-years' experience in the pastorate. He reports in their own language the testimony of various men and women of different ages and types, in a way somewhat similar to that of Professor James in his "Variety of Religious Experience." His incidental criticisms of certain phases of modern methods of inquiry and research, about evolution and scientific historical investigation, are not always as self-restrained and sympathetic as one might wish or expect. But notwithstanding such unimportant blemishes, one must admire the earnestness of his convictions, the originality of his mind, and the brilliancy of his metaphorical style. The physical make-up and letter-press of the book has been admirably done by the publishers.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

BETHLEHEM BELLS. By B. J. Hoadley. Sherman, French & Co., Boston, Mass. Cloth. Pages 44. Price \$1.00 net.

Fourteen brief meditations on the significance and meaning of Christmas are brought together in these pages. A number of them deal in a very tender and beautiful way with the nature and purpose of the great Gift of God which Christmas bells commemorate, and in a style level with the capacity of children for whom possibly they were originally prepared. The book is suited for Sunday-school libraries, and for the young in the home.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

JESUS. By George Holley Gilbert, Ph.D., D.D. New York, The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pages 320. Price \$1.50 net.

The author of this volume is widely known by his previous contributions to the literature of New Testament research. They were all based on a scientific study of the sources of our biblical knowledge and they sought to set forth, mainly for beginners, the consensus of modern scholarship on questions pertaining to the life and teaching of Jesus.

This latest offering of his pen, breathing the same spirit of reverent and sincere scholarship and following the same method of patient scientific study, is easily the most ambitious literary enterprise of the author. It aims to supplant his *Student's Life of Jesus*, published fifteen years ago, which covers the same ground as the present volume. This intervening decade and a half marks



the most important epoch in the study of the sources of our knowledge of Jesus. It has wrought important changes among scholars, in their estimate of the historical value of these sources. These changes the author frankly accepts. And this change of viewpoint leads to such radical changes in his conception of the life of Jesus, that he finds it easier to rewrite his former book than to revise it.

Consequently the reader of this volume will find in its pages a view of Jesus which demolishes the traditional conception of the Saviour of mankind. In Part One it takes up the sources for the study of the life of Jesus, the four Gospels, the Epistles, and also the extra-biblical sources. The second part is devoted to The Historical Jesus. Here the author discusses the world in which Jesus lived, and his life and work from his birth to his death on Golgotha. The last part of the book bears the significant title, The Legendary Jesus. Here the traditional stories of Jesus' birth and material resurrection, as well as many reported events of his ministry, are taken from the realm of historical fact and placed in the region of religious fancy. The value of the book for students is materially enhanced by copious indexes of the quoted passages.

The author himself foresees the inevitable results of such a radical departure from the traditional faith of the church. He predicts that there will be an unsettling of the faith of some people in Jesus, and that there will also be a reaction on the part of many Christians from the new views and an attempt to support the heritage of devout, but unscientific, ages. These predictions will doubtless be fulfilled in many readers of his volume. But the author also knows himself animated by a devout spirit of Christian piety. His professed aim is to carry the church forward through such times of stress and to establish it in the larger and truer conception of the Master. He conceives that there is no higher service which New Testament scholars can render the Christian Church than to set forth, with the utmost patience and accuracy, the simple facts of the life of Jesus, assured that nothing can so further the Jesus-type of religious life as an intelligent acquaintance with the historical Jesus Himself.

A book like this will be vehemently condemned by conservative Christian thinkers and it will be received with praise by radicals. But it does not crave encomiums, neither does it deserve violent vituperation. It is symptomatic of our age and calls for earnest study. It is written throughout in the spirit of devout appreciation of the vital work of the Master, and in the assurance that confidence in Him, as the spiritual leader of mankind, is not weakened but strengthened by these critical conclusions concerning his life on earth. It calls for an answer conceived in the same spirit.

Meanwhile, one must wish for the book the widest circulation



among those who are not ready or willing to relegate to the realm of legend the virgin birth and the physical resurrection of Jesus, and among those who are not able to see in a Jesus, divested of his metaphysical supernaturalism, the Son of God and the Saviour of mankind, in order that its radical conclusions may be tested and tried before the tribunal of competent New Testament scholarship.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

THE HEART OF THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE. By George A. Barton, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and Semitic Languages in Bryn Mawr College. New York, The Macmillan Co. Cloth. Pages 218. Price \$1.25 net.

The eight lectures composing this book were originally delivered in 1908 to the Friends' Summer School at Sagamore, Mass. Their appearance in this more permanent form will be welcomed by all who know the spirit and scholarship of their author. Professor Barton is one of the leading biblical scholars of America. And the same breadth and depth that mark his labors in his special sphere of Semitic languages will be found in this suggestive volume on *The Heart of the Christian Message*. The treatment is popular. But, happily, the author does not sacrifice historical truth and scientific accuracy in order to gain the plaudits of the multitude. He speaks for those who accept the results of the modern literary study of the Gospel. And he speaks to those who seek to know the truth.

The volume consists of eight chapters. Their central theme is the Christian message. Beginning with Jesus' glad tidings of the loving Fatherhood of God, which contained an inner spiritual side and also an outer social side, the author first shows how this great redemptive message was formulated by Paul and in the Johannine writings. Paul's thoroughly Christian message was universal salvation from sin by union with Christ. These conclusions are reached and advocated by Paul through the agency of a Rabbinic reasoning which is meaningless now. The Johannine message to man is the supreme message of the mystics—union with God. The author then describes the further interpretation of the Christian message in the Eastern and Western Churches. He shows how, in the Greek East, it was shaped by conflict with the seething thought of the world, and how, in the Roman West, from the day of Augustine, the constant tendency prevailed to make the Christian message the charter of the church as an institution, and to herald to men the fact that here only was salvation to be found. In the next chapter, we find a splendid historical appreciation of the world's debt to Luther, Zwingli and Calvin, the great Reformers, who broke for millions of men the bonds of Rome and who

shaped Protestant thought to fight and to survive in an age of stress. But there is also a clear recognition of the fact that the Christian message as interpreted by the Reformers is neither a complete nor a final form of the Gospel of God to man. The seventh chapter of this volume, which forms the connecting link between the Christian message of the Reformers and the Christian message for the twentieth century, is devoted to George Fox and to the Early Friends. This somewhat unusual recognition of the Quaker Movement, as furnishing an essential link in the interpretation of the Christian message from its proclamation by Christ to its latest statement, is fully warranted by the original audience for whom these lectures were prepared. But it will also vindicate itself to the wider circle of readers who agree with the author that the heart of the Quaker message of the seventeenth century was the rediscovery of the direct access of every soul to God. The crowning glory of the volume is found in the concluding chapter on the Christian Message for the Twentieth Century. It is not a new gospel, but the old gospel told and lived in such a way that it will be seen to be the one indispensable help to the completion of life.

This volume will be found helpful by all who believe in the supremacy of Jesus Christ, as the revealer of God and as the redeemer of man, and who wish to extend his sway by precept and example.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

THE RISE OF THE MODERN SPIRIT IN EUROPE, A STUDY OF THE PRE-REFORMATION AGE IN ITS SOCIAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND LITERARY ASPECTS. The Swander Memorial Lectures, 1910. By George S. Butz, Ph.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. Pages 293. Price \$1.25 net.

The Swander lectureship in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States, located at Lancaster, Pa., was founded by the Rev. John I. Swander, D.D., and his wife, Barbara Kimmell Swander, for the twofold purpose of promulgating sound christological science and of erecting a memorial to their daughter, Sarah Ellen Swander, and to their son, Nevin Ambrose Swander. This volume of lectures, given on this foundation before the faculty and students of the Theological Seminary at Lancaster, amply fulfills the purposes of the creator of the Swander lectureship. It does not lay claim to the promulgation of "christological science" in the technical sense. It is not, nor professes to be, a theological treatise. Nevertheless, it comes well within the scope of the larger purpose of the founder of this lectureship, which is the setting forth of the truth as it is in Jesus. The sub-title of the book is, A Study of the Pre-Reformation Age



in its Social, Scientific and Literary Aspects. It is obvious that such a study relates itself directly to the promulgating of the Christian truth. For one thing, it will show conclusively that the Reformation was not a revolutionary catastrophe, but the culmination of an evolutionary movement in the mind and heart of mankind, that was the result of historical forces and factors that were operative during the ages preceding the Reformation.

The modern spirit, whose rise in Europe the author describes, is the human spirit emancipated from the bondage of external authority. Born in Europe, in the fifteenth century, this spirit has meanwhile fared forth to the uttermost parts of the world. To-day it reigns supreme everywhere, in all the spheres of life, ecclesiastical, political and economic. But its modern supremacy is by no means regarded as a blessing by all. Some regard this emancipated spirit as the spirit of the nethermost pit, deluding and destroying man; while others acclaim it the spirit of right and reason. This conflict between freedom and external bondage has many various forms and names. Its latest phase was the political struggle between the Progressives and the Reactionaries. But, in every instance, it is the modern spirit in conflict with the mediæval spirit, the inner man, with his human rights and duties, aspirations and obligations, revolting against external masters, with their vested rights, their hoary privileges, their traditional political and ecclesiastical constitutions. The really significant life of our present era moves between these two antipodal poles. And no one can hope to understand this distracted age without some knowledge of the genesis of the modern spirit. The author, therefore, of this volume essays a strictly contemporaneous task of great practical value in attempting to describe the rise of the modern spirit.

This is not primarily a book for the specialist, who can go to the sources for his material or thread his way laboriously through scientific monographs covering small periods with exhaustive fullness. Such readers, indeed, will find much to praise and little to criticize in our volume. But they must also inevitably observe minor defects in the elucidation, emphasis and synthesis of the bewildering array of forces, personal and impersonal, that are here brought to a focus. The author himself modestly disclaims the pretension of offering any new facts or startling theories in his essay. He also waives the claim that his study of the social, scientific and literary aspects of the Pre-Reformation Age is a comprehensive or encyclopædic classification of the material of history. Thus he disarms the criticism of those who expect to find in his pages a complete and exhaustive treatise.

The chief value of the volume is for the average man of culture who desires to familiarize himself with the distant epoch where



the spirit was born that animates his age. For such, Dr. Butz is an instructive guide. He sees the period which he describes with an eye unclouded by religious prejudices, and undazzled by humanistic splendor. His vision of events and of their value is true and his appreciation of men sound. And his portraits of the things his trained eye discerns are not mere pen and ink sketches. They are living pictures, aglow with life. They reveal a keen sense of the artistic value of words and a deft hand in their use.

The book is earnestly recommended to students of the Pre-Reformation Age, who will find in its charming pages, for their rapid and authentic orientation, a condensed bird's-eye view of one of the most important epochs of history. The comprehensive bibliography appended to the volume will enable them to conquer and possess the land which they have surveyed. The volume is also recommended to the general reader whose interest in life dips beneath the surface of meat, drink and raiment, to the spirit that moves us. They will find in its pages a description of the genesis of that spirit that is not surpassed in any other volume of similar scope and design.

THEO. F. HERMAN.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION, ITS ORIGIN, FUNCTION, AND FUTURE.  
By James H. Leuba, Professor of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College.  
New York, The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pages 371.

Psychology of religion as a distinct subject of investigation is a young science. Its literature is confined practically to the past two decades. In this short time, however, many splendid contributions have been made to this department of knowledge by men like Hall, James, Starbuck, Coe, Pratt, Ames, Stratton, King, Leuba and other investigators. These men, as a rule, have labored both in the interest of science and of religion. In spite of certain misgivings which men may have had at the thought of putting the scalpel into anything as sensitive as religious life, it is generally acknowledged that both scientific and religious truth have gained a great deal by the labors and investigations of scientists in this new field. The study has opened to science a world of hitherto unanalyzed experiences; it has vindicated for religion its true dignity as a normal and healthy part of human nature.

At the present day there are two distinct ways of defining religion psychologically. The one defines it in terms of the conservation of values. This is based on Höffding's conception of value, and is best interpreted in the works of Irving King on *The Development of Religion*, and in the recent brilliant volume by Edward S. Ames in *The Psychology of Religious Experience*. The other type of definition is that adopted in the volume before us, in which Dr. Leuba considers religion as that part of human



experience in which man feels himself in relation with psychic powers and makes use of them.

Dr. Leuba has been one of the pathfinders of the young science of religious psychology. For the past fifteen years he has written various articles on different phases of the subject in French, English and American magazines. Three years ago a London firm published his volume on *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*.

In the volume before us, the first of three, two of which are to appear later, Dr. Leuba has gathered together in book form and has published under the Macmillan imprint his opinions on the origin, function and future of religion. The volume claims to be based on a study of present customs and beliefs of primitive peoples, the behavior and ideas of children and the teaching of general psychology. It apparently leads one to believe that it is a strictly psychological study drawing scientific conclusions from carefully ascertained data based on religious phenomena. The book has certain elements of real value. It is built on that modern conception, fundamentally true, that the most satisfactory approach to the study of religion is from the standpoint of psychology. The author's criticisms of the purely intellectual and emotional conceptions of religion are keen. The part of the book which shows the difference in the origin and nature of magic and religion is of especial interest.

On the whole, however, we confess that Dr. Leuba's presentation of the subject in this volume is a distinct disappointment. It prejudices the case. It lacks scientific disinterestedness. His treatment carries with it a spirit of dogmatism which one cannot excuse in a scientific study. The author fails to recognize the limitations of his science, a mistake which William James and those other investigators in this field, whose names are mentioned above, have not made. One can forgive audacity in a young science. But when an investigator starts out to study the scientific aspect of phenomena in any field, he is not justified in drawing conclusions which do not grow out of his data. Dogmatism is least warranted in a man who in a scientific study pretends to confine himself strictly to induction from well-established facts. What scientific right has a man who studies religion scientifically to prejudge the whole case by asserting that for him "divine personal beings, be they primitive gods or the Christian Father, have no more than a subjective existence."

In the chapter on the relation of Theology to Psychology the author, with little argument or ceremony, brushes the whole Kantian and Ritschlian theory of knowledge aside in less than a page with a mere sweep of the hand. He is cock-sure that the objective reality of religious objects believed in by "pious souls" and



argued for by no less a psychologist and philosopher than the late William James is simply the result of blindness brought on "by too great a desire to discover a new world." We grant him that psychology is incompetent in the matter of judging of the objective value of religious truth. Is not this the very reason, however, why his insistence on pure subjectivity is dogmatism of the most rigorous kind? Has he scientifically more of a right to deny religious objectivity than others have to assert it?

Those of us who have heard the late Dr. Otto Pfleiderer, of Berlin, in his classroom would never have suspected him of being a dolt and a dissembler. Yet the author of this volume goes into hysteria over a sentence, innocent enough in itself, in Pfleiderer's *Development of Theology since Kant*, viz., "A sound tact giving prominence to what is for us religiously essential and putting into the background what is antiquated will, perhaps, be better able to solve the problem than a rigorously systematic method." This sentence calls forth from our author high condemnation of the noted German theologian and the modern ministry in general in words like these: "When men of the highest influence affirm that theology can hardly do better than perpetually strive to reconcile that which is acknowledged to be false, or at least deficient (the religious faith handed down in the Church) with our present knowledge, we must hold it well for the manhood of our young men that they should prefer to that sublime vocation almost any other, even perhaps that of the American practical politician, whose chief business seems to be the reconciliation of the irreconcilable, dishonesty and honesty." This savors of the mock heroic.

In the last part of the book treating of the "Future of Religion" the scientist turns prophet. He is very sure that what this unbelieving generation needs is a morality that is entirely independent of transcendental belief. To him the idea of a personal God, all-powerful and all-good, is outgrown. The world is drifting beyond theism, and pantheism is insufficient. No purposive intelligence for him. There are too many logical contradictions. What then is the sum of it all? It is pretty hard to tell from the conclusion of this volume. The author quotes half a page from Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and then goes into raptures over a religion of humanity, an idealized humanity as the manifestation of a non-purposive Creative Force. This is the scientific substitute for all religion. This in the eyes of our prophet will take "the place that the Christian religion lost when its cardinal beliefs ceased to be in harmony with secular beliefs."

How all these conclusions are necessarily drawn out of a scientific study of religious phenomena we fail to see. Every man has the privilege of holding whatever philosophic opinion he pleases



about theism. But when in a scientific study of religious phenomena a man foists his dogmatic preconceptions upon us at every angle as conclusions legitimately evolved from carefully selected data, conclusions which have absolutely nothing to do with the premises in the case, we object in the name of logic and of scientific regard for truth. We doubt very much whether that man is best qualified to write a psychology of religion who begins his study with the preconceptions upon which this volume is based.

The psychology of religion is a worthy and helpful science. But such dogmatism and lack of appreciation of the more vital elements of the religious life, as are found in this volume, will not enhance the value of the science in the eyes of scientifically trained men.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

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#### EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

The April number of this REVIEW will be devoted to the commemoration of the 350th anniversary of the Heidelberg Catechism. It will contain articles on the history of the Catechism, and on its significance as a Confession of Faith and as a Manual of catechetical Instruction. And it will also present and discuss various phases of the problem of Religious Education for our age.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### AN APPRECIATION OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.

J. SPANGLER KIEFFER.

Perhaps it would be well if, among the many special days appointed to be observed by our churches, place should be found for one which might be known as a Day of Appreciation. The object of it would be to call the attention of church-members to, and to teach them to form a just appreciation of, the great treasures which belong to them by inheritance. The great Creeds of the Christian Church—the Apostles', the Nicene, the Athanasian; the Te Deum; the Litany; the Christian Year; the Collects—these are some of the precious things which as Christian persons we have inherited; which it is quite possible for church-members to know little of, and to care little for; in regard to which there is much need of information, that they may know how they came into possession of these treasures, and be able to form a just appreciation of their value.

This thought has been suggested by the circumstances of our being asked to write an "appreciation" of the Heidelberg Catechism, of the origin of which the present year is the 350th anniversary. There are precious things, such as those we have



named, which belong to us as members of the Church universal; and there are inheritances which are peculiar to us as Protestants. The Heidelberg Catechism belongs to this latter class. It is, and has now been for more than three centuries and a half, the Confession of Faith of the Reformed Church. The circumstance that, after so long a time, it is still serving as a confession of faith and being used as a book of religious instruction, would seem to indicate no small degree of significance and value. It is not characteristic of things without value to last so long and wear so well. That the Heidelberg Catechism has lasted so long, and is at present so living a thing, is presumptive evidence of its being a precious object, the value of which needs to be adequately appreciated.

The very circumstance, however, which seems to demand a just appreciation of the Catechism, leads also to a certain depreciation of it. Just because it has lasted so long, it is easy to disparage and depreciate the Catechism; and, indeed, within recent years, there has been a considerable amount of such disparagement and depreciation of it, as a thing old and "out of date." It must be admitted that there is a measure of justification for this derogatory criticism. In a certain sense, the Heidelberg Catechism is not "up to date"; there are things in it which the lapse of time and the progress of theological science have rendered in a measure antiquated and obsolete. Certain doctrinal statements, once adequate and acceptable, are no longer satisfactory. It may be that the time is at hand for a new Confession of Faith, more truly expressive of what is actually believed by Christian people of to-day, and a new book of religious instruction, more perfectly adapted to the wants of the times.

Meanwhile, however, it is well to remember, and it properly belongs to our appreciation of the Catechism to consider, that, if there are things in it which are out of date, there are many more things in it which are not, never have been, and never can be, out of date. A curious matter is this, of things being up to date or out of date. It is not determined exclusively by

time. Things may be old and stale ; things may be old and may yet be as fresh and new as the morning. It has been said that "if one were searching for a real synonym for the fresh rush of life in the world, he would find Shakespeare ; if he were looking for an example of old, stale and unprofitable things, he would find it in some morning newspaper." It is significant that the thing in the Heidelberg Catechism which perhaps may be considered to be the most out of date, viz., the concluding clause of the answer to the eightieth Question, did not become so ; it was out of date to begin with ; it was obsolete in 1563 ; it was both out of place and out of date when, under peculiar circumstances, it was first added to the Catechism, to which it did not originally belong. On the other hand, the things most characteristic of the Catechism are of such a nature as to be equally up to date, whether in 1563 or 1913. Horace Bushnell once said of a certain newspaper that it was "not only behind the times, but behind all times." In like manner, there are things which are not only out of date, but out of all dates. And, on the other hand, there are things which are not only up to date, but up to every date. Things of this kind are not wanting, indeed there is a certain abundance of them, in the Heidelberg Catechism. There are things which can never, by any lapse of time, be rendered antiquated or obsolete. The answer to the first question is as true to-day as when it was first framed ; it will be as true ten thousand years from now as it is to-day.

Of every great and lasting production, of every work of genius, whether in the realm of literature, of art, or of religion, the greatness will probably be found to consist in the presence in it of certain great principles, to which it has conformed, and of which it is, in its measure, an embodiment and expression. It is these that impart to it its excellence ; it is these that invest it with its staying power. For, while times and fashions and views and opinions change, principles remain the same forever. It is quite possible to recognize in the Heidelberg Catechism certain principles whose presence in it has



evidently had much to do with imparting to it its characteristic significance and value, and its measure of perennial freshness.

The first principle we notice is that of what we may call the primacy of personality. This book is of a personal character. As a book of religious instruction, its questions are not only addressed to a person, but have a direct personal reference to the person addressed. It is said, "What is *thy* only comfort in life and in death?" It is said, "How art *thou* righteous before God?" The Catechism is personal, also, in the deeper and more comprehensive sense of being about a Person. It is a confession of faith; and the belief which as Christian persons we confess, is, above all, belief in a Person; a divine-human Person, living, suffering, dying, rising from the dead, ascending to heaven. If our belief is a belief in propositions, it is only in consequence of its being first a belief in a Person. The Apostles' Creed, instead of being added to the Catechism in the form of an appendix, is in the very midst of it, nay, is the center and heart of it all.

This personal character of the Catechism is a thing of more significance than might at first appear. It is, in its place and its degree, the expression of a great and vital principle; the principle, namely, of the priority, the primacy, of personality, as compared with everything impersonal. There are powers to which impersonality can never attain; it is destitute, for example, of all propagating force. An idea, a theory, a truth, a doctrine, can become a living power only so far as it incarnates itself in a human person and a human life. A movement can become a movement only when the truth for which it stands embodies and expresses itself in some powerful and influential personality. "Men," says Dr. Döllinger, "are more than doctrines. It is not a certain theory of grace that makes the Reformation; it is Luther, it is Calvin." What would the Revolutionary period of our national history be without the personality of George Washington? What would the history of our next great national crisis be without the personality of Abraham Lincoln?

There would seem to be a mysterious law, by which the highest gifts can be given and the noblest impulses imparted to men only by means of persons. Of personality, nothing can take the place; no thing; no mechanism or contrivance however perfect; no law, or institution, or constitution; no theory, or doctrine, or system of philosophy; no creed, no rite, no ceremony. It may be said that there is no good thing in the world but is directly traceable to some man or woman, in whom it originated, from whom it proceeded, by whom it was transmitted. The virtues we possess, whatsoever these may be, we derive not from any impersonal source. These things come not thus; virtues are not to be imparted by instruction; it is of their nature that they go only by contagion. Nobleness, generosity, courage—it is characteristic of such things as these that they are directly communicated from person to person. Life can come only from life; it is torch that kindles torch. Impersonalities are powerless, or at least of altogether subordinate rank. It is personality that sits on the throne, and accomplishes the results which they are incapable of effecting.

Religion is essentially a relation of person to person; it consists in the personal belief in, and the personal following of, a personal leader. Christianity has much to do with doctrines; the principle of which we are speaking involves no tendency to disparage or undervalue in any manner the great importance of these. But their place is entirely subordinate; important as doctrine is, it is not the essence of Christianity. It has much to do with creeds; but these, important as they are, are of inferior value; they are in themselves incapable of accomplishing the results at which religion aims; they are the expressions of a spiritual life already existing, rather than the producing cause of that life, a power which can be found only in personality.

God's greatest gifts to men have always been by means of personalities; His own supreme gift to mankind is itself none other than a Person. When "the fulness of the time" came, He



gave, not a system of philosophy, nor a code of laws, but His only-begotten and well-beloved Son. In giving Him, He gave us all: doctrines, theologies, philosophies, laws, institutions and constitutions without number, all follow in the wake of this one all-including gift. Above all, in giving Him, He gave us what belongs to the very idea of religion: One whom we may admire and love with all the admiration and love of which our hearts are capable; One whom we may follow, serve and obey with all the energy of which our wills are capable. And, when the time came for the great process to begin of winning men everywhere to the great God of righteousness and truth and love; when Jesus Christ ascended on high and "gave gifts to men," it is significant that it was persons that He gave; "and He gave some, apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists and some, pastors and teachers." Always persons; neither at the beginning nor at any point of the process of imparting life to a dead world, may anything take the place of personality. There are great books, and great doctrines, and great creeds, and great theologies, but their significance is altogether derived and dependent; they are what they are entirely because of their relation to the Person of Jesus Christ Our Lord.

Such is the principle of the priority of personality. The Heidelberg Catechism is constructed in accordance with it, and is strong with the strength of it.

Closely akin to the one we have mentioned, another principle found in the Catechism is that of the superiority of the concrete to the abstract. It needs no argument to prove the superiority, in matters relating to the presentation of the truth, of the concrete. It is the concrete that arrests attention; that is vivid, striking, impressive. Archbishop Trench, in his instructive book on "Proverbs," points out the characteristic use which proverbs make of the principle of the priority of the concrete over the abstract. It is characteristic of the proverb that it is the striking utterance of some general truth; and it is made striking by being made concrete. To

say, "All men are mortal," is to utter a stale and wearisome truism. But compare with this the Arab proverb, "Death is a black camel which kneels at the door of every man's tent." How picturesque and striking this is; who, that has seen it, can forget that black camel? So much difference is there between the one way and the other of saying the same thing. Our Savior's teaching was for the most part on this principle; it was by parables. He gave us, for example, no abstract philosophical definition of repentance; the philosophical terms of such a definition would have lost or changed their meaning in the course of time. He gave us, instead, the parable of the Prodigal Son, whose perennial freshness "age cannot wither nor custom stale."

The difference between the abstract and the concrete was strikingly expressed, a few years ago, by a phrase which, originating in political life, came into extensive use. It was the significant phrase, "a condition, and not a theory"; i. e., a concrete, and not an abstract, thing; a fact, and not a thought; a situation to be dealt with, not by argument, but by action. It is one thing to be dealing with a theory; it is another to be dealing with a condition. Now, the Heidelberg Catechism, at the very beginning, and throughout, is evidently dealing with concrete conditions. The first question and answer show that; as it has not to do with impersonalities, so it has not to do with abstractions. It implies from beginning to end a certain gracious condition on the part of the one receiving instruction. It is implied that the catechumen stands in a certain gracious relation to God; that he is a child of God and an heir of salvation. The Catechism has been criticized for this assumption, as being contrary to the actual facts of the case and detrimental to the spirit of true religion. It may well be questioned, however, whether it is not in strictest accordance with the New Testament and the principles of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Those who are supposed by means of the Catechism to be receiving instruction in religion, are just those who have been made disciples by being baptized into the name



of the Trinity, and who are now, in obedience to our Savior's directions, being taught to observe all things whatsoever He has commanded. They have been brought into a condition, first, that afterwards their character may be made to correspond with their condition. They have been made Christians, so to speak, that they may become Christians.

In this there is no contradiction. It is a truism to say that one must become in order to be; the deeper truth, which underlies the superficial truism, is, that one must be in order to become. Every living thing is, to begin with, that which it is its destiny ultimately to become; it is, from the start, in idea and possibility, what, by a gradual process of unfolding, it is eventually to become in actual realization and manifestation. One must be a man, in order to become a man. Every organism is complete at the beginning; its development is nothing else indeed than the expansion and evolution of that which previously existed. Nor is this a fanciful and figurative, an imaginary and unreal, way of speaking; it is the simple and truthful expression of the law of growth, which always takes place by unfolding from within, and not by addition from without.

Nothing is more characteristic of the New Testament than the manner in which it continually implies and affirms that Christian people are what they are commanded and expected to become. After the manner of the Savior, who declared to those who were still in the beginnings of their religious experience, that they were "the light of the world" and "the salt of the earth," His Apostles habitually address as "saints" those at whose saintly character it would have been the easiest thing in the world to scoff with great appearance of reason. To them these beginning Christians were "the saints," the "sanctified in Christ Jesus," "the faithful." They were "children of God," "heirs, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ"; they had been brought "out of darkness into marvellous light," and made to "sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus"; they were "a chosen generation, a royal

priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people." This is lofty language, language which might well seem to be applicable to the end rather than to the beginning, to the time of attainment, and not to the period of endeavor. It is language which can be explained and justified only by the truth that the end is in the beginning, that Christian people are at the outset what they carry in themselves the power and the destiny of becoming, and that what may be said of them at the last may in some true sense be said of them at the first. The New Testament writers were men of vision; they were inspired to see realities in possibilities, the consummation in the beginning. And what they saw was not fiction but fact. To them the people they addressed were indeed saints. They were saints by calling, that they might become saints in character; they were "children of God" by adoption, that they might become such by obedience; they were "heirs" by right and privilege, that they might become such by the claiming and actual possession of their inheritance; they were "dead unto sin," that they might refuse to let sin reign over them. It was this conviction and belief that gave power to the commands and exhortations of the Apostles. The most effectual way of helping a man to become, is to see that he in some sense already is, and to deal with him as being what he ought to be. Rightly understood, the best way of inspiring a man with the desire and endeavor to become a saint, is, on the basis of proper authority to do so, to treat him as if in some sense he already were one. It was our Savior's way; it was the way of His Apostles; it is the way of the Heidelberg Catechism. It is characteristic of the Catechism that, assigning a secondary place to abstractions, it deals primarily and throughout with concrete conditions. A large part of its strength and excellence consists in the presence in it of the principle of which we have been speaking; in the fact that, from beginning to end, it takes for granted, as the New Testament does, the existence, on the part of the baptized youth who are being instructed, of a gracious condition in relation to God. It is on



this principle alone that educational religion, for which the Catechism stands, becomes possible. For, if it be asked whether it be possible to make Christians by education and training, it must be answered very positively that this is not possible except upon one assumption, namely, that of having Christians to begin with. This, however, is the very assumption which the Catechism, following the example of Jesus and His Apostles, makes.

Another principle which the Heidelberg Catechism illustrates in a very remarkable manner, and to which it owes no small portion of its peculiar excellence, is that of reserve. Perhaps, speaking as we have hitherto been doing, we ought to call it the principle of the priority of silence over speech. There is certainly a sense in which silence is to be exalted above speech; this is testified by the proverb which says, "Speech is of silver, but silence is of gold." In every great personality, or utterance, or action, there will be found something of silence and reserve. Strength, and power, and perfection go hand in hand with restraint and reserve; weakness, futility and failure are associated with the lack of them. One of our own poets has said:

"Of every noble work the silent part is best,  
Of all expression, that which cannot be expressed."

And the greatest of German poets has said:

"Vergebens werden ungebundne Geister  
Nach der Vollendung reiner Höhe streben;  
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,  
Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben."

Especially any work which has the power of enduring, which has lasted from generation to generation, will be found to have in it something of reserve. It will not be "ungebunden"; it will show signs of "Beschränkung"; it will be characterized by moderation and restraint; it will have the low tone. Edmund Burke said of himself that he "had chosen his ideas of liberty not too high, that they might last him through life."

Longfellow, in his *Journal*, speaks of "the subdued tone of the best artists, in song, as in painting."

Carlyle, in his "Reminiscences," speaking of his peasant father, for whose intellect he had such respect that, comparing it with that of Robert Burns, he hardly knew which to pronounce superior, makes a curious and striking remark concerning him; he says: "The thing he had nothing to do with, he did nothing with." Now, there are things which a Confession of Faith has "nothing to do with"; it is the part of wisdom for it to do nothing with them. It is not a solution of the riddle of the universe; it is not for the answering of all possible questions; it is not even a system of theology; it is a confession of faith. Nothing is more characteristic of the Heidelberg Catechism than its moderation and restraint, its reticence and reserve, in regard to matters concerning which it might conceivably have spoken positively, dogmatically and fully. In some respects its strength seems to lie in what it does not say, as much as in what it says. Certain questions, instead of answering, it leaves unanswered. This is true, especially, of the doctrine of the divine predestination. St. Augustine said of this doctrine that it was a very high and mysterious doctrine, capable of being understood only by a few persons. And Sir William Hamilton says that, if St. Augustine had pronounced it a doctrine which no one could understand, he would have spoken more truly, and might have saved the world whole libraries of acrimonious literature. The essential truth at which this doctrine evidently aims, the Heidelberg Catechism gives, in a concrete and practical form, in its teaching as regards God's sovereignty and providence, but the rest of it it leaves to philosophy and metaphysics, where, and not in a confession of faith, it properly belongs. It has nothing to say of a decree of election, much less of a decree of reprobation. It is not a philosophy, but a confession of faith; having nothing to do with these things, it does nothing with them.

The reserve of the Catechism on the subject of the decrees



is, as has often been pointed out, the more remarkable in view of the fact that the makers of it were themselves firm believers in Calvin's doctrine on this subject. It has sometimes been explained by supposing that, in this work, they were taken possession of, as it were, by a spirit broader than their own which led them to be silent when otherwise it would have been natural to speak, and otherwise also "made use of them as organs for reaching its own end." Why should this be thought a thing impossible or unnatural? It is, in fact, a well-known experience; there are instances and illustrations of it even in the literary world. The biographer of George Eliot says: "She told me that, in all that she considered her best writing, there was a 'not herself' which took possession of her, and that she felt her own personality to be merely the instrument through which this spirit, as it were, was acting." Both Thackeray and Dickens asserted that they were often absolutely surprised by the sayings and doings of their creations. A certain poet said that he valued his poems, not because they were his, but because they were not; he believed that they were given to him; they came by inspiration.

However these things may be, the fact remains that the Heidelberg Catechism, in regard to matters respecting which it might have been expected to have been outspoken, practises a remarkable reticence; and that the principle of reserve, thus embodied in it, is one of the causes of its excellence, its charm, and its enduring power.

There is another principle, the presence and influence of which in the Heidelberg Catechism are perhaps more pervasive and more characteristic than those of any of the others we have named. Having done so in the case of the others, we will make this also to consist in a "priority." It is the priority of that which is moral and spiritual, of the things of the will and the affections, of the "heart," in the deep and comprehensive sense in which the word is used in the Scriptures, over the things that are merely intellectual. These two elements, thought and feeling, are both of them present in the

Catechism; each is at its best when they are perfectly blended together. Sometimes the voice that we hear is the voice of the philosophizing, defining, explaining intellect; sometimes it is the voice of the heart, expressing belief, confidence, attachment, devotion. It cannot be said, however, that the philosophizing element is the chiefly characteristic thing in the Catechism, or the principal source of its peculiar charm and power. On the contrary, it is a significant and suggestive fact that the points at which philosophy is predominantly present, at which it is "*intellectus sibi permissus*" that is speaking, in philosophical terms of definition and explanation, are just the points at which there is obsolescence or obsolescence, while those parts which seem to be immune to obsolescence are the parts in which it is the heart that is finding utterance. Perhaps the most characteristic thing in the Heidelberg Catechism is a certain warmth and glow, by which it is pervaded and suffused, and of which all who are familiar with it are conscious. The Catechism is—let us say it boldly, for the word is used in a good sense—emotional. There are hidden fires in it. There is in it something of that suppressed passion which was in the heart of the Elector Frederick when he declared himself ready to lose his crown rather than violate his conscience; in the heart of Ursinus when he said that he would not take a thousand worlds for the blessed assurance of being owned by Jesus Christ; in the heart of Olevianus when, dying, he replied to the question whether he was sure of his salvation, with a triumphant "*Certissimus*." The Heidelberg Catechism is a thing of the head; but it is still more a thing of the heart. When, some years ago, there was published in Edinburgh a series of books entitled "*Books of the Heart*," it was a sound instinct that led the editor of the series to choose, as the first volume of it, the Heidelberg Catechism.

Let it not be thought strange that our Catechism should be characteristically of an emotional quality. It may be that emotion is a more significant thing than it is sometimes considered to be. It may be that it has come into discredit by



being confounded with emotionalism, which is something entirely different. Men sometimes speak, in a contemptuous tone, of "mere feeling," that is to say, feeling that is simply this and nothing more; that is unintelligent and blind; that comes and goes, being irregular and untrustworthy; that is inefficient and unproductive, or, it may be, even productive of evil. All these things may, not without show of reason, be scornfully said of feeling or emotion, which, like all things, has "the defects of its merits" and "the vices of its virtues." And yet it remains true that emotion, as being one of the natural and legitimate elements of our being, is not to be spoken against, or regarded otherwise than with respect. It is reassuring to find it stated on good authority that "the psychologists have recently discovered, after devoting their attention almost wholly to the scholastic operations of the intellect, that the emotions, the feelings, are fundamental to the life of the soul." Emotionalism is bad, but emotion is good. "Nothing great," says Hegel, "is ever accomplished without passion." There are certain things which cannot be done except passionately; to do them otherwise than passionately amounts to not doing them at all. This is especially true as regards a confession of faith. If, as is said in the New Testament, it is "with the heart" that man "believeth unto righteousness," his confession of that belief will have in it something of that emotion or passion which is characteristic of the heart. A confession of faith without anything of the nature of passion in it would be like a fire without heat. The passion may be restrained, the fires may be hidden, as they are in the Heidelberg Catechism, being all the more powerful for that, but they will be present all the same, and they will be the predominant and most characteristic elements in the confession to which they belong.

There is a scientific maxim which says, "*Corpora non agunt nisi soluta.*" Material substances must be dissolved before they can act. It is so with emotion. In order that it may fulfil its office, it is necessary that it be dissolved and diffused.

It cannot act as a thing separate, apart, independent. Its presence is a mysteriously diffused presence; it is in every thought, statement, explanation. Thus, in a state of dissolution and diffusion, it is at its best; especially when fused with thought, its natural and appointed coefficient, it is capable of exercising a vast and beneficent influence. And it is just in this form that emotion is present in the Heidelberg Catechism.

Finally, we name one more principle which is embodied and illustrated in the Heidelberg Catechism, and has much to do with making it what it is. It is the principle of rhythm; following the method of naming we have observed hitherto, we might call it the principle of the priority of poetry over prose. It is intimately related to the last named principle; for genuine emotion is always rhythmical. When it is the heart, as well as the head, that speaks, rhythm and poetry are natural and inevitable. The editor of the Heidelberg Catechism as a "Book of the Heart," speaks of the poetical quality of it, and of the rhythm of some of its utterances, a rhythm which, he says, "clings to the memory like that of an exquisite lyric." "No one thinks," he says, "of a catechism and a poem as having any affinity with each other. The singer would be indignant who should find his raptures spoken in such a dubious connection; yet the Heidelberg Catechism, in some of its parts, has all the characteristics of prose poetry." The author contrasts it, in this respect, with Calvin's Catechism and that of the Westminster divines, "which lack the element of poetry entirely, however excellent they may be in other respects."

That there should be considered to be a constitutional lack of affinity between a catechism and a poem is a curious and surprising circumstance; it is the result of a prevalent misapprehension as to the idea and object of a catechism or confession of faith. When the matter is attentively considered, poetry and the Confession of Faith, instead of being incongruous, will be found to possess affinity for each other in a special and extraordinary degree. If anything ought to be



poetical in spirit, it would seem that it ought to be the Confession of Faith.

For poetry, as Matthew Arnold somewhere says, is that species of language in which man comes nearest to being able to speak the truth. It is the form which language naturally assumes when utterance is at its highest and best. When utterance casts off its fetters and obtains its freedom; when the highest and most august things are spoken of in a worthy manner; when there is discourse, in any wise adequate, of the truth that is of central and supreme significance for the human soul; when thought and feeling are so perfectly blended together that the thought seems all feeling and the feeling all thought; the result is always sure to be, in some form or other, poetry. This statement may easily be tested by considering the character of those few supreme passages in the orations of the world's greatest orators, which have achieved for themselves a sort of literary immortality. They are all of them elevated and august in character because of the lofty and dignified themes to which they relate; and they are all of them characterized by a certain unconscious and inevitable rhythm, being what may be called "prose poetry." The nearer expression approaches to the heart of things, the more rhythmic and poetical it becomes. All the greatest utterances belong to the "eternal melodies."

Poetry is not only the form which language naturally assume when the highest truth is worthily spoken of; it is also the language in which truth must be expressed when it is intended to transmit it to future generations and ages. This is because, while the speech of philosophy speedily becomes obsolete, that of poetry does not, but continues the same from age to age. The chief instance and illustration of this principle is, of course, the Bible. It has to do with the highest truth which is capable of being communicated to the human race; it is an expression and embodiment of this truth in such form as shall render it capable of being received by all men and by all ages; it is a thing which was intended to endure, which has

endured, which shall endure, "from generation to generation." Consequently the Bible is very largely poetry; it has to be so; the chief things of which it speaks could not adequately be spoken of in any other language. The Bible is steeped and saturated in poetry. Much of it is poetical in form as well as in spirit; all of it is poetical in spirit. Not to perceive this is to miss much of its meaning, and to be in danger of misunderstanding many of its utterances.

The same is true of a Confession of Faith, just in the degree in which it is truly and actually that which by its name it claims to be. A confession of faith has to do with the highest, the most vital, the most concerning and affecting truths; it is an expression of the passionate beliefs and convictions of the soul. It is intended, also, for the preservation and transmission of the truth; it is supposed to be constructed with a reference to after days and coming generations. Such being its nature and purpose, it is, when at its best, penetrated and dominated by the spirit of poetry. A confession of faith will probably be found strong where this spirit is present, and weak where it is absent; and the confession of faith which manifests most power of enduring unimpaired from generation to generation will probably be the one which possesses in combination with its doctrinal teaching the most of the poetical quality and character. Let it not be thought surprising that a confession of faith should be of a poetical character; the surprising thing is, rather, that it should not be so. If men have come to believe that a confession of faith has no affinity for poetry, it is probably because they have been in the habit of regarding such confession too exclusively as a system of theology. A confession of faith is something more than a compendium of doctrinal and theological statements; it is, as its name implies, for the confession of faith; and faith is of such a passionate nature that the language in which it is expressed becomes of necessity a species of poetry. Far from being incongruous with poetry, it may not unjustly be said that it is a good test of the excellence of a confession of faith whether



it is rhythmical, musical, poetical, capable of being sung or chanted. A system of philosophy or theology could hardly be chanted; but a confession of faith one ought to be able to chant. The oldest and best of the confessions of the Christian Church possess this capability; the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed may without any sense of incongruity be chanted as a part of the worship of the Church. And the ideal confession, whenever it comes, will probably be more like these; it will be shorter and simpler than some the Church has had; it will be, not less doctrinal, but more poetical; it will be capable, not merely of being taught, but also of being sung. However this may be, the fact remains, as shown by the instance of the Heidelberg Catechism, that, instead of being incompatible with poetry, it is the strength and glory of a confession of faith that in it the highest species of truth should be poetically apprehended and poetically expressed. It is significant that it is the most characteristic parts of the Heidelberg Catechism that exhibit this poetical quality; also, that these are the parts which manifest no signs of obsolescence.

Without doubt, as has been said, there is much in the Catechism, both as a confession of faith and as a book of religious instruction, that is not suited to the requirements of the present day. It contains things which might well be omitted; it omits things which it ought to contain. What changes it ought to undergo to make it acceptable and satisfactory, it is not part of our present purpose to discuss. It may be said, however, that the significant circumstance that it is the philosophical parts of the Catechism that have become obsolete, would seem to indicate that, however the Catechism may be changed, it ought not to be changed by putting more philosophy into it. The philosophy of the twentieth century is no more a finality than that of the sixteenth; it, too, shall become old and pass away; and the confession of faith ought to be expressed, as far as possible, in terms that "shall not pass away." It may be said, also, that whatever may be done with the Catechism, there are in it certain precious things which it would be

a great loss to lose, and which ought by all means to be preserved in whatever may take its place as a confession of faith and as a book of religious instruction. These are such as we have named: its personal and concrete character; its restraint and reserve; its subdued passion; its rhythmical and poetical quality. Above all, the spirit by which it is pervaded is most worthy to be that of whatever confession may take its place. The spirit a man is of, is a thing of more consequence than any particular view or opinion he may hold. It is so with a catechism; the spirit it is of is a thing of more importance than any philosophical or theological statement it may make. Whatever changes may be made in the Catechism, it is to be hoped that the beautiful spirit of it may be preserved. Let those who may be entrusted with the work of revising it beware lest this spirit escape them; for it is a thing as subtle and evasive as it is precious. The Heidelberg Catechism, with all its incorrectnesses corrected, and all in it that is out of date brought up to date, but with its spirit gone, would, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, be an example of retrogression instead of progress, of impoverishment instead of enrichment. But to correct its incorrectnesses, to omit what is antiquated and obsolete, to supply what is omitted, and to preserve intact the spirit of the Catechism—this, if it were possible (which is by no means certain, for the formation of confessions of faith is not congenial to this age), would be an instance of true progress and true enrichment.

HAGERSTOWN, MD.



## II.

### THE ORIGIN OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.<sup>1</sup>

WM. J. HINKE.

To-day we commemorate the 350th anniversary of the introduction of the Reformed faith into Germany, an event of the most far-reaching significance and importance, for it exerted a lasting influence, not only upon the destiny of Germany, but even upon the whole later history of Europe.

This event of world-wide importance was heralded by the appearance of a small and apparently insignificant little book, of less than one hundred pages, the Heidelberg Catechism, so called after the picturesque city of Heidelberg, situated on the vine-clad banks of the beautiful Neckar valley. By issuing this book Frederick III, the Elector of the Palatinate, was regarded by all Protestant princes as introducing a new faith into Germany differing in several important particulars from the then prevailing Lutheran creed, which, besides the Catholic faith, was then the only tolerated religion of the empire.

The appearance of the little book caused a tremendous stir. Soon angry voices were raised in protest. Pamphlets and books appeared in rapid succession, which denounced its supposed heresies in unmeasured terms, while the princes of the empire threatened Frederick with the loss of his electorate, yea even the loss of his life.

In order to understand the causes which led to the introduction of the Reformed faith into Germany, it is necessary to review briefly the conditions, which prevailed in the Palatinate, when Frederick III became Elector in 1559.

Germany, then as now, consisted of a large number of inde-

<sup>1</sup> Address delivered before the Reformed Social Union of Philadelphia, January 17, 1913.

pendent states, whose religion was determined by their princes, the people having no voice in religious matters. Of these princes a considerable number were adherents of Protestant principles. But while agreeing in all essentials they were by no means united in details. They were in reality split into two parties, named after their respective leaders, strict Lutherans and milder Melancthonians.

The princes of the Palatinate belonged to the latter party. Ever since the 3d of January, 1546, when the Lord's Supper was first celebrated in Heidelberg in Protestant manner, by giving both bread and wine to the communicants, the Palatinate had been Melancthonian, or mildly Lutheran. This appeared especially in the church order, which Otto Henry introduced in 1556, which, while adhering to the Augsburg confession in its liturgical parts, inclined distinctly to the Reformed position in its definition of the Lord's Supper. For, according to it, "there are visible signs given to us in the supper, which serve to remind us of the promise and testify to it, so that each one may apply the promise to himself, *by faith*, while rightly using the sacrament."<sup>2</sup>

It must also be remembered that Melancthon was himself born in the Palatinate and, from the first introduction of the Reformation, in 1546, to the day of his death (April 19, 1560), exerted a powerful influence upon its development. Owing to this influence of Melancthon and to the conservative position of the princes of the Palatinate, a large number of theologians, professors and statesmen were called to fill important offices in church and state, who felt an inclination towards the milder Melancthonian or even Calvinistic position. The historical antecedents, therefore, as well as the influence of its prominent men prepared the Palatinate for the Reformed faith and were themselves the receptive soil, into which Reformed ideas were sown with lasting results.

But the central figure of the stirring events which took place in Heidelberg in the third quarter of the sixteenth cen-

<sup>2</sup> See Seisen, *Geschichte der Reformation in Heidelberg*, p. 58.



ture was, without question, the Elector Frederick III. His life shows a singular chain of providential events, which by a moral necessity led him to the position which he finally occupied.

He was born on February 14, 1515, in the Ducal castle of the little town of Simmern, situated in one of the poorest and most barren districts of Germany, the Hunsrück. His father, Duke John II, of Pfalz-Simmern, was firmly attached to the emperor and the Catholic religion. Aside from other indications of his favor, the emperor had appointed John II president of the superior Court of the Empire, which position he held for years, while the church was supplying his sons and daughters with lucrative offices. Two of his sons had entered the church, while five of his eight daughters had taken the veil. Thus Frederick grew up in an intensely Catholic atmosphere. As a boy he was sent for several years to the most Catholic courts of Europe, to that of the Cardinal of Lorraine at Nancy, that of the Bishop of Liege (now in Belgium), and to the court of the Emperor Charles V, at Brussels. When seventeen years of age, he took part in an expedition of the emperor against the Turks and, on account of his valor, was knighted by the emperor. The lance, which he wielded in battle, is still preserved in his home church at Simmern, fastened to one of the pillars, with an accompanying inscription, testifying to his prowess.

When a young man of twenty-two years, he married in 1537 Maria, the seventeen-year-old daughter of the Margrave Casimir of Brandenburg-Kulmbach, a strong and noble woman, herself an enthusiastic Lutheran, who soon made her husband acquainted with the writings of Luther, induced him to take up the study of the Bible and of theological questions and thereby succeeded in making a Protestant out of him. There were two influences which assisted her efforts. The first was the fact that Frederick himself felt repelled and disgusted by the immorality which he had witnessed at the various Catholic courts. It had impressed upon him the necessity of a moral

reformation in church and state, while the simple piety of his wife showed him the beauty of a true Christian life. The other influence was his own poverty, his slender income, which was hardly sufficient to provide for the rapidly increasing family. The cares of family life turned him to God. Necessity taught him to pray.

Moreover his conversion to Protestantism was accomplished, not without considerable sacrifices. He incurred thereby the lasting displeasure of his father, who would not pardon his apostasy and punished him by still further decreasing his limited income. This reduced his family to still more distressed circumstances and compelled his wife to appeal repeatedly to her relatives for financial help. In view of his extreme poverty his later elevation to the electorate appeared to his contemporaries as an act of special providence, while even his enemies recognized that his devotion to the truth had early exposed him to danger and disgrace. Referring to this time of obscurity and distress, the Elector himself confessed at a later time, that he had felt "like a poor, soiled, sooty kitchen maid, sitting behind the stove, after whom none inquired, because she was so poor and black."<sup>3</sup> The way to the Electorate was opened for Frederick by the fact that two electors, Frederick II, and Otto Henry, passed away childless. With the latter the Heidelberg line of the Palatine princes died out and the Electorate passed to the Simmern line.

When Frederick III became Elector, in February, 1559, he was by no means inclined to the Reformed faith, for in October of that year he directed the tutor of his son, Count Christopher, to instruct him "according to the Augsburg Confession and especially in the catechism of the sainted Martin Luther."<sup>4</sup> Indeed Frederick would have preferred to assume a neutral position among the warring factions in the empire, as well as in his own principality. But circumstances soon forced him to a definite decision.

<sup>3</sup> See *Briefe Friedrich des Frommen*, Vol. I, p. 260.

<sup>4</sup> See Ullmann's interesting sketch of the life of Frederick III in Piper's *Evangelischer Kalender, Jahrbuch für 1862*, pp. 185-199, esp. p. 189.



In 1558, at the recommendation of Melancthon, Tielemann Hesshus, a former student of Melancthon, had been called to Heidelberg as the general superintendent of the Palatinate church. He was a man who had become a perfect zealot for the cause of extreme Lutheranism, intolerant, and over-bearing in spirit, who soon strained every nerve to establish the pure Lutheran faith and worship in the Palatinate. But his efforts met with a determined opposition. Strict Lutherans were but few in number among the higher officials of the Elector. Melancthonians and adherents of the Reformed faith were in the majority, and surpassed the Lutheran extremists both in learning and in personal ability. The leading men who were Calvinistic in their tendencies were: Thomas Erastus, a famous physician and professor of medicine in the University, Peter Boquinus, the dean of the theological faculty and professor of theology, Christopher Ehem, one of the Electoral councillors, Stephen Cirler, the Electoral Secretary, Michael Diller, the court preacher of the Elector, Nicholas Cisner, professor of ethics and the two classical philologists, Simon Grynaeus and William Xylander.

Even at the beginning of his reign, the closest friends of Frederick were afraid of the subtle poison of his Calvinistically inclined courtiers and councillors. As early as April 7, 1559, the Elector's wife, Maria, who was staying at Amberg, wrote to her son-in-law, expressing the fear that the Counts of Erbach (Eberhard and George) might gain influence over her husband, for they were "strongly Zwinglian."<sup>5</sup> But in 1559 there was as yet no real danger of his dreaded apostasy, for shortly after his accession Frederick called Lutheran ministers to vacant charges and a Lutheran professor to the University of Heidelberg.<sup>6</sup>

The first influence which estranged Frederick from the Lutheran faith was the violence and fanaticism of the Lutheran extremists, especially the intolerance and bigotry of his Gen-

<sup>5</sup> See *Briefe Friedrichs*, Vol. I, p. 53.

<sup>6</sup> See Kluckhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme*, p. 50.

eral Superintendent, Tielemann Hesshus. His former teacher Melancthon seems to have known only his great talents and earnest piety, but was apparently unacquainted with his passionate nature and his extreme theological position.

It did not take long till Hesshus was involved in a fierce quarrel with the university, the members of the Consistory and the Calvinistic ministers, especially with the deacon or assistant preacher of the Holy Ghost Church, William Klebitz, who was just about as hot-headed and violent in speech as his opponent. After several preliminary skirmishes, it came to an open rupture between the two men, when Klebitz, in the absence of the superintendent, received from the university the degree of bachelor of theology, defending in his public disputation theses which were essentially Calvinistic. On his return Hesshus turned, therefore, against the university, calling it "a hellish, devilish, cursed, cruel and terrible thing." Klebitz followed his opponent with a similar violent outbreak, challenging him to prove that his views were false. During this time Frederick was away from Heidelberg, being at the diet of Regensburg, where the emperor solemnly invested him with the electorate. Meanwhile, Count Erasmus von Venningen, whom he had left behind as his governor, was hardly able to control the warring factions. When the governor called the ministers into his presence and admonished them to refrain from all controversy until the return of the Elector, Hesshus declared not only that he would forbid Klebitz the administration of the sacraments, but he also threatened the old count himself, Frederick's governor, and the court preacher Diller, with the ban. A few days later the ban was actually pronounced on Klebitz.

Upon his return to Heidelberg Frederick cited the contending parties into his presence, and forbade them, under pain of dismissal, to continue their controversy. He removed the ban from Klebitz and demanded that no other formula be used in the Lord's Supper than the one authorized by the Augsburg Confession.



But Hesshus was not to be silenced. On September 13 he hurled new invectives and denunciations upon Klebitz and even dared to cast suspicion upon the orthodoxy of the Elector and of his councillors.

This was too much even for the long-suffering and patient Elector. On September 16, 1559, both Hesshus and Klebitz were dismissed, the latter, however, with an honorable testimonial.

Shortly afterwards Frederick sent his private secretary to Wittemberg, to ask Melancthon for a written opinion as to what course should be pursued.

On November 3, 1559, Melancthon answered more definitely than might have been expected from his long-continued silence during the theological controversies of the preceding years. He advised that the words of the institution of the Lord's Supper as used by Paul be employed, and he explained communion as "that whereby the union with the body of Christ takes place, not without thought, as when mice gnaw off the bread."<sup>7</sup> He also approved of the act of Frederick dismissing the chief disturbers of the peace. This opinion of Melancthon was of great importance for the future development of Frederick. It did not convince him at once of the correctness of the Calvinistic view of the Lord's Supper, but it sent him to the Bible for renewed study and examination.

As a result he passed whole days and nights, poring over theological books, but above all in the study of the Bible, so that the old court marshal declared "that he was depriving himself of sleep, health and the enjoyment of life, in order to search for the truth."<sup>8</sup>

After the departure of Hesshus peace was by no means established in the Palatinate, for the fanatical chancellor Von Minkwitz, supported to some extent by the old court judge Von Venningen, continued the fierce attacks upon the suspected heretics.

<sup>7</sup> See Kluckhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme*, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> See Kluckhohn, l. c., p. 62.

How great the alarm of the Lutheran party was can be gathered from the fact that on March 16, 1560, the Elector's wife asked her son-in-law, in a letter, to have public prayers said, in his churches, in behalf of Frederick, that God might keep him in the true faith.<sup>9</sup>

During the years 1560 and 1561 two important conferences were held which exerted a lasting influence upon Frederick's future course of action.

In June, 1560, during the wedding festivities of his second daughter with the Duke John William of Saxe-Weimar, the two Lutheran theologians of his son-in-law, John Stoessel and Maximilian Moerlin, held a public disputation in Heidelberg, lasting five days. The result was that the Lutheran theologians were generally regarded as the better orators and debaters, but that Boquinus and Erastus, the theologians of the Elector, surpassed them in "the thorough defence of the simple truth." But even this conference did not convert the Elector to the Reformed position. His chief aim was rather to maintain peace among his churches and to demand of his theologians adherence to the Augsburg Confession. But when he had exhausted all efforts in trying to induce some of the most ardent defenders of Lutheranism to be peaceful and tolerant, without meeting with any success, a few of the worst offenders were dismissed and, as was to be expected, their places were filled with men more peacefully inclined, more of a Melancthonian or even Calvinistic tendency. The Heidelberg disputation and the dismissal of the main disturbers created quite a sensation among the Protestant princes. Frederick was now openly accused of having departed from the Augsburg Confession. This had never been his intention, for it was not his aim or desire to maintain a separate and distinct position in German Protestantism. He still thought that the differences could be overcome by a synod of the Protestant leaders. Hence he gladly accepted the suggestion of Duke Christopher of Wurtemberg, that, as only two of the original

<sup>9</sup> See *Briefe Friedrich des Frommen*, Vol. I, p. 131.



signers of the Augsburg Confession were still living, all the Evangelical states and princes should sign the Augsburg Confession anew. A conference of the princes was therefore held in Naumburg in January, 1561.

At this conference an attempt was naturally made to find an authentic Ms. copy of the original Confession, as presented to the emperor at Augsburg in 1530. None could be found. They, therefore, had to fall back upon the printed editions. In comparing the earliest editions of 1530 and 1531 the surprising discovery was made that the earliest edition, in the accompanying apology, was almost Catholic in phraseology,<sup>10</sup> which even the strictest Lutheran extremists were slow to accept. Hence the later edition of 1531 was taken as the authoritative text. To it a preface was added, in which the altered edition of 1540 was recognized. This was signed by all the princes present, except Frederick's son-in-law, the fanatical Duke John Frederick of Saxony. The influence of this conference on Frederick was the deciding factor in his development.

The discovery that the first edition of the Augsburg Confession was almost Catholic in its statements, lowered at once the respect which Frederick had formerly had for that historic document. It showed him that even the greatest men reached their later convictions only gradually. If they were mistaken in their first views, might they not also be mistaken in their later views? Before he had unhesitatingly accepted the more moderate Lutheran views of the Lord's Supper; now, however, doubts were raised whether after all they might not be wrong.

This compelled him once more to study the whole question, in the light of the Scriptures, and with the help of ancient and later commentators and books. The leading Lutheran book on this question, to which Frederick was repeatedly referred, was the "Short Confession of the Holy Sacrament," written by Luther in 1544. But this book was singularly weak, filled more with denunciations than solid arguments. Hence it

<sup>10</sup> See Kluckhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme*, p. 88; *Briefe*, Vol. I, pp. 156 f.

made a bad impression on Frederick. A few weeks after the Naumburg conference he wrote to the Saxon Duke: "I find in it little that tends to edification, but Luther denounces in it the false teachers and Zwinglians, and warns against them, which is quite right. . . . Yet he confesses that he knows of their views only by hearsay and does not state how, when and where they teach false doctrines.—This I cannot praise."<sup>11</sup>

The Reformed books, treating of the Lord's Supper, were mostly filled with good reasoning and Scriptural argumentation, which did not fail to influence the Elector deeply, for in the year 1562 he definitely left his neutral course and became a conservative advocate of the Reformed faith.

These then were the various steps that led the Elector to the Reformed faith, which at that time was still regarded as a permissible form of the prevailing Protestantism which enjoyed legal recognition and protection: (1) The general tendency of the Palatinate towards the Melanthonian or more moderate position; (2) the large number of Reformed theologians and officials then in the Palatinate; (3) the violence and fanaticism of the strict Lutherans; (4) the disputation at Heidelberg in 1560 and the conference at Naumburg in 1561, which made Frederick doubt Luther's authority; (5) his own independent study of the scriptures and his peacefully inclined nature. These influences induced him to adopt the Reformed faith.

Having reached this position himself, it was a natural desire to unite his churches upon the same theological position. This could not be done more effectively than by preparing a catechism, which should be based, like his own convictions, exclusively upon the Word of God.

He himself gives us, in the preface to the Catechism, the reasons which actuated him in its introduction. He writes: "I learned in the beginning of my administration, that although my dear cousins, the Electors, my predecessors of blessed memory, had undertaken different Christian orders

<sup>11</sup> See *Briefe Friedrich des Frommen*, Vol. I, p. 167.



and regulations, that they were not carried out as earnestly as they ought to have been and did not yield the fruit that was hoped for. This induced me not only to renew the same, but also, where necessity required, to improve them. I also found no little deficiency in this, that young people everywhere in my electorate, both in schools and churches were carelessly instructed in Christian doctrine, and in some places not at all, everywhere unequally and nowhere by a uniform catechism, but according to each one's private ideas and plans. From this state of things it came to pass that the children were brought up without fear of God and knowledge of his word. I deemed it, therefore, of the highest importance and the chief duty of my administration, to correct the lack of uniformity and other abuses and to bring about necessary reforms. To this end, with the advice and consent of my whole theological faculty and all superintendents and most prominent ministers, I ordered a catechism of the Christian religion to be compiled from the Word of God, in German and Latin, that hereafter not only the youth in churches and schools may be instructed in these doctrines, but also preachers and teachers may have an authoritative form and rule, according to which they can instruct the youth, without making changes and introducing new doctrines." The object of the Catechism was, therefore, according to the Elector's own statement, mainly twofold, purity of doctrine and unity among his churches.

With this object in view, the writing of a catechism was entrusted to a commission consisting, as Frederick put it, of "the whole theological faculty, all his superintendents and principal ministers." All other contemporaneous documents support this statement. Under the direction of this commission Ursinus prepared two preliminary catechisms, a larger one of 323 questions, strongly Calvinistic, elaborating the idea of the covenant, and a smaller catechism of 108 questions,<sup>12</sup> the latter based, after the model of "Common Places" of

<sup>12</sup> These two catechisms of Ursinus are reprinted in Lang, *Der Heidelberger Katechismus und vier verwandte Katechismen*, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 152-218.

Melancthon, the teacher of Ursinus, upon the Epistle to the Romans, with its threefold division of human sinfulness, divine deliverance and Christian thankfulness. This smaller catechism of Ursinus, with its threefold division, became the principal source of the final Catechism, the Heidelberg. The final revision was most probably entrusted to Olevianus, for our Catechism shows the persuasive eloquence of this great theologian. It is written in his fervent style. Moreover the sections referring to the church (Qu. 54–55) and the office of the keys (Qu. 83–85) agree closely with the later Palatinate order of worship, which appeared in November, 1563, and is certainly the work of Olevianus. The Elector himself took an active interest in the very form of the questions. Thus he declared in October, 1563, to the messengers sent to him by Dukes Christopher and Wolfgang, "that the Catechism was composed, not without previous consultation; but after thorough deliberation was prepared by pious men, then presented to him, read by him carefully several times, considered and compared with the rule and guide of God's word and finally published with unanimous approval."<sup>13</sup>

Before the Diet of Augsburg, in 1566, Frederick said: "I can prove by my own handwriting, that after receiving the catechism from my theologians, and reading it, I corrected it in several places."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See Kluckhohn, *Briefe*, Vol. I, p. 465.

<sup>14</sup> Kluckhohn, l. c., p. 726.

An interesting change was made by Frederick in the form of the 78th question. According to a statement of the Reformed professors at Heidelberg in 1707, made in answer to the attacks of Christian Rittmeyer, a councillor of the then Catholic Elector, there was at that time "somewhere a memorial, written by the Elector's own hand, from which it appears, that the very words of the Catechism had to be submitted to his approval. 'The answer to the question: Do then Bread and Wine become the real body and blood of Christ? was at first worded thus: 'Just as little as before the body of Christ became essential, real bread, when he called himself the true bread [John 6: 32], and yet he was truthful in his words.' Which answer was taken



When the work was completed, it was laid before a Synod, which convened in Heidelberg for eight days in January, 1563. The work was received with unanimous approval and subscribed by all save one, the superintendent of Ingelheim, who it seems later joined his associates. The Synod closed its sessions on January 17, 1563, when all partook of the Lord's Supper, celebrated in the Reformed manner, with bread that was broken, instead of wafers handed to the communicant. On Monday, January 18, all the members of the Synod were called to the castle, where the Elector dismissed them with an address, expressing his satisfaction with their work. On the following day, January 19, the vigorous and beautiful preface was written by the Elector, with which the book came from the press during the course of the next month.

The first edition was remarkable by the fact that the questions were unnumbered, the scripture passages were only cited by chapters, the division into Sunday lessons was absent and the question, later numbered as the 80th, treating of the difference between the Mass and the Lord's Supper, was entirely wanting. We now know that this 80th question was inserted at the urgent representation of Olevianus. On April 3, 1563, he wrote to Calvin: "The question of the Lord's Supper had been omitted in the first German edition. . . . Admonished by me, the prince ordered it to be added to the second German and the first Latin editions."<sup>15</sup> In the second

almost verbatim from the Greek Dialogues of Theodoret. This was changed in order that it might not be thought that it was the intention to make merely a symbol or figure of speech out of the sacrament, although in the following question the opposite is brought out at length. When the catechism was adopted with this one change, I was not only well satisfied, but, according to my opinion, it redounded to the honor of God and my special pleasure.' From this one specimen it follows, that the authors of the catechism could not have inserted anything into the Eightieth Question, without the knowledge and consent of the Elector."

See *Christliche Erinnerung der Reformirten Professoren Theologiae zu Heidelberg*, etc., 1707, p. 6; Gooszen, *De Heidelberg. Catechismus*, p. 98 f.

<sup>15</sup> See *Corpus Reformatorum*, Vol. XLVII, p. 683; Gooszen, *De Heidelbergsche Catechismus*, p. 116.

edition the 80th question still lacked the closing sentence in the definition of the Lord's Supper and also the closing sentence in the definition of the Mass, including its denunciation as "an accursed idolatry."<sup>16</sup> This last addition, made in the third edition of 1563, was most unfortunate. It added no strength to the catechism, but exposed it and the church it represented to fierce persecutions in later years. The catechism was issued in its final form in the Palatinate Liturgy or Order of Worship, which appeared in November, 1563. It, together with the Consistorial Order of the year 1564, completed the organization of the Palatinate church.

The crowning success came to Frederick at the Diet of Augsburg, on May 14, 1566, when his enemies had planned to exclude him from the peace of the empire, as not being a true adherent to the Augsburg Confession. Then his immortal and noble defence of his catechism silenced all opposition so effectively that even his opponents were compelled to confess that Frederick was more pious than all of them.

To-day we celebrate the appearance of this little, but world-renowned book, which, as Dr. Goebel has well expressed it, may be regarded as "the flower and fruit of the whole German and

<sup>16</sup> The additions made to the 80th question in the third edition have never been given in English, although they are important enough to deserve careful attention. In the following quotation they are indicated by *square* brackets:

"The Lord's Supper testifies to us that we have full forgiveness of all our sins through the one sacrifice of Jesus Christ, which He Himself once accomplished on the cross; [and that by the Holy Ghost we are ingrafted into Christ, who with his true body is now in heaven at the right hand of the Father and is to be there worshipped]. But the mass teaches that the living and the dead have not forgiveness of sins through the sufferings of Christ, unless Christ is still daily offered for them by the mass-priests; [and that Christ is bodily under the form of bread and wine and is therefore to be worshipped in them]. And thus the mass at bottom is [nothing else than] a(n) (idolatrous) denial of the one sacrifice and passion of Jesus Christ, [and an accursed idolatry]."

This shows that the third edition made *four* separate additions to the text of the second edition, while one word of the second edition, put in round brackets, was dropped as superfluous.



French reformation. It has Lutheran fervor, Melancthonian clearness, Zwinglian simplicity and Calvinistic fire, all melted into one,"<sup>17</sup> and therefore it has become the one common confession of the Reformed churches all over the world.

AUBURN, N. Y.

<sup>17</sup> See Göbel, *Geschichte des Christlichen Lebens in der Evangelischen Kirche*, etc., Vol. I, p. 392.

### III.

## THE THEOLOGY OF THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.

A. E. DAHLMANN.

When we speak of the "Theology of the Heidelberg Catechism" we would not be understood as asserting that the little book, as rich in content as it is brief in expression, as great in power as it is small in bulk, to whose value this year's celebration of its 350th jubilee throughout the Protestant world bears witness, was intended to be a strictly logical and systematic statement of Christian doctrine. Its original purpose was to be a text-book for the teaching of Christian truth as held by those German Protestants who found no warrant in Scripture for certain decisively and exclusively Lutheran doctrines. Its aim was to teach the vital saving truths of Christianity not so much as a system of doctrine to be grasped by the mind, but rather to present to the mind and heart the fundamental facts and truths given in the Lord Jesus Christ as revealed unto us in the Holy Scriptures, those facts and truths which are essential to our salvation. The manner in which these truths find expression in our catechism is the noteworthy characteristic and distinguishing glory of this small book, which is a priceless boon, not only for the Reformed Church in the United States whose only confession of faith it is, but for the Christian world; and in regard to which a righteous pride and a reverent regard should not be wanting in any member of the Reformed Church, whose mind and heart were charged with these truths by the training in a Christian home and the instruction of a faithful pastor. We have in the catechism more than a mere statement of these facts and truths—and a careful and exact



statement it is;—they are stated as the profession of the personal faith of the believer, a profession growing out of his own personal experience and made with all the fervor and joy which such experience brings. Its definitions and statements are therefore not merely radiant with the cold light of logic; they are at the same time aglow with the warmth of love to Him who loved us and gave Himself for us.

And yet there is a well-connected and comprehensive system of Christian doctrine underlying all these statements from beginning to end; they are not “*disjuncta membra*,” not disconnected teachings. The beautiful connection of thought running through the catechism is so evident that it needs no illustration. Even the uneducated who has become familiar with it through wise instruction has a connected and orderly knowledge of the teachings of Christianity, though he may not be fully conscious of it. He will never be in danger to place that which belongs in the center in the circumference, or vice versa. He will be able to judge of any teaching or opinion of the day in its relation to the fundamental truth of Christianity. Such a one will in this respect never be as a reed shaken by the wind. And the educated Christian, the professional theologian, finds in the Heidelberg Catechism not only a comprehensive theological system underlying it as its framework, but a theology far in advance of the time when it was written; in its freedom from scholasticism in which so much of the Protestant theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth century was enthralled; in its broad and comprehensive grasp of the truth as it is in Christ Jesus; in its view of Christianity as a life, a spiritual dynamic to regenerate not only the individual but also society; and in its irenic spirit.

A thorough and exhaustive treatment of the theology of the Heidelberg Catechism would be a valuable contribution to the theology of to-day. Within the narrow limits to which a REVIEW article must be confined, we can at best only refer to some essential features of this subject.

1. The first essential feature of the theology of the Heidel-

berg Catechism is that it is *Biblical*. We do not mean that it is Biblical in the sense of being supported by proof texts taken “ad libitum” from any part of Scripture; nor that all the proof texts quoted in the original and subsequent editions are applicable and adequate to show that the doctrine referred to is taught in the Bible. The progressive character of divine revelation was not recognized at the time the catechism was written, neither did editors of later editions observe it. We mean to say that not only the tenor of the catechism taken as a whole, but that every one of its teachings considered separately and in its connection, is in such full accord with Scripture truth, that it is an accurate statement and an edifying elucidation of Bible teaching. The doctrine of total depravity in the sense that man is entirely incapable of self redemption and is wholly dependent for his salvation—a salvation here and now, perfected in eternity—upon the grace of God freely offered in Christ Jesus; and the doctrine of original sin as an iniquitous and sinful condition of our nature, transmitted according to the law of heredity by the father of the race to all his posterity, these doctrines are taught clearly and unequivocally in the catechism; but we submit that although they are relegated by some to the fossilized orthodoxy of the past, they are distinctly taught in the Scriptures, as is testified by the best and most authoritative grammatico-exegetical and historico-critical commentaries of to-day. When the catechism states that “we are by nature prone to hate God and our neighbor,” it emphasizes a fact, of which every one who with noble endeavor, deep earnestness of heart and burning zeal strives for the “higher life” becomes most painfully and humiliatingly conscious; the fact namely that the ascent to the “holy mount of God” is more difficult and impossible for us than that of Mont-Blanc and the Matterhorn on account of the very pronounced aversion of our nature to the life required, whereas the descent into the quagmire of moral corruption is as free and easy as the exhilarating coasting down the hillside on a brisk, sunshiny and breezy winter’s day. Does it merely ex-



press the experience of the apostle when he says, the good that I would I do not, but the evil that I would not, that I do? Is this not rather the sad wail out of the depths of every soul which hungers and thirsts after righteousness? Does this not clearly express the tendency of the human heart away from God, its natural selfishness which is an aversion against the righteous claims of God and our neighbors upon us? And do we question the Scriptural correctness of the strong word used in the catechism: "prone to hate," when the apostle himself declares: carnal-mindedness, that is the state of mind and heart of the natural, unregenerate man, is enmity against God?

And the doctrines of a vicarious atonement of the necessity of the satisfaction of the righteousness and holiness of that God who is infinite love, it is true, but *righteous* and *holy* love, if human sin and guilt are to be removed; of the fact of such satisfaction rendered by the vicarious sufferings and death of the Lord Jesus Christ; these doctrines as explicitly taught in the catechism, are they not essentially and perfectly Scriptural? If you would expunge from Scripture all those passages which teach explicitly or impliedly a vicarious atonement, an atonement which is on the one hand a necessary satisfaction of the divine righteousness and holiness and on the other a reconciliation of man to God wrought by infinite love, you must eliminate the greater part of the New Testament; and in order to do that you must throw aside as worthless most of the grand hymnody of the Christian ages as well as reconstruct and rewrite the liturgies of the church from the apostolic time to the present day. More than that you must replace the old unmovable rockbottom foundation of a faith that gives the guilty conscience peace, that conquers sin and affliction in life and triumphs in death: "*the blood of Jesus Christ cleanses from all sin,*" by a better and more reliable one. Who will dare the attempt more atrocious than the storming of Olympus?

Space forbids to give more instances of the Scripturalness of the teachings of the Heidelberg Catechism. The doctrines

we have instanced were selected, because they have borne the brunt of the attack against our precious heritage from Heidelberg, as out of date according to the latest light shed on the Scriptures. But the same Scripturalness can easily be shown for all its teachings. The forty-fourth question, it is true, does not explain the descent into hades. But what is stated there in regard to the believer's comfort in all his tribulations is as much Bible truth as is found in any answer.

2. The theology of the Heidelberg Catechism is *Christocentric*. In this respect it surpasses all books of its kind contemporaneous with it and is far in advance of the age in which it was written. The cardinal and fundamental, the great central truth of divine revelation as given in the Bible, revealed indistinctly in the Old Testament, fully manifest in the New, that which constitutes the unity of all the different books of the Bible, is the self-revelation of God in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, and redemption, life and blessedness in Him for the individual and for the human family. Jesus Christ is the great central sun from Whom all the light and truth of Scripture radiates and in Whom it is focused. The authority and spiritual value of any book of Scripture is greater or less in proportion as the Christ is more dimly or clearly revealed in that book. Jesus the Christ is the sum and substance of the Bible. As of the Bible He is also the sum and substance of the Christian religion, its alpha and omega. Christianity is the life of Christ in the soul of man, transfiguring him as to his inner and outer life into a child of God and therefore into sanctified manhood; it is the redeeming, regenerating and life-giving presence and activity of the Christ in the world, leading to the victory of His eternal kingdom of truth, righteousness and peace in the Holy Ghost. All the springs of that life which is the light of men for the individual and society are in Him. Now if the Christ is the sum and substance of the Bible, its fundamental truth and central fact, and if Christianity is life proceeding from the Christ present and active in the soul and in society, then it follows that the person of the



Lord Jesus Christ, Who is the revelation of the Father, Who unites us with the Father, in Whom we have redemption and life, must be the central and unifying principle of a theology which is truly and fully Christian; the principle underlying all its teachings, from which all its doctrines are evolved, and in which they are all gathered together as the different parts of the rose or lily are gathered together and blended in the fragrant and beautiful flower. In this sense we claim that the theology of the Catechism is Christocentric.

This characteristic is evident in the classic and beautiful first question and answer which is the introduction to the book and gathers in itself all its teachings as it were in a focus. This introduction may be compared to the portal and vestibule of a palace all radiant with the light and glory within, affording the beholder even before he enters the reception hall an enrapturing vision; or to the living seed germinally containing within itself all the richness and beauty of the matured fruit. Not knowledge of doctrines but the personal relation between the believer and Christ, Who has purchased him as His own, preserves him in perfect safety amid all the changing scenes of life, dwells within him by His spirit as the power and assurance of life eternal which is here and now a life of godliness and service and of glory hereafter, this is the essential characteristic of Christianity and the well-spring of consolation and blessedness in life and death.

The threefold division of the catechism according to the epistle to the Romans is Christocentric; namely, (1) the need of the Christ on account of human sinfulness; (2) the redemption by the Christ, and (3) the joyous thank-offering of heart and soul to the Christ. How thoroughly and well this great central truth of Jesus the Christ and redemption and life in Him is carried out through the whole book is evident to every one from its pages.

We have a striking illustration of this fact in the position and space given to the creed and its elucidation. Jesus Christ the only begotten of the Father, conceived by the Holy Ghost,

born of the Virgin Mary, suffered, risen and glorified, is the central truth of the Apostles' Creed, the fundamental article of our faith. Remove or change this in any way and you eliminate the organizing principle of the creed so that you have disconnected fragments left. How well this was recognized by the authors of the catechism, how perfectly and naturally they incorporated the creed in the catechism so that its explanation fills not only a considerable and most important part of the book, but the Christ, the revealer of the Father and the Savior of men is the vital truth in every question and answer.

This Christocentric character of the theology of the catechism comes into view very clearly in the 20th, 21st and 60th questions. In the two former we have a very clear and exact definition of true faith, analyzing it as a belief of, an intellectual assent to the revealed Gospel truth; but essentially as a personal trust in the Christ, bringing us into vital union and fellowship with Him, so that with His life pulsating within us we partake of His salvation here and of His glory hereafter.

In the answer to the 60th question we have a simple but comprehensive statement of the pivotal doctrine of the Reformation, Justification by Faith. It is described as a declaratory act of God, Who grants and imputes to the believer the perfect satisfaction, righteousness and holiness of Christ. But he receives it only by faith, and as this faith brings us into vital union with Christ and makes us partakers of His life, we are justified on the ground of what Christ has done *for* us and is doing *within* us. Thus there can be no justification without the Christ for us having become the Christ within us, whose complete dominion in thought and feeling, in word and deed is effected in the process of sanctification.

That Christ is the central and vital principle of the theology of the catechism can easily be illustrated by many other questions, but those referred to will suffice. That the person of the Christ, the Godman, the revealer of the Father, must be the central and vital principle of a theology which is Biblical,



is taught in no confession of faith, in no catechism for the instruction of the people so clearly and is the unifying and organizing principle of none of them so completely as it is of our precious heritage from Heidelberg. The unifying principle of many Protestant theological systems is the sovereignty of God and the doctrine of the decrees; of others it is the facts of Christian experience and human consciousness as testifying to Scripture teaching. A theology which is thoroughly Biblical, that is, in full accord with the spiritual truth revealed in the Bible, must be Christocentric. We have such systems; Dr. J. A. Dorner's great monumental work, *Christliche Glaubenslehre* is preëminent among them and by no means out of date. The Christian church to-day is surely not without some indebtedness to the Heidelberg Catechism for this central and unifying principle of a theological system which is comprehensive and Biblical; a principle recognized as such to-day by theologians of all Protestant evangelical churches.

3. The third characteristic of the theology of the Heidelberg Catechism which we would mention is that it is *experiential*. By this we mean that it is not based upon innate ideas nor upon merely intellectual conceptions of Scripture teaching, but upon Scripture facts and truths which have become our own conscious possession by way of personal experience. The system of doctrine taught in the catechism is the truth revealed in Holy Scripture and experienced as the power of God unto salvation in the heart and life of the believer; a truth, therefore, which is not merely a concept of the mind but a living fact in the soul. Our idea of a certain truth may be indefinite and obscure, so that this truth after all remains something foreign to us. But when we have learned to know the meaning, value and power of this truth by the test of experience, it becomes precious to our hearts and luminous to our minds, and what was formerly an abstract idea becomes a blessed and living reality. As such realities the Scripture teachings are given to us in our catechism. And upon these realities rather

than upon abstract ideas its theology is founded. Thus we know that we belong to Christ not only because the Bible says so, but also because of the testimony of the spirit within. Sin, redemption, repentance, faith, conversion, justification, sanctification, are not mere ideas but experiences and realities. It is not the abstract idea of Christ deduced from the Scriptures by a process of reasoning, which gives unity to our catechism and makes it an organic whole, but the Christ of the Scriptures living and dominant in the soul of the Christian by personal faith and communion with Him, known by the soul's experience as the Way, the Truth, the Life, the Revealer of the Father, giving us the vision and leading us to the realization of the length and breadth, the height and depth of the love of God and filling us with the fulness of God. It is the Christ living and reigning in the soul and in the world of men for the victory of His kingdom of righteousness, peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, Who is the sum and substance of the whole catechism, to Whom every question, either directly or in the connection in which it is found, bears witness, and to Whom it leads. This is evident from the first question as to our only comfort in life and death unto the last witnessing the triumphant faith, that our prayers in His name and for the fulness of divine grace and the choicest blessings for time and eternity are surely answered for His sake.

Every question of the catechism is addressed to the believer who is a living member of Christ, and every answer is a confession of his faith by which he has realized the saving and life-giving power of the Christ, a personal testimony of his heart's experience.

This is a great excellency and glory of our catechism. Its theology has its basis in facts, the great facts of divine revelation, and the no less significant and wonderful facts in the realm of consciousness within the soul. It meets the modern requirement of science that it be grounded in fact, that reality precedes theory, the fact our consciousness or idea of it; it is in full accord with the demands made to-day of a theological



system, that life precedes doctrine and the latter is an outgrowth of the former and not vice versa. What is heralded as a modern acquisition of theological thought we find in the little book from Heidelberg of the sixteenth century. How fully up to date it is!

4. The latter is also true of the fourth characteristic of its theology, viz., its *irenical spirit*. It has been said repeatedly that the catechism is melanchthonian in tendency, *i. e.*, mediating between the Lutheran and the Reformed—Calvinistic—position. This claim is made by such an authority as Heppe in his *Deutscher Protestantismus*. Dr. Sudhoff positively denies it. The history of the catechism seems to prove that it was intended to be a clear, definite and popular statement of Reformed doctrine over against Lutheranism. Melancton took a stand against the bigoted and intolerant teachings and practices of the Lutheran theologians of his day and endeavored to bring about a consensus of opinion and a *modus vivendi* of the contending parties. Of a mediating tendency toward Lutheran views or of a yielding of distinctively Reformed convictions we find no evidence in the catechism. But the effort toward a better mutual understanding and more fraternal relations between the two great divisions of Protestantism, by avoiding all harshness of expression, all judgment and condemnation of those holding opposite views, all intolerance in word and spirit, is evident throughout the book. The catechism breathes the spirit of reconciliation, Christian brotherhood and love, which without sacrificing principle and deep-rooted convictions of the truth, recognizes the opponent's right to his honest convictions, the fallibility of all human knowledge, and the possibility of being one in love to the master and in efforts for His glory, though differing in their views of non-essentials. This spirit animated Melancthon; but Calvin none the less, who declared himself ready to sail through ten seas to promote the union of the Protestant churches. This spirit has found beautiful expression in our catechism.

The authors were undoubtedly Calvinists and believed in

the doctrine of predestination and the decrees as taught in Geneva. We know that Ursinus was a Calvinist from his commentary on the catechism and other writings. We know that Olevianus had studied at Geneva and was one of Calvin's devoted adherents. And yet the doctrine of predestination and the decrees is mentioned nowhere in the catechism. We will not argue with those who claim that the doctrine is there though not explicitly stated; that the inference from what is stated naturally leads to it. Such expressions as in the first question, "all things must work together for my salvation"; in the 31st question, "who defends and preserves us in the redemption obtained for us"; in the 53d question, "and He (the Holy Spirit) shall abide with me forever"; in the 54th question, "and forever shall remain a living member of the same (the Church of God)," are quoted to prove that the doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is taught in the catechism and by inference the doctrine of the decrees which is necessarily implied in the former teaching. We submit that the doctrine of the "*perseverentia sanctorum*" does *not* necessarily presuppose or imply the Calvinistic teaching of the decree of election and reprobation. Be that as it may, the question calls for an answer: Why is predestination not mentioned in a book which was not only written for instruction but was also a confession of faith written by Calvinists and for a church which looked toward Geneva for its teachings? It will not do to answer: the doctrine was considered too abstract for a book which was to be used for the religious instruction of the young and unlearned. Other doctrines just as abstract are mentioned and briefly explained, such as the Trinity, original sin, the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, the quickening of spiritual life and the gift of special grace by means of the sacraments, and the real presence of Christ in the Lord's supper. Its omission is rather to be regarded as an evidence of the *irenical* spirit pervading the catechism. It is in perfect consonance with this spirit that a teaching, which, though it was not essential to



salvation, was one of the chief matters of controversy, should not be mentioned.

In the questions concerning the Lord's Supper the doctrines of transubstantiation and consubstantiation are declared incorrect and the Reformed doctrine for which the church is indebted to Calvinism clearly stated; viz., the real presence of Christ in the supper and the nourishment of the believer's soul by the true body and blood of Christ through the Holy Ghost. We have a candid statement and a manly stand in our catechism on a subject in regard to which the two churches so essentially differed, a statement required in a publication which was to be the doctrinal standard of the Reformed Church over against Romanism and Lutheranism. But how carefully worded! how much closer the two views are brought together than when championed by Luther and Zwingli at Marburg! How carefully all harshness and judgment are avoided! How with all clearness of conception and loyalty to conviction the treatment of the question at issue evinces a conciliatory and fraternal spirit! How favorably our catechism compares in this respect with others contemporaneous with it and other doctrinal standards!

If in objection to the foregoing statement we are referred to the 80th question, and especially the last sentence, the historical fact is a sufficient answer, that this sentence was not in the original edition but was inserted later by command of the authorities.

The catechism reflects the spirit of the Reformed Church, whether in France, Holland, Scotland, Switzerland or Germany. Clear in its conceptions of the truth, tenacious in its adherence to the faith once delivered to the saints, true to its convictions, manly and heroic in their defence, it was ever ready to recognize those of different views as brethren in Christ, to offer them heart and hand in Christian love, as Zwingli did to Luther; zealous to do its share in making the article of the creed concerning the communion of saints a reality in this world. The theology of the Heidelberg Cate-

chism does not ignore the doctrinal differences between its own and other churches, but it does not unduly emphasize them. It builds its system with the great fundamental truths of evangelical Christianity, not arranged with reference to the exclusive denominational point of view, but brought into the right relation to the great central truth of Christianity, viz., Christ, the Godman, the revealer of the Father, the Savior of the individual and of society, the king of the heart and of redeemed humanity. So far from inculcating sectarianism, this theology cherishes the spirit of conciliation, fraternity and Christian love, so well expressed in the 55th question and answer. The idea that a different conception of doctrine can well go hand in hand with brotherly love and hearty coöperation in the general work of the kingdom is implied in the theological viewpoint of our catechism, an idea of whose meaning, scope and power the churches of Christ have become more fully conscious to-day than ever before and have consequently drawn more closely together than at any other time. The Reformed Church may well rejoice in the fact of having contributed its share to this closer union of the Churches by the teachings and influence of the catechism whose 350th jubilee it celebrates.

5. Another merit we claim for this little book so highly esteemed by all the branches of the Reformed family of churches is the *ethical* character of its theology. It emphasizes with no uncertain sound the life of obedience and devotion to God, of righteousness, of loving service to God and man, as the fruitage of a genuine living faith in Christ. The believer in whose heart Christ dwells by faith, is represented as recognizing both the high privilege and solemn obligation of such a life. Christ has redeemed us and renews us after His own image, *for the purpose* that we should offer ourselves a holy sacrifice of thanksgiving to Him by living the Christ-life in this world. Thus we are assured of our faith as genuine. This life is a service by which we win others to Christ. Question 86. Such obedience and service is not a mere matter of duty. The child of God finds *delight* in living according to



the will of God in all good works. Question 90. This life of godliness and righteousness, however, is not spontaneous; it is not a fruit which grows out of the regenerated heart according to natural law as the apple grows out of the tree bearing it. It requires faithful, constant, wholehearted and prayerful effort. The ten commandments are explained as God's will and rule for the Christian's life. Christians are actuated by the earnest purpose to live not only according to some, but according to *all* the commandments of God. Question 114. As individuals, as members of the family, the church, society, as citizens of the state, as members of the great brotherhood of man, they are to serve their day and generation and hasten the coming of the kingdom. For such life and service we need ever new and increasing supplies of divine grace and power, to be had for the asking. Hence the latter part of the catechism treats of prayer as the key which unlocks all the treasures of divine love for the soul.

✓ The Reformed Church has never emphasized one-sidedly the great truth of justification by faith, but giving this foundation truth of Protestantism the proper place and importance in its teaching, it has always insisted on a righteous and godly life as the evidence and fruit of genuine faith. No one can live this life isolated from others. He is a member of what we would call the social order. The Christian must recognize his relations to his fellowman and the social order of which he is a part, his dependence upon it and his obligation to it. He is not to live unto himself but unto Him Who loved him and gave Himself for him; and he is to do this by serving his fellowman individually and collectively. This truth finds expression in the catechism and is implied in the entire third part of the book. The Reformed churches from the time of Calvin unto this day have not been oblivious to this truth and have therefore taken a live interest and actively participated in all efforts for the betterment of society, the relief of suffering, the rescue of the fallen, the spread of the Gospel of the kingdom for the salvation of the individual and society. At the same time

their aim has been in theory and practice to build up the individual into Christian manhood and Christlike character, manifesting itself in a righteous and godly life.

A theology which is ethical in the sense mentioned above, is in demand to-day. It is the theology which the church must teach its ministry if the pulpit is to have a hearing and be a power for the salvation of men. It is the theology which the Lord Jesus Christ has given us in the Holy Scriptures. His Gospel is a gospel of divine grace and peace, and of regenerating and sanctifying power for the individual and the social organism. From this Gospel the Heidelberg Catechism has taken its theology, a theology which in its essential features is as true, as well adapted and needful for the twentieth century as it was for the sixteenth.

SHEBOYGAN, WIS.



#### IV.

### RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND CATECHETICAL INSTRUCTION.

THOMAS M. BALLIET.

Education to be effective and to be free from waste, both of effort and of time, must have a clearly defined aim. In order to determine this aim in religious education, it is necessary to form some definite conception of the nature of religion, and to eliminate from it elements which are intimately associated with it, which have not infrequently been mistaken for it, and which are not unimportant but do not constitute its essence. It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to formulate a scientific definition of religion or to enter upon a philosophical discussion of it; its aim is purely practical. Nor is it necessary for the purpose in hand to discuss the nature of religion in its universal conception, as the problem before us is the more specific one of the nature of the Christian religion; and what, in consequence, should be the aim of the religious education in the Christian Church.

It is rather a singular fact that nineteen centuries after the death of the Founder the question is still asked, "What is Christianity?" and that there is still wide divergence in the answers given. But there is no escape for the teacher of religion from the necessity of forming, for his own guidance, some more or less definite conception of what the religion of the Old and the New Testament stands for in order that he may make it effective in the lives of men.

What are the fundamental elements in the Christian religion, and by what means and methods can we make them a vital force in life? The answers to these two questions deter-

mine the aim and the method of religious education for the Christian Church.

Religion is a universal element in the human soul; there is no race, however low in the scale of civilization, which is wholly devoid of it. Instances of races without a trace of religion which used to be cited by the earlier anthropologists have been proved to be erroneous. Religion is a universal instinct; the human being is born with it. The expression of this instinct may, as in the ethnic religions, be on a low plane; it may be, as in the other great historic religions, on a higher plane; and it may be, as in Christianity, on the highest plane. The study of comparative religion has widened our conception and has taught us not to classify religions as true or false, but as differing from one another in the degree in which they express the highest aspects of the religious nature and hold these up as a motive for conduct.

According to the teachings of Jesus, one of the fundamental elements in the religion of which He was the founder, is love; Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself; on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.

A second fundamental factor is reverence, or the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom. This feeling is a part of our religious nature whether directed toward God or not; reverence for God is merely its highest form; it includes reverence for everything great in nature and for everything high in human character and human achievement. It is the capacity to appreciate the greatness of what is great in God's creation as well as the greatness of the Being of God Himself. "The undevout astronomer is mad."

A third element is trust, absolute trust and confidence in the love and care of our Heavenly Father. This is the message of the prophets of the Old Testament and of Christ and His disciples in the New.

A fourth element is conduct, the doing of God's will, "good



works," "righteousness." This again is a part of the message of both the prophets and the gospels. This, however, does not mean mere outward action but includes right motive. On this point the teachings of Jesus differ radically, not from the message of the prophets of the Old Testament, but from the teaching of the Judaism of His day. He emphasized motive as the essential thing in conduct; they laid chief stress on the outward act. Conduct apart from motive ceases to be conduct; it is mere action, like the falling of a tree which may kill a man but involves no moral responsibility so far as the tree is concerned.

The word "faith," not as used in theological literature as a technical term, but as used in the Bible in a popular sense, includes to a remarkable degree the essential elements of the religious nature, or the religious life in man.

It is used in the Old Testament and in the New in the sense of trust, confidence in God. It is this trust and abiding confidence that enables the Christian to bear suffering and affliction, and is exemplified in a thousand ways in the history of the Church as well as in the daily lives of men and women. "The Lord hath given and the Lord hath taken away, blessed be the name of the Lord." It was this trust which bore up St. Paul toward the close of his life, as we recall from familiar passages in his later epistles.

The word faith is used in a sense almost identical with love. The thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians is the classic passage to illustrate this use. Faith even to remove mountains devoid of love is an empty thing.

Again, James tells us that "faith without works is dead." In short, faith as trust and love must issue in conduct; they must be the motive, the impelling force, which leads to right conduct. Modern psychology teaches us that the biological function of feeling both in the animal series and in man is to lead to action, and in man also to conduct; and when it does not function in this way it degenerates into sentimentality and weakens character. The Biblical teaching is in harmony with modern science on this vital point.

Again the word faith is used in the sense of logical conclusion, belief based on evidence. We have an instance of this in case of the "doubting Thomas." The colossal error of the church all through the ages of Christian history has been to single out this use of the word faith and treat it as if it were the essential, if not the only, usage of the word in the Bible. This has led to all the bloody persecutions of the Church, to the unfortunate divisions within the Protestant church, and to the bitterness of theological controversy through the centuries. As Emerson says, "churches have been built on tropes," and as Professor Seeley of Oxford once said, "theologians are never more bitter in their controversies than when the differences between their views are almost imperceptible—except, perhaps, when they are quite so." Faith as a mere intellectual assent to a dogma, or to the propositions of a creed, has been made the whole of faith, while Jesus never emphasized it. With him faith was a matter of the heart and of life and conduct, not of mere intellectual belief. His severe rebuke of the unbelief of the heart in case of the Jews contrasts sharply with His mild reproof addressed to Thomas. Such unbelief as is attributed to Thomas in the Gospel was little else than intellectual honesty and genuine sincerity. It was this kind of "unbelief" which Tennyson had in mind when he wrote: "There lives more faith in honest doubt, believe me, than in half the creeds."

It is true that in the later writers of the New Testament there is a use of the word which foreshadows its post-apostolic use as identical with the word "creed." "The faith" and "The faith once delivered to the saints" are expressions which indicate the beginning of this tendency. But there is no trace of this in the teachings of Jesus. Paul, too, uses the word sometimes in a mystical sense as a part of his theory of justification, which, however, need not be considered here.

Religion, as viewed in the Bible, is therefore essentially love, reverence, trust, conduct, and what is implied by these. Now love is an act of the heart; so are reverence and trust; they



imply a certain degree of knowledge, for we cannot love, reverence and trust a being of whom we are wholly ignorant; but the emphasis is always on the emotional factor and not on the intellectual as the essential one. The teachings of Jesus are unmistakable on this point. But emotion must bear fruit in right living, in conduct, and conduct is an act of the will. Our religious nature involves therefore the heart and the will, the two deepest elements of character. It involves secondarily also the intellect in that no rational being can rest satisfied without making an effort to comprehend this spiritual nature within him and the Infinite Being towards whom it is directed. This intellectual need has led to the formulation of creeds and dogmas. Such creeds and dogmas have, therefore, their legitimate function in satisfying the human reason, but they must not be substituted for the far deeper elements of the heart and the will as constituent elements in our religious nature. Creeds and dogmas are therefore not divine, not inspired and not infallible, but human and fallible. They represent the effort of the human mind to comprehend the facts of the religious life; and they must therefore change with the increase of light which comes from history, from the discoveries of new documents, from science and philosophy, and from human experience. Dogmatic theology bears the same relation to religion which botany bears to the world of plants, zoology to the world of animals, and astronomy to the stars of heaven. There were plants before botany, animals before zoology, and stars in the heavens before there was a science of astronomy. The stars do not depend for their existence upon astronomy but astronomy depends on the stars. When Copernicus revolutionized our conception of the solar system, it created no change in the heavens; the planets kept on majestically in their course as they had for untold ages before.

In like manner, religion does not depend on theology, but theology depends on religion and a change of theological conviction does not necessarily involve a change in religion. While this is not absolutely true, as is obvious to any one who

holds to idealism in philosophy, as the writer does, it is nevertheless true that there is more danger of confounding theology with religion as is popularly done than of drawing the distinction too sharply. If religion could be destroyed by heresy it would have been destroyed ages ago. If it rested primarily on reason, and not on an instinct far deeper than reason, it would not have outlived all the theological warfare of the past.

Moreover, if religion were a matter primarily for the intellect it could not be universal; only those possessing some considerable capacity for thinking could be religious. As it is primarily a matter of the heart and of life all men have the capacity to be religious, and we know that the finest type of Christian living is not infrequently found among persons of little education. Jesus selected his disciples from among the uneducated.

In view of this line of thought, stated in brief outline only, what, we may ask, is the problem of religious education, and what is the peculiar function of the catechism in such education?

If we are born with a religious nature, it follows that religion need not be implanted in the human soul. We are not "so far depraved that we are wholly unapt to any good and prone to all evil." Such a dogma of "total depravity" is not supported by anything we know in a scientific way of the human soul, nor is it sustained by modern theological thought. Our spiritual aspirations are inborn; they need only to be developed. In the words of Augustine, "Thou, O God, hast created us for Thyself and our hearts are without rest until they rest in Thee."

1. My first proposition, then, is that the problem of religious education is not to implant but to cultivate and develop the religious nature inborn in every human soul.

2. As religion is primarily a matter of the heart, the problem of religious education is one of nurture more than of instruction. It should aim to develop love in all its higher



phases; love of God and love of man above all things, but also tenderness towards the lower animals and sympathy with every living thing. Cruelty of any kind is inconsistent with the love of God. It should aim to develop the feeling of reverence in its broadest sense; reverence for God, for parents, for the great characters of history, for everything good and great in the world. Such reverence springs not from knowledge alone and can not be developed by mere instruction. It is awakened in large part by the emotional attitude of the teacher; it must be caught rather than taught. Emotion is contagious; it is largely the product of unconscious suggestion by the teacher and equally unconscious imitation by the pupil. This is illustrated in case of the spreading of a panic in a crowd. Hence the child will imitate emotionally the emotional state of the teacher. If the teacher feels no reverence when he speaks of religion and of God he will awaken no reverence in the child. On the contrary, he will communicate his own irreverence, or emotional indifference, to his pupil. Hence, there are so few people, even among the educated, who are competent to teach religion. If it were merely a question of instruction it would be much less difficult to find suitable teachers. Much of the instruction in the average Sunday School cultivates the spirit of irreverence.

Furthermore, religious education must aim to cultivate the innate trustfulness of the child, and above all things see to it that this trustfulness is not abused, shocked, or in any way weakened. This is the most lovable trait of childhood, and the trait, no doubt, which Jesus had in mind when He admonished His hearers to be as little children, and when He said "of such is the Kingdom of Heaven."

3. But while religion is fundamentally rooted in the emotions and the instincts, it is also a matter of volition. Faith without works is dead. Religion is also conduct, it is life. It is impossible to draw sharply a line of distinction between morality and religion. While religion and morality had each its own independent origin, and the two were afterwards brought

together and religion became ethical and God was conceived as a moral being, so far as Christianity is concerned, it is impossible to conceive of religion as real and vital except as it issues in right conduct. We may say without going far wrong that morality is the highest, the truest expression of religion. The actual doing of God's will is a higher expression of the religious life than either worship or prayer, essential as all three are.

Hence, all genuine moral education is religious education. This again is less a matter of instruction than of inspiration, of instilling high motives, and of developing right habits.

In short, to be a Christian does not mean intellectual assent to certain propositions in a creed; it means to be Christ-minded; to look upon life as Christ looked upon it; to feel towards God and towards man as He felt; to be actuated by the same motives by which He was actuated; and to live a life of self sacrifice as He lived it.

4. In method religious education must therefore appeal primarily to the emotions, to the heart. Hence the teaching must be concrete. Aristotle said over two thousand years ago "Abstract thought moves nothing." No one becomes indignant at a proposition in geometry. The abstract thought of suffering does not arouse our sympathy, but a concrete case, a flood, a fire, a shipwreck, or a famine. This is the psychology of the parable, and it explains why Jesus uttered so few abstract truths. The teaching of creed and dogma, therefore, cannot touch the heart and does not constitute the most vital element in religious education. The actual, concrete life of Christ must be vividly pictured to the children's imagination, and the most precious parts of the Bible should be read to the class so well that they will want to hear the same passages again and again. The Evangelists and the writers of the Epistles should be allowed to speak directly to the young. This should be done with a minimum of indispensable comment.

5. A knowledge of the Bible is therefore only a means and not an end in religious education, although it is made an end



in most Sunday Schools. A Biblical scholar is not necessarily a religious man, and a man can be religious without wide knowledge of the Bible.

6. But there is a place for dogma in religious education, as it furnishes the intellectual element in such education. It satisfies the craving of the intellect to comprehend the facts of religion; and to the majority of people it furnishes their philosophy of life. The problem of evil in the world; the mystery of death; the great calamities which befall men, communities and nations; all these challenge the thought of men and women even of little education. Theology has furnished them answers to these questions; the answers have not all been correct, for some have been contradictory of one another, but each has accepted those which satisfied the cravings of his own mind.

7. The function of dogma in religious education is to satisfy the intellect, to remove doubt, or at least to alleviate it; it should therefore be taught to the young only when doubt arises. Statistics show that this usually comes during the early teens and continues sometimes through the later teens. As this is the period when young people in all ages have joined the church, the period, too, when religion can get its deepest hold on the heart, it follows that there is a place for instruction in dogma in the religious instruction of young boys and girls generally known under the name "catechetical." Such instruction should, however, only cover the great questions upon which young people crave knowledge; it should not force upon them a system of theology in outline as most catechisms do. It should occupy a subordinate place in such instruction, whose chief aim should be to deepen the religious life, to make the strongest possible appeals to the heart, and to discuss the great ethical problems which such young people will soon have to meet in their lives; in short, to make religion a vital force in their lives.

8. It is questionable whether the memorizing of abstract answers to questions, as presented in a catechism, is an effect-

ive method. The memorizing of a very few fundamental statements may, perhaps, be a help in after life to those who have not the ability or education to follow clearly an informal discussion of vital theological questions while they are young; but the fact is that such propositions are usually soon forgotten. Modern pedagogy does not sanction the memorizing of abstract scientific propositions which are not understood. The memorizing of the concrete truths of the Bible is a different matter. The memorizing of carefully selected portions of the Bible is a very important feature of all religious instruction; even if they are not wholly understood at the time, the life experiences of the future will interpret them.

9. But in order to make most catechisms available for such instruction they would have to be radically revised, the Heidelberg Catechism included. They teach the dogmas of the reformation period and are largely out of harmony with modern theological thought. I realize that this depends on one's own point of view; but there is surely quite a large body of ministers and laymen in all protestant churches who can no longer accept all the dogmas taught in the catechism of their own church. Modern thought has entirely changed our points of view, and any theological teaching which ignores this fact is sure to weaken its appeal to the religious consciousness of men. It is often said that men are indifferent to theology and to doctrinal preaching, but they are indifferent only to dogmas which they can no longer accept and which seem to them to be out of harmony with modern thought. Men are alive as never before to theological thought which deals with modern religious questions from the modern point of view.

10. While I should not place a high value upon the memorizing of a catechism, nor upon emphasizing dogma in detail, I would place the highest value upon religious instruction to young people preparatory to their joining the church which would make the strongest possible appeal to their hearts and make religion vital in their lives. I would teach them dogma only to meet their doubts, and I would encourage them to



express their doubts and their difficulties with the utmost frankness. Such instruction and such frank discussion should, and I think inevitably would, establish intimate confidential relations between them and their pastor which would immensely increase his power for good over their lives. If churches give up the formal teaching of the catechism, it is to be hoped that they will not abandon all religious instruction in special preparation for admission to the church. Such instruction, if it is of the right character, and the solemnity of confirmation, make a deep impression upon young people at that impressionable age.

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## V.

### A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE HEIDELBERG, LUTHER'S SMALLER, AND THE WEST- MINSTER SHORTER CATECHISMS.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

A comparison of three catechisms, prepared at different times, in different lands, by different men, and partly for different purposes, may be considered an impossible task. The points of agreement may not be sufficient to permit a comparative study. Closer investigation, however, will bring to light certain characteristics, which enable one to put these books into one class, both in form and in contents. They have the word "Catechism" in their title. They are intended for the instruction of the youth in the fundamental truths of the Christian religion. They contain expositions of evangelical, in distinction from Catholic, Christianity and belong to the conservative, rather than to the radical, type of Protestantism. Since they have been published, each has become a symbol of faith; the first in the Reformed, the second in the Lutheran, and the third in the Presbyterian, Churches. Recognizing, therefore, both points of difference and of agreement, we shall attempt a comparative study of the three catechisms.

In order to condense the results of our study within the prescribed limits, we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of the following points: (1) The purpose of their composition; (2) their evangelical characteristics in distinction from Roman Catholicism; (3) the differences between the Heidelberg and Luther's Smaller Catechism; (4) the differences between the Heidelberg and the Westminster Shorter Catechism.

I. Since the year 1523, Luther had in mind the preparation



of a booklet which would contain all that is necessary for a Christian to know and would be adapted to the teaching of children and simple folk. The essentials of a Christian's knowledge he defined in the preface to his Larger Catechism as follows: "However, for the common people we should be satisfied if they learn the three parts which Christendom has received as a heritage from the olden time." He referred, of course, to the Decalogue, the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. In vain did he urge Jonas and Agricola to prepare a handbook of this kind. Yet the importance of "a coarse (*groben*), plain, simple, good, catechism," was brought home to him, as never before, by his tour of inspection of the churches of Saxony in 1528. He describes the status of the congregations as he found them in the preface to the Smaller Catechism: "The deplorable condition in which I found the religious affairs of your parishes on my recent visit of inspection has impelled me to publish this concise and simple Catechism. Merciful God, what wretched ignorance I beheld! The common people—especially in the villages—apparently have no knowledge whatever of Christian doctrine, and even many pastors are ignorant and incapable teachers. Though all are called Christians and have the privilege of the sacraments, yet they cannot even repeat the Lord's Prayer, nor the Creed, nor the Ten Commandments. They live like brutes, and, having now the light of the Gospel, rankly abuse their Christian liberty."

He at once set himself to the task of writing a religious handbook for "crude villagers." He was at work on the Larger Catechism in January, 1529; but before he finished it, he prepared also the Smaller Catechism "for children and the family." It was issued in the form of a booklet in May, 1529. In delightfully homely and yet impressive questions and answers, Luther expounded the Decalogue, the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Sacrament of Holy Baptism, and the Sacrament of the Altar—the same succession of subjects which the Bohemian Brethren had made familiar in their Catechism. The sole purpose of the Smaller Catechism was to teach "the

young and the unlearned," while the Larger Catechism was intended for the use of ministers and teachers and the more advanced laymen. "When you have finished the Smaller Catechism," he says in the preface, "begin with the Larger Catechism and give the words a more comprehensive explanation."

The Heidelberg Catechism was written a generation after Luther's Smaller Catechism. It was prepared at the request of the Elector Palatine, Frederick III. In the preface written by the Elector, the method and purpose of its composition are set forth as follows: "And accordingly, with the advice and coöperation of our entire theological faculty in this place, and of all Superintendents and distinguished servants of the Church, we have secured the preparation of a summary course of instruction, or Catechism of our Christian Religion, according to the word of God, in the German and the Latin language; in order not only that the youth in churches and schools may be piously instructed in such Christian doctrine, and be thoroughly trained therein, but also that the Pastors and Schoolmasters themselves may be provided with a fixed form and model, by which to regulate the instruction of youth, and not, at their option, adopt daily changes or introduce erroneous doctrine."

The Catechism was intended to serve a two-fold purpose. It was to be a confession and standard of faith for pastors and teachers throughout the Palatinate, and a religious handbook for youth in churches and schools. The work was finished in January, 1863.

The Westminster Shorter Catechism was prepared under the auspices of the Westminster Assembly, which was convened as a standing body of counsellors on ecclesiastical affairs by the long Parliament which opened in November, 1640. The Parliament passed an ordinance that Divines in number 121, supplemented by 10 peers and 20 members of the House of Commons (40 being a quorum), "should meet and assemble themselves at Westminster in the Chapel called King Henry



the VII's Chapel, on the first day of July, in the year of our Lord One thousand six hundred and forty-three," and thereafter "from time to time to sit, and be removed from place to place" and to "confer and to treat among themselves of such matters and things touching and concerning the Liturgy, Discipline, and Government of the Church of England, or the vindicating and clearing of the doctrine of the same from all false aspersions and misconstructions, as shall be promised unto them by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament, and no other; and to deliver their opinions and advices of, or touching the matters aforesaid, as shall be most agreeable to the word of God, to both or either of the said Houses, from time to time, in such manner and sort as by both or either of the said Houses of Parliament shall be required; and the same not to divulge by printing, writing, or otherwise, without the consent of both or either House of Parliament."

"The four points or parts of uniformity" which the Assembly was to prepare, were a confession of faith, a form of church government, a directory of worship, and a catechism. Through these ordinances "the churches of God in the three kingdoms" were to be brought "to the nearest conjunction and uniformity in religion, confession of faith, form of church government, directory for worship and catechizing." The Assembly had bound itself in all its transactions to "the *preservation* of the reformed religion in the Church of Scotland in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, against our common enemies," on the one hand; and on the other, to the *reformation* of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government, according to the Word of God and the example of the best reformed churches."

After the Confession of Faith was finished, the new catechism was taken up, and from September 14, 1646 to January 4, 1647, was rapidly passed through the Assembly up to the questions which dealt with the fourth Commandment. While they were engaged on the Larger Catechism, members of the

Assembly became convinced that they were attempting an impossible feat. In the words of the Scottish Commissioners, they were trying "to dress up milk and meat in one dish." The Assembly, therefore, called a halt, and "recommitted the work that two formes of Catechisme may be prepared, one more exact and comprehensive, another more easie and short for new beginners." Recommencing on this new basis, the Larger Catechism began to be debated on April 15, 1647, and was finished on the 15th of the following October, and sent up to Parliament on October 22. The Shorter Catechism was taken up on August 5, 1647, and was finished November 22 and sent up to Parliament November 25, 1647. It was approved by Parliament September 22, 1648, and issued under the title, "The Grounds and Principles of Religion contained in a Shorter Catechism, According to the Advice of the Assembly of Divines sitting at Westminster, to be used through the Kingdom of England and Dominion of Wales."

In Scotland it was approved by acts of the General Assembly of 1648, and ratified by the Estates of Parliament February 7, 1649. It at once became in Scotland the text-book in religion in the schools and has held that position up to this date; and for a long period it was scarcely less popular in Non-Conformist England than in Scotland. From both sources it was transmitted to their affiliated churches in America; and in the extension of the mission work of the several Presbyterian Churches in the nineteenth century, its use has been diffused throughout the world. Professor B. B. Warfield summarizes its merits as follows: "No other Catechism can be compared with it in its concise, nervous, terse exactitude of definition, or in its severely logical elaboration; and it gains these admirable qualities at no expense to its freshness or fervor, though perhaps it can scarcely be spoken of as marked by childlike simplicity. Although set forth as 'milk for babes' and designed to stand by the side of the 'Larger Catechism' as an 'easie and short' manual of religion 'for new beginners' it is nevertheless governed by the principle (as one of its authors—



Seaman—phrased it), ‘that the greatest care should be taken to frame the answer not according to the model of the knowledge the child hath, but according to that the child ought to have.’ Its peculiarity, in contrast with the ‘Larger Catechism’ (and the Confession of Faith), is the strictness with which its contents are confined to the very quintessence of religion and morals, to the positive truths and facts which must be known for their own behoof by all who would fain be instructed in right belief and practice. All purely historical matter, and much more, all controversial matter—everything which can minister merely to curiosity, however chastened—is rigidly excluded. Only that is given which, in the judgment of its framers, is directly required for the Christian’s instruction in what he is to believe concerning God and what God requires of him. It is a pure manual of personal religion and practical morality.”<sup>1</sup>

The purpose of the several catechisms largely determined their form and their contents. The ‘Smaller Catechism of Luther and the Westminster Shorter Catechism were designed to teach the “young and the unlearned” or to be “a more easie and short form for new beginners.” They were not supposed to be standards of doctrine. For the latter purpose, the Lutherans adopted the Larger Catechism and the Augsburg Confession, and the Westminster Assembly prepared the Confession of Faith and the Larger Catechism.

The Heidelberg Catechism, however, was to serve the two-fold purpose of a norm of doctrine and a book of instruction. It combines, therefore, in a single work what the Lutherans and the Westminster Fathers formulated in three separate documents. This fact will account for certain differences in form and contents between the Heidelberg and the other catechisms. In form the latter are briefer and in style simpler than the former. Luther’s Catechism has forty questions, the

<sup>1</sup> The data on the Westminster Catechism are taken from an article by Prof. B. B. Warfield on “The Westminster Assembly and its Work,” *Princeton Theol. Review*, April, 1908.

Westminster one hundred and seven, the Heidelberg one hundred and twenty-nine. In the nature of the case, the Heidelberg Catechism required more space for its purpose than that which is taken in the other catechisms. Written a generation after Luther's Catechism, and at a time when the Palatinate was rent by theological controversy of the most malignant sort, the authors of the Heidelberg had to so formulate its doctrine as to bring an end to the strife between the Lutherans, Melancthonians, Zwinglians, and Calvinists in the province. At the same time, they had to set forth Reformed doctrine in a moderate way so as to satisfy the Elector and to conciliate all the parties in his realm. This required keen discrimination between Catholic and Protestant ideas, between Lutheran and Reformed doctrines, and between high Calvinism and moderate Calvinism. The authors of the Heidelberg, therefore, were compelled to go more into detail in doctrine and definition than Luther or the authors of the Westminster Catechism.

The Heidelberg is, also, more polemical in certain questions than the other two Catechisms. The polemical elements, however, are not wanting in the Lutheran confessions nor in the Westminster standards. They are excluded only from the Smaller Catechism of Luther and the Shorter Catechism of Westminster. The Heidelberg Catechism, having to serve as a catechism and a confession of faith, not only goes far more into detail in doctrinal definitions and theological statements, but admits certain polemical statements which the other Catechisms happily omit.

## II. EVANGELICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE CATECHISMS.

However widely the catechisms differ from one another, they agree in their opposition to Rome and in their loyalty to evangelical Christianity. This opposition is shown by the omission of material which plays a prominent part in the catechetical works of the Catholic Church. Not a single question is devoted to relics, pilgrimages, processions, mortal



sins, indulgences, five of the seven sacraments, holy orders, the Virgin, and the saints. This silence indicates that a consideration of these doctrines and customs is foreign to the genius of Protestantism. The points in which the catechisms differ from Catholicism, though the differences are not stated with equal definiteness, are the following: the original state and the fall, faith, justification, good works, prohibition of invocation of saints and of images, the mass, and the sacraments.

The evangelical character appears in direct statements or in implications underlying the three Catechisms. The sense of depravity and the need of redemption are the psychological basis from which the Reformation proceeded. The helplessness of man, therefore, and the redemption wrought out by Jesus Christ are fundamental in the three documents. They, also, agree in accepting the Bible as the norm of doctrine and life. The objective ground of salvation is the atonement made by Jesus Christ, while the blessings of redemption are appropriated by faith in Him. The motive for Christian living is found in gratitude for redemption, or in the desire to glorify God, not in the necessity of performing works of merit. Only two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's Supper, are recognized as biblical. The doctrine of the priesthood of believers, while not directly taught in a single answer, underlies the three formulas.

### III. THE HEIDELBERG AND LUTHER'S SMALLER CATECHISM.

We have already alluded to the brevity and to the simplicity of Luther's Catechism. In both these respects it is better adapted to the instruction of youth, while the Heidelberg on account of its fullness and thoroughness is more suitable for persons of mature age. Certain minor verbal differences appear also in the rendering of the Decalogue, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer. The Heidelberg Catechism gives the Commandments in full, following the twentieth chapter of Exodus and the old Jewish and Greek division; while Luther

presents merely an abridgment, and follows the Roman division by omitting the second Commandment and splitting the tenth into two.

The Heidelberg retains the term catholic or universal with the addition of Christian in the article of the Creed: "a holy Catholic (or universal) Christian Church." Luther omits "catholic" and substitutes for it "Christian." In the Lord's Prayer the Heidelberg uses the modern form "Our Father" (*Unser Vater*), while Luther in his Catechism (though not in his translation of Matt. 6:9 and Luke 11:2) adheres to the Latin and old German form of "Father our" (*Vater unser*)—"a difference tenaciously maintained by the German Lutherans." The Heidelberg divides the prayer into six petitions, like the Greek commentators, and translates *ἐκ πονηροῦ* "from the evil one" (*vom Bösen, i. e., from the devil*); while Luther, like Augustine, numbers seven petitions, and translates (herein agreeing with the English version) "from evil" (*vom Uebel*).

Each Catechism contains five main parts: the Decalogue, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, Baptism, and the Lord's Supper; but the order and the setting of the parts differ. Luther puts them side by side without an attempt to show how the several parts are related to one another. He observes the following order: the Decalogue, the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Sacraments. Nitzsch, a German theologian, says: "The Catechism of Luther contains the material for building but is not a building." The Heidelberg Catechism is controlled by a clearly defined plan, which is set forth in the second answer: the misery of man, the redemption of man, man's thankfulness for his redemption. Into this framework the five main parts are set as follows: in the first part, in place of the Decalogue, the two Commandments of love are put as a summary of the Law through which comes a knowledge of sin; in the second part, the Creed and the Sacraments, in the third part the Decalogue and the Lord's Prayer, are explained. This order is not without significance. The Heidelberg expounds



the Decalogue in the third part, since it is to be followed in its Christian aspect as a permanent rule of life. Luther regards the law in its Jewish or pedagogic aspect, as a schoolmaster leading men to Christ. Hence he places it before the Creed. Ursinus says on this point: "The Decalogue belongs to the first part so far as it is a mirror of sin and misery, but also to the third part as being the rule of our new obedience and Christian life."

In its arrangement of material the Heidelberg Catechism conforms to the plan of the Epistle to the Romans and Melancthon's *Loci*. It follows the logic of life rather than the logic of the schools. It is soteriological, reflecting the way of salvation as experienced by the saints of the ages. It must be acknowledged, however, that for this plan, the Heidelberg is indebted to Luther far more than to Zwingli or to Calvin. In the preface of a work earlier than the Smaller Catechism, entitled "A Short Form of the Ten Commandments, the Creed and the Lord's Prayer" (1520), Luther defines the relation between the Commandments, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer as follows: "The Commandments teach a man to recognize his malady, so that he realizes and experiences what he can do and what he can not do, what he can avoid and what he can not avoid, with the result that he knows himself to be a sinful and wicked man. Then, secondly, the Creed offers grace as a remedy and he is enabled to be godly and keep the Commandments. It reveals God and His mercy made available and offered through Christ. Thirdly, the Lord's Prayer teaches him how to desire and seek this grace, and shows how to secure it, by means of regular, humble, and comforting prayer. These three things virtually comprise the entire Scriptures." Professor Reu has, also, brought to light a Lutheran Catechism entitled *Kurtzen ordenlichen summa*, reprinted in Heidelberg in 1558, in which he claims to find an anticipation of the plan underlying the Heidelberg, and concludes that "one of the most notable merits of the Heidelberg, its systematic arrangement, came from a catechetical work of Lutheran origin."

In doctrine it is difficult to compare the Heidelberg with the Smaller Catechism of Luther, since the latter limits itself to a simple exposition of the five main parts, without making doctrinal distinctions. The doctrinal difference between the Heidelberg and the Smaller Catechism appears mainly in the definitions relating to the Sacraments. But when one contrasts the Heidelberg with the Lutheran type of doctrine, he will find numerous points of difference which were readily detected by the earliest critics of the Catechism. The Emperor Maximilian wrote a letter, dated April 25, 1563, to the Elector Frederick, acknowledging a receipt of a copy of the Catechism, in which he reminds the Elector that the Catechism is contrary to the Augsburg Confession and to the ancient Catholic religion in its doctrine on baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the ascension of Christ. In the same year, May, 1563, three Lutheran Princes, whose territory joined the Palatinate, sent a letter to Frederick, in which they enumerated the erroneous doctrines in the new Catechism. Among them are the following: the doctrine on baptism, the Lord's Supper, Christ's humanity in relation to his divinity, man's freedom, election. They emphasized also the revolutionary tendency of Zwinglianism and Calvinism, which made itself felt in the lands where this view of the gospel prevailed.

So far as the doctrine of the sacraments is concerned, as set forth in the Heidelberg and the Smaller Catechism of Luther, the distinction is clear, though it is made without any polemical bitterness. The Heidelberg, evidently with the Lutheran view in mind, distinguishes sharply between the external signs of the sacraments and the spiritual realities which they symbolize. These realities are not bound up with, nor communicated through, the material elements. They are merely symbolized and sealed by the visible elements. Baptism and the Holy Supper signify and seal unto thee "that thou has a part in the one sacrifice of Christ on the Cross." Baptism in the Calvinistic sense has clearly only representational and confirmatory significance. The blessings of forgiveness and re-



generation are not imparted through or by water, but by the Holy Spirit whose operation may coincide with the baptismal act, but who “under no circumstances,” works through the baptismal water. Luther in the Smaller Catechism says in answer to the question: “What benefits does baptism confer? It *worketh* forgiveness of sins, *delivers* from death and the Devil and *gives* everlasting salvation to all who believe this as the words and promises declare.” Such an interpretation of water and the word and such an operation of the word through water, the Reformed Churches in none of their confessions have ever acknowledged.

In the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, also, the Catechism clearly differs from the Lutheran teaching. Luther’s Smaller Catechism, in answer to the question: “What is the sacrament of the altar?” says: “It is the true body and blood of our Lord, Jesus Christ, *under* the bread and wine, given unto us Christians to eat and to drink as it was instituted by Christ himself.” If we may accept the interpretation of this definition of later Lutheran theologians, all communicants, worthy and unworthy, receive through the mouth, in, with, and under, the elements, the body and blood of Christ. The Heidelberg Catechism steers clear of the conception of a corporeal real presence in the elements and a reception of this presence through the mouth by believer and unbeliever. Answer 75 lays stress on the fact “that with His crucifying body and shed blood He Himself feeds and nourishes my soul to everlasting life as certainly as I receive from the hand of the minister and taste with my mouth the bread and cup of the Lord.” This nourishment, however, is not given *under* the bread and wine, for the bread and cup of the Lord are no more than “certain tokens of the body and blood of Christ—not vehicles nor instruments.” The most that one could claim is, that the spiritual food is imparted by the mediation of the Holy Spirit, at the same time that the bread and wine are received. Nor does any one save the believer receive the body and blood of Christ; the unbeliever receives only bread and wine. In the

sacramental teaching of the Catechism, the views of Zwingli and Calvin are blended. The Lord's Supper is described both as a memorial and as a food. The heavenly nourishment, however, is imparted to the communicant through the mediation of the Holy Ghost, but not through a material channel of bread and wine.

In the *Creeds of Christendom*, I. p. 543, Dr. Schaff says: "Luther's Catechism is the most churchly of the three (including the Heidelberg and the Westminster) and adheres to the Catholic tradition in its order and arrangement. It assigns a very prominent place to the Sacraments, treating them in separate chapters, coördinate with the Decalogue, the Creed, and the Lord's Prayer; while the others incorporate them in the general exposition of the articles of faith. Luther teaches baptismal regeneration and the corporeal real presence, and even retains private confession and absolution as a quasi-Sacrament. The Heidelberg and Westminster are free from all remnants of sacerdotalism and sacramentalism, and teach the Calvinistic theory of the sacraments, which rises, however, much higher than the Zwinglian."

#### IV. THE HEIDELBERG AND THE WESTMINSTER CATECHISM.

In comparing these catechisms it must be remembered that the one is a German work of the sixteenth, and the other an English work of the seventeenth, century. The controversy in the Palatinate was between the ultra-Lutherans and the Calvinists, in England and Scotland between the Anglicans and the Puritans. The main point at issue between the former was the doctrine of the sacraments; between the latter the doctrine of divine sovereignty. It is significant that the Heidelberg Catechism vents its polemical feeling in the 80th question, which denounces the Mass as "an accursed idolatry." The theological wrath of the Westminster theologians finds expression in Chapter XXV, Section VI, of the Confession of Faith, which says: "There is no other head of the Church but the Lord Jesus Christ, nor can the Pope at Rome in any



sense be head thereof; but is that anti-Christ, that man of sin and son of perdition that exalteth himself in the Church, against Christ, and all that is called God.”

In the interim between the Heidelberg Catechism and the Westminster Standards, a bitter controversy arose in Holland between the Calvinists and the Arminians. The decretal, far more than the sacramental, aspects of Calvinism were under discussion. The relation between the will of God and the will of man, or between divine sovereignty and human freedom, in the process of salvation, was the bone of contention. The so-called Five Points of Calvinism were formulated in opposition to the Five Points of Arminianism. For a century afterwards the question of election and reprobation was central in theological disputations in Great Britain and in New England. The Heidelberg, written nearly fifty years before the Synod Dort convened in 1619, shows no trace of the Five Points. But the Westminster Standards, composed about twenty-six years after the decrees of Dort, and designed to differentiate Puritanism from Anglicanism which had now become Arminian in its theology, were clearly controlled by the decretal Calvinism of Dort. Thus the spirit pervading and the scheme underlying the Heidelberg and the Westminster Catechism differ widely. This difference was accentuated doubtless by the distinctive national genius of the English and Scotch on the one hand, and of the South Germans on the other. The former were by nature intellectual and legalistic; the latter mystical and experimental.

In certain points, both the Heidelberg and the Lutheran Catechism differ from the Westminster. They retain the Apostles' Creed as a basis of doctrinal exposition, while the Westminster puts it in the appendix and substitutes a new logical scheme of doctrine for the old historical order of the Creed. The former strike a personal and experimental note in the form of questions and answers, addressing the catechumen as a member of the Church. The answers contain the actual or the prospective experience of the catechumen. The

latter is objective and impersonal, and states its answers in abstract propositions. The Heidelberg and the Smaller Catechism use the warm language of experience and life; the Westminster uses the language of the schools and of dogma. The former are less definite and more suggestive; the latter excels in brevity, terseness, and accuracy of definition.

Before we consider the differences between the Heidelberg and the Westminster, we shall enumerate certain points of agreement. Both are Calvinistic symbols, though the Calvinism of the Heidelberg is modified and mollified by the spirit of the German Reformation. In type of doctrine they differ from Lutheranism and from Anabaptism, and belong to the Reformed branch of Protestantism. Both Catechisms emphasize the sole authority of the Word of God as over against the traditions or opinions of men. They stand for "the Church reformed according to the Word of God." In worship and life men are taught to conform to the Scriptures and to seek the glory of God—a thoroughly Calvinistic note. True to the Reformed genius, also, is their emphasis on the absolute dependence of the believer on God, on the perseverance of the saints, the demand for ethical proof of faith, and the rejection of material channels for the mediation of saving grace. In their definition of sin, atonement, faith, justification, and the sacraments, they may differ in the form of words, but in substance they are in accord with each other.

The differences between the Catechisms may be clearly seen in the arrangement of the material. The Heidelberg is divided into three parts: (1) Man's misery, (2) man's deliverance, (3) man's thankfulness for his deliverance. The definitions are determined by man's experience of salvation. The five catechetical parts are brought together, not simply in a mechanical way, or fitted into a speculative scheme of divinity, but they are organically related by the logic of the Christian life. The ultimate question to be answered in the Heidelberg is: "How are men to find comfort in life and in death?" The comfort is found in the fact that they belong to Jesus Christ,



that in him they enjoy the Father's providence, and that through him they are assured of eternal life and inspired to every good work. Each part of the Catechism is controlled by the idea of comfort. As a rule, therefore, only the positive and edifying side of Christian doctrine is presented. Metaphysical distinctions and transcendent mysteries are excluded. The doctrine of election to salvation and holiness, for example, is so presented as to inspire humility, gratitude, and comfort; but nothing is said of the decree of reprobation, or of a limited atonement. These are questions for theological discussion, and not for catechetical instruction.

The Catechism is anthropological; it starts with the cry of man for help out of the depths of sin. It is soteriological and christological; it shows how men are saved by faith in Jesus Christ. Even the motive for Christian living is not primarily the glory of God, nor loyalty to the Scriptures; but gratitude for the grace of redemption—a soteriological basis even for Christian ethics.

The first question of the Westminster strikes a keynote wholly different from that of the Heidelberg. It defines the chief end of man as consisting in glorifying God and enjoying Him forever. The Heidelberg seeks man's comfort in life and in death; the Westminster, the purpose and goal of man's existence. The comfort of the one is found in the salvation of Christ; the goal of the other in the glorification of God. The divisions of the Westminster are based upon the answer to the question, "What rule hath God given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him." This rule is found in the Scriptures, and, accordingly, the two-fold divisions of the Catechism are stated in the answer to Question 3: "The Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God and what duty God requires of man." Division one extends from Question 4 to Question 38; divisions two from Question 39 to Question 107. The following topics are discussed in the two divisions: (1) definition of God, the decrees of God, creation and providence, sin and the fall, redemption,

Jesus Christ the Redeemer, the application of redemption by effectual calling, justification, adoption, sanctification, eternal blessedness; (2) obedience as required by the Ten Commandments, conviction of sin, faith in Jesus Christ, repentance, the use of the means of grace for communicating the benefits of salvation, the Word, the sacraments, prayer as defined in the Lord's Prayer.

The Catechism is a compendium of Christian doctrine arranged according to a theological scheme, for memorizing and practical instruction. The same order of topics is followed in the Confession of Faith and in the Larger Catechism, though the substance of these longer formulas is condensed and simplified in the Shorter Catechism "for catechizing such as are of weaker capacity." The plan of arrangement is equally appropriate for a treatise on systematic theology. The Catechism embodies the conception of biblical revelation stated in terms of the scholastic orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, and as it was comprehended by the most cultured and devout Puritan minds. It is the clearest and concisest definition of Calvinism that is found in any language. Professor Curtis rightly calls it "an acknowledged masterpiece, the triumph of happy arrangement of condensed and comprehensive instruction, of lucid and forceful expression."

Yet when one compares the plan of the Heidelberg and of the Westminster, he will readily see how widely they differ. The definitions of the former are based on the Christian consciousness—the knowledge of sin, the way of redemption, the life of the redeemed—as realized in fellowship with Jesus Christ. The definitions of the latter are based on the teaching of the Scriptures concerning God and duty. The Bible is used abstractly, apart from the religious consciousness of the believers. In the Heidelberg the emphasis is laid less on the Bible than on the Christ, who, in living union with His people, is the object of faith and the source of life. For this reason, we say again, the Heidelberg is in spirit soteriological and christological; the Westminster, theological and legalistic.



A comparison of specific doctrines will bring out more clearly the difference in tone and tendency. Two things run through the Westminster which are not mentioned in the Heidelberg—the doctrine of the decrees and the doctrine of the covenants. The decrees of God are to be realized through the covenants. After the covenant with Adam failed, God entered into a covenant of grace to “deliver those elected to eternal life out of the state of sin and misery” (Qu. 20). The benefits of redemption are limited, therefore, to the elect. In the Heidelberg there is no trace of the idea of the covenant. The comfort of the Christian is based on the one offering of Christ on the cross. The doctrine of mystical union with Christ takes the place of the covenants. The scope of salvation is not defined in the Heidelberg in terms of election, but in terms of faith. The human, rather than the divine, side is emphasized in the saving process. In answer to Question 20, “Are all men then saved by Christ, as they have perished by Adam?” the Heidelberg says: “No, only such as by true faith are ingrafted into Him and receive of His benefits.” In answer to Question 20, “Did God leave all mankind to perish in the estate of sin and misery?” the Westminster says: “God having out of his mere good pleasure from all eternity elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into a “state of salvation by a Redeemer.” Here the divine factor in salvation is intoned. The Catechism is true to its theological spirit in contrast to the anthropological and christological trend of the Heidelberg.

How are the benefits of Christ's redemption appropriated? Here again, the divine factor is emphasized in the Westminster, the human in the Heidelberg. In answer to Question 29, “How are we made partakers of the redemption purchased by Christ?” the Westminster says: “We are made partakers of the redemption purchased by Christ, by the effectual application of it to us by his Holy Spirit.” In the Heidelberg the definition of the way of appropriating the benefits of redemp-

tion sets forth man's faith rather than God's activity. In answer to Question 60, "How art thou righteous before God?" the Catechism says: "Only by true faith in Jesus Christ, etc." Observe that faith is centered not on a book but on a living person. Union with Christ through faith brings with it all the blessings of redemption. This is the mystic note pervading the Heidelberg, which one finds only at rare intervals in the Westminster.

In the form also of its questions and answers, as well as in its contents, the Westminster reveals its didactic and theoretical character. "It is," says Dr. Nevin, "an admirable compend of metaphysical divinity after its own order and kind; but all impersonal and ideal. A description of Christianity in the abstract more than the felt appropriation of it in any way as a living and present fact. In the Heidelberg, on the contrary, question and answer move from the very start in the actual bosom of the new life of grace itself, and involve all along the practical acknowledgment of the great facts of the Christian salvation in the form of experimental, personal faith. All is so construed as to hold continually, not only in the element of personal experience, but in the element of such experience advanced to the consciousness and sense of a true personal interest in the salvation of Jesus Christ."

We may say, in conclusion, that the three Catechisms under comparison are Christian classics, a rich and ripe product of Protestant Christianity in its different types and groups. They set forth the salient truths of evangelical religion in its different aspects. In their theology, they are children of their age; they belong to the sixteenth, and not to the nineteenth, century. Not one of them anticipates the theological positions of our day. Each has its own merits and defects. In brevity and simplicity, Luther's Smaller Catechism is unexcelled; in its plan of arrangement, in its blending of the experimental and the theological, of the personal and the biblical, of the mystical and the practical, of the devotional and the didactic, the Heidelberg is a masterpiece; in the brevity and clearness



of its questions and answers, in its fidelity to the Scriptures, in its dignified and yet unaffected language, in its preciseness and terseness, and in its high ethical ideal, the Westminster is unsurpassed. Yet the three Catechisms are human productions, and not final and infallible statements of divine truth. The time may come when the Christian consciousness of the twentieth century will demand a new formulation of faith, conforming to the modern conception of the Bible, of Christ, and of salvation. The heavenly treasure must always be preserved in earthen vessels. The vessels grow old and wear out, but the heavenly treasure abideth forever.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VI.

### A SYMPOSIUM ON THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM.<sup>1</sup>

A. E. TRUXAL.

The members of the Reformed Church may justly feel proud of their Confession of Faith. Of the scores of Confessions produced in the sixteenth century the Heidelberg Catechism unquestionably became the most popular. "It was translated into all the European and many Asiatic languages." It has been more widely circulated and used than any one of the others. Its authors wrought better than they knew. They meant to meet the requirements of the Reformed branch of Protestantism of their country in their day, but their production commended itself also to the Reformed Church of other lands, not only in that age but for centuries to come.

But the question now at the end of 350 years arises whether or not it has fulfilled its mission. A considerable number of ministers and intelligent laymen of the Church are no longer able to accept all of the theological positions of the Catechism. For example, some do not believe that the doctrine of total depravity and of the atonement as presented in the Catechism can be justified by the teaching of the Gospel. Other difficulties appear to other minds. Revision would not remove the objections, as the underlying principles would necessarily remain the same. Ought the Church to form a new Confes-

<sup>1</sup> These brief articles were prepared, at the request of the editor, by a group of clergymen of the Reformed Church. They represent the eastern and western sections of the Church, and the progressive and conservative tendencies. They discuss the question, "Is the Heidelberg Catechism adequate to the needs of today as a Confession of Faith, and as a Catechetical Manual, or do we need a new Catechism?"



sion? I answer emphatically no. No new Confession could be produced that would be as generally acceptable to the Church as a whole as the Heidelberg Catechism. This is not an age for the creation of confessions. Let the Heidelberg Catechism remain as the Confession of Faith for the Reformed Church and as a monument to the faith and wisdom of those who originally formulated it.

But as a book for the instruction of the young it is no longer satisfactory. The presumption is against it. It cannot be expected that a textbook prepared 350 years ago when the conditions in church, state and social life were entirely different from those of the present would meet the requirements of our day. And as a matter of fact by a forty years' experience in catechization I have found it very unsatisfactory for the purpose. It is not in harmony with the pedagogical practices of the day; its questions and answers are too difficult for children of 12 to 15 years of age; the subject matter is too theological and doctrinal; and deals with too many questions that are at present in dispute in the theological world. As a confession of faith it can be accepted by almost every one as setting forth the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel. But when it comes to teaching it the instructor must enter into particulars, and then he will find himself confronted by the doctrinal objections (if he has any) in their full force. Speaking for myself, I do not believe that any one is morally corrupt from the soles of his feet to the crown of his head, unless he has brought himself into such a condition by a life of depravity. From the attitude and acts of Jesus towards children and from my knowledge of childhood I believe that there is an element of goodness in every one born into this world. If such were not the case there would be no basis, no Anknuepfungspunkt, for religious instruction, unless the child were regenerated in baptism or in some other way, which I do not believe to be the case. Or, the child might live in a state of depravity until regenerated at the age of maturity through what is popularly known as conversion. That is a

position I cannot accept. Yet there stand the question and answer of number 8 in the Catechism. This and other particulars perplex me in teaching the young with the Heidelberg Catechism as a textbook.

May not all of these objections be obviated by a simplified form of the Catechism? Evidently not, for such editions by different persons have been published at different times, but none has proven satisfactory. I have been using one such for years, but it does not meet the requirements as I see them.

What we, in my opinion, need is an entirely new book; formulated according to the principles of modern pedagogy; treating of faith and personal piety, and of the Christian life, its duties and privileges, its hopes and pleasures; setting forth the Christian's obligations to the church, to missions, to society in general and the social affairs of life in particular. Let the book be divided into three parts; the first part adapted to the needs of a primary class, the second part to those of an intermediate class, and the third part to those of an advanced class; and in the preparation of it the capacities and needs of boys and girls from 10 to 15 years of age must be kept strictly in mind.

This, then, is my answer to the questions that have been raised:

1. Let the Heidelberg Catechism stand, unrevised, as the Confession of Faith for the Reformed Church in the United States.

2. Let it, however, be discontinued as a book of instruction for the young, as in my opinion it is no longer suitable for the purpose.

3. Let a new book be prepared in harmony with the general spirit and life of the Church of the present day.

MEYERSDALE, PA.



( 2 )

S. R. WAGNER.

“We cannot sacrifice experience to the requirements of a system,” says Henri Bergson in his *Creative Evolution*. The Heidelberg Catechism was not the ripe fruit of experience but an emergency book to meet the requirements of the system of thought that established Protestantism. As such it was a most worthy publication. As such it has had a splendid history. As a key to the theology of the Reformation it is splendid—especially of the Reformed type of theology. As a handbook to perpetuate the history of sixteenth century theology it has had a unique history. As a monument it should be preserved, not changing one jot or tittle.

But the Protestantism of the Reformation is no longer with us. We have different work to-day. Our ecclesiastical mission to-day is not to show the differences between the Roman Catholic and Protestant faith and then build up on the points of difference. A larger experience and the lapse of three and one half centuries have made many changes in the dominant notes of the Christian life. The Heidelberg Catechism does not adequately represent the theology of the Reformed Church to-day. A new statement of our position would eliminate many things and add many others. But even if the Catechism were to be conceded as an adequate expression of our position to-day, even then it is very questionable whether in preparing for confirmation the youthful mind should be asked to adopt a scheme of theology produced as an emergency in an age of strife. At the age when confirmation usually takes place, questions other than theological are uppermost. Of course there are other questions and answers, and good ones too, in the latter part of the book, but the approach to them is along an uncertain way.

The adolescent mind calls for light on questions of conduct, sin, temptation, forgiveness, worship, social and vocational

duties and all the questions of *life*, and it was Jesus himself who said that he came to give *life* and abundantly. It is important that the right material be taught but it is even more important that the right direction and impulse be given. And the material and direction must be adapted to age and circumstances. We do not teach advanced mathematics in the elementary grades of our public schools. We do not expect the same results from the dull and the alert. Likewise it is scarcely good pedagogical form to try to develop the innocent children with speculative thought that is baffling to adult minds even after long years of studying the questions involved.

The Heidelberg Catechism is built upon the theory of a fiat creation, the original perfection of a first pair, the fall of man, total depravity, plenary inspiration, a sacrificial atonement, physical resurrection, etc., and these subjects are to say the least debatable, and therefore not proper material to teach with certainty to persons who expect from us light on things surely believed and on things essential.

The efficiency of the Catechism as an adequate textbook for preparation for confirmation and the Christian life may be measured somewhat by the use that is made of it after confirmation. Does it remain a book which is used for meditation and inspiration by the new church member? In most cases in my experience the best that can be said of it is that it is put with the books of the household and kept for the next child when about to be confirmed. It does not find a place in the hearts and minds and daily life of the people. Perhaps it did in the time of its publication, but it does not now. Nor does the preacher often use it as a basis for his preaching or pastoral work. Why? Because it does not meet present-day needs.

In my twelve years as an active pastor I have been called to minister hundreds of times in the sick room. I never think of taking the Catechism to read, to give comfort and cheer. I have never been asked to use it. It has seldom been referred to in any way, by any one, while under the bonds of affliction. In the many times that I have had to minister in the house of



mourning the experience has been similar. When men want light on the questions of personal temptations, on vocational, social and dogmatic problems, do they turn to the Catechism? The only place where the book in question figures large is in the class preparing for confirmation, and I believe it is used there not so much because of the feeling of its fitness as because of its requirement and the absence of anything to take its place. And in such classes as a rule much help is derived from the supplementary material to be found in any of the several editions.

The Reformed Church to-day certainly needs a new literature—a literature stripped of its Nicene and Mediæval accumulations, in which the pure and simple gospel of Jesus is supreme.

READING, PA.

( 3 )

J. M. G. DARMS.

The Heidelberg Catechism needs not to beg for champions in our Reformed Church. We plainly feel that in its possession we have a priceless treasure and a glorious heritage. We fairly love this precious book and exposition of the faith of our fathers, not only because we have drawn so heavily upon it, in the 350 years just passed, for the “expression of distinctive denominational teaching,” or because it has spoken so eloquently and forcefully of that immeasurably deeper and worthier book, our *Biblos*; but because it has contributed so largely to *our* faith and religious life. More than we know in our denominational life, moral philosophy and theological thinking, do we owe directly or indirectly to the influence of the Heidelberg Catechism. If we may use this expression, the pen and the mind of the framers of that precious book were like the “key” on the wireless telegraph, attuned and tensioned to catch and transmit the wave of the dominant,

current truths of the "Progressives" of that age, securely house the message and with accuracy again give it to the world of inquirers. We have been the inquirers and have adequately understood its message. *Our* Catechism is the peer among the four great catechisms of the world, viz.: Lutheran, Anglican and Westminster. Through the possession and impression of the Heidelberger, we have been enabled to continue, what is dear to the heart of every member of the Reformed Church, the *educational* element in our religious instruction. Our people have been indoctrinated and fortified by the *constructive* teachings of the Catechism, which lent strength, clarity and permanency to their religious convictions and joy and comfort to their religious lives. There is something of intellectuality and spirituality in our faith, that we can trace directly to the influence and moulding property of our Catechism. Moreover, through the Catechism, we have been inducted into the Word of God, for the Gibraltar, upon which these our denominational and theological fortifications stand, is the *Word of God*. The framers of our Catechism were very careful to impress us with the "authenticity" and "Biblical verifications" of their teaching, by placing the *steel bands* of appropriate Bible passages around every question and answer. Of course, their philosophy, peculiar theological views and their individuality were also expressed in their production. No one engaged in such constructive work of thought, theological, philosophical or pedagogical, can remain entirely impartial without throwing his personality, and with his personality, his individual views and convictions, into the production. It might be more *scientific* to refrain from doing so, but in matters religious, where the *heart* is so closely bound up with the *head*, spirituality with intellectuality, revelation with *personality*, it is almost impossible to do otherwise. Their production is none the less *larger* than their personality because they did so. It is possible unconsciously to be a *redactor* and *instructor* at one and the same time.

But there is, in our humble judgment, one thought, which



even the framers of our Catechism never entertained, and that is: That *Truth* in its last development had been gathered in and incorporated in their production as the *finished religious product of the ages*. The Heidelberg Catechism, however much it may be thought so in some quarters, is not to be accepted as the *last word in the confessions of religion in the world*. There may be none more beautiful and comprehensive, but that is not saying that the Heidelberger is the be-all and end-all of expressions of religious belief. Not even the fathers thought thus. Their very humility and integrity of purpose, as well as their intellectual grasp of the *vastness* of things spiritual, militates against this, which would otherwise be a stupendous claim. The *truth* in all its force and fullness, in its completeness and comprehensiveness, is *in Jesus*, and Jesus was the Son of God in a unique sense. His was a *teaching plus a personality*. He never intended Christianity to be a mere dogma, however rock-ribbed and perfect this may be. It was more than theology, philosophy and pedagogy which he gave to the world. Jesus revealed and reflected *God* to the world. The framers of the Catechism had a comprehensive vision of the Christ and conception of the truth as it is in Jesus. Their burning passion was to see their children and their children's children possessed of the only comfort in life and in death, but their vision and conception and passion was no *finality*.

The truth is larger than the conception of one man's mind of the minds of a coterie of men and larger too than the conception of any one church or denomination. Others see and think and feel as did our fathers. There is a certain consecutiveness in thinking the thoughts of the master minds of the world after them, but there is always room too for *individuality* and *originality* of thought. The *truth* is, in our opinion, fully expressed and in a finished form in *Jesus*, in His teaching *and* personality; but the interpretation and application of the truth will naturally be relative, made to apply to and fit adequately the needs and the conditions of every

age. No age has ever *exhausted*, nor will our's exhaust the search for the truth. The admonition of the Master, *Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life and these are they, which testify of Me*, John 5:39, continues in force until there is no mind to think and search any more in the earth. It is directed to *us*. Here not the Catechism, but the whole Word of Law and Prophecy and Gospel is meant, the whole Book of God.

Every age has its mentality and spirituality; every truth its appeal to the intellect and the heart. But in its development it is built like one of our modern buildings, *tier upon tier*. Not a single one of these lower tiers can be excluded and eliminated if the safety of the building is not to be threatened, or if it is to retain its firmness and attain its height. We must not be slow in appreciating either the progress or the limitations of this or of a previous age. For more than *pious reasons* and the "veneration of our venerability," should we value our Heidelberg Catechism. Its substance, its intrinsic value, is its real worth. It stands or falls on its *merits* and not on its *historicity*. We must recognize that. But we must not permit ourselves to become satisfied "without a reason and conviction," as little as we should become oblivious to the imperative needs of our times to help our people secure "a reason for the hope, that is in them."

All this leads us to say:

1. We should not discard, but retain our Heidelberg Catechism as a Confession of Faith of the Reformed Church.

2. We should have a perpetual *re-vision* and *re-study* of the teachings of our Catechism and rightly understand, interpret and emphasize the teachings of our fathers. There is such a deplorable lack of effort on the part of many, to give to the Catechumens a thorough, systematic instruction in the Christian verities. For the sake of brevity, succinctness and comprehensiveness which sometimes spells mental inertia if it does not spell something worse, many of the rich treasures of our Reformed teaching remain buried and unknown and those



that are taught are but lightly touched and not exhaustively taught. Our age will need not less but more indoctrination of vital truths, in order to attain to a larger degree of Christian faith and denominational efficiency.

3. Following the lead of our Catechism and true to its genius, let us find our way back to "our Bible." Let us search its depths for pearls of great price, for vital truths, as yet undiscovered, though read and believed with sincerity and yet lacking the *emphasis*, which should be given to them, to make them a stimulant to our religious lives and have them meet the "social needs of our times," which are crying to Heaven for attention and correction. To these truths in the Holy Bible, there is no limit, neither to their adequacy or efficiency. Every age has only scratched the surface of this soil. No generation has exhausted, nor will we exhaust, the rich treasures of the Bible.

4. Let us with more industry and reverence study the *personality of Jesus*, enthrone Him in our hearts and lives and give Him his rightful place in the Kingdom of God in the earth. Whilst we reverently think the thoughts of our fathers after them, we must not for a moment let any dogmatic teaching (though the Heidelberg is more than that), however beautiful and impelling, take the place of the *Living Christ*. Religion is not only a dogma; it is *life*. And as we study the life of the Christ, we set our mind to work, under the direction of modern (not medieval) philosophy, to grasp "the truth as it is in Jesus," we will find many added truths *trickle* down through our mind and take firm root in our heart and become fixed expressions in our religious convictions. The Kingdom of God is of a growing nature and the Kingdom thoughts are uppermost in our minds. The social aspect of our modern civilization and Christian life needs attention in these days of social unrest. Our religious convictions must have "*iron in the blood*" in order to withstand the assaults and meet the needs of our materialistic age.

Sin must be crucified and conditions rectified. We must

show our people a way out of the wilderness and into a sweeter and larger life of worship and service. This is our challenge.

5. Whilst we reverence our Catechism and the rich thoughts of our fathers, let us not discourage, but rather encourage, individual thought and personal study of the vital truths of Christianity, but employ the *sifting process* in their acceptance and extreme *caution* in their recommendation and abundant *wisdom* in their documentary expression. We need discard nothing, we may add much in a statement of belief. We should see to it that it does not sacrifice anything vital for the sake of being concise; that it is lucid enough to be understood by any ordinary mind; that it embodies the essentials of that first grand confession of Christianity of Peter: Thou art the Christ, including all that he meant in saying that; that it be in such a practical form as to be of real service and need not pass through the experimental stage or find its touchstone first.

With the Christ as the centre, the Kingdom of God as the circumference, we will have a wide sphere to pursue our labors and studies. And if we are not only critical but actuated by the same motives as our fathers, we will adopt as a part of our motto: The Christ, the entire Christ and nothing but the Christ; the *truth*, the whole *truth* and nothing but the *truth*. Doing this we will find the *tangents* going through the heart of that good old book we love so well, which has served us as a rich treasure store, for upwards of 350 years, and we will find these stretching forth like the vital tendrils of the plant for a *hold upon God* himself, bringing *Him* so close to us that though owning His Absolute Sovereignty, over men and affairs, which the Heidelberger constantly upholds; yet we become conscious of His *presence*, convinced of His *leadership* and assured of His undying *love*.

Thus we will retain reverence for the faith and labors of our fathers of yesterday; have bread for our people of to-day and a satisfying spiritual food for our children of tomorrow. Whilst we are praying: Thy Kingdom come, all along the far-



flung battle-line of 300,000 earnest champions of the truth in the Reformed Church, the standard of our Reformed faith is displayed and we are privileged to see the *Glory of the Lord* filling our houses of worship, feel the joy unspeakable gladdening our hearts and feel the thrill of "world conquest" to which we also are called and which work of "bringing men to God," we will pursue with unabated zeal and renewed vigor as a memorial to our fathers and an expression of the effectiveness of the faith, we have thus expressed. We frame these lines to express our feeling, as a sort of Processional:

One God, one Christ, one Truth alone,  
 One passion of our heart we own:  
 That throughout earth God's will be done,  
 In *every* heart *His* Kingdom come.  
 Our *fathers'* God, be with us yet!  
 Lest we forget, lest we forget.

ROCHESTER, N. Y.

( 4 )

F. C. NAU.

Is the Heidelberg Catechism adequate theologically and pedagogically for the Church of to-day? The writer does not think that it is. It may have been adequate to the religious needs of the sixteenth century. In fact, it contains the very best theological conceptions of the Reformation period. It is the finest distillation from the theological and ecclesiastical ferment of that great time. And for 350 years the catechism has rendered a signal service to the Church, because it set forth a christological religion, it emphasized the all-sufficient grace of God, it helped to conserve the idea of an educational religion, and it showed that personal knowledge of doctrine and personal heart-religion belong together. But its statement of doctrine and its analysis of truth belong to the sixteenth century. During the past 350 years floods of new light have been poured upon the religious world, and no theological book of

350 years ago can fully satisfy the religious consciousness of our time. Revelation is progressive. The capacity for receiving truth has expanded. A new manual for religious instruction is therefore needed. Christian doctrines should be restated.

1. Instead of emphasizing a rigid, logical, historical plan of salvation, we should hold up religion as the transforming, regenerating, fruit-bearing life of God in the soul of man.

2. Instead of "original sin" we should speak of heredity. But personal responsibility for individual sin must always stand out prominently. "Total depravity should be applied only to the degenerates of the race." Jesus did not begin His teachings with the fall of Adam.

3. The Catechism bases its scheme of redemption on the proposition that God's justice must be satisfied, that His anger must be appeased. The truth of redemption, however, is rooted in the love of God. God's *love* must be satisfied. Instead of the penal suffering and death of Christ as a substitute for the sinner, the great voluntary self-sacrifice of Christ should be made fundamental. John 3:16 and the "Parable of the Prodigal Son" are the basic passages for the truth of redemption, and not the juridic and Judaistic arguments in some of Paul's epistles and in Hebrews.

4. The eschatology of the catechism is not sufficiently spiritual. The resurrection of man should be treated in the light of Christ's statement: "I am the resurrection and the life." The second coming should not be treated so much as a coming event, but as an ethical and spiritual process which will eventuate sometime in the complete triumph of spiritual personality over the animal and the material, when Christ will be all in all.

5. Christ's teachings about the "Kingdom of God" are not given large enough room in the Catechism. This age demands a true interpretation of the social ideals of Jesus. The Church must be made to understand the true doctrine of the Kingdom of God, or she will continue to be baffled by the great social



movements of our time. She needs sound doctrine on Christian brotherhood, Christian service, and Christian missions.

6. The Catechism does not tell us what the Bible is. A false conception of the Bible has been a chief cause of controversy, heresy, bigotry, sectarianism and infidelity. It is high time for the Church to teach her children that the Bible is the progressive revelation of God, through human experience, in various forms of literature, during a period of 1,600 years, culminating in Christ the perfect revelation. It is the world's supreme religious book.

These and other things convince the writer that our Catechism does not meet the requirements of the Church to-day.

Pedagogically the book is more satisfactory than theologically. But modern pedagogy and psychology would demand a better book for the religious instruction of our youth. The Catechism is too heavy for the untrained mind. The scholastic argument for the satisfaction theory can not be followed by the youthful mind, nor by many an adult mind. The sentences are too involved. The definitions are often couched in theological and philosophical language. Words like co-eternal, co-equal and God-head are difficult. In some respects it has simplicity, but in general it lacks simplicity. A new Catechism should be characterized by the utmost simplicity of reasoning and expression. A new manual for moral and religious instruction should retain the catechetical method, that of question and answer. The teaching method of Socrates and Jesus have not been superseded by any methods of modern pedagogy. Jesus taught by asking questions and drawing out what was in the minds of his disciples. The questions should proceed in logical order, each growing out of the preceding one, and all subordinate to but illuminating of one central idea. It should have the personal element and fervor of the old. The new manual should be prepared by devout scholars, who will make it an expression of their deepest religious experience.

READING, PA.

( 5 )

A. O. REITER.

Under this general question, two subordinate questions have been assigned to me for discussion in this issue of the REVIEW, (1) Is the Heidelberg Catechism pedagogically adequate? (2) Is the Heidelberg Catechism theologically adequate?

I. Our answer to the first of these questions will, of course, be largely determined by our attitude toward the "new psychology" and "modern pedagogy" concerning which we have heard so much within the past twenty years. If it be true that "interest" is the key to all education, if the only gateway to that interest is the child's instinct for play, if dogmatism is "a sin against the mind," and the path of least resistance the only right way, if the only real knowledge is that which the learner first acquires through experience and then formulates for himself: then, certainly the Heidelberg Catechism, both in form and in substance is inadequate as an instrument of education. But there are new psychologies and new psychologies, new pedagogies and new pedagogies, at least fifty-seven varieties, and no greater agreement among them than between the many theories of socialism. Perhaps when the newest psychology is written and the most modern pedagogy formulated there may be found room even for the *a priori* and the categorical imperative and the dogma.

"By their fruits ye shall know them."

For three hundred and fifty years pastors in the Reformed Church have used this text-book heedless as to whether it was as interesting as a fairy-story or not. The play instinct has been entirely ignored. Regardless of the path of least resistance, the formulas of the catechism have been presented as so many dogmas the catechumen should store up in memory, that he might know "what to believe and how to live." That the language of the catechism is, in form, largely empirical by no means signifies that the corresponding experience of the cate-



chumen was ever more than potential. Our catechetical method has never aimed to lead the child through experience to his own formulation of the truth of that experience, but rather by giving the truths of the experience of the race to direct the learner that he may know what kind of experience to seek and where to seek it. Some millions of catechumens have studied this catechism, many of them memorizing it from cover to cover, and the world has had the benefit of the lives and labors of strong, Christian men and women, possessed of a broad and comprehensive view of God and this relation to man, of deep and lasting religious experience and conviction. Bold indeed is he who will assert that the law of cause and effect has had nothing to do with this, that we have had strong Christians in spite of the catechism with its dogmas and its anti-pedagogical, anti-psychological method. Some thousands of boys and girls within the past year have learned to say: "I with body and soul both in life and in death, belong, not to myself but to my faithful Saviour, Jesus Christ" and have experienced within their hearts an answering throb of assent to the ancient dogma. And some who have studied modern science, modern philosophy and the richest treasures of literature have stumbled upon the 26th question and answer and have marvelled that a man of the sixteenth century could, in so few words, and in such perfect poetic form, express so much of the best that the science and philosophy of the twentieth century have tried to say, so much of man's fundamental faith that never grows old. Perhaps, after all, there is wisdom, even pedagogic wisdom in the practice of gathering together in concise formulas the best the race has experienced and in giving these formulas to our children as a framework for their spiritual lives. Certain it is, that after a generation of Froebelian theory, wrested from its sociological purpose into an educational cult in the kindergarten, of Herbartian theory in the public schools, of eclecticism and specialization in colleges and universities, of manifold inventions, to make work into play, not in generations has the world been so ill satisfied

with the results obtained in the schools as it is to-day. Perhaps the Heidelberg Catechism, with its inflexible dogmas, and the despised memoriter methods of other days have something to teach us even about modern pedagogy. Dean Smith, of the University of Pennsylvania, in a recent address said that the great lesson the college youth of to-day need to learn is that "*they must.*" However destructive of the play instinct, however out of harmony with the educational theory of interest, however dogmatic and anti-empirical such a maxim may be, it is what we need not only in the college, but in the public school and Sunday-school as well. As of old, every one must *work out*, not play out, his own salvation. This attitude of authority, this demand for obedience, this insistence on personal responsibility, the Catechism and the practice of catechization have preserved for us.

But is there no room for improvement? Is the Heidelberg Catechism in substance, as well as in form, adequate to the pedagogical needs of the twentieth century? That is an entirely different question, and we have no hesitancy in answering, no. Rich in truth, beautiful in form, dear to the hearts of many, are many of its questions and answers. But the book as a whole is of the sixteenth century and looks at the great problems of the religious life from the sixteenth century point of view. Truth is ever unchangeable, and God is "the same yesterday, to-day and forever." Man is man, sin is sin, and salvation is salvation, to-day as four centuries ago. But we are living in a new age and our apprehension of truth demands a new statement, a new formulation of fundamental truths. The great facts about numbers and their relations are exactly what they were in the days of Bruno. Three times seven is twenty-one, as it was when Columbus learned the multiplication table. The relation of the hypotenuse to the base and altitude is just what it was, and the "rule of three" has not changed since the days when Calvin ruled the city of Geneva with iron hand. But we should ridicule the idea of trying to use in our public schools a translation of a German arithmetic



published in the city of Heidelberg in 1563, even though it bore on its title page the names of the greatest mathematicians of their day, and just as little should we be content to continue to use a sixteenth century catechism as a text-book for religious instruction. The facts remain the same but the emphasis has shifted. While large areas of religious experience developed in our lives since the days of Ursinus are of such inestimable value that we rob our children when we fail to include them in our manual of instruction.

II. The question, is the Heidelberg catechism theologically adequate? has already been answered in part. Theology is our formal statement of the truth we apprehend about God and our relation to Him. No sixteenth century statement of that truth could by any possibility be adequate for the full expression of a twentieth century experience. Nor is any statement we make to-day likely to be more than approximately adequate. Something of mystery there must ever be in dealing with these great themes. When a God of infinite wisdom, love and power condescends to reveal Himself and His will to a man of finite mind, something there must be which that finite mind cannot grasp, cannot formulate. Yet even finite minds may grow "into all truth" when led by the promised Paraclete. The twentieth century has something better, something more nearly adequate from a theological standpoint to say on the great fundamental truths of the spiritual life, than the sixteenth century could possibly have had. We owe it to those coming after us to put not only: "that which was from the beginning" but likewise, "that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled concerning the word of life," into that sum of highest truth which we intend to use in their religious instruction.

In this answer to the question I have assumed that the question is as to the theological adequacy of the Heidelberg catechism as a text-book for religious instruction and not as a confession of faith. Yet, unbidden, the other question will obtrude itself. In our church constitution, and in our rituals

for ordination the Heidelberg Catechism is set forth as a confessional standard to which theological professor, minister, elder and deacon are alike required to promise conformity. Is it theologically adequate for such use? My opinion is that it is not adequate, that it never will be adequate, and that it never was adequate as a confession of faith for anyone except Ursinus and Olevianus, and that one or both of them possibly had mental reservations. The dream of a *confessio fidei* to be "everywhere, always, and by all received" was an obsession of the prescientific, not to say unscientific mind, and has no rightful place in modern religious life or the modern church. The attempt to enforce a standard in either faith or practice is ever fatal to the peace of the church and destructive of all true Christian progress, because it subverts both the spirit and life of the Christ himself—the spirit of freedom the life of loving service. It is because we of the Reformed Church have externally and formally, though not at all in reality and in practice, regarded the Heidelberg Catechism as a confession of faith, that we have not been able down to the present time to formulate a better manual of instruction for catechumens. In the present unsettled condition of theological thought, the preparation of a statement, theologically adequate as a confession of faith for anyone except the maker of it, is absolutely out of the question. But we have many men as capable of preparing a text-book for religious instruction for the children of the twentieth century as were Ursinus and Olevianus to do the same work for their generation. But this will not be done until we do away with the dishonest pretense of conformity to any standard save that which the Holy Spirit rears in each one's own heart.

The Heidelberg Catechism in the hands of an educated ministry, breathing that air of freedom in the truth the Reformed Church has ever prized, though formally denying it, has been blessed of God in wondrous degree. Millions by its use have been led step by step to Christ and made to live in them. That it has not lost its power and usefulness is not, however, due,



either to its form or contents, but rather to the fact that those using it have supplemented its formulas with the whole range of their own experience in the Christian life. This catechism should not be revised. In its historic unity it ought to stand as a monument of what God led man to do for His glory in the sixteenth century of the Christian era. As such it is the richest distinctive possession of the Reformed Church, and throughout the ages it will be increasingly prized.

The need of the present day is a new manual of instruction catechetical in method, dogmatic in form, pedagogically and theologically adequate to the demands of our times. Its aim should not be to interest the child by substituting candy for meat. It need not appeal to the play instinct any more than did the catechism of our fathers. A clear and forceful presentation of the truth, concise, and as beautiful as it is possible to make it, appealing to all that is deepest, noblest, and most heroic in the human soul, such a text-book we need. It should contain, in addition to all the gathered treasures of the religious experiences of men before the Reformation, those greater riches of truth and wisdom which the ever-living Spirit hath in these last days revealed in us.

POTTSVILLE, PA.

( 6 )

FREDERICK C. SEITZ.

The Heidelberg Catechism as a work of the sixteenth century has our highest admiration. From the viewpoint of that age, it has Scripture as its basis, it is logical in its conception and arrangement and clear in its statements. For any age or people that looks upon religion as law, and holds that the foundation of the Christian religion is the appeasing of an angry God, the Heidelberg Catechism will ever be a splendid and sufficient text-book to instruct the unchurched and the children of the church.

The religion of Jesus Christ is, however, not viewed in our day as law, nor do its adherents think of Christ as having paid any kind of a penalty which had in view the satisfaction of God. Religion is life; and in Jesus Christ we find the highest, noblest and fullest manifestation of that life. That Christ was crucified and died on the cross is a fact as well authenticated and as indisputably established as any other fact of history. Just as certainly as there was a Revolutionary War with Washington at the head of the troops of the colonies, or a Civil War with Lincoln as President of the United States, so certainly was Christ crucified. That is a fact, one of many in His life. Now the Heidelberg Catechism is built upon the assumption that all these facts, and especially the crucifixion, were necessary to satisfy the wrath of God and to pay the penalty for sin.

In our age the facts are accepted as readily and as fully as they ever were, but they are no longer viewed as penal in any sense. Religion is life. The Christian religion represents the highest kind of life. In Christ there was perfect life. And since love is the fundamental requisite of true life, all the facts of Christ's life reveal God's infinite love. The cross, therefore, represents the extremity to which love went to win men, and as we behold the cross, we see the greatest exhibition of love the world ever knew.

But now, what has all this to do with the Heidelberg Catechism? Well, any book that is false in its premise, cannot be satisfactory in its conclusions, nor can it ring true to the convictions of many honest men who believe most heartily in the catechetical method.

True, the catechism is Christological. But it is the Christology of Paul interpreted by the mind of the sixteenth century. Certainly Christ should ever be central. But in our day the catechist wants Christ to interpret himself for us, and not Paul, much less the mind of 350 years ago.

Then, too, the Heidelberg Catechism as a text-book is simply impossible. And this is not because the pastors have weak-



ened in their high regard for the catechetical method. Every pastor has one class, and many have two catechetical classes. As a teacher, the pastor is as eager to teach Christ to the children as were any men of any age. But the active pastor does not have the time, even if he had the ability, to give a course of training in mediæval philosophy and the controversies of the sixteenth century, in order that the catechism may be understood. Consequently he finds it necessary to omit much that is in the catechism, and add more that is not in. It was my privilege as well as my pleasure to be present when an earnest and able catechist, one of the most faithful in our Church, demonstrated the use of the blackboard in teaching the catechism. It was admirably done, and I wish that my own child might sit at his feet and learn of him. But the Heidelberg Catechism was really not taught. Many of the questions were omitted; doctrine was entirely absent, and vital, ethical religion was set forth in all its beauty, glory and power. To my mind, this was a fine exemplification of the fact that the Heidelberg Catechism as a text-book for our day is an impossibility. And I am persuaded that the great majority of pastors, even while the catechumens have the catechism in their possession, do not use it in any large measure as a text-book. There are some things in it that they love to teach, but there are a great many things not in it that they feel the children must know.

Doctrine should have very little place in the life and mind of children. And at any rate doctrine is by no means the starting point. It is the conclusion rather than the premise. And since the Heidelberg Catechism has doctrine as its prevailing purpose, and, further, since it is the one authorized text-book of our Church, the pastors are asked to give the conclusions before the children understand the facts upon which the conclusions are necessarily based. We are asked to indoc-trinate rather than to invigorate. Pedagogically this is all wrong.

Take the Sermon on the Mount, for example, and teach it

thoroughly and understandingly to the children and they will be far better fitted for life than they will be if even they are able to recite from memory every one of the 129 questions and answers in the catechism. A well wrought out life of Christ is in my mind a better text-book than our present authorized and only standard. We are pretending to teach a book that the majority of the pastors, I dare say, are not teaching at all or only in small portions. And though some men think they are teaching the catechism, they unconsciously drift away from it time and time again because they feel that it is inadequate as a present-day text-book.

My conclusion is, not that we need a revision of the Heidelberg Catechism, but that we need an entirely new structure. The viewpoint needs to be modern, and the structure pedagogically possible. The one thing that needs to be retained is that Christ be the center and heart of the whole structure. For Christ is not only central in doctrine, but he is also central in life.

ALLENTOWN, PA.

( 7 )

J. H. BOMBERGER.

This contribution to this symposium might be summarized as follows: We need a new catechism. The Heidelberg Catechism is pedagogically inadequate. For a very large number of our ministers and laymen it is still theologically adequate. No doubt there are others whose opinions are no longer in close accord with it. Theoretically this divergence is radical. Practically—so far as the actual work of the kingdom is concerned—these men of variant view are apparently in entire harmony. Continued earnest concentration upon the great task of bringing the evangel of the saving Christ to sin-submerged men will continue to result in the furtherance of the kingdom, and, incidentally, the question of theological adjustment will take care of itself. It is doubtful if any attempt at peda-



gological reconstruction could be carried through at present without involving a discussion of the question of theological divergencies. Therefore it would seem expedient to postpone all catechism reconstruction to a more convenient season; or until time's readjustments shall have minimized the danger of precipitating what could easily become an acrimonious (if we are the true sons of our sires) and well-nigh hopeless theological controversy.

*This hands-off policy is advocated, not because the Heidelberg Catechism is sacrosanct. It is not.*

There is a tradition current that the Reformed Church apotheosizes its standard. Reluctance to endorse the proposal to prepare a new catechism is not grounded upon undue veneration for the symbol itself. Bibliolatry is as truly idolatry as is Mariolatry. And the worship of a standard has even less warrant. The revised version of the St. James translation of the Bible has come into wide use. Why should there not be a revision of the catechism? Fond associations should not be permitted to stand in the way. Ultra conservatism clinging to certain expressions and phrases should not block any real improvement. In writing of the New Intermediate Catechism, the approval of which by their General Assembly last year he vigorously condemns, a loyal presbyter of the Presbyterian Church declares that "a more suitable catechism than the Shorter Catechism never has been, and probably never can be, prepared."

Many of our Lutheran friends feel that way about their Catechism. And no doubt many of our own church could echo those words with application to the book that Ursinus and Olevianus wrote. But it is not because of an inclination to canonize the catechism that the writer would urge "hands off."

*Nor is it because the Heidelberg Catechism is pedagogically satisfactory in all respects. It is not.*

This is unavoidably the case because of the divergence between the purpose in view in its original preparation, and the use with which it is most prominently associated in our minds to-day.

It was prepared primarily as a carefully wrought-out statement of the Bible plan of salvation for adults in a day when theological dialectics was as the breath of life for multitudes.

Our thought of it to-day—and our most frequent use of it—is not merely as the Biblical norm by which we weigh and test orthodoxy and correct theological variations, but as a text-book for the instruction of the young—ranging in age from ten to fifteen years—in religious truth.

Used in this way there are probably already as many “new” catechisms—revised, abbreviated, detechnicalized—as there are earnest and successful catechists. A personal canvass among a number of pastors has confirmed the opinion as to the correctness of this statement. Why not then, by a comparative study of these church-wide individual, pedagogical reconstructions of the catechism establish a consensus as to what is generally desirable in re-phrasing and re-arrangement, and thus obviate any further necessity for individual revision? This would be little more than setting the seal of ecclesiastical endorsement upon some simplified and abbreviated form of the Heidelberg Catechism similar to the four or five modified forms which have been prepared and published by individual ministers and which are now in somewhat general use. This would cover the ground contemplated by the Presbyterian Intermediate Catechism referred to above, which was prepared under the definite instruction to “cover the system of faith and practice held by the Presbyterian Church, and taught in the Holy Scriptures,” and that it be “simpler in language than the Shorter Catechism.”

If the proposed revision of our catechism could be held down to this it is not only unobjectionable but desirable. The writer does not believe that it would.

*The difficulty emerges just here. In view of the excessive fluidity of current theological opinion at present any general and official attempt at pedagogical revision would almost inevitably precipitate a flood of theological controversy. This would, as was the case aforetime, divert the Church from the*



lines of religious activity upon which representatives of the different theological trends are now so happily and harmoniously concentrating. It is probable that there is not one of General Synods boards which does include enough shades of theological opinion to turn that harmony into strident discord if transferred from our oneness in earnest world-winning activity to our many-ness in theological dialectics.

Let all the restive souls with itching digits who sit in the seats of the controversially speculative pause and consider before they pen or publish aught which shall tend to divert us from these lines of practical effort along which we are now so smoothly working, and in the prosecution of which, for so long, we were woefully lacking because of the dissipation of our denominational energies in our internecine Thirty Years' War. The writer's cradle was rocked amid the din of battle. He hopes to escape the experience of going to his grave, when that time comes, to the accompaniment of an ecclesiastical Marseillaise.

In Reformed, Presbyterian, Methodist, Congregationalist, and other communions, there are, to-day, loyal followers of Christ working together in close fraternalism and with richly blessed endeavor, whose theological positions are well known to be widely divergent. Conservative and radical, in opinion, are equally orthodox in their zeal for the progress of Christ's kingdom so long as no green banner of controversial challenge proclaims a Jihad. Fortunately heterodoxy, for many a man, is, like Boston, merely a temporary "state of mind." Interest him intensely in real work for Christ and he will often "get over" it, forget it. But stop long enough to argue the question with him, and in a trice peaceful fellow-toilers will become bitter antagonists; the works close down, and the reign of the mob and the picket begins.

With divergencies represented on the one wing by the man who believes that God made Adam of dust, and, on the other, by the one who holds to a genetic connection between man and the original form of life in the world; by him who stands

staunchly by the historicity of the Genesis narratives, and the one who looks upon much of the Old Testament story as a blend of myth and folklore; by the man who believes in the eternal preëxistence of Christ and the one who shades off into something close akin to Socinianism; by him who avows that the Bible is the Word of God, and the one looks upon that view, with a recent writer, as "the tottering heritage of devout but unscientific ages,"—with doctrinal chasms yawning as widely as these that man is sanguine indeed who hopes to be able to bridge them by formulating a new symbol—unless its limits are as contracted as those of a catalogue of titles.

Therefore, because it seems inevitable that what is begun, in this instance, pedagogically will resolve itself into a theological issue, it would appear to be the course of wisdom to bear the pedagogical ills we have than fly to others that we know of, from an extremely bitter and wretchedly costly denominational experience, only too well.

CLEVELAND, OHIO.

( 8 )

C. B. SCHNEDER.

Among the many true and beautiful words which have been written in appreciation of the Heidelberg Catechism there are few to which our hearts and minds are more readily responsive than to the words found in the introduction to *The Heidelberg Catechism* by Rev. Alexander Smellie, M.A. After setting forth in some detail "the qualities which invest the Heidelberg Catechism with a supreme value," the writer adds, "But it has more positive claims to the attention and esteem of Christian men. From first to last it is pervaded by a beautiful spirit. It is the product of the heart as well as of the head. It is warm, spiritual, unctional, no less than exact and convincing. There are times when its utterances rise to a kind of heavenly pathos; there are other times when their rhythm clings to the memory like that of an exquisite



lyric. No one thinks of a catechism and a poem as having any affinity with each other—the singer would be indignant who should find his raptures spoken of in such a dubious connection; yet the Heidelberg Catechism, in some of its parts, has all the characteristics of prose poetry. The truths which it enunciates were loved by those who wrote them down, and they never thought it needful to conceal their love and feign only an intellectual interest in their theme. Their hearts overflowed into those questions and answers of theirs; and because they brought to their undertaking not only rare learning and judgment, but a passion of fervor and enthusiasm, they imparted to what they did a unique distinction, and they secured for it an irrepressible fame. Opie, according to Dr. John Brown, mixed his colors “with brains,” and so his pictures lived; but the books which are to laugh at the corrosive and destructive influences of time require in their composition something even better than brains—they must be tintured and warmed with ruddy life-blood. The young German divines of three centuries ago understood the secret, and therefore we can linger over their sentences still, and find that they speak to us intimately and lovingly.”

To these words of praise and appreciation of the authors of the Heidelberg Catechism and of the catechism itself our hearts and minds leap with joyful and grateful response and approval, and yet, considerations of faithfulness to the teachings of the catechism and of loyalty to ever-unfolding truth, compel us to consider very carefully at this time of our Jubilee celebration, our doctrinal standard from all possible sides. In this way only can we be just to the authors, to our beloved catechism, and to ourselves, and thus make the most out of the Jubilee occasion. It is not conceivable that the authors themselves would be satisfied with anything less than this if they could mingle and take part with us in this celebration. For them we claim, and we think justly, that they were men who stood in the forefront, not only in theological learning, but also in the apprehension of the needs of their

times and in the application of the truth as it is in Jesus to those needs. Is it conceivable therefore that if they were living now, in the light of three and one half centuries of progress in theological thought and practical Christian living, they could stand where they stood at that time? May we not suppose rather, that, in spite of the honor which we at this time bestow upon them and their work, in our attempt at recognition of the great good the catechism has accomplished, they would express surprise, if not disappointment, that the Church has been and is so well content to put the new wine of our present-day apprehension of truth and its application to the practical needs of life, into the old bottles of several centuries ago? Surely all must agree that the great distinction in which we hold these men lies in the very fact that they were not content to do thus; that they, in giving us the Heidelberg Catechism, gave a new bottle into which they put the new wine of evangelical truth, old in itself, but newly apprehended and to be practically applied. That they did their work wisely we all know. Eternity alone can reveal its wonderful influence for good. That it is monumental in its results is freely acknowledged. And yet, much as the world appreciates their work, greatly as we honor it, may we not ask, as in imagination we call them to our side, would not the authors themselves urge us to faithful efforts to do for our day and generation just what they did for their day and generation? The urgency may not seem so great, nor the emergency so pressing as in the days of the Reformation, but who that reads the signs of our times and with vision attempts to interpret them, can deny that ours is an age of re-formation in civil, industrial, educational, social, and religious ideals? These ideals are impelling us toward realization in a quiet, peaceable, yet irresistible manner, and coming years may reveal that which we now but faintly see, namely, that ours in a wonderful way, is "an age on ages telling."

That we may go forward safely both for ourselves and those who succeed us, and to the glory of God, we must be true to



our heritage according to its best spirit. That best spirit as it pervades our catechism, may be interpreted as urging us to create a new bottle into which to put the present-day apprehension of truth in heart and mind, for doctrine and teaching and life, in the clearest and purest light of the advancing revelation of God.

In this way will we do proper honor to our time-honored doctrinal standard and its inspired authors, as the branch honors the vine, or the oak the acorn from which it sprang. Inspiration in this direction should be the richest and best fruit of the Jubilee celebration to the observance of which the whole Reformed Church has been called.

SHAMOKIN, PA.

( 9 )

C. E. CREITZ.

The persistence with which the question, Do we need a new catechism, is asked, is one of the best reasons for believing that there is a widespread feeling of such a need. When there is entire satisfaction with what one possesses, the question whether one does not need or want something else does not continually obtrude itself.

This feeling of need is no doubt often vague and indefinite. Just what kind of a catechism we would like to have is not very clear. This is shown by the number of private catechisms that have been prepared at various times, not one of which has gained any considerable number of adherents.

But while we may not be in the clear as to just what kind of a catechism we want, there seems to be a growing feeling that the Heidelberg Catechism is no longer an adequate or satisfactory statement of our beliefs, and that it does not furnish a satisfactory handbook or manual of instruction for the youth of our Church. In other words, that it is neither doctrinally nor pedagogically adequate to the needs of the twentieth century.

This feeling of inadequacy is coupled with the most profound veneration for the little book that for three centuries and a half has held its place as the symbol of faith and the manual of instruction in the Reformed Church, and has gained the respect of all, and the commendation of many of the denominations of Christendom. The celebrations of this Jubilee Year bear new and striking testimony to the affection for the Catechism on the part of those who have been instructed in it.

But in spite of all our attachment to the book, we can not get rid of the conviction that we need a new catechism; not a revised catechism. For the suggestion of laying mutilating hands on this venerable book is repugnant to the best feeling of the Church. The Heidelberg Catechism should remain untouched. It was the flower, no doubt, of the best theological and ethical thinking of the Reformation. It was the finest expression in terms of intellect and of heart of that creative age. It belongs to the literature of power. It has in it something of the quality of deathlessness. It has perpetuated its life and influence in the Reformed and other churches for three hundred and fifty years, and by that very fact has demonstrated its ability and its right to live.

But we are living in a new age. A bewildering number of new facts have been discovered since the Catechism was written, which clamor for admission into our organized thinking. New light has been shed on the Bible, on religious experience, on history, on education, on science, on literature. This new knowledge can not be ignored. The thinker must take it into account. Theology is thinking on religious things, the intellectual apprehension of divine truth. As long as men think on religious things, therefore, there will be theology, and an ever growing, an ever expanding theology. For one age can no more do the final thinking on religious things, than one age can do the final thinking on botany, or astronomy, or on any other science.

Our thought also is cast into new moulds. We speak a different language from the ancients. Seventeenth century



formulas are often unintelligible to twentieth century minds. There is a need of recasting the old truths in many instances. While truth as such has not changed, and the fundamentals have remained undisturbed from century to century, our apprehension of them changes. But a different theory of the creation, or of the creative process, has not destroyed the Creator. The new view of the Bible has not destroyed the Word of God. We will never outgrow the fact that the world needs saving and that Christ was commissioned to do it. But our views on these subjects must needs be modified as new facts are discovered, or new light is thrown upon them, or as a profounder insight illuminates them more clearly.

In view, therefore, of our growing and expanding knowledge, and the intense intellectual and spiritual activity of our age, it is inevitable that both the theology and the pedagogy of the seventeenth century should fail adequately to meet our present needs.

A few examples, by way of illustration, may help to make this clear: The theory of the atonement as revealed in questions 1, 40, 56, 60 and others, does not satisfy the modern mind and heart. The atonement is a profound mystery, and can not be fathomed by the human mind, but experience and a fuller study of the Scriptures have thrown much new light on this doctrine since the Reformation, which must be taken into account by the theologian.

The total depravity of man is no longer satisfactorily treated by such questions as 5 and 8.

The modern mind would hardly be satisfied with the reason for the belief in everlasting punishment as given in question 11. The modern man may hold the belief, but it will be on different grounds.

Our sonship we believe to grow out of a somewhat different relationship to God than that indicated in question 33.

Questions 47 and 48 confuse rather than illuminate the topic which they discuss.

The teaching of the Catechism on the resurrection of the

body in question 57 is no longer generally satisfactory. A new statement of doctrine would no doubt modify the teaching of the Catechism on the sacrament of baptism, and would omit altogether the teaching of question 80.

Indeed a new book would probably be far less theological and doctrinal than our present Catechism, as the emphasis in religion has changed from doctrine to life, from creed to character. Such a manual would seek to give the inquiring student the proper viewpoint for thinking, rather than a cut and dried formula to be believed.

Is the Catechism adequate pedagogically? We believe not. It is, for one thing, too difficult. It is intellectually beyond the average catechumen. It also lacks the strong ethical note present in the teaching of Jesus and demanded by our age. Its method emphasizes memory rather than thought. The answer to a question should not usually be put into the mouth of the pupil, ready-made, as is done by the Catechism.

The theory and practice of education have been revolutionized since the Catechism was written, and it is, therefore, almost inevitable that in this respect also, it should no longer be entirely satisfactory.

It is usually easier to pick flaws than it is to create that which is flawless; to criticize, than to construct; to tear down, than to build up. And yet this is no reason why the Church should not begin to study seriously the problem of producing a manual of instruction for the youth of the Church, which will speak to them in the language of to-day, about the great truths of our holy religion.

READING, PA.

( 10 )

J. G. NOSS.

In the question as to the need of a change in the matter, or form, or both, of the Heidelberg Catechism, it is well to keep in mind the premises on which its doctrine is based. These



premises may be summarized thus: God created man in His image, endowing him with power to know and love Him and to live in union with Him. Man's sin sundered him from God and thus he could no longer use these powers for the end for which they were given. Whatever good he was able to do on the basis of his fallen nature, he could not do that good which God demanded from him in His law of love and, by doing it, live. But while man's self-love made God's love for man ineffective for ages and generations, His promises of coming deliverance were made from Eve to John the Baptist. These promises were to be fulfilled, not in some merely external and temporary manifestations of His love for man, but in the Seed, who should overcome all the powers of evil and establish an everlasting kingdom. All these promises become available for man in Jesus Christ, the son of Mary as well as the Son of God. He came neither to create nor to destroy men, but to save them; neither to set up or to put down the kingdoms of this world, but to establish one of His own. In short, He did not come to do what God has always done in and for the world, but that which had never been done before. Nor did He come to destroy the Law, but to fulfill it. Being in His own person the Truth and the Life, the kingdom He came to establish must rest on the same unchangeable basis, and if the subjects of this kingdom are to be fitted for an everlasting life of love, peace, righteousness and glory, there must be powers at hand to make them so. If Christ were only man such powers were impossible. The subjects of this kingdom do not merely become the beneficiaries of His example and teaching in an external way, but partakers of His life and all that this involves. Such participation is effected by the incoming and abiding presence of the Holy Spirit in the children of the kingdom, for it is the office of the Spirit to be the medium of the new birth and, on that basis, to teach them "all things" and to "guide them into all truth." But all this only within the sphere of the kingdom, for he is only to take the things of Christ and shew these unto them. The outside world can neither receive, nor

know Him. The "all things," therefore, do not include those of the natural order, nor yet all the "concrete minutiae" of the spiritual; for it is one thing to know the truth and altogether another to know all about it. We know and prophesy only in part. And all these blessings become the inheritance of the children of the kingdom by faith as over against works, and even this faith is wrought and confirmed in them by the Holy Spirit through the Word and Sacraments. And finally the Catechism reminds the children of the kingdom of the debt of gratitude they owe to God and this salvation by confronting them with the law of love and the Lord's Prayer—the law of love because the love of God is shed abroad in their hearts, and the "Our Father" because they are His children.

On these premises the catechism is constructed. It is sometimes spoken of as "the expression" or "the confession" of the faith of the Reformed Church. Strictly speaking, it is neither. The fact that the Apostles' Creed and the Sacraments constitute the heart of the Catechism does not make it either one. The Creed itself is the expression of the faith of the Church of Christ, in general, and the confession of faith of each individual member of it. The authors of the Catechism had no thought of formulating new articles of faith; their only purpose was to interpret the fundamentals of Christianity in accordance with the Word of God. In the organic law of our Church the Bible is declared to be "the ultimate rule and measure of the whole Christian faith and doctrine," and the Heidelberg Catechism is acknowledged to be "the standard of doctrine in the Reformed Church in the United States" (Articles 188–9). Nor did the authors of the Catechism claim infallibility for their interpretations. Denying such infallibility in the Roman Church, they could not consistently claim it for themselves. Only He who is the Truth can interpret truth infallibly.

In its interpretations the Catechism is Protestant, not Roman, Reformed, not Lutheran, nor Baptist. As such it is of necessity polemic, as any denominational catechism must be.



Notwithstanding its catholic and irenic spirit its polemic features are deemed too pronounced by those who favor a revision. The absence of the polemic element in any denominational interpretation of the Word of God, written or unwritten, is evidence in itself that such denomination has no justification for its existence. Legitimate polemics, rooted in the love of the Truth as it is in Jesus, has never wrought evil in the Church; its suppression has never wrought anything else. Mere strife about words and forms is a different matter.

Another objection to the Catechism is, that its teaching is not abreast with the spirit of the twentieth century, especially as it does not deal with the modern sociological problems. There are two kinds of socialism; the one, that of Jesus whose legitimate sphere of activity is within the Church, the other, that of the socialists whose sphere lies outside of it. Christ and Cæsar both have ends to attain, but neither the ends nor the means to attain them are the same. No civil government, whose organic and statute laws would be formulated on the basis of the Sermon on the Mount, could exist a single year without disaster. The Church of Christ cannot be in health and thrive on any other. No, the "Communion of Saints" is a proper subject for interpretation in a Christian catechism, the "Community of Socialists," not.

It is conceded that every member of the Reformed Church, whether in office or not, who has carefully studied the Catechism, is not perfectly satisfied with all its interpretations; but this has been true from the beginning. Its many merits are appreciated by all. Any new interpretation, in this time of much learning and little wisdom and in which some of the fundamentals of Christianity are regarded as no longer credible, would be not only difficult to formulate, but almost impossible to adopt by the Reformed Church by the process required in our organic law. Any attempt to do so at present might produce a result similar to that of the man who was persuaded to try a panacea for his ills—mostly imaginary—and before death came ordered this epitaph: "I was well; I wished to be better; and here I am."

As to the pedagogic adequacy of the Catechism for our time: The very fact that such a question is raised reveals the superficial, mechanical methods of religious instruction of to-day. We are simply overwhelmed by the amount of outward machinery that is crowded upon us so that we are in danger of forgetting that there is a Holy Spirit within us, without whom we cannot discern the things of the Spirit. When the Spirit of the Master is in the teacher and the catechumen, outward form is a secondary matter; when He is absent the multiplicity of pedagogic aids (?) can only result in keeping Him absent. Mr. Garfield's famous saying as to the essentials which constitute a university is to the point in this matter. Perhaps, if a change in the form of the Catechism is deemed necessary, it might be made to conform with primitive custom (without doing violence to the spirit of the age) by having the catechumen ask the questions and the catechist answer them (Gen. 12:26; Deut. 6:20; Luke 2:46).

NEW HOLLAND, PA.



## VII.

### RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE CHURCH.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER,

What is the purpose of education? Bird Coler, late Controller of New York City, in his recent book, *Two and Two Make Four*, says it is "to make a good man." His statement is worth quoting. After referring to different theories of education, he says, "In everything but one have they differed. There is one point upon which they all centered. From the early Hebrews and Greeks to the recognized modern authorities, there is a thread of agreement that holds a true course. There is one straight-edge that can be laid down upon the history of education from the beginning to now, and it will touch every great teacher from Plato to Pestalozzi, from Moses to Dr. Eliot. Differ as they may and do as to method, they all hold that the purpose of education is to make a good man. By whatever path, virtue is the goal. By whatever method, the end is righteousness. In all the long record there is no note of dissent upon this; in every system advanced everything else is secondary to the development of moral character."

Few would, I suppose, seriously question this statement. Whatever education of body and mind there may be, these clearly have their ultimate purpose in something beyond themselves. Only that training, which makes the utmost possible out of a man, which develops that which is highest and best in him, is worthy of the name of education. Hence all lower forms of training, whether physical or mental, must find their completion in the development of our moral and spiritual being. A man may be a good man, with a weak and sickly body or with an imperfectly trained intellect; but we cannot

conceive of a good man, whose moral sense is dormant, or whose spiritual faculties have been dwarfed. No matter how perfect his physical training may have been, or how far his intellectual culture may have been carried, he is not a truly educated man, if he lacks character; and hence his education has failed of its purpose, so long as it does not lead to his moral and spiritual development. It is in this that all education, whether of the individual or of the nation, must reach its crown and goal.

How may such moral and spiritual education be attained? Can it be found in our ordinary public schools? It is acknowledged by all that the scope of our public schools is limited. However excellent they may be within their own proper sphere, it is well understood that they can not do everything. They stand for purely secular education. The religious element is, in the nature of the case, excluded; and hence they cannot appeal to the highest sanctions for the moral life. Mr. Coler quotes Dr. Paul Monroe, late professor of the history of education in Columbia University, as saying, "Since the aim of education, as *limited* in the work of the American Schools to-day, must eliminate the religious element, it can find no higher purpose than that of determining for each individual the things in this life that are best worth living for." But will that suffice? If the horizon of the pupil is bounded by this life, can the things, which are really worth living for, be seen in their true perspective? Will not the view necessarily be distorted, so that things, which are really secondary in importance, will be exalted into the first place? We may confidently answer the last question in the affirmative. And hence we may with equal confidence affirm that the public schools, however excellent these may be in their own sphere, can never give us that which is highest and best in education. They are no doubt indispensable to the community for what they do give; but at the very best, the community which relies exclusively on them, can never attain to the true purpose of education. The education, which they do give, must be supple-



mented by moral and religious training through some other agency; otherwise what they give may become a curse, rather than a blessing.

On this point, Mr. Coler has some very definite and pronounced convictions. He takes what are probably extreme cases to illustrate his point; but we think that, in the main, his position is correct. He says, "The public schools in this country are not making for righteousness. There isn't an educator of any note in this country who hasn't admitted this. The metropolis of this country is thug-ridden. It has developed a new type of criminal, a conscienceless, fearless young brute who murders for hire, and recognizes no moral accountability and no social obligation. 'Gun-men' and murder-procurers have had their activities exposed in court. There is a similar state of affairs in Paris. Probably it is a little worse there. This is 'Two.' In Paris and New York there are godless public schools. In Paris atheism is a little more bold, a little more positive, than in New York. This also is 'Two.'" The inference which he draws is that, putting "Two" and "Two" together, there can be but one conclusion; and that is that a system of education which excludes the religious element can not, by itself, make good men, and that hence it can not accomplish the true purpose of education.

To sustain this conclusion, Mr. Coler, farther on in his book, gives a number of facts with reference to Paris, since the close of the schools of the religious orders in 1901. He quotes Mr. Alvan F. Sanborn, "a Protestant in religion, a native of Massachusetts, who has devoted all his life to the study of social problems, and whose book, *Paris and the Social Revolution*, is accepted as being the last word in the description of the social forces at work in the French capital." Mr. Sanborn, among other things, says: "Illiteracy is increasing in France at a surprising rate in consequence of the closing of the schools of the religious orders, which the State is unable to replace, and will be unable to replace for a long while to come." And again, "The withdrawal of religious instruction

from the public schools, and the closing of the schools of the religious orders, have been followed by an appalling increase in crime, particularly juvenile crime. The attempt to substitute the teaching of morals for the teaching of religion is a failure." And to confirm this last statement, the chairman of the committee on judiciary reform is quoted as saying that there has been "an increase of eighty per cent. since 1901 in the total number of crimes in the country."

Now, as we said above, we are willing to grant that conditions in New York and Paris are exceptional. Newspapers have protested against the indictment which Mr. Coler has brought against our public schools. Similar results have not followed purely secular education elsewhere. In our smaller cities and in our country districts the majority of our public school teachers are godly men and women; and where they are in control, the schools can not be godless. However little of specifically religious instruction they may impart, their influence and example are all the while exerting a powerful influence in molding the character of their pupils. This we freely grant; yea, and we glory in the fact. Yet the case, as presented by Mr. Coler, and especially as confirmed by the statistics of France, proves conclusively that, excellent as our public schools are within the sphere which belongs to them (and we are unjust, when we expect them to do what lies beyond their own proper sphere), there is urgent need for supplementing their work by distinctively religious education through some other agency. And it is not at all difficult to tell where this kind of education must come from. It can only come from the Church of Jesus Christ.

The facts above presented emphasize the importance of this side of the Church's work as nothing else can. For many, many years the work of education, secular as well as religious, was for the most part in the hands of the Church. Since the State has taken over the former, distinctively church schools have, at least among Protestants, been discontinued; and with it religious education has suffered. It has been relegated to



the Sunday School and the catechetical class. The former meets for only one hour a week, and seldom gives more than half an hour to instruction. Where the latter exists at all, the case is even worse. Three to six months in the year, with one exercise a week, is the best we can claim for the average catechetical class. Is there any wonder that the results compare so unfavorably with those obtained in our public schools in merely secular education?

Much has been said in these days about the great task, which confronts the Church in the work of missions and social service; and these are no doubt of tremendous importance to the world at the present day. But they are not one whit more important than the work of religious education. One of the functions of the Apostolic Church was *teaching* (Acts, 2:42); and it is just as much a function of the Church's life to-day as ever. If our home land is to be preserved from anarchy, if our ever-increasingly efficient secular and scientific education is not to breed a constantly greater number of clever and intelligent thugs and criminals, the Churches must be up and doing. They must supply the religious education, which is necessary as a supplement to the secular education, which is given by the public schools.

How may the Church accomplish this God-given task?

The first thing to be said is that the Church must make earnest with the means and agencies which are at her disposal. These may be inadequate (they no doubt are); yet such as they are, they are here, and it is the part of wisdom and good sense to make the best out of them, until other and better may be provided. What are these agencies which the Church does have immediately at her disposal? And how may they best be used for the purposes of religious education?

I suppose the answer to the former question, which will spontaneously rise to the lips of every one, is this: Foremost among all the agencies for the religious education which the Church possesses is the Sunday School. That is an institution which is coëxtensive with, at least, Protestant Christianity.

It has undoubtedly accomplished, and is still accomplishing, great good. Far be it from me to undervalue or disparage the work which it is doing. Yet it is but right that we should recognize its limitations. Its deficiencies are great. When looked at from the standpoint of the time which is given to it, of the methods which are employed, of the qualifications of its teachers, even of the ideals which are cherished, it compares most unfavorably with the public school. The latter is open six hours a day, during five days in the week, while the former has but one hour a week. The latter has, in many cases, had its methods worked out by pedagogical experts, while the former has in the majority of cases gotten along as best it could without either scientific or even common sense methods. The latter in almost every village and hamlet commands teachers who have had at least some special training for their work; the former has been compelled to accept any one, and has in consequence, had an army of inefficient and poorly prepared instructors. The latter is everywhere conscious of the end for which it exists. It recognizes itself as an educational institution, and its ideals are all molded by that fact. The former has in too many cases no ideals at all; and where it does, they are very often inadequate and low.

The last point may well bear some amplification. It ought to be a truism that the Sunday School is an educational institution, and that it exists for the purpose of religious education. It ought to be pervaded through and through by the educational ideal. Yet in how many cases that ideal is never thought of! Or where it is thought of, it is given a secondary place. The statistical ideal has been exalted above it. Numbers give the appearance of prosperity; and in too many cases Sunday Schools seem to exist for the sake of the enrolment. Not so long ago the writer was present in a school—one of the largest in the denomination. About twenty minutes was given to the lesson; and such was the confusion and noise during that time that bedlam could not have been worse. Such a thing as effective teaching was an utter impossibility. When



the lesson was over, the pastor mounted the platform, and from five to ten minutes was given to an address. The time should have been occupied in driving home the main truths of the lesson, which the school was supposed to have studied. Instead of it, the good man pointed to a device on the wall for registering the attendance; and every one was implored to go to work during the week to look up the absentees and to bring in recruits, so that by the following Sunday, at least five hundred might be present. Can a school, conducted under such circumstances, and with such ideals, contribute anything worth while to the religious education of our people?

That our Sunday Schools may accomplish their mission as institutions for religious education, there is need for thoroughgoing reformation along at least three lines.

1. There is need for a restatement of our Sunday-School ideals. All connected with them need to be impressed that they are *schools*, and that the sole purpose of their existence is religious education. Far better have a school of one hundred, earnestly devoted to the study of religion and morals, than one of a thousand, where that one purpose is forgotten or subordinated to lower ends.

2. There is need for reformation in the construction of our Sunday School buildings. Who can teach in a room, in which there are from one to five hundred others, all talking at the same time, many of them shouting at the top of their voices? What is needed is a building so constructed that every teacher can have his or her own class-room. Classes may then well be much larger; and yet the instruction which is given will not be lost. With buildings constructed as they are now, with from ten to fifty classes in the same room, there is absolutely no possibility of accomplishing anything worthy of the name of education. Conditions which prevail in our best Sunday Schools would not be tolerated in the public schools even by the most backward of our communities.

3. There is need for a thoroughgoing reformation in the teaching forces of our Sunday Schools. Sunday Schools should

have trained teachers. Not every one is fitted, either by nature or by training, for the task of teaching religion; for there is no subject more difficult. Only persons who have the qualifications for the task should be asked to be teachers. As Sunday Schools are usually organized, it is safe to say that no congregation has half the number of persons, properly qualified, that are needed as teachers. But if we had buildings, so constructed that every class could have its separate class-room, the want could be more easily met. From an educational point of view, it would be far better to have a school of two hundred divided into eight classes of twenty-five to a class, with eight well-qualified teachers in charge, and each in a separate room, than to have the same school, divided into twenty-five classes of eight each, with twenty-five average teachers, such as we have to-day, and all shouting against each other in the same room.

There are, no doubt, untold possibilities in our Sunday Schools. With the divorce between secular and religious education, which exists in this country, they are an absolute necessity. But that they are not accomplishing what may reasonably be expected of them is evident. What they need is a renewal of consecration to the end for which they exist, and a thoroughgoing reformation in their ideals and methods.

Another agency which the Church has at hand for the accomplishment of her task in religious education is the catechetical class. Where a pastor, who has pedagogical skill, conscientiously sets himself to work to teach religion to his young people, he has here an instrument of incalculable value. Though he meets the class for only six or nine months in the year, he can impress the truths of our religion here as nowhere else. To make the most out of its possibilities, he ought to have two classes, a junior and a senior class,—the former for all children between the ages of seven and fourteen, and the latter for those who are preparing for confirmation. In the former children ought to remain from year to year, until they are ready for the full communion of the Church. The instruc-



tion ought to be largely informal, clear and analytic. The aim should be thoroughness. Illustrations, parables, Biblical stories, and anecdotes of concrete religious experience should be freely used. Above all the members of the class need the warm sympathetic touch of the pastor's own religious life.

When one considers the tremendous power which the catechetical class has been in many a pastor's work, and the enormous possibilities which are in efficient and faithful catechization, one wonders why it has so often fallen into desuetude and why it is so often a practical failure. What are some of the difficulties and dangers to be avoided? And what are the requisites for successful catechization?

Foremost among the things to be avoided is mere routine memory work. With our catechisms, arranged in the form of question and answer, the danger of being satisfied with such mere memory work is ever present. Nothing except the lack of reverence and genuine godliness on the part of the catechist could be more fatal than this. There is no objection to the committing of sound words, in which great religious truths are enshrined; but the committing should be the end of the educational process, not the beginning. Before the child is asked to commit any formula, he needs to be taught the truths which it expresses. He should be made to understand every word used; and his heart should be made to feel the force of the religious truth which is involved. After that is accomplished, mere words will take care of themselves.

Chief among the requisites for successful catechization is that the instruction should touch the present needs of the catechumen's life. It must not simply seek to awaken the child's religious consciousness; but it must answer the questions which that awakening consciousness is constantly asking. And it must link in the child's life with the present problems of the Church's life. Nothing can be more fatal to the child's religious life than to attempt to nourish it with the husks of dead issues or worn-out religious thought. It is true, the child will not at once know that he is being fed on husks; but after he

has gone forth into the world, he will find it out. When the instruction which he has received in the class fails to meet the new issues of the day in which he lives, there is bound to be a reaction, which may be fatal to his whole religious life.

The writer has long since been convinced that, considered from a pedagogical point of view, it is a mistake to continue the use of a text-book in our elementary religious instruction, which is three hundred and fifty years old. In what other line of educational work would such a thing be even thought of? No school or college, which should attempt such a thing in any other kind of instruction, would be tolerated in any community. Why should we put a text-book for religious instruction into the hands of our children, and tell them that they have here all that is necessary for them to believe and do, when yet that book knows little or nothing about some of the most vital problems which will confront them in their daily life? Yet just that it what we have been doing. Our Catechism does not even contain the word missions;<sup>1</sup> and yet we have come to hold up the work of missions as the great work

<sup>1</sup> The Catechism, indeed, quotes the great Commission, Mt. 28: 18-20; and that, not simply as a proof text, but as part of answer 71. The catechist, with pedagogical skill, may find an opportunity of introducing the subject of missions at this point; and this may be urged against the position taken above. But it is to be observed, the great Commission is introduced, not to teach or even to suggest the subject of missions, but as an authority for the practice of baptism. Probably no better argument could be found in favor of the position that the idea of missions was not even present to the minds of the authors of the Catechism. They neither engaged in mission work, nor did they feel the need of missions in their conception of the Christian religion. Probably the nearest thing to our modern idea of missions, found in connection with the Catechism, is the following comment on question 71 in the Commentary of Ursinus: "*Go ye and teach all nations*: as if he would say, do not confine your instructions to the posterity of Abraham, or to particular nations; but go and teach the whole world. Christ here removes the wall which had hitherto separated the Jews from all nations, and makes a distinction between the sacraments of the Old and the New Testament. The Old was instituted for the Jews only, but Christ here declares that baptism was not for the Jews only, but for all nations." That is all; and then follows a long exposition of the doctrine of baptism.



of the Church! Is it any wonder that our people are so slow to respond to the Church's challenge? For generations we have been training our children for church-membership by using for their instruction an old book which knows nothing about this and other fundamental and vital issues. And by our legislation and by our entire attitude we tell the children that here they have a summary of all that they must do and believe!

No: effective catechization must deal with the vital issues of our everyday Christian life; and the pastor, who wishes to continue to use our otherwise excellent Catechism, must at least supplement its teaching by other lessons, drawn from other sources.

A third means for religious education, which the minister has ready to his hand, is the regular preaching of the Word. This is in reality the greatest and best. Here the pastor has the opportunity of reaching the entire community, old as well as young. And such is the scope and such the importance of religious education, that no one ever quite outgrows his need for it. As our entire life is, in an important sense, but a training school for the higher and better life to come, so the day never comes in this world when any of us has wholly outgrown his need for religious education. And the opportunity as well as the means for this continued higher education of our religious life has fortunately been prepared in the regular services of the sanctuary.

That this end may be attained, two things must be kept in mind.

1. Much of the preaching must be didactic. Its aim must be to instruct and edify. Of course, there is always room for the parenetic. Many are naturally phlegmatic; and hence there is need for exhortation, for persuasion and warning. And there are in every congregation those who are but adherents. They need to be won to the faith. And there are in every community open and wilful sinners, to whom the Gospel must be brought as glad tidings of salvation. Hence there is

always room and need for purely evangelistic preaching. But the great body of the congregation consists of Christians, whose great need is edification. They have accepted the faith; and they are making earnest with it in their daily life. But the more earnest they are, the more will they think of the great mysteries of faith. Life becomes full of problems, which they feel they and the Church must solve. Where shall they look for guidance in their thinking and working? Where but to the pulpit, under whose droppings they sit from week to week? Hence the pastor needs constantly to preach the great doctrines. He should be a constant student of the life of the community and of the age in which he lives; and his preaching should be an ever new interpretation of the Gospel to the needs and perplexities of his people. And no preacher who fails at this point, can hope to be successful in the highest and truest sense of the word.

2. Not only must the minister aim to edify the adults in his congregation, he should feed the lambs of the flock. Unfortunately the lambs too often are not present. That is likely due to several causes. The idea has prevailed that the Sunday School is the children's Church; and the pastor has too generally overlooked them in his ministrations. Two things, therefore, demand attention: The children must be won back to the Church service; and after they are there, they must receive their portion. The former has in a number of cases been accomplished by the "Junior Congregation," and the latter by a special brief sermon to the children. Whatever the means, religious education demands that this side of the work of the sanctuary be not neglected.

Finally, all this still leaves a large part of the problem of religious education unsolved. There are millions of our fellow citizens who are not connected with the Church, and who never attend any of its services. How can these be supplied with this kind of education? The problem is large—as large as that of Home Missions. We have only one suggestion to offer. The children of most of these persons attend the public schools.



The State can not undertake to supply what is needed. Why might not some arrangement between the Churches and the State be effected, whereby the latter would allow the former to come in for an hour or more each week, after the regular work of the school is done, to instruct the children in religion? Attendance would, of course, have to be entirely voluntary. The Churches of any community would have to agree as to the manner in which the work should be done; and they would have to assume the entire responsibility for it. We simply raise the question. Why might not a part of the work be done in this way?

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## VIII.

### RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN THE HOME.

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Religion as a life is both an intensive and a comprehensive view which demands new methods in religious education in the home, school, and church. This is true, however, not because religion in reality has not always been a life, but because men did not so conceive it and consciously plan accordingly to foster it. Christian education in the time of the Old Catholic Church was largely a catechumenate preparing the pagans for entrance into the church. In the period of the Roman Catholic Church, when religion as an institution predominated, the problem of religious education broadened somewhat but was nevertheless restricted to the institutional and ecclesiastical limitations peculiar to the system. The great Reformation of the sixteenth century burst the dykes of ecclesiasticism, so that the stream of the inner religious life was permitted to overflow the spheres of common life more freely. The conception of sacred and secular was broken down. Theoretically, at least, "the freedom of the Christian man" was acknowledged. The reversion of Protestantism to Catholic philosophy and dogma, however, greatly restricted the conception of religious education which at first so grandly promised to cover the whole of life. The emphasis of religious education was changed from the church as an institution to the Bible and the creed. It is only in our late modern period that the full freedom of the idea of religion as life is being proclaimed as a basis of religious education, regarding man in his whole being as an individual and as related to society, in the light of his present as well as his future destiny. It is an advance toward the full and free emphasis of the present consciousness



of God in life as affecting man in body and spirit as a part of the ever-coming and eternal Kingdom of God. The movement of dogma within the Church has been from the theological to the anthropological, to the soteriological, onward to the sociological. That is to say, the focal point at present is the problem of eschatology, the working out of a clear consciousness of the social and individual basis of the Kingdom of God as a present as well as a future reality. Modern economic ideals and religious concepts are rapidly approaching one another. The days of the necessity of a universal religion are at hand. The Kingdom of God is upon us. Consequently not only the conception but the reality of religion as a life is demanding new methods of religious education touching every department and calling of life.

Religious education in the home is no exception. Indeed, considering the focal significance of the home in civilization there is no department in which it is more true that new methods are necessary. The unity of life, furthermore, requires a hearty coöperation between the home, school, state and church. We acknowledge that we are far from realizing more than the beginnings of such a conception in actual practice. We must feel our way. We have but few precedents. Nothing but the heroism of such a faith as described in Hebrews 11:1 (A. R. V.) will suffice us: "Now faith is the giving of substance to things hoped for, the test of things not seen." In the spirit of such an activist faith we believe that religion as life ever carries with it its own realities—God, Christ, the soul, and the community of souls. Inherent in them and their historical movement we have the fact and the content of religious education. Psychology, pedagogy, and sociology are after all only formal. They discuss the processes. They have no Gospel to offer. They only indicate directions and methods. Consequently the problem of religious education in the home must recognize the influence of the sciences on the methods to be employed, but religion as life, an ever-growing experience of God, self, fellowmen and the world,

must always deliver us from the modern "psychologizing of religion" which so readily depersonalizes the realities of experience and volatilizes everything into a colorless pantheism. Professor Höffding declares, "Religion is faith in the values of life." Another authority equally significant says, "All values ultimate in persons."

In the light of this setting of the problem, religious education in the home may be considered from two points of view: First, some of the principles underlying all religious education but including the home; second, the functions of the home in the religious life. The former will be treated only in summary statement; the latter, more in detail.

Among the principles most prominently recognized is the immediacy of consciousness. Nowhere in the process of education more than in infancy and childhood is it true that the directness of the vital relations of life is experienced. The impress of environment, the touch of personality, the sense of self, the consciousness of God—these all are primary elements of life and nowhere more simple and direct than in the home.

"Heaven lies about us in our infancy."

Religion as life depends very much on the transmission of truth through personality and the constant effect of environment. The thing to be noted and appreciated, however, is the immediacy of consciousness. It is in and through the home that we are introduced to the world and come to self-consciousness. There, too, the consciousness of other persons as related to us comes to expression. As the nursery rhyme

"Twinkle, twinkle, little star,  
How I wonder what you are,"

appeals to the child, so the cosmic consciousness arises in the soul in the early days of home life. What father or mother has been able to answer the instinctive questions of a growing child from three to five years of age with reference to the origin of stars, and flowers, and birds without the idea of a God.



The God-consciousness of the child, instinctive and sure without the mediation of temple or priest, is one of the marvels of the home. However naïve the child's life-view may be, it is significant that philosophy after long detours returns to its instinctive immediacy; witness, Eucken and Bergson.

The principle of personality and life may be stated as "truth through personality." Life begets life. The conscious religious life is peculiarly dependent on the fact of incarnation. The vitalizing of truth in personal life and its transmission from generation to generation is the very basis of the home. "Personal influence remains a great force throughout human life; but it is far more powerful with children than with adults, not only because of the well-known imitative tendency of children, but because the child's world is distinctively a personal world."

History and life is another principle in which religious education in the home is intensely interested. Religion as a life has a human history. It has ever been expressing itself and always will. It is necessary to initiate the child into the history of religion, giving him the best of the tested experience of the past. The content of the present religious consciousness is never divorced from the past. The connection has always been a vital one. As a life and therefore a growth, nothing of the past may permanently bind or throttle the present in spontaneity and freedom but without the past there could be no present living consciousness. There is an appreciation of the past which is creative. The vital forces or realities are the same. There is a definite content of teaching which necessarily must form the point of contrast in the immediacy of the child's mind with the best experience of parents and earlier generations. The historic basis of Christianity both in the personality of Jesus, apostles, prophets, teachers, and believers in general and Christian institutions and doctrines must be realized in the continuity of Christian life in the present Christian consciousness. Here again the home is paramount in importance.

The fourth principle may be called fellowship or association. It touches the whole problem of companionship of parents and children, children with children in and outside of the home. By the silent influence of example, by conversation, exhortation, appeal, by fellowship in play, household duties, and social life, by leadership in introducing the child into the complexity of life outside of the home in shop, store, school, and church,—by all these and all else that goes to make up the personal and social atmosphere of the home, the character of the child is formed and he is helped or hindered to become himself as he is and will be.

There remains another principle, namely, self-activity. There can be no real education without it. The whole process of the revelation of God to the soul is centered in the arousing of the inner self to activity of thought and action. The tendency in secular education to emphasize this principle in response to the necessities of life should make us more concerned about it in religious education. Religious feelings and aspirations must find expression, individually and socially, in the worship of God and the service of man. Here again, not in theory but in the concrete practice of daily life, the home is the most original and important of our race institutions in conserving and advancing the welfare of man. The highest development of the individual is essential to the best social improvement.

This principle is inseparably bound up with another called coöperation. The social emphasis of life has become so great that socialism has become one of the important challenges of the human mind. The relation of the home to the social consciousness is most direct and vital. There is little doubt that the social significance of the family as a coöperative unit, instinct with the highest ideals of the common good, enters deeply into the problem of religious education. The change from the monarchical to the democratic view of life involves equally great changes in the home. It is a question whether the ideal of common welfare in the home is not at last joining hands with other social forces and breaking the bondage of



wealth, aristocracy, and heredity. At any rate the relation of the family to our social problem is evident and the demand for a religion in the family that will help to make possible a fraternal, just, and righteous community is one of the new paths just being blazed into the unknown land of the coming social life of the twentieth century.

This statement of principles is intended merely to give a setting to the discussion of the functions of the home in the religious education.

The three great institutions on which Christianity bases the progress of mankind are the home, the church, and the Kingdom of God. Just what the Kingdom of God is in its real relation to the present age is the burning question of the hour. These three institutions embrace the whole life of man. There are three functions that are alike to each of them.

The first is the coördination in worship of the relation of God as creator and father and of man as creature and son; the second is the initiation of each new generation with the history of the Christian religion as the past expression of the vital relation of God and man; the third is the service of man for man, as brethren, sons of God; or in simplified form they are worship, education, service; the ritualistic, the didactic, and the social elements of life.

The principles of immediacy of consciousness and of personality and life are both fundamental in worship as a vital religious factor in the home. It is one of those intangible and yet most real things which is far easier experienced than described. Devout reverence before God, coupled with obedience and hunger for fellowship, as well as aspiration to be like Him, and love toward our fellowmen surely is a matter of the spirit. "God is a spirit and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." The character of the persons worshipping determines its purity, strength, and power. "What you are speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say." A saying of Carlyle supplements this one of Emerson very emphatically, "Religion is what a man does practically believe

concerning his vital relations to the mystery of the universe." The spirit and attitude of parents toward God, persons, and the higher values of life have very much to do with the worship of the children in the home. The home must have an atmosphere in which worship can live. The child's world is largely personal. Its sense of worship, obedience and love can only be conceived in terms of personal relations. It is in the home, therefore, that the deepest rooting of the sense of God and the worship of God must be made. The child should be led into three definite directions.

First, he should be led into the expression of his own individual, private consciousness of reverence before God. One of the first elements of the work of religious education in the home is to awaken the sense of wonder in the presence of the mystery and immensity of the universe, and awe and reverence before its majesty, power and harmony. Who can measure the influence of the little poem referred to above, taught by mother whilst watching the stars on a summer night, just before being put to bed and saying the evening prayers. Or who can be surprised at the three-year-old boy clapping his hands and crying out, "How pretty! How pretty!" in viewing a beautiful sunset. So the appreciation of the beauty and wonder of the spring flowers or cultivated ones in the winter windows, aroused in the child by a reverent and godly mother, showing them in the spirit of the Master, puts the spirit of worship into the family life. "Consider the lilies of the field how they grow." Indeed, in mystery, in quietness, in power, they grow and are arrayed in royal splendor beyond that of kings and queens. What child has not asked, "Who made them so beautiful?"

Just as elemental as the sense of awe and wonder growing into trust and love, is that of awe and fear growing into obedience and reverence. The austere in nature has its place and meaning. The thunder and lightning, the storms also are messengers. Sin, sorrow, disease, death, as they manifest themselves in the course of the family and community life



become part of the mystery of child life. Who does not remember the thousand and one questions of early childhood. How amazingly fundamental they are!

Beside reverence and obedience, the element of love and sympathy with the great mystery and marvel of the universe should be aroused in the child. And how easy it is, when all is clothed in terms of personality and God is a reality of life and power and love to the parents themselves. Jesus made children feel the nearness of the Father. Many will remember how early this sense of worship of a personal God through a godly mother came to consciousness. When the little sister lay ill and dying, how you went secretly into the garret and prayed that God would spare her. At another time when the awful summer thunder storm shook the house, you saw beyond the storm to God. How the hush of the night opened the very heavens to you. How the coming of the spring and the finding of the early flowers made you kneel and kiss them, saying, "God is good." Do you remember the dawning of the sense of eternity and the infinitude of space and when you joined with them the idea of right and wrong, reward and punishment?

At every juncture the home stands out as the clearing house of the problems, perplexities, joys and pleasures aroused by the inquiries of the child's growing soul. In this period we well say, "Blessed is the boy or girl whose mother read the Bible for them and prayed with them," And "Blessed, the boy whose father invited him to frequent walks in the woods and meadows." "Blessed, the children who have a Christ-like home atmosphere of righteousness and love."

The reading of the Bible stories to little children at this period is of great value in stimulating the individual sense of worship, but this feature will be discussed later.

The second direction into which the home should lead the child is toward a natural and sincere family worship. The consciousness that father and mother and brother and sisters likewise feel the mystery, power and love of God is equally as important for the child. It confirms his own inner im-

pulses and strivings. It leads him out into a community expression. It stimulates his self-confidence. It prepares him for the worship of the Church and Sunday School. It gives him courage to be true to the calls of conscience. The decay of family worship in America is an ominous prophecy of the irreverence and disobedience of the new generation of Americans. Nothing else can ever take the place of family prayer. It has a distinctive function of its own in the religious life. Its absence means an irreparable loss.

As a part of worship the reading of the Bible is essential. It is wise to follow a plan in the readings, as for example, the portions assigned by the International Sunday School committee each day, or some other series arranged for devotional purposes. It is also practical to use the Apostles Creed at times as well as the Lord's Prayer. The Beatitudes, the twenty-third, the eighth, and the nineteenth Psalms and the Ten Commandments repeated in concert may be used to vary the form. Nothing is more helpful than the assistance of the children in the reading of the lesson. In the absence of the parents the children, if properly instructed, can conduct a simple devotional service themselves, as is being done in some families.

It has been found very helpful to the children to have their birthday remembered in a special prayer. Thus also in times of illness in the family the spirit of prayer has been a great factor. Any one who has at all followed the children in their evening prayers at such times has found some real surprises in the special petitions which they added to meet their special needs.

The question of a suitable time for family worship is very perplexing in many of our modern homes. In many instances the most favorable opportunity is immediately after the evening meal. As a rule where there is a will there is both time and a way.

Giving thanks at meals is also a part of family worship to which more attention should be given both in its real signifi-



cance as an expression of our sense of thanksgiving and love to God and in its value as a factor in the development of the spirit of worship in the children. The children themselves should often ask the blessing and give the prayer of thanks.

The third direction into which the home should lead the child is toward a vital experience of sincere community worship. The child should early be brought to Sunday School and Church. For the parents to send the child when either one or the other could bring him, is a grave mistake. It is of the utmost significance that the parents should be the ones who initiate him in this form of the worship of God. Through Bible reading and family worship and his own inner prayer life, he finds the introduction of the community idea quite natural. The unity of worship impresses him. It is not only on Sunday in Church and Sunday School that he should be made to feel this community reverence but on the great church and national holidays and other public occasions where the recognition of God and prayer are made, so that he may be made conscious of the fact that God is "over all and through all and in all" and that the whole creation should worship Him.

The didactic function of religious education in the home is the second point to be considered. The problem here is approached in the more technical meaning of the word education. It has reference particularly to the initiation of the child into the history of the religion and the present vital consciousness of it among its professors. With us it means the fact and history of the Christian religion and it further implies that the Bible is the text-book, and that the history of the Church leading up to the present Christian consciousness now dominant in the community and expressed in its literature and institutions, is its illustrative material. The principle of history and life is here predominant. Our thought is therefore turned to the method and content of religious teaching.

Religious education aims to bring the child into the full and free consciousness of God, self, the world and fellowmen. It is very evident that the factors of the problem include for us as

Christians the reality of God as the creative Father, revealed in Jesus, and vitalized in the life of brotherhood in the history and development of the Kingdom of God. Just what part the home plays in this in an educational way is the question.

After all, the elements, as in all complex situations and problems, are comparatively simple. We freely acknowledge that the home is first in the order of time, and most direct in the immediacy of its touch and influence on the child. Consequently here it is that we find the elements, as it were, in solution. Here is the period of greatest plasticity on the part of the child, and the greatest moulding powers on the part of parents and of the environment around both parents and children.

In acknowledging the Christian view of God and the world, we, therefore, look upon religious education as Christian, however much we may think of the universal aspects of religion psychologically, biologically and sociologically considered. For merely so regarded religion would be but formal. When it comes to the historical content and the actual fact of a life really lived religiously, we have to do with the Christian religion.

Now the main factors in the more technical idea of religious education in the home are the same as those which must persist and ever grow in consciousness throughout the whole of human life. They are these: a vital present Christian consciousness and environment; the Bible as the revelation of God to the individual and society in and through Jesus Christ; science as revealing the fact and wonder of the universe; Christian art, literature and history as an expression of Christ in individual and social life.

All this seems very general and yet it is most concrete as soon as we begin to apply it. It is natural to recognize the several periods of growth adopted by all graded lessons of the present religious educational systems.

In infancy, during the age of one to three years, the problem of religious education in the home is most critical, because



it is so intangible and yet so concrete. It involves particularly the first element mentioned above—a vital personal, individual and social Christian consciousness and environment: parents, family, home. As we reflect upon our lives, what has been more determinative of our characters than just this fact. Many a Hannah conceived a Samuel and in the very conception created a man of God. The real problem of religious education in the home is the education of the parents and the creation of the real Christian family. Both the prenatal and postnatal influences are paramount in importance. The Christian atmosphere and the vital, personal life of the home charges the personality of the growing child. What has been given above under the heading worship in the home applies here and throughout the whole treatment; for, without this environment of real spiritual living, little may be expected from the early development of the child. It is not the least difficult to make it practical. Simply to be natural as Christian parents is to transmit our spirit to our children. They must of necessity learn a language; in the Christian home they will speak with a Christian tongue. They soon distinguish persons and objects and give them names; in the Christian home, they soon know the symbols of the faith—the Bible, a kneeling posture in prayer, the ready hand in loving service. They soon say “I” and “me,” “you” and “they”; with Christian parents, they already confess, mother, father, brother, sister, Jesus and God. They readily reach toward the moon and stars, and delight in birds, animals and flowers; in the Christian home, they solve all this mystery of why, how and whither in God. They follow the days in play imitating your daily labors and your Sabbath habits; in the Christian home, they will know the real joy of the Sabbath in its contrast with the days of toil. In other words, the child from one to three years of age in the Christian home is already introduced to the great fundamentals of religious education: witness-bearing personalities, God, Bible, nature and the Sabbath.

In the next period from four to eight years of age, this same

process of naturally living the Christian life before the child goes on but it gradually becomes more consciously objective and concrete. The time for reading the simple Bible stories, the simple myths and nursery poetry has full sway. Simple nature reading dealing particularly with birds, animals and flowers, and insects always fascinate little children. At the very beginning of the period the parents should bring the child to Sunday School and make special effort to coöperate with the teachers of the Beginners' and Primary Departments in the home study of the lessons; for the graded system of lessons is admirably adapted in these two departments to the needs and impulses of the child. In the person of the parents the point of contact between the child and the home should be made real and vital. In coöperating with the Sunday School the use of Christian art by means of reproductions as the Perry pictures, the Tissot copies, etc., should be freely made. For general reading several of our publishers have issued sets of ten to twelve volumes like *The Children's Hour*, by Houghton and Mifflin Company, which are very satisfactory. Individual volumes are numerous nowadays. There is no dearth of good children's readings.

Taking it all in all, this is one of the most important periods of child life. It is characterized with the growth of imitation, the birth of the imagination, and the development of the sense of right and wrong. The moral feelings and religious instincts are never closer than now. Scripture illustrations should abound. The social virtues should be cultivated; such as, obedience, kindness, politeness, order, cleanliness, truthfulness, courage, cheerfulness. The close companionship of parents and children is highly essential. The mother reading to her children is the real educator of this period.

In early youth, from nine to thirteen years of age, religious education in the home should particularly seek close fellowship with the public school, Sunday School and the church. As a period it is characterized by the birth of idealism, hero worship, development of the social feeling. Junior societies



are natural now. No center of social life should be more attractive than the home and no home too fine or too poor for the children. It is the age in which they read for themselves. Simple history, stories of adventure and heroism, good, clean fiction should be within their reach. In the religious reading the heroes and heroines of the Bible should be read and studied. The graded Sunday School lessons for juniors usually covers such a series. Above all a simple junior study of the life of Christ should be completed. The Bible as the record of God's dealing with men should stand out prominently. Where the Sunday School is deficient the home might well secure "The Junior Bible" course, covering the heroes and heroines of the Bible, published by Charles Scribner's Sons, which is one of the best instructive courses published at present. This course followed by parents and children is most helpful and stimulating. By the time it is covered the child will have made his own Bible by binding the readings, the Tissot illustrations, and questions; for which the authors and publishers of the series have provided in a truly artistic manner.

Early adolescence, from the age of twelve to fourteen, is the critical storm and stress period of the growing child. It is marked by the growth of the sense of sex, emotional activity, moral insight, and moral values. Young peoples' societies now become a natural expression. Hearty coöperation of the home with the Sunday School which should have a well-graded course of study throughout is increasingly essential. Several points should be clearly marked in the home training: personal cleanliness and order, industry and self-control, personality and idealism.

Books on the mystery and sanctity of life should be brought to the attention of the boy and girl alike. The following list has been found quite practical and helpful: *A Song of Life* (Morley); *The Renewal of Life* (Morley); *Truths, Talks with a Boy* (Lowry); *From Youth Into Manhood* (Hall); *What a Boy Ought to Know* (Stahl); *What a Girl Ought to Know* (Stahl).

If the Sunday School fails to provide in this period a good boy's and girl's life of Christ, the wide-awake father and mother should secure one published by the University of Chicago Press, entitled *The Life of Jesus* (Gates).

To bring Jesus as a personal factor into their own lives at this time is most necessary. It associates Him with the idealism growing within them in a way that can never be forgotten.

Under the next division of "Service in the Home," the necessity of associating the children with the parents in the work of the home will be emphasized. Definite effort at inculcating industry, self-discipline and conscientiousness should be made. Surely the home should coöperate more sympathetically with the domestic science and manual training departments of our public schools during this critical period of the life of their children.

Adolescence, the period from fourteen to eighteen, is marked by the growth of the larger social self, the social impulses, sympathy, love, heroism, vocational and spiritual ideals. It is the high school period of life, the time of choice and decision, of work and calling and independence. The main function of the home now is that of sympathy and guidance. Unless the earlier inner fellowship and influence of parents with children has been established, there can now be no real help from the home. The parents will find themselves outside of the centers of sympathy and power in the lives of their own children. But who can measure the influence of the father and mother who hold the hearts of their boys and girls during this time of life. When children in their struggle toward self-realization instinctively come to the home for advice and help, the real victory is already won. As far as the more technical religious educational work is concerned in the home, little can be done; for this is the time when the boy and girl work on their own basis of interest and character. It is very evident, however, that the church and Sunday School have a great responsibility to provide such courses of study as will lead the young people into the larger moral and religious problems of life.



The separate treatment of worship, education, and service is only a method. It must be remembered that the spirit of worship pervades the whole, that the educational process is persistent throughout, and that service is but the constant growing expression.

The growth and development of the social consciousness and its obligations and privileges in this practical way is a new field of investigation. The importance of the home in it all is one of the first recognitions made by the leaders. "Remember, that all must live in some sort of a home—that everyone finds his chief happiness there—that character is developed there—that no great advance, spiritual or material, is possible which does not begin with the home—that the home-makers of America have the making of the nation." This is one of the six watch-words printed on the literature of the American School of Home Economics. It is characteristic of the modern psychological, sociological viewpoint. The relation of religious education to social service is one of the great themes of the day. The meaning of the home and family touches the very heart of it.

In the relation of parent and child we have the social virtues of respect and obedience; in the sharing of life among brothers and sisters, those of equality and service; in the coöperative principle of the home, those of the common good of the state; in home work and duties, those of industry and vocation; in home worship, those of reverence and authority.

In the conception of the home as the primary school of life we presuppose children, and at least two or more in the family, in order the more easily to incarnate and realize the higher social ideals of life. The courage to live is not only required in the various great moral issues of the day in combating a deep-seated national pessimism but the courage to marry, to beget and train and send forth more children is the challenge given to all of the civilized nations. The social significance of the home is inherent in the creation of life, as well as in the sympathy and coöperation developed in the midst of the family.

It was our purpose to sketch, for the several periods of life given above in treating the didactic element in the religious education of the home, the social virtues and ideals and forms of service suitable for each, but the scope of this article exceeds the permissible space limits. Several fundamental principles, however, may be stated.

First, parents should make the home and the family one of the chief considerations of their life. No educational institution can take its place, especially in teaching the spirit of service and the common good. Second, life should be sufficiently simplified to allow time for family fellowship and intimate personal companionship. The vital points of contact with the community life through recreation and pleasure and school life should be made in and through the family in such a manner as to keep parents and children in intimate touch and knowledge of each other without breaking the real companionship of the family. Third, time and money should be given freely as may be necessary to create such home occupations as will bring parents into companionship and partnership in work. Gardens, workshops, sewing rooms for the boys and girls should be a part of every home. Through this the connection should be made with domestic science and manual training in the public schools. No child, rich or poor, should be removed from the real work of the world. Economic freedom should be the spirit of the home. The common weal means the common toil of all. Fourth, the home should at all times coöperate with the junior civic organizations in creating public spirit, with boards of health and sanitation to promote health, and with patriotic organizations in stimulating the love of country. Fifth, every home should have such a sense of love of life as to teach a healthy philanthropy at all times. Neither home nor foreign missions should be a strange topic. In the courses of illustrative reading available these days no material is more interesting than that of the awakening of the great eastern nations, their social and religious customs, missionary biography, and the heroism and idealism of Christianity in asserting itself as the universal religion.



It may seem that the home is unduly exalted and religion illogically enlarged in this view of religion as life. "Remember, that on the breadth and strength of the base depends the height of a pinnacle—on the home foundation we rear the pinnacle of all that is good in state and individual." The more democratic and coöperative the state becomes, the more will the home be essential and the more must religion, as a comprehensive life, expand into the Kingdom of God among men.

GREENSBURG, PA.

## IX.

### RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN SCHOOL AND COLLEGE.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

The widespread public interest in religious education is a part of that spirit of new idealism which is asserting itself in our age. In twentieth century America we have not only new external conditions brought about by scientific knowledge and discoveries and by changing social life, but we are entering a new inner world and we are sharing with mankind in the desire for higher moral and spiritual ideals. We are beginning to see that if our life is to be noble and healthy we must not neglect the invisible world and the culture of the soul. This new inner world which is opening with extraordinary interest before the eyes of thoughtful men, this "new idealism" as Professor Eucken calls it, this really finest spirit of all the ages is revealing to us above all things the permanence of religion as a fact in human nature and human history. We see more clearly than ever that the work of the world and the culture of the soul must go hand in hand. We see that the highest efficiency of a people comes only when constructive work is united with a growing impulse toward religion.

This master thought of modern times has given fresh stimulus to the whole question of the religious life of men and nations. We are beginning to realize that it simply will not do to take sixteenth or eighteenth century ideals of religion, or nineteenth century materialistic ideals of science and apply them to twentieth century conditions without question. If, as has been predicted, the twentieth century is to be an age of reconciliation, and if, as we know, a new outer and inner world



is confronting us, then it is our plain duty to reopen certain fundamental questions and to rethink them and restate them for ourselves. One of these questions concerns us vitally, for it has to do with the religious education of the young men and women of America.

At the outset we must try to arrive at a clear conception of the meaning of the term religious education. To do this, it may be well to fix with a certain degree of definiteness the meaning involved in the two terms, religion and education. What then is religion? It is primarily a life, a spirit, an attitude. It is the sharing of life between the spirit of man and the spirit of God. As life it is not primarily a subject to be taught, but rather a thing to be lived, though instruction in religion is helpful. Religion is not primarily a creed, though creeds are the outgrowth of religion. Religion is not the same as conduct, though conduct is an important part of religion. Religion does not mean the same thing as formal worship, though the outward acts of worship symbolizing the inward thought are an important element in religion. What then is religion? It is the sharing of God's life by the spirit of man. It is not something grafted on to man in addition to the other elements in his life, not an addendum. It is the motive power in all of man's highest life, the spirit that permeates and promotes the growth of the whole personality in all its manifold relations, the reality which makes worth while every element of human nature, every phase of human activity. We must not think of religion as a thing apart and outside of the rest of man's experience. Man is a unit and religion must pervade his entire consciousness, so that all the thoughts, words and deeds of his life shall be considered sacred because they are born out of a spirit controlled by the thought and the life of God.

What then is education? Is it not the process of developing the whole personality of man and adjusting it to God as he has manifested himself in the whole environment of the world? Education is not synonymous with instruction, though formal

instruction is an important part of education. Education is not confined to the school; it is the resultant of all the influences of life upon the individual, "under the tutelage of the Infinite Spirit." Here again we must recognize man's unity. It is the whole individual who is before us to be educated. While we can emphasize one phase of the individual at a time, we cannot say "Now I will train the muscle, now the mind, now the soul; now I will cultivate one phase of your life and then the other." There are no such artificial subdivisions of the human consciousness. It is the interests of the whole man that demand attention in the educational process. Education then is the eternal perfecting process by which the whole man, body, soul and spirit, is "to become in time," as Fichte suggests, "what he eternally is."

If religion is the source of inspiration for the highest life, and education is the process by which the individual is to be brought into that largest, richest, highest life, then religious education in the nature of the case cannot be isolated and fragmentary. It must be the permanent and controlling element in the whole development of human personality. Its task must be nothing more or less than the permeation of all education with the religious ideal as well as the permeation of all religion with the educational ideal. All education must be ultimately religious. All religion must be ultimately educational in character. The abiding aim of religious education must be the normal development of the whole human nature divinely related.

When it comes to the practical application of these principles to life the real difficulty of the problem becomes apparent, just because life is so complex and unanalyzable. This is not a theme on which a thoughtful man will readily prate "thus and so." A small mind always has a ready formula that will solve an intricate problem, and a little scheme that will bring about the Millennium. But a man who has breadth of outlook and sees how varied and complex life really is may well hesitate to suggest a method of solution. Still the fascina-



tion of the subject and its overweighing importance lure on thinker and educator to hazard opinion and experiment, each knowing in turn that the solution lies afar.

It seems clear that, since religion is life, the key to the whole question of religious education must lie somewhere in the sphere of personality. Only religious persons can impart religious life. The word must be made flesh. Religion is vague in terms of ideas; it becomes clear and concrete only as it is lived by a religious person. The personality of the teacher then is the supreme thing in religious education. Every teacher who has the religious spirit is an incarnation of religion to his pupils; so is every father and mother, every friend and pastor. All familiar things they touch, all common words they speak become signs and forms of a diviner world. The great means of bringing men to a sense of the realities and values of the spiritual life are found in personal association with men and women who are trying to live that life. The supreme factor in religious education must ever be found in the unconscious influence of a quickening and ennobling personality. That given, the rest will follow, in so far as it can follow, for education even in the sphere of religion has its limitations in hereditary tendencies and individual will.

This principle of the influence of personality holds true in the three great and mutual agencies that serve the interests of religious education, the home, the school and the church; but of none does it hold more true than of the school.

If in the public schools we have teachers who are religious, reverent in spirit, living in harmony with God's laws, men and women to whom the world is a revelation of God's truth, and history the unfolding of his purpose, and society the opportunity of coöperating with God, then their actual religious influence will be tremendous even though they do not impart any conscious formal religious instruction. If a teacher has the spirit of religion in his own life he cannot help but inspire and awaken a religious spirit in his pupils. If a teacher is possessed by the spirit of reverence he cannot fail to inspire

others with a sense of this wonderful world as God's world; he cannot fail to shed the glow of the eternal upon every valuable human thing. Our public schools are not godless, and will not be, so long as we have in them so vast a majority of teachers who live the religious life. Our public schools will be homes of idealism so long as we have teachers who are consecrated to high ideals. In tone, temper and trend the public school system of America is religious, just because of the superior religious personality of the average public school teacher. By the law of imitation and sound suggestion, by the subtle power and charm of the unconscious influence of life touching life, the spirit of religion is being transmitted from teacher to pupil. This element of personalism which trusts largely the uplifting influence and saving power of personality is an important factor in the selection of teachers. School boards and superintendents are demanding high religious ideals of their candidates because they believe that through Christian teachers the unconscious influence of the public school will be religious even on those whom religion meets in no other way.

In the college likewise religious education is a matter depending fundamentally upon the personality of the teaching corps. To have a number of men of positive moral and spiritual worth in a faculty, men who go about their own affairs with good heart and friendly spirit, men who allow their normal Christian life and usual nature to have whatever genuine, unsolicited effect it may—this is the best spiritual asset of any educational institution. Professor Starbuck sent out a few years ago a list of questions to a large number of college graduates for the purpose of getting information in regard to the religious life of colleges. The highest consensus of judgment was that the whole religious influence of a college was largely dependent on the intimate, helpful, personal relationships between teachers and students. Spiritualized personality was generally conceded to be the only force which could beget spirituality. Men who are as near independent in



thought as possible, who are absolutely frank in helping a student to a readjustment of the faith of his childhood with the new facts and truths which have to be assimilated for the constructive faith of manhood; men who will not spiritually coddle students, but in candor and honesty endeavor to build up in them a faith that is strong for righteousness; men who are broad-minded and warm-hearted, with a sense of humor and a spirit of good cheer; men who themselves have struggled for their faith and have learned how to face life's problems—such men, no matter in what department they may teach will tend to develop in young minds and hearts a strong religious personality.

Teachers of positive Christian character cannot fail to give moral and spiritual stimulus to a school. They create standards of Christian living which permeate every phase of student life. From them worthy living is caught as by a contagion. This influence of personality is inevitable, inherent, unescapable. But it dare not be obtrusive. It must have a fine sense of reverence for the personality of the student. Youth abhors posing and pretense. Youth looks with suspicion upon a model or a mentor. For this reason it seems to me to be hardly advisable to have in an educational institution—especially in a small college—one specific man whose conscious purpose and recognized mission is to make men good, by inference having the other members of the teaching corps looked upon as existing simply for the purpose of making men wise. One point of vantage in the denominational college lies right here. It does not ignore religious life altogether or hand it over to a special secretary of religious affairs. If a church school remains true to its origin and purpose, if it has any reason for existence at all as a church school, it will see to it that it is led and taught by men not only of the highest intellectuality and of the best teaching ability, but by men who are willing to serve not for filthy lucre but for Christ and the Church in the institutions of the Church. Such men will unconsciously impress Christian ideals because they are striving to realize

them in their own life. In spite of occasional lapses and frequent thoughtless criticism the fact remains that the moral and spiritual life of our smaller colleges is being kept on a comparatively high level largely by the influence and personal touch of faithful leaders who in simplicity and excellence are doing a man's work in a quiet, manly way in the world which the Son of Man has in a similar manner ennobled by his divine presence.

When we come to the state universities the problem becomes more complex. The fact that there are over sixty thousand students in state institutions of education makes the problem one of the greatest importance. The hopeful feature of the whole situation is that in spite of the fact that teachers are chosen without regard to qualities of spiritual leadership, the large majority of them are Christian men. But the very fact that the state school as such pretends to take the impossible attitude of being strictly neutral in respect to the great problems of life and destiny tends to create the impression that religion is unimportant. This neutralizes a great deal of the influence for spiritual ideals which men of positive religious convictions in a staff of instruction might have. The severest criticism of the non-committal attitude of our state schools comes from these men themselves. "The real danger to religion in the state universities," said Dr. Kelsey, of the University of Michigan, before the Religious Educational Association, "lies in a tendency to atrophy of the spiritual nature. Minds become so absorbed in the details of a particular field of knowledge, that the things of the spirit are lost sight of. In their devotion to lines of study that do not bring them into contact with vital religion, even students of religious habits of thought tend to lose their perspective, drift into indifference, and finally assume an attitude hopelessly negative towards religious matters." We have developed in quite recent times a very interesting and anomalous situation in our state universities. On the one hand the public is given to understand that religion is to have no official recognition in them what-



ever. On the other hand there are no educational institutions in the land to-day that are more anxious to convince the public of the religious opportunities afforded in a non-official way to the students than are our state schools. Since they cannot in the nature of the case establish a distinctively Christian community life by making the school itself a religious community, they do the next best thing by making it a community of some sort or other with a religious appendage. Religion is not infused into the very spirit of the place from within. It is an effort from without.

One of the most promising of these ab-extra efforts to remedy what is recognized as a defect in our state schools is the Ann Arbor school of religion—a recent combination of the religious forces working among the students of the largest of the state universities, that of Michigan. This school, under the leadership of Dr. Wenley, of the department of philosophy, has no official connection whatever with the university. It is perhaps the most successful experiment that has been made in the line of voluntary religious effort in state schools. After this Ann Arbor school of religion had been organized two years, more than thirty undergraduates had determined to devote themselves to the foreign mission field.

Other state colleges are encouraging the system of student pastors for colleges. The functionary known as student pastor is not quite the same as the college pastor of some of our eastern schools, for he is nearer the student age. Neither is he so remote as the town pastor who has the spiritual welfare of the non-college element to look after. The student pastor lives in or near the campus. He is supported by some denomination, and has the special responsibility for the students of the denomination which supports him. Of course he is supposed also to assume responsibility for other students who may accept him as friend, guide and counselor. He has the approval of the university authorities and may occasionally lecture on religious matters. He does not preach however. He is frequently a man who is versed in the philosophic and scientific thought

of the time so that he may help students over the period of spiritual unrest and philosophic doubt. The University of Michigan has seven student pastors in addition to the school of religion; the University of Wisconsin has at least four; and the University of Kansas has two.

Another agency has been the work of the Christian Associations at the state universities. Their influence has been wholesome. Frequently, however, they have cultivated a morbid spirituality, and have formed a religious set or clique, which has failed to attract the student body because the large and human aspect of religion was lost sight of. According to Dr. Kelsey the Christian Associations have not been able adequately to cope with the religious situation in the larger state universities for two reasons: "first, because of an imperfect adjustment of their work with the work of the religious denominations, and secondly, for the reason that, while they have stationed in the state universities as their representatives a type of men that are high-minded, efficient in organization, conscientious and alert, they have not attempted to place there men with either the special qualifications or the vigor of personality required to make them effective in a large way as spiritual leaders."

The Christian churches have felt themselves incumbent in recent years to surround state schools with church buildings for the accommodation of students belonging to the different denominations. Often these local churches have congregations of their own but are specially equipped and enlarged for the accommodation of students. The trouble is however that a minister in a university town frequently finds considerable difficulty in looking after several hundred students in addition to his regular and permanent membership. It is right here that the student pastors, referred to above, can be of great help. The Presbyterian Board of Education recently adopted the following resolution in regard to its work at state schools: "*Resolved*, that the Board, while recognizing the need of pursuing different policies based upon local conditions at each



university center, affirms its unalterable conviction that the personal work of the university pastor with the individual students is fundamental in this work, and that this pastoral care of students, leading up to contact with the local church, is absolutely necessary to the success of the movement and the spiritual welfare of the student body." On the strength of this conviction the Presbyterian Church has established eight of these university pastors during the last two years. It is rather significant that one of the leaders of a large state school in a recent speech said: "The cry of the state universities to the churches is: Send us men! Men who will say to the students of their own churches without exclusion of others: 'Come let us reason together on spiritual things.'"

Our main contention up to this point has been that religious character is the resultant largely of contact with strong religious personal leaders as teachers. Since then religious character is a thing that is caught rather than taught, does it follow that there is to be no room for religious instruction in our schools and colleges? Because formal religious instruction is only one phase of religious education is it to be ignored by our schools entirely? This question has presented the greatest difficulty. The most varied opinions are still being held in regard to it. Europe and America furnish four types of schools exemplifying the different possibilities of solving the question of formal religious instruction. First are the schools having no specific religious instruction at all. This is the case in the state schools of France, in most of the public schools of the United States as well as in some private schools. Then there are schools in which undenominational religious instruction has been made a feature and moral instruction associated with it. This method is aimed at in the English elementary schools and in some American colleges. If parents wish to do so they may withdraw their children from the periods devoted to religious instruction. Then there are schools in which religious as well as partially denominational instruction is given under the control of the denominations of the locality. This

system is found in Germany and Switzerland. Finally there are schools in which religious instruction according to one faith is given and moral instruction is made dependent thereon. This system is found in parochial schools, and in countries where are found state-schools of one faith as the Roman Catholic or the Lutheran.

The situation in the American public school presents a perplexing dilemma. On the one hand we have the doctrine of the separation of church and state. We are told that the men who framed the constitution showed consummate wisdom in laying down this policy. We are assured that this doctrine holds the secret of our civil and religious liberty. On the other hand we have a whole nation, a vast majority of whose people are professedly religious, supporting an educational system from which the teaching of religion is excluded, yet believing that religion is necessary to the welfare of the nation. Personally we feel that the total exclusion of all reference to religion in the public schools is certainly not warranted by the American policy of the separation of church and state. The history of our country does not warrant so narrow an interpretation of our national policy. The Ordinance of 1787, which created the great Northwest Territory, has the famous passage, "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall be forever encouraged." The whole secularist theory of the state is un-American. Has not religion been intertwined with our national affairs from the Fast Day and Thanksgiving Proclamation of the Continental Congress and the orders of Washington down to our own day? Does not the nation provide for the religious instruction of soldiers and sailors of the army? Do not Congress and the state legislatures invite ministers of religion to open their sessions by invoking the blessing of God? Does not every witness and juryman in court take an oath in the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts? Did not General Grant invite the churches of America to coöperate with the



government in the civilization and christianization of the Indian tribes? The American people do believe in the separation of church and state, but at the same time they repudiate the idea that the Kingdom of God is the monopoly of the church and that all the rest of human life lies outside the sphere of religion and is secular or profane.

Great confusion has resulted from the attempt of men to be true to the policy of the separation of church and state, and at the same time to be true to their deeper convictions that the most important educational force of the nation ought not to take a purely negative attitude toward that which has the highest value for life, viz., religion. The spirit of modern idealism is reopening the whole question. The spirit of modern pedagogy which sees that the child is one and indivisible, that the whole child is in the school forming his attitude toward life and destiny, is raising its voice of protest against cutting the Gordian knot by the easy way of farming the religious nature of the child over to the church. This easy way of dividing the child into a secular and a sacred half raises more questions than it solves. To be thoroughly consistent in the attempt to make the state neutral in religion it would be necessary to keep teachers with religious ideals out of the school-room altogether. Why say to our teachers: "Every tree in the garden of knowledge you may touch, but not this tree of life?"

How about the rights of private conscience? Will not every attempt at religious instruction lead to sectarianism with all its attendant evils? To the first question we answer that a nation simply because it is free has no right to be debarred from taking necessary measures to insure its own stability and permanence. We are not satisfied with the naturalistic theory of ethics with all its shifting standards. We believe that the religious sanction is still the background of high moral endeavor in men and nations, that moral codes are effective only as they inspire in men emotions of reverence. For this reason it is incumbent on a nation for the sake of its own moral life, which means its permanence and stability, to see to it that its

children receive at least elementary instruction in the fundamental principles of religion. To the second question we answer that the religious forces of twentieth century America are more unified than ever before. Slowly but surely under the influence of the new idealism non-essentials are being lost sight of and the few fundamental principles of life and destiny are rising above the spirit of contention. Surely truths like belief in God, the brotherhood of man, the value of life, the moral order of the universe are universal enough to be taught without giving reasonable offense to any one. There is a possibility of teaching religion upon the ideals of our people as a whole without making it sectarian. It has been done, it is being done to-day. The twentieth century spirit of America in its attempt at reconciliation will not rest until it finds a way of conserving not only the unity of the child and the unity of education, but of linking the school to the whole of life and of making it in every way representative of the highest ideals of our people.

For the present, confusion still reigns. It seems to be centered about the question of the Bible in the school, whether it is to be admitted at all, how it is to be read, devotionally or academically. The law in the several states varies considerably. In New York the law gives no authority to use any portion of the school hours for religious instruction. In some places in the state religious services of any kind are forbidden. At times the Bible is read, but if some one objects the law is immediately enforced. Massachusetts requires some portion of the Bible to be read daily in the public schools. In Missouri the trustees compel Bible reading. In Illinois a student may be expelled for studying during the reading of the Bible. In Georgia the Bible must be read in the schools. Iowa leaves the matter entirely to the judgment of the teacher and permits no dictation by either parents or trustees—a very sensible law. In Arkansas the trustees decide the question. In the Dakotas the Bible may not be excluded from any public school and at the option of the teacher may be read daily for



a period not exceeding ten minutes. Rhode Island recommends the rejection of any teacher who is in the habit of scoffing at religion. The state of Washington prohibits the reading of the Bible in the schools. Arizona takes the certificate from any teacher who conducts religious services of any kind in school. Wisconsin has a peculiar legal decision. In 1890 a matter of great interest came before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of the State *ex rel.* Weiss and others *vs.* The District Board of School District No. 6 of the City of Edgerton. In this case the question was whether or not the reading of the Bible in King James's Version in public schools was sectarian instruction. In an elaborate opinion the Court held that the reading from the Bible in the schools, although unaccompanied by any comment on the part of the teacher, is "instruction"; that since the Bible contains numerous doctrinal passages, upon some of which the creed of certain sects is based, the reading of the Bible is also "sectarian instruction"; that therefore the use of the Bible as a text-book in the public schools and the stated reading thereof has a tendency to inculcate sectarian ideas and falls within the prohibition of the Constitution of the State. So likewise in 1869 the Cincinnati school board was upheld in forbidding the reading of the Bible, the same action was taken in Chicago in 1875, and in New Haven in 1878. New Hampshire requires that "the morning exercises of all the schools shall commence with the reading of the Scriptures, followed by the Lord's Prayer." The Bible is not read in any of the schools of Utah. New Jersey has the law that no religious service or exercise except the reading of the Bible and the repeating of the Lord's Prayer shall be held in any public school. Oklahoma rules that "the Bible shall not be excluded from the public schools." The Supreme Court of Texas ruled in 1908 that "to hold that the offering of prayers, either by the repetition of the Lord's Prayer or otherwise, the singing of songs, whether devotional or not, and the reading of the Bible make the place where such is done a place of worship, within the meaning of the Constitution,

would produce intolerable results." Pennsylvania says, "the Scriptures come under the head of text-books and they should not be omitted from the list." In consequence the Bible was read in 9,200 schools in Pennsylvania cities and in 18,821 rural schools in the year 1910. The bill recently agitated making the Bible reading obligatory in the public schools of Pennsylvania was defeated in the state senate, probably because a clause was attached to it making the failure to read ten verses daily sufficient ground for the expulsion of a teacher. The ten-verse condition had a tendency to make the bill ridiculous.

All these different opinions and decisions assure us that this is not a purely academic question, but rather one that is very much alive. So far as we can see, the solution lies afar. Certainly those who would exclude the Bible from the schools entirely are not consistent. The most consistent of these opponents is the Kansas freethinker, who claims to have discovered through physical science and biological laws that there is no real God, that man has no soul, and that life ends forever at death; and in consequence of these marvellous discoveries he has introduced into the Kansas legislature a bill, the first section of which reads: "That it shall be unlawful for any text-book commission, board of education, superintendent of instruction, teacher or other school authorities to adopt any book to be used as a text-book, song book or classic in any educational institution of Kansas, that is supported wholly or in part by public taxation, containing any article teaching the existence of gods, devils, souls, spirits, ghosts, angels, heaven, hell and the resurrection of the dead as facts in nature, etc." Away then with Browning! What school boy would dare to commit,

"Call this God, then, call that—soul, and both,—the only facts for me.  
Prove them facts? that they o'erpass my power of proving,  
Proves them such."

To prison with the man who ventures to introduce Emerson's lines on the death of his child into a text-book,



“What is excellent  
As God lives is permanent;  
Hearts are dust, hearts love remain,  
Hearts love will meet again,  
House and tenant go to ground,  
Lost in God, in Godhead found.”

What shall we say of Shakespeare and Milton, of Goethe and Schiller, of Cowper and Burns, of Wordsworth and Tennyson? By what right do we include these and exclude the Psalms and the Prophets? Banish history and literature and the arts, exclude Washington's inaugural and his farewell address, Lincoln's Gettysburg speech—all in the name of consistency. Surely consistency at this price is intolerable.

On the other hand we appreciate the difficulty in introducing the Bible into the schools in a legal way. Here, too, it is hard to be consistent. All stand equal before the law—the Protestant, the Catholic, the Mohammedan and Jew, the Mormon, the freethinker and the atheist. Whatever may be the view of the majority the question arises, has the state the right to enforce the view of the majority upon the minority, however small? Is it not precisely for the protection of the minority that constitutional limitations exist? Majorities need no protection; they can take care of themselves. It is a delicate question, indeed, and requires compromise in either case.

Perhaps under present conditions, the best temporary solution is, not to insist by legal enactment upon the use of the Bible academically in public schools, but the permission and encouragement to use it devotionally, leaving the matter entirely to the judgment of the teacher without dictation by either parents or trustees. Here again the whole matter resolves itself into a question of religious personality and good sense on the part of the one who alone can solve the problem, the teacher. Professor Huxley's famous letter to the rector of St. Mary's Church in Bryanstone Square, London, sums up the whole situation better than any other document of which we know. “I hold,” wrote he, “that any system of education which attempts to deal only with the intellectual side of a

child's nature, and leaves the rest untouched, will prove a delusion and a snare, just as likely to produce a crop of unusually astute scoundrels as anything else. In my belief, unless a child be taught not only morality, but religion, education will come to very little. I believe, further, that in the present chaotic state of men's thoughts on these subjects, the only practical method of not altogether excluding religion from the education of the masses is to let them read the Bible, and permit the many noble thoughts and deeds mirrored there to sink into their hearts." This, however true, does not justify us in adopting legal enactments making the reading of the Bible compulsory, or in passing laws prohibiting the reading of Scripture entirely in the public schools. After all, the first thing is not a law but a religious spirit that recognizes a sense of the eternal in things temporal. Out of that spirit there will grow the voluntary use of the Bible as a book of devotion, at least in the opening services of our public schools. Just because it is voluntary, growing spontaneously out of the life of the teacher, it will be all the more effective in the nourishment and quickening of the religious life of the pupil.

When we come to religious instruction in the college we approach a different aspect of the question. The entire history of the American college must be taken into consideration. The whole college idea has its genesis in religion. The universities of northern Europe, which are the real prototypes of the American college, were the outgrowth of Christianity. It was the religion of Christ that turned men from the quest of pleasure and the love of plunder, to the pursuit of the higher ideals of education and contemplation. The American college itself began as an institution of religion. It began really for the training of ministers in order that the work of the church might be more intelligently conducted. In the three centuries of American history nearly all denominations of the church have founded their colleges, many of which are still supported and controlled by the church. They were established for the purpose of giving a liberal education from a



Christian point of view. They were established by Christian men and built upon Christian foundations. At first the teaching of religion as a distinct subject entered largely into the curriculum. Every college had its course on evidences of Christianity. In more recent times, however, men have begun to see that a Christian college is not to be judged by the amount of religion that it teaches in definite courses, but rather by the fact that religion underlies, unifies and is the postulate of all its instruction. Religion is found in the college as a presupposition rather than as an irritating self-assertion. There came a time, however, in at least certain American colleges, when even the presupposition was lost sight of, and all reference to religion was practically excluded. The ignorance of college students in Biblical lore became proverbial. The story of the young collegian who replied to the question what Shakespeare meant by the phrase, "the penalty of Adam," that it "referred to the mark set on Adam for killing his brother" was passed on from mouth to mouth. It was felt that college men were not only hopelessly ignorant but painfully careless about religious matters. It was felt that the appreciation of the wealth and the benignity of the spiritual was not what it should be among college men. It was felt that it would be sad indeed if the institutions founded by our fathers as training schools for the Christian life would neglect to give men a consciousness of the solid substratum of the religious reality in life. The result was a reaction toward a certain amount of definite religious instruction which is to-day making itself felt in many of the colleges of the land. This reaction does not attempt to carry on any scheme of enforced religious instruction based upon an accepted type of thought or church life. It is more tactful than that. It recognizes present conditions and adapts itself to the new age. It makes a serious attempt to adapt itself to the peculiarities and needs of undergraduate life. It recognizes the fact that the average young collegian is unconventional in his religious experience, that he dreads seeming to appear better than he is and in consequence

often appears worse than he is, that he hates sham and loves reality, that at heart he is sincere and idealistic, that the religious knowledge which he brings with him to college from home and church is meager enough. With this in mind many of the colleges have within recent years made the study of the English Bible a part of the curriculum, believing that a knowledge of the historical facts, literary forms, modes of thought, moral and religious teachings of the Old and New Testament were essential elements of that true culture, which in a complete man ought to culminate in religion. In some colleges Biblical instruction is made a part of the earlier years of undergraduate life. In the upper classes, optional courses are offered showing how the problems of literature and philosophy bear upon the Bible and Christianity.

In addition to more or less formal religious instruction it is possible, without doing violence to the subject in hand, for a wise teacher to impart a great deal of incidental religious inspiration. We can easily see the vital relation which the chair of philosophy sustains to Christianity, in the way of responsibility on the part of a teacher to become at once the "guide, philosopher and friend," to a young man who is becoming freshly oriented in religious belief. So in the study of history. It is simply impossible to treat the history of institutions without reference to Christianity, and its place in the world.

One of the most interesting experiments in direct religious instruction in a college is that made by President Hyde of Bowdoin College. For a number of years he has been giving an annual course of twenty lectures, followed by informal discussion, on the essentials of religion. Students representing every form of religious opinion attended his class-room and at the end of the semester wrote a thesis covering the twenty topics, expressing their own views. He has done this for twenty years without objection on the part of his students or patrons. The syllabus of twenty topics covering the vital truths of religion treated by Dr. Hyde are as follows: (1) The



facts of the world, and the possible principles of their interpretation. (2) The conception of God. (3) The historic representations of God. (4) The presence of God in humanity. (5) The literary expression of religion. (6) The institutional embodiment of religion. (7) Religious aspiration and depression. (8) Justification by aspiration. (9) The answer to prayer. (10) The authority of duty. (11) The inevitableness of sacrifice. (12) The nature of sin. (13) The opportunity of repentance. (14) The assurance of forgiveness. (15) Rewards and penalties. (16) The future of the world and the hope of immortality. (17) Love as the universal solvent of social problems. (18) Evangelism. (19) The mission and the settlement. (20) Religious education. The result has been as he himself says, "more reverence for their common Heavenly Father, more respect for each other, more loyalty to the Spirit of Christ, more readiness to live pure lives and do good work in the world."

All through our colleges to-day there is to be found a religious interest that is significant. We are waking to a sense of responsibility for the religious life of the student. We are beginning to feel that his religion is our business. Everywhere we see the establishment of chairs for Biblical literature, the formation of Bible departments, great conventions of college men, social work by students. Men are feeling that college life must not degenerate into a period of indolent enjoyment. Neither does it exist for the purpose of creating a new type of Hellenism that is to end in the pagan rehabilitation of the flesh. College men are to be trained for leadership. This can not be done without the recognition of the fact that religion is the dynamic to be applied to the duty that lies nearest and the ideal that rises clearest. There can be no permanent leadership in things worth leading on the part of college men unless college men are trained above all things to a sense of exaltation in the things of the Spirit, to a faith in the eternal significance of life and of the world, to a reverence for the sacredness of the individual person, and to a sense of simple

trust in God. Eucken is certainly right in his claim that any theory of personality is insufficient which is not religiously based. This thought is strong in the minds of leaders of education to-day. The dominant note in at least two of the great inaugural addresses of university presidents delivered quite recently was the necessity for the cultivation in the higher schools of America of that essential religion which exalts the things of the human spirit over things physical and which reads back of the material world a purpose and a destiny. It is easy, of course, to caricature and to criticize this tendency and to make light of the visions which are seen and of the dreams which are dreamt by the new idealism of the age. But the truth still remains that religion lifted above its accidents to its essential significance is bound to continue to be the inspiration of the highest educational ideals of our day.

LANCASTER, PA.



## EDITORIAL NOTICE.

This issue of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW is devoted exclusively to the Heidelberg Catechism, whose 350th anniversary is being observed this year by the Reformed Church in the U. S. of America. It contains articles that discuss the Heidelberg Catechism itself, in its various aspects as a confessional symbol and as a catechetical manual, and others that treat of the larger question of Religious Education as it confronts us in home, church, and school.

The purpose of the editors in planning this special number was neither eulogy nor criticism, but history. They believe that this purpose has been achieved in the appreciative, as well as in the critical articles in the foregoing pages. Both are historical symptoms. And jointly they represent the present day attitude towards the Heidelberg Catechism.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### CONTEMPORARY RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

A. S. WEBER.

#### THE PROBLEM OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN HISTORICAL AND LITERARY CRITICISM.<sup>1</sup>

The problems which challenge contemporary attention are very numerous in almost every department of human thought. In many instances the pressure of those problems and the solutions of them suggested by scholars occasion disquietude of mind and compel the revision of notions whose soundness was once thought to be unassailable. Instead of deploring such a situation, as some do, it may be regarded, in my judgment, one of the gratifying and reassuring characteristics of present-day life. Investigation and change invariably attend periods of

<sup>1</sup> *Literature:* 'Articles on the Gospels in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* and the *Encyclopædia Biblica*; Askwith's *Historical Value of the Fourth Gospel*; Burkitt's *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*; Bacon's *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*; Scott's *The Fourth Gospel, Its Purpose and Theology*; Lightfoot's *Biblical Essays*; Parts 8, 10 and 12 of the *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*; Forsyth's *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*; Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*; Westcott's *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*; Inge's *Sermons*, Clemen's *Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources*.



intellectual vitality and progress—their absence often indicates mental stupor or listless indifference.

Among the problems which have to do with biblical and doctrinal considerations, that of the Fourth Gospel is one of outstanding and far-reaching importance. As long as twenty years ago, Bishop Lightfoot, the greatest English scholar of his generation, pointed out its vital character, and insisted that its significance was of central moment in the study of Christianity. To-day we are in a position to see this much more clearly. On account of the issues, generally recognized by those acquainted with the nature and bearings of the problem as necessarily involved in its solution—issues which must wield a potent influence in determining the Church's ultimate decision for or against certain controverted conceptions of our Religion and its Founder—the problem for ages has been and continues to be one of commanding and absorbing interest to the leaders of both traditional and progressive tendencies in religious and theological inquiry.

This explains why for a long while past, our literary seas have been, why they still are crowded with craft carrying biblical critics' discussions of the so-called Johannine Question. Not a few of their contributions to the large and constantly growing body of the literature on the subject bear the marks of competent scholarship, of painstaking exhaustive investigation, and of undoubting confidence in the validity of their contentions and the trustworthiness of their conclusions. And were it not for our added knowledge of the different angles from which they approach, and of the differing prepossessions with which they pursue the study of the problem, the radically variant and utterly unharmonizable attitude of biblical students toward the controverted doctrinal views alluded to, we might despair of ever finding a satisfying answer to the question.

With all this in mind, namely, the importance of the problem, the significance of the issues involved in its solution, the well-equipped character of those who have attempted to solve it,

and the widely divergent nature of their published conclusions, it were nothing less than a stroke of temerity for me to undertake a paper on the present topic with either a view of adding even a little to the sum of knowledge regarding it already available, or under the supposition that my personal alignment with one or the other side of the contending parties could be of any weight or importance to the learned readers of this REVIEW. My purpose is far less ambitious, much more modest. I mean simply to note in a more or less disconnected and superficial way, certain features of the problem, which, in the course of the survey of it I have made for myself, have particularly impressed me; to refer to the part which recent biblical criticism has had in its discussion; to justify, if possible, the application of critical principles and methods to the study of Scripture; and, incidentally, to indicate the direction in which according to my opinion we may look for the truth on our problem in the newer light. This program, I am well aware, is much too large for detailed and satisfactory treatment within the limits of space at my command, but a few of its more significant points may be at least lightly touched and their purport briefly noticed.

1. To begin with, we may remind ourselves, in the first place, that under some of its aspects, the problem of the Fourth Gospel is not at all new. From the time of the formation of the New Testament Canon—indeed at a considerably earlier period—it was recognized by students of the several Evangelical documents that the Fourth Gospel stands in a category of its own, that what it contains is in very important respects distinct from the Synoptic accounts of our Lord's life and teaching. The writers of the latter, simple-hearted and unsophisticated Hebrews, were intent upon setting forth, broadly speaking, the life and words of Jesus, in strict accord with what some of them may have remembered, or with what was authentically reported to them by oral tradition or earlier writings. Their controlling purpose was to make their records faithful transcripts of the historic facts and incidents of the



Master's life. And, barring some later accretions, their narratives exhibit a consistent historical situation, true to the conditions of the time of their appearance as known to us from other reliable sources.

The author of the Fourth Gospel, one of the profoundest philosophical thinkers and greatest theologians known to Christianity, represents a mental type widely different from that of the Synoptists. His distinguished and unmistakable individuality is stamped from beginning to end upon his document. His self-avowed purpose is not a strictly historical one. His mind was evidently steeped in that mixture of philosophical and religious thought which had come to prevail about the end of the first century among educated Jews who had been brought in contact with Greek and Roman culture. In his thought the origin of Jesus is pressed into a region which lies beyond the horizon of history altogether. He begins his Gospel in the uncalculable heights of pre-creation times, and declares that ere the universe began to be, in the unbegun life of the Eternal Deity, lived the conscious and luminous One who was manifest among men as Jesus of Nazareth. His account of Christ's earthly career certainly accepts and incorporates some important and probably authentic traditions of certain events in his life, but this traditional historical material, whether taken from Synoptic or independent sources, is somewhat freely handled, often subordinated to the author's specific purpose, and constantly overlaid by a remarkable doctrinal and philosophical construction.

These differences between the Synoptists and their writings on the one hand, and the Fourth Evangelist and his production on the other hand, which, as already intimated, raised questions in earlier ages regarding the historical nature of Fourth Gospel and its authentic apostolic origin, have in our age been brought into much clearer and fuller perspective and so thoroughly established as to be no longer a matter of dispute among informed persons. For bringing about this altered situation, credit belongs to modern methods of studying historical prob-



lems and to the application of literary tests to ancient documents with a view of ascertaining the comparative value of their respective representations when at variance. These methods and tests have been gradually making their way during the last fifty or seventy-five years, and have given us a conception of history quite different from that which before had prevailed. To my mind this new conception of history and of historical study marks a long step forward in the path of intellectual progress, and leaves little room for one to doubt that the critical methods, of which it is the result, must have had their origin in a divinely given impulse.

In the application of these critical principles and literary tests to the study of the historical questions underlying the Gospels, no less than to those of history in general, the scientific inquirer of to-day, if he wishes the results of his study to receive approbation, must lay aside the advocate and assume the judge. He must divest himself of personal prepossessions and idiosyncrasies in order to pursue his quest in the whitest light attainable. Moreover, to prosecute his studies in an accurate, unbiased and judicial manner, he must possess the historical imagination, be clothed with the rare quality of impartiality, and have respect for and open-minded willingness to accept any proved fact. And in addition, he must have adequate insight to trace the origin, the true relation and succession of events in the history of human thought and life, and to discover whether or not the writer of a particular document was actuated by a desire to make it a naturalistic transcript from actual life or an idealized, purposive picture of speculative theories. It should require no argument to show that for the ascertaining of whatever solid historic facts may be hidden in the fabric of writings constructed with a purpose, that purpose with all that rests upon it must first be eliminated. And when we are assured, as we are, by a learned German historian, that "none of the ancient writers intended simply to describe real life or actualities, that that would have been a breach of the laws of art as then understood, and that even historians, including those who



have made contributions to the New Testament, did not deem it essential to chronicle merely outward occurrences, but allowed themselves much wider scope in order to produce desired effects upon their readers' minds," the modern method of subjecting the Evangelical writings to critical analysis and comparison seems to be fully warranted.

This contention is now more generally sanctioned than it once was. Some years ago the great University President who has done more for the advancement of education in this country than any other individual, aroused bitter protest by his earnest advocacy of absolute freedom in biblical and theological inquiry, and was maligned for commending the application of the scientific spirit as needful to overcome "the terrible stress of temptation to intellectual dishonesty which has always beset the clerical profession." To-day large numbers of men gratefully own as essential and supremely valuable, the spirit on which he so courageously insisted—"the spirit which seeks only the fact without the slightest regard to consequences. Any twisting or obscuring of the fact to accommodate it to a pre-conceived theory, hope, or wish, any tampering with the actual result of investigation, is the unpardonable sin. It is a spirit at once humble and dauntless, patient of details, passionless but energetic, venturing into pathless wastes to bring back a fact, caring only for the truth, candid as a still lake, expectant, unfettered, and tireless." One of the most conservative of the Anglican Bishops, even, is willing to refer questions about the Scriptures to the tribunal of historians with this spirit. In an excellent discussion of the subject Bishop Talbott declares students of the Bible should be "quite ready to leave scientific scholars and historians to test and try all questions about the making of its several Books and find out for us to the best of their power what the truth is about them and their contents." That is exactly what biblical critics insist upon as their right and purpose of doing. And are there not special reasons why, in our times, this right should be readily accorded them? The traditional method of supporting the

statements of Scripture on the ground of the inspiration and consequent inerrancy of their authors is now widely discredited. It is hardly more satisfactory than are dogmas established simply by a majority vote of ecclesiastical councils. The only appeal that at present counts, is an appeal to facts, the nature and value of which are immediately accessible and interpretable. In other words, pre-conceived theories of inspiration, traditional conceptions regarding that which is historically valid, no matter how hoary with age or well fortified by an array of names, serve no longer to answer satisfactorily the questions raised by the statements of the Fourth Gospel which are at variance with those of the earlier Evangelists. Without allowing any doctrinal prepossessions or traditional theories to influence them, scientific critics address themselves in searching for the truth to the study of the available documents themselves. They analyze and compare their respective contents. They weigh the trustworthiness of their respective statements when in conflict, and assume the responsibility of pointing out on which side the preponderating evidence of the truth in their judgment is found. It goes without saying that such a method of dealing with the first four Books of the New Testament must prove in its results somewhat disconcerting to minds that have always supposed them to be inerrantly perfect, and their contents harmonizable. It is a method that is destructive—the opprobrious epithet often flung against it—but it is destructive only of unsound views. It is constructive from the view-point of those who are interested in historical truth.

Investigations of the historic facts underlying the beginnings of Christianity and the production of the Gospels, in accordance with the scientific principles and critical methods just noticed, have yielded two results, which before passing to the more definite consideration of our problem, may be given preliminary mention. One of these results is that originally all the Gospels were valued not as narratives of facts but as props and proofs of doctrine. That is to say, the testimony



regarding the life of Jesus they contain, was accepted or rejected not on historical but on theological grounds. This finding of New Testament scholars of the scientific school could scarcely be more forcibly or concisely expressed, or receive more honorable endorsement, than that which the late Dr. Westcott puts into a single sentence in his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*. Without a word of qualification he affirms that "the Gospels were the results, not the foundation of the Apostolic preaching." The other result alluded to is that while theological or doctrinal bias is discoverable in every one of the Evangelical documents, its influence in the first three affects the form of our Lord's *teaching* rather than the *historic facts and incidents* of his life. That is, Matthew, Mark and Luke are, generally speaking, in accord with one another in their historic representations, and admittedly accurate in recording what really happened in the course of the Master's life. They give a realistic not an impressionist portrait of Jesus' life. The significance of these two achievements of critical inquiry will, if kept in mind, prove of service to us later in our discussion, and may possibly aid us in determining for ourselves what attitude to take toward our problem.

2. Up to this point in our study, attention has been directed principally to such of the surface characteristics of the Fourth Gospel as from the beginning or middle of the second century raised perplexing questions concerning it in Christian minds, and led to the recognition of its occupying a place distinctly apart. Availing ourselves of the light thrown on it by modern critical research, we must attempt now, in the second place, to penetrate beneath the surface of the Johannine Gospel with a view of accounting for its radical departure from the facts and traditions preserved by the Synoptists. At the time when our author wrote, and amid the new environment of a culture that was not native to Hebrew soil, he was forced to adjust his message so as to meet the requirements of a new situation. A wider, a universal, a cosmic significance had to be given to the Founder of Christianity, his simple parochial ethical and re-



ligious teaching, well adapted to Hebrew thought and life, had to be translated into timeless principles, if Christ and his Gospel were to make a successful appeal to cultured philosophical minds. Hence, he lifted Jesus out of his racially narrow relations and represented him in a universal aspect and transformed his teachings accordingly. This is the secret which unquestionably underlies the form and content of his document and constitutes the purpose he sought to accomplish. From the constructive material which was available to him, and among which were doubtless the Synoptic writings, his selections and rejections are all made in strict accordance with the ends he had in view. His production, which Luther calls a "spiritual Gospel," bears the marks throughout of its practical aims—aims which govern the writer's evident preference of serviceable ideas to merely cold and dry historical facts. All this is done in the interest of giving validity and strength to his interpretation of the personal nature, character and office of Jesus Christ as the Eternal Word which "became man, . . . and dwelt among us full of love and truth." These inner features of the Fourth Gospel, of course, interpenetrate and overlap one another, and in our examination of them no effort will be made to hold them apart.

The facts just mentioned bear directly upon the question regarding that feature of our problem which concerns the authorship of it. Without pausing to consider in detail this question—to the true solution of which perhaps the nearest approach may be found in Professor Reville's observation that "its authorship will remain unknown, because it was not intended to become known"—we may say that the acceptance of the critical findings mentioned with reference to the arbitrary departure from the historical Synoptic data, as disclosed by the author's selections and omissions, precludes the possibility of identifying him with St. John the son of Zebedee. Moreover, if the critical view on this point is valid, it is very improbable that even a disciple of St. John, recalling after the Apostle was gone what he had told him, can be credited with the



authorship. And, that such purposive choice and rejection of available historical material was deliberately made by the undiscoverable writer of the Fourth Gospel can be verified by simply examining the parallel columns of any of our so-called "Harmonies of the Gospels."

Even a cursory examination of such parallel columns must yield surprising disclosures to anyone that has not undertaken it. Let us instance several of them by way of illustration. In the Fourth Gospel we meet with Jesus in the halo of a philosophical and doctrinal conception of which there is not the faintest trace to be found in the narratives of the earlier Evangelists. In the Fourth Gospel alone reference is made to the water which at the marriage-feast in Cana is said to have been changed into wine. The interviews of Jesus with Nicodemus by night, with the Samaritan woman at the well, and with the Paralytic at the pool of Bethesda, are all peculiar to John. So also are the accounts of the miraculous draught of fishes, the raising of Lazarus from the dead, and the overpowering effect upon the incredulity of Thomas wrought by the sight of the wounded hands and the pierced side of the Risen Saviour. Every one of these selections is intentionally made for the purpose of showing that it reflects super-human power and glory, thus lending verifying support to the doctrine announced in the opening sentence of Book. And, what is hardly less striking, and really a more daring departure from the historical tradition than that of the purposive selections, is met with in the fact that whatever historic fact or incident reported by the Synoptists, which might be considered to discredit his conception, is prudently omitted. Nothing is said of the genealogy of Jesus, nothing of his Baptism by his kinsman, nothing of the temptation, and nothing of the Transfiguration. There is no mention of the institution of the Holy Communion, none of the Agony in the Garden, none of the prostration of Jesus under the burden of the cross which afterwards Simon of Cyrene was compelled to carry, and none of the despairing cry, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me!"

It would take us too far afield to undertake the examination of all these instanced omissions and selections in their bearings upon the problem under notice. For our present purpose this is not necessary. It will be sufficient to give attention to one of the omissions and to one of the selections mentioned. The Fourth Evangelist relates at length what according to his account took place in connection with the last meal of Jesus with his disciples in the Upper Room. He tells of features and discourses not found in the Synoptic records, but strangely omits mentioning the central fact incident to that meal, namely, the institution of the Memorial Rite. That an eye-witness of that unforgettable scene should in silence have passed over what our Lord himself desired to impress indelibly upon the memories of those present, is almost inconceivable. And yet, the writer of the Fourth Gospel does pass it over and substitutes for it the washing of the disciples' feet. The explanation of the omission must be sought in the facts furnished us by the lengthy discourse which Jesus is represented to have spoken after the feeding of the multitude which concludes with the words, "It is the Spirit which quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak, they are spirit and life," and with which, to his mind, a permanent sacramental rite could not be reconciled. Accordingly it is omitted. "This," says the author of *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, "is something more than historical inaccuracy. It is a deliberate sacrifice of historical truth."

A similar appraisal is put by critics upon what is, aside from the nature of the Prologue, the most striking peculiarity of John, namely, the raising of Lazarus from the dead. Not a few contemporary scholars are willing to take their stand on this single incident to maintain their position relative to the non-historical character of much that is found in the Johannine document. The Bethany incident is said by the Fourth Evangelist to have taken place in the full glare of publicity, and is represented by him to have been the immediate cause of the arrest, the trial, the condemnation and crucifixion of Jesus.



In the account of Mark, whose historical trustworthiness we have already spoken of, the circumstances to which the tragic end of our Lord's career is ascribed, are totally different and irreconcilably in conflict with the representation found in John. How explain these remarkable divergencies? The fact that in the Fourth Gospel alone the Bethany miracle is mentioned would of itself suggest historical difficulties, and when in addition consequences are attributed to it in John which elsewhere are referred to other causes, the difficulties are vastly increased. How such a crucially significant event, one so directly fraught with a most momentous outcome, could have been passed over in silence by every one of the Synoptists, has taxed to the utmost many a man's confidence in the historical trustworthiness of the Johannine account regarding this event. Had Matthew and Mark no knowledge of it? Did Luke, who according to his own word was at pains to "trace accurately from the first the course of all things," fail to discover any reference to it in the various sources from which he gathered his material, or was the event which raised popular belief in Jesus and enthusiasm for his cause to the highest pitch, too insignificant to merit his notice? The theory that John was written to supplement the earlier accounts of Jesus' life, furnishes no adequate reply to such inquiries. The suggestion that the Synoptists, writing while Lazarus was still living, suppressed reference to him in the interest of his protection, and that the Fourth Evangelist, writing after Lazarus had died a second time, was free to chronicle it, to my mind, carries no weight. To explain the difficulty by regarding the episode as symbolical rather than historical is certainly a far easier and much more reasonable way of dealing with it.

This course is followed by some of the most competent biblical scholars of our age. The late Professor Salmon, for instance, who was a thoughtful and painstaking student of the New Testament, conservative to the very core in his theological instincts and religious practices, found himself compelled, after most careful investigation, to conclude with painful reluctance,



that the alleged miracle at Bethany had never happened, that the account of it was intended to symbolize a truth of faith rather than to record a fact of history. Practically the same conclusion is reached by Professor Scott, whose right to speak with some authority no one who has read his masterly treatise on the Fourth Gospel, *Its Purpose and Theology*, will feel disposed to question. "We cannot with any show of probability," he writes, "find room for this miracle in any intelligible scheme of the life of Christ." And, he continues, "it is inconceivable that a miracle of such magnitude, performed on the very eve of the last momentous week of our Lord's life, and in the presence of crowds of people in a suburb of Jerusalem—a miracle moreover which was the immediate cause, according to John, of the Crucifixion—should have been simply passed over by the other Evangelists. We are almost compelled to the conclusion that the narrative is in the main symbolical." Professor Burkitt, whom I have already quoted, is even more emphatic in declining to accept the event as historically reliable. "Where in the frame-work of history preserved by St. Mark," he asks, "are we to place the Raising of Lazarus? Can any answer be given, except 'There is no room'? If the events occurred as told in the Fourth Gospel, if they were as public as the Fourth Evangelist insists, so fraught with influence upon the actions of both friends and foes, they could not have been unknown to a well-informed personage like Mark, nor could he have had any reason for suppressing a narrative at once so public and so edifying. Is it possible that anyone who reads the continuous and detailed story of Mark from the Transfiguration to the Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem, can interpolate into it the tale of Lazarus and the notable sensation which we are assured it produced? Must not the answer be, 'Mark did not know of it'? And if Mark did not know of it, can we believe that, as a matter of fact, it ever occurred? For all its dramatic setting, it is, I am persuaded, impossible to regard the story of the Raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical events."



Coming as all these quoted statements do, not from distrusted skeptics chargeable with purposes hostile to Christianity or designed to overthrow religious faith, but from distinguished biblical scholars, honored occupants of professorial chairs, loyal churchmen, the weight and force of their conclusions are not to be brushed aside as baseless theories by the shrug of a shoulder or the wave of a hand. They compel us to give them attentive and respectful consideration. And if we can accompany them to their conclusions and surrender the historical nature of this crowning miracle, we shall be able to see why other statements of the Fourth Gospel purporting to be historically grounded, when not in harmony with the Synoptic representations, cannot be highly evaluated from the viewpoint of modern critics and in the light of their achievements.

3. When we turn now, as our time for doing is long overdue, from the examination of the Johannine selections and omissions, to the consideration, in the third place, of the nature and content of the doctrine of the Fourth Gospel, we meet with a feature of our problem which is even more arresting than those regarding its authorship and its historicity. Indeed, were the questions concerning authorship and historicity our only ones, we might content ourselves perhaps with the thought that whoever the author, his exalted purpose to win men's belief in "Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God," to the end that so "believing they might have life in his name," justified him in departing from precise historic accuracy. In fact, such a theory has been advanced in explanation of the historical difficulties. If to know what is believed to have taken place is often more important for religion and more serviceable for salvation, than to know what actually has taken place, then, it has been argued, no serious exception should be taken to the use of symbolical or even fictitious instead of factual representation. A literary document produced by such a method and under the constraint of such a purpose does not necessarily involve designed historical imposture. On the contrary, it is a form of history, idealized subjective history,

the history of conceptions and experiences, which, as such, belongs to a diviner realm and embodies deeper truths than can be claimed for the history of facts as ordinarily understood, the contents of which are frequently poor and empty of religious meaning and spiritual value.

But whatever elements of truth there may be in this view, and whatever their value for the solution of the historical feature of our problem, they avail nothing in the way of explaining the unharmonizable divergence of the Fourth Gospel from the Synoptic narratives in regard to Christ's person and its doctrinal teaching. Too much space has already been taken to allow a survey of the entire field which this divergence opens. There is room only for reference to the content of the unique Prologue and to the Christology which consistent with the Prologue is elaborated by our author.

According to the Synoptic tradition the whole drama of our Lord's life is a real human drama in every essential feature of it. Jesus comes forward at the time when the Baptist's reform-movement is under way, and takes up his prophetic and humanitarian work along the lines of his fore-runner. He calls upon men to repent, and upon that condition invites them to become his followers. He desires them to learn of him. He becomes the friend of publicans and sinners, and champions the cause of the down-trodden and the oppressed. He assures those who respond to his call, of the Father's forgiveness and of His pleasure to give them the kingdom. He preaches the Kingdom of God, and points out what is required for entrance, and what is sure to exclude from it. He ministers graciously and sympathetically to the afflicted and distressed, and denounces the hypocrisy and wickedness of the ruling pharisaic classes. He cleanses the Temple, righteously indignant that "the House of Prayer" has been turned into "a den of thieves." By the latter act and rebuke the secret enmity of an over-bearing priesthood is aroused to open hostility which, according to the earliest Evangelist, results in his arrest at the instance of the priestly conspirators. He is delivered to the



Roman governor, charged as claiming equality with God and kingship among men, and crucified on that ground. All this, from beginning to end of his public career, is consistent with the Synoptic conception of him as "the Servant whom God according to promise had raised up from among his brethren, to bless them in turning away everyone of them from his iniquities."

The Johannine conception contrasts strangely with all this. The moment one turns from the pages of Matthew, Mark or Luke to those of John, one is conscious of moving in a different climate, of breathing a different atmosphere, and of seeing the central Figure and much besides in a different light. The opening words of the unique metaphysical Prologue affirm a conception of Jesus which is wholly foreign to everything met with in the earlier Gospels. The source from which this foreign element is derived can hardly be a matter of question. In the earlier half of the first century, the doctrine of the Divine creative Word, the personified Mind of the Eternal, had been developed by the Jewish Alexandrine philosopher, Philo. Before the end of the century it had spread far and wide over the East and affected the teaching even of Paul. Of our author's acquaintance with this philosophic system of thought and with Pauline doctrines, there can be no reasonable doubt. Experts in what the Germans call "*Quellen-forschung*" have no hesitation in declaring that "every verse in the Prologue offers striking analogies to corresponding sayings of Philo," and "all of the Logos doctrine but the name is already present in the Pauline Epistles." What the writer of the Fourth Gospel did, as shown by a study of it and its sources, was to identify Philonic notions regarding the Eternal Word with the Jesus of history, and to adapt Pauline teachings to his purpose of vindicating the philosophico-religious conception with which he had started out,—steps, these were, which not only determined the course and character of the thought which runs through the Fourth Gospel, but have, in connection with those of Paul in the same direction, affected the whole subsequent development of Christianity.



Once Jesus has been conceived of and presented as incarnating the Eternal Word in his unique person, under the influence of Philo and Paul, everything that such a super-humanly originated Being might be expected to say and do in order "to manifest forth his indwelling glory," and to make clear his redemptive mission, *that* is represented to be said and done by Jesus. With unsurpassed literary skill, everything is made to serve the writer's aim of justifying his conception of our Lord. Dean Inge declares that "Philo showed an utter indifference to chronology and historical fact, and regarded historical events as valuable only as they symbolized some eternal unchanging truth," and like him, the Fourth Evangelist handles his constructive material. Precise accuracy in the use of historic facts is for him less essential than the employment of them in changed form as symbols of timeless and abiding value. What is the result? The simple ethical and religious utterances of Jesus, reported by the Synoptists as having been illustrated and enforced by Parables of matchless beauty and depth of insight, give way in John to lengthy discourses and spirited dialogues on Christological doctrines. In John not a single one of our Lord's parables is retained,—the word "parable" itself does not occur. The "miracles" of the Synoptists, wrought according to their version out of the Lord's sympathy with suffering and sorrowing men, become "signs" in the Fourth Gospel whose performance was intended to reveal Christ's own nature and commend him to those who witnessed the signs. The writer makes no attempt to present happenings in chronological order or historic connection, gives no heed as a rule to the antecedents or consequences of reported events, and employs them simply in defence, not of the powerful teaching, but of the wonderful personality of Jesus. In the Synoptic narratives Jesus is described as Prophet, or Son of Man, or King of Israel, and the description serves far on into his public ministry if not to its end. The Fourth Evangelist tells us that he was recognized by the Baptist at the very beginning of his public appearance as "the Lamb of



God which taketh away the sin of the world," thus presenting from the outset a prophetic intimation of the redemptive act in which the mysterious Life was to culminate.

That the doctrinal contrast in which the Fourth Gospel stands when compared with the other three, cannot be shown in its full significance by such a brief examination as this, must be perfectly plain. Enough has been said, however, to show the radical nature and the fundamental importance of the contrast, and to establish the fact that it compels us to face difficulties of stupendous proportions and consequences. To the reality, the difficulty and the significance of this doctrinal contrast, vigorous reference is made by the Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University, in his great book on *The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate*. "It makes a tremendous difference," he says, "whether the particular and distinctive doctrine of John as to Christ's person and office is or is not to be enforced as the main feature of the Gospel message. On this question we are driven unavoidably to the alternative: Either the Synoptists, or John. Either the former are right in their complete silence regarding the pre-existence and incarnation, and their subordination of the doctrine of Jesus' own person, in presenting his work and teaching as concerned with the kingdom of God, with repentance, a filial disposition and an obedient life, as the requirement made by the common Father of His children for attaining unto eternal life; or else John is right in making Jesus' work and message supremely a manifestation of his own glory as the incarnate Logos, effecting an atonement for the world which otherwise has no access to God. Both views cannot be true, and to a very large extent it is the science of literary and historical criticism which must decide between them."

By thus definitely and squarely stating the issue with which critical research has brought us face to face, Dr. Bacon renders the Christian public a notably important, though perhaps not generally appreciated service. If we are prepared to accept the conclusions of advanced scholarship, then, our lives of

Christ must be re-written, our interpretations of Christianity revised, our confessional standards reconstructed, in accordance with facts brought to light by modern inquiry. That this cannot be done without entailing some loss as regards the contents of the Fourth Gospel in the traditional view of it, is of course plain, but at the same time much of what constitutes its charm, its religious value, its abiding power, may be conserved. If, on the contrary, we are unwilling to accept those conclusions, then, we must do one of two things, either blink the light of the facts brought to our knowledge by modern methods of studying the Scriptures—in which case we may rest passively content in holding on to traditional Christological views and ancient creedal statements; or else, acknowledging the facts, insist that they are erroneously interpreted by critical thinkers—in which case it is necessary for us to discover the error and to correct it.

This latter position, it must be frankly acknowledged in this connection, has the support of some eminent scholars. Dr. Forsyth may be mentioned as one of their most distinguished representatives. In his study of *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, he observes that “the final tendency of advanced theology is backward” (backward that means, one may suppose, to the teaching of Jesus as found in the historical narratives of the Synoptists). “Its great act of violence is in the driving of a wedge between the Synoptists and the Epistles” (including those of John which represent of course the same views as those of the Fourth Gospel), “between the message of Jesus and the Gospel of his Apostles.” “The Synoptists,” he continues, “exhibit an incomplete situation, a raw audience, an inchoate context of evidence. It is in the Epistles (and in the Fourth Gospel, he might have added) that we find the essence of Christianity. The apostolic inspiration takes as much precedence of Jesus’ earthly and partly interim teaching as the finished work is more luminous than the work in progress.”

Contentious like these show into what desperate straits the



progress of theological thought has driven reactionary thinkers, and to what questionable theories they are compelled to resort in their efforts to maintain the positions of traditional orthodoxy. "The first impression made by this new defense of the faith," it has been well said by an able American writer, "is that it turns the New Testament up side down." Paul and John, not Jesus, in its view, become the real founders of the Christian Religion. Jesus had a "message," the Apostles preached the "Gospel." The Synoptic Gospels are subordinate to the Epistles of Paul and the Johannine writings. Jesus, it tells us by implication, was not understood while he lived, indeed, did not understand himself. "Orthodoxy is thus saved at the loss of historicity. The Sermon on the Mount and the Parables are subordinated to the mysticism of the Christian tradition. '*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*' Christian faith is not likely to find itself strengthened by this undermining of its foundations. The creeds are but poorly defended when they are set in sharp contrast with the facts. Even more obvious, however, is the fact that Christian ethics on these terms become impracticable. We are left, not with a teaching of duty, but with a rapt communion of the spirit which is possible to the elect alone. Contemplation has supplanted obedience. The knowledge of the doctrine supersedes the doing of the will." Considerations like these force upon one the conviction that such reactionary views, even though they have back of them a great name like that of the Principal of Hackney College, cannot in the final outcome of the discussion of our problem succeed in commending themselves to the calm and enlightened judgment of unprejudiced thinkers, rather than those suggested by men who feel compelled to surrender the Johannine authorship, the historical nature, and the distinctive doctrinal forms of the Fourth Gospel.

One can rest in this conviction the more securely when it is realized that although some loss is sustained by such required surrenders, much that is of priceless value to us remains un-

touched. If John, the brother of James, cannot be regarded the author, that does not hinder us from recognizing with admiring gratitude that the writer was a profound spiritual genius and a rarely gifted soul,—one whose confidence in Jesus as the Christ was absolutely commanded by him, and whose rich and enriching religious experiences were due to his having found and without reserve committed himself to him as his Lord and Master. If the Fourth Gospel cannot be read as a chronicle of actual historical events—and likely it was never intended to be so read—that does not prevent us from reading and prizing it as an elect and lofty spirit's interpretation of the religious significance and value of the historical Jesus for those who trustfully follow him, and of the enlightening and rewarding nature of the timeless and ageless truths which he taught while here among men—an interpretation which, once it is seen to be what it is, must be recognized as a precious if not indispensable commentary on the earlier Evangelical writings. If, in the progress of biblical and theological inquiry, the peculiar philosophical form in which the Fourth Evangelist saw fit to express his doctrinal conceptions in order to make them effective in his age, fails to meet the intellectual requirement of the present generation, that does not forbid us to confess with the eldest of the Apostles that Jesus is “the Christ, the Son of the living God,” and, in terms suited to our day, to attempt re-stating our conceptions of him as the supreme revelation of the Eternal Father—the revelation which satisfies the deepest cravings of human souls for both the life that now is and the life that is to come.

The critical view of the Fourth Gospel as largely an interpretative symbolical representation, based on the knowledge and personal experience of its writer, of the meaning and saving efficacy of Jesus and his Gospel for men of the second century, should afford light for our guidance in attempting to re-interpret Christ and Christianity to men of the twentieth century. A knowledge of what has been wrought by the historic Jesus and his revelation in the progress of the world's civiliza-



tion, and a personal experience of the regenerating power that resides in a vital faith in and obedience to his spirit and word, must give support to the doctrines of the faith in the re-stated form demanded by our age. Lessing's famous saying that "the eternal truths of reason cannot be dependent on the accidental truths of history," is valid if we regard "the eternal truths of reason" to be in the main the formulations of men's experiences. The Fourth Evangelist illustrates this. He had experienced the truths which he formulates in his doctrinal conceptions. He writes as one who has spiritually heard and seen and handled and verified the word of the historical Master, as one whose life was transformed, whose character was transfigured, and whose hope of immortality was abidingly confirmed. Hence we can understand why in unshaken confidence he can represent Jesus as saying "Except a man be born from above he cannot see, cannot enter into the kingdom of God," as declaring "Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall never thirst," as inviting men "Come unto me, . . . I will give you rest," and as giving the assurance "I am the way, the truth and the life." Mere historical information could not have supported or given authority to such eternal verities. In a corresponding way the facts of history have importance also for us. They challenge us to put them to practical test, and though our resulting experiences may require our doctrinal conceptions to be expressed in altered language, Jesus will continue to command our adoring gratitude and love, our constant devotion and ceaseless praise.

"Yes, thou art still the Life; thou art the Way  
The holiest know. Light, Life, and Way of heaven!  
And they who dearest hope and deepest pray,  
Toil by the Life, Light, Way, which thou hast given."

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND.

## II.

### AN ESSAY OF PROVINCIALISM.

C. ERNEST WAGNER.

Men and women will travel to the ends of the earth in search of "local color." In the fishing villages of Brittany, in the sequestered Hallingdal, on the tiny Isle of Marken, among the marshes of the Spreewald and the valleys of the Tyrol, in the bazaars of the Orient—in Algiers, Stamboul, Delhi, Smyrna, Cairo, among the teeming millions of Peking or amid the blandishments of fair Tokio, they will find what they have come so far to seek. Now, "local color" is only another name for provincialism—provincialism of the most pronounced type, provincialism, so to speak, in its most aggravated form.

A curious thing, is it not, that men will prize so highly and go so far afield to enjoy that which, in themselves, they make every effort to conceal, and of which, for "the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them," they would not be convicted? Curious too, it is, that women will rave over the costumes and caps of the Breton peasants—so distinctive, so womanly, and withal so pleasing; they will deplore the signs which betoken a coming change and the gradual displacement of these charming oddities by modern *modes* and millinery; and then they will proceed studiously to conform to the latest Parisian decree and, regardless of individual figure or physiognomy, permit themselves to be flattened, elongated, hobbled, and otherwise disfigured. And why? Merely in order to look, as nearly as may be, like other fashionable women and, at all hazards, avoid the suspicion of provincialism. What, then, is provincialism that men should, by turns, seek and avoid it; that women should, with like intensity, admire and abhor the mysterious thing?



In its literal signification, provincialism is that which characterizes a province or a provincial person. When applied to dress, it is a certain singularity of costume, such as we have already noted; when applied to speech, it is a matter of expression peculiar to the people living in a province, a county, or a parish—a local or dialectal way of speaking. In its broader signification, it applies also to a certain rudeness of manners and a certain narrowness of thought or opinion, characteristic of the inhabitants of a province, as distinguished from the metropolis, or of the smaller cities and towns, as distinguished from the larger. So much for the formal definition. Let us see, now, how it may be elucidated.

In England there is the simple, hard-and-fast distinction between London and the provinces. London is the one metropolis, and whatever is not of it is of the provinces. Newspapers published in other cities (of which the *Manchester Guardian* is a good example) are representatives of the provincial press, no matter how able they are or how wide their influence may be; theatrical companies, after they have finished their engagements in London and have taken to playing “one night stands,” are said to be “on tour through the provinces.” Roughly speaking, there are as many provinces in England, as there are separate counties, each county having something about it that marks it off from its neighbors. In colloquial speech the variations are notoriously striking. One need only pass from Yorkshire to Kent, on the east coast, or from Lancashire to Cornwall, along the western boundaries, with one’s ears open for the speech of the rustic population, to have this matter of dialectal divergence brought home in the most forcible way, and to understand what provincialism, as exemplified by speech, really means in England. Diversity in dress and manner of living are by no means so noteworthy.

In France the situation is similar. Paris is the metropolis *par excellence*, and in all things holds the primacy. Beyond her borders lie the provinces, each with something distinctive about it, in dialect, costume, cuisine, popular customs, and

method of tilling the soil. The French spoken in Tours may be grammatically above reproach, the speech of Provence may charm by its soft and liquid beauty; but to the sensitive ear of the Parisian, both alike are provincial and therefore to be eschewed. To Paris gravitate scholars, poets, artists, musicians, publicists—all eager to efface the provincial stamp and merge their identity in the gay, brilliant, stimulating life of the capital. And thus the sway of Paris, in the realm of thought and taste, is absolute; her authority is never seriously questioned. To be provincial in France is to vary, in some particular, from the Parisian standard.

In the United States of America it is not so. Here there is no single metropolis or capital, whose decrees are binding upon the people as a whole. We are too vast in extent, too heterogeneous, too varied in our interests, proclivities, and opinions, to acknowledge the authority of any one tribunal. In consequence, we are both cosmopolitan and provincial to a remarkable degree. Over the greater part of New England, Boston is supreme; but her sway hardly extends beyond the Connecticut Valley. New York, though the metropolis of the country, both numerically and commercially, rules only so far as her mammoth journals circulate. Along the banks of the Delaware and westward to the Alleghanies, Philadelphia is acknowledged arbiter of thought and taste. South of Mason and Dixon's Line and west of the Alleghanies, the territory is so immense and the elements of population so composite that, in the nature of the case, no one city can hope to exercise more than a limited sway. In the South, Atlanta, New Orleans, and Louisville stand out as centers of influence; in the Middle West, Chicago, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, Denver, San Francisco, Portland, Seattle. In consequence of this lack of a supreme tribunal, an ultimate court of appeal, provincialism assumes, in our country, an infinite variety of forms; it may be said, indeed, to develop a type unknown in other lands. We are provincial, not only in our outlying districts; we are provincial in our large cities—yea, in the very largest of all!



Let us, then, in a detached, dispassionate mood—if that be possible—consider the question more attentively. It will certainly be granted that anyone who exhibits, in speech, accent, intonation, manners, opinions, or mental attitude, certain peculiarities which vary from the commonly accepted standard in such matters, is essentially provincial. There are men, for example, who seem so sublimely content with the mode of life and thought habitual to them and common to the region in which they have been “raised,” so supremely indifferent to the great current of life which moves outside their “pent-up Utica,” as to merit the contemptuous sneer of Geraint in Tennyson’s immortal *Idyls*:

“Ye think the rustic cackle of your bourg  
The murmur of the world!”

Again, anyone who goes about with a chip on his shoulder challenging “all comers” in defense of his own particular town or “section” of the country, is aggressively and laughably provincial. He is, by turns, inciter to and defender of provincialism, unconscious exponent and champion of that which he would disown.

As chief pattern of this type I have in mind a woman from the Middle West, whom I met in a French *pension*, not many years ago. It was her first trip abroad, and she was consumed with zeal to see and do and know. But, paramount even to this was her desire to impress every one at table with the superior learning, culture, refinement, and sophistication of the Middle West. She discoursed confidently upon art, literature, music, and domestic economy; and when, after throwing down the gauntlet and boldly inviting attack, she failed to draw upon herself the expected fire, her contempt for the craven, effete spirit of the East, as exemplified by her table companions, was amusing beyond words. Never shall I forget my feelings when I heard her say, one evening at dinner: “I haven’t yet seen, in Europe, any church that surpasses a church we have at home, in my own block, just a few doors from

where I live." I have read such things in the humorous column of newspapers, and have laughed at them, as jokes; but never has it been my good fortune, before or since, to hear, in casual conversation, anything so impregnated, so saturated with the essence of provincialism. And to be asked to take it seriously, and actually to do so—that, to my mind, was the real humor of the situation!

It has always seemed to me that the irrepressible curiosity which many people display with regard to the habitat and occupation of fellow-countrymen whom they chance to meet in traveling, and a corresponding eagerness to proclaim their own identity, abiding-place, and social standing constitute the very hall-mark of provincialism.

To press the inquiry further, it is not only the "Down-East Yankee" or the Georgia "Cracker," the "Pennsylvania Dutchman" or the Ohio "Hoosier," the dweller in the Mississippi Valley or beyond the Rockies—it is not alone any or all of these who, being known of other men by his shibboleth of speech, may be confidently dubbed "provincial." If the whole truth must be told, the resident of our largest cities is often essentially, if less obviously, provincial.

In search of a shining example, let us venture into the metropolis itself, and what shall we find? A smug, self-confident, imperious sort of man, capable and aggressive to the last degree, who, nevertheless, upon close acquaintance, exhibits certain tell-tale signs which set us thinking. In his overweening pride of citizenship, in his contempt for all other mortals who hail, vaguely, from "the country," in his indifference to what may go on outside of Manhattan and the Bronx, he is—(may we be permitted to breathe it?)—really provincial. For, as we learned at the outset, New York is not, to this great land, what London is to England, or Paris to France. Furthermore, when the New Yorker is guilty of what Mr. Kipling calls "the unreproducible slid r," when he says "fy-ist," or "by-id," or "gy-il," he is undeniably provincial; for thereby anyone, not a New Yorker, is able immediately to place him. Again,



when he confuses "lie" and "lay," in their several forms (as he is so prone to do), he is indefensibly provincial. And again, when he undertakes to rule (as a certain university professor, ignoring "reputable use" in the English-speaking world, has actually done), that "don't" shall do double duty for "do not" and "does not," he is flagrantly provincial. Behold, in all these things, a paradox! One may live and move and have one's daily being in the metropolis; and yet, because of the intoxication that comes with breathing that electric air, and because of one's indifference to what the great outside world may think and do and say, remain, in certain particulars, blindly and incurably provincial.

In the world of letters, critics, from time immemorial, have distinguished between literature which is "polite"—of the city, the center, the capital,—and literature which is "provincial"—remote from the center, in spirit, quality of thought, tone, and style. If our present-day literature were tested for this "note of provinciality" (to use Matthew Arnold's phrase), how much of it, think you, would be found free from harsh discord? Polite literature, if it be worthy of the appellation, has about it not only an air of refinement, ease, and urbanity—like the manners of a gentleman, accustomed to move in good society; it has about it also a certain elevation of thought, a certain distinction of style, which comes only to the man who has kept company with the best thinkers and writers of all time.

To escape provinciality, in matters literary, it is not enough to wield a facile pen, to be vivid, vital, and virile, in the treatment of living issues. One may be all that and still remain crudely provincial. One may live in the heart of the great metropolis, and from that vantage ground be able to sketch studies of the "under-world" which shall find a ready market in a score of magazines, and be devoured with avidity by thousands of readers. One may write of "crooks" and "grafters," of "rounders" and "gunmen" in a way that shall make these worthies live again on the printed page; and yet,

the tone of that writing may be so low, its spirit so debased, its vocabulary so meagre, its range of thought and expression so pitifully limited, that if the work had been done anywhere but in the heart of the metropolis, if its subjects were other than the denizens of the great city, it would be crassly provincial, and nothing more.

The French do well when they call the woman of this "under-world" the *demi-monde*. She knows but half the world, after all, and it is the under half—the poor, shabby, seamy side of life. It is a half that should be treated tenderly, a side that one should view with sympathy; but to think of this under-world, this half-world, as "real life"—to treat it as though it were the whole of life—is surely to have a very imperfect and distorted view of things; to cultivate a taste for it alone, to batten on the stories that unmask it, to gaze with deadened sense and unaverted eyes upon its ghastly hideousness—this, surely, is to be provincial in thought, proclivities, and feeling.

If a writer would produce something which shall be other than provincial, he must have not only an insight which penetrates the "eternal verities," he must have a vision which reaches beyond the confines of his county, parish, or quiet village—an outlook wider than his city, ward, or daily "beat." As a stream cannot rise higher than its source, so a man cannot produce anything greater than that which he has within him. If he know only his own region, town, or city, and the types that there confront him, and think he need know nothing more; if he be indifferent to the great life of humanity, in its myriad forms and phases; if he be ignorant of "the best that has been thought and written in the world"—he is and shall remain hopelessly provincial.

Carlyle, the seer, once said: "Not a parish in the world but has its parish accent." And again: "All men have accent of their own,—though they only notice that of others." If this dictum be accepted, who that breathes and speaks can plead exemption from provincialism? The accident of birth,



the associations of childhood, the fixed environment of later years, unite in our undoing. As with Peter of old, our speech, if nothing else, is sure to betray us. We all have accent of our own,—though we only notice that of others. Doubtless we are all provincial in many, many, ways—though we only notice the provinciality of others. If, then, we abhor provincialism of every sort, and, whether conscious or unconscious of it, would fain rid ourselves of the taint, how shall we proceed? Schooling will do much, reading will do much, travel will do much, keeping good company will do much. But all these are not enough. Last of all, we must not be heedless, though resentful, when others—be they friends or enemies—who notice our provinciality, in accent, thought, opinion, or ethical standard, frankly tell us of it. By harkening to such reproof and rigorously applying it, we may go a long way toward clearing ourselves of the suspicion which secretly annoys or the direct charge which so surely irritates.

LANCASTER, PA.

### III.

## SOME PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY.

EDWIN M. HARTMAN.

We are all familiar with the well-known saying of Sir William Hamilton, "on earth there is nothing great but man; in man there is nothing great but mind." Back of every machine and every movement is mind. The important matter and forces in the world are intellectual and moral, not material. Greece is great in history, not because Alexander conquered the world, but because men like Socrates and Plato and Aristotle thought and taught. Leibnitz said, "If you will leave education to me I will change Europe in a century." Napoleon, when urged to develop an educational system for France after Pestalozzi, contemptuously replied, "I have no time for the alphabet," and he lived to see the day when the power of the German schoolmaster overcame the finest military machinery of Europe in which Napoleon had put his trust.

At some time in the process of evolution there was a great and comparatively sudden change of the conditions under which our pre-human ancestors lived, perhaps for instance the glacial period. The change was too sudden and too great to be met and survived by bodily adaptation. The only adequate response to this challenge for survival was a mental one which met the changed conditions by devising new means of adaptation, such as protection by the invention of clothing and shelter, food secured by their wits or by preparation rather than by chance or force, etc. Those who were affected by the sudden change of conditions and could not respond to this mental challenge perished and the others rapidly developed a higher nerv-



ous organization and mentality. This hypothesis supplies the missing link which scientists have been seeking by effecting adaptation and development through nervous organization rather than through gross bodily changes, thus making the link largely a mental one.

The body of a man is about the same weight as the body of an orang-utan, but the highly organized part of the brain of the former is three times the weight of that of the latter. In the other sections of the brain and nervous system there is comparatively little difference between the two.

As the hard conditions of that great change could be successfully met by mind only, so must mind and not brute force or violence finally solve many of the problems of the future. Herein lies a suggestion of the possible service or application of the better knowledge of the mind furnished by modern psychology. Since mind is the latest, the highest and the most complex product of the process of evolution it is but natural that the science of the mind should be the newest and the most difficult of all the sciences.

Before we speak of the application or service of modern psychology (for only modern psychology can be called a science) it may be well to sketch very briefly the birth and the wonderful development of this science in the last fifty years and of its practical applications in the last ten years. The last decade or two has seen a miraculous development in all sciences and their application. It is said, that if Tyndall and Huxley, who died in 1893 and 1895, were to return to life, the present-day scientific literature would not be intelligible to them because of the new terms that have been brought into use by inventions and scientific development since their death. Note the following illustrations of this fact in the science of psychology: The 1899 edition of the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia contains about 100 words or expressions beginning with the letters P-s-y-c-h, and of these many are simply adjective or adverb forms of the same word. In the latest edition issued under date of 1911 there are 88 new or re-defined words beginning

with P-s-y-c-h. Münsterberg says:<sup>1</sup> "There is no doubt that in these few decades (since 1860) more psychological facts have been discovered than in the preceding 2,000 years of the history of psychology." Wundt says,<sup>2</sup> in substance, that psychology as a science did not advance a single essential step between Aristotle and the middle of the nineteenth century. During the 2,000 years or more referred to, psychology was not an independent subject of investigation. It was an integral part of ancient and medieval philosophy and received consideration only in so far as it seemed serviceable or necessary in solving the problems of philosophy. The principal subject of investigation in the earlier psychology was the soul, which, by the way, has entirely dropped out of modern psychology. This does not mean that psychology denies the existence of the soul but simply that in its present status the science is not cognizant of it as a fact. As an object of belief or faith its existence is posited by philosophy rather than by any science.

Philosophy deals with large problems and conclusions, such as the ultimate nature of matter and mind, of truth, goodness and beauty, of values, of the fundamental laws of reality and their relation to human experience. In their direct attack of these large problems men paid little attention to individual phenomena, therefore there could be practically no science. Wundt says, progress in natural science is bound up with progress in methods of investigating phenomena. Every important new apparatus or instrument is followed by a series of new discoveries. Modern science originated, therefore, in the discoveries, and in the change and development of methods effected by such men as Bacon, Galileo, Newton and a host of others.

Naturally the more concrete sciences were the first to take form. Inventions, experiments and measurements transformed "Astrology into Astronomy, Alchemy into Chemistry and Mystery into Physics." These were followed by the study of the human body leading to the development of anatomy, physi-

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 90.

<sup>2</sup> *Founders of Modern Psychology*, p. 319.



ology and medicine, which ultimately led to a science of psychology. The obstacles which had to be overcome in the gradual development of these sciences may be inferred from the following illustration from medicine of sixty years ago: Instead of realizing that the body is material, subject to physical and chemical laws, general medical practice went on the principle that the main thing to deal with in diagnosing and treating a case was a sort of psychic life principle which must be understood and treated by a sort of philosophic intuition. The spirit of medicine represented a perversion of the old Hippocratic maxim, "Godlike is the physician who is also a philosopher." When Helmholtz, after an attack of fever, bought a microscope to make some investigations in medicine (and this was within the time of men still living and in Germany) the old doctors shook their heads in disapproval. Tapping a patient's chest to learn the condition of the lungs, listening to the heart beats, measuring the temperature, etc., were coarse mechanical means of investigation disparaging to the dignity of the patient and quite unnecessary and in bad taste for a physician with clear mental insight.

It is a long step from this status of knowledge of the body to the miracles that are now being wrought. Recently, for instance, a surgeon in Paris removed the injured cornea of a patient's eye and successfully planted the cornea of another eye which had for a month or more been preserved in a serum in cold storage. From an authorized report recently published<sup>3</sup> we learn that Dr. Carrel at the Rockefeller Institute in New York is taking tissue from the heart of an animal after death and making it grow and beat for months. He recently removed the essential organs of a cat—heart, lungs, liver, kidneys, stomach, intestines, etc.,—placed them in a solution, started the lungs with artificial respiration, after which the heart began to beat, the blood circulated and all the other organs resumed a state of active functioning life. If such results can be attained through experiments on the body then we ought to expect much from an experimental study of the mind.

<sup>3</sup> Burton J. Hendrick, in *McClure's*, Jan., 1913.

Modern psychology dates its real beginning from the establishment of the first laboratory for psychological experiment at the University of Leipzig in 1879 by Wundt.

Among the John the Baptists who, by preparatory contributions of various truths, half-truths or even suggestive errors, prepared the way for this master of the new science, we may name Locke (1690), Berkeley (1709), Kant (1780), Herder (1785), Volta (1801), Gall (1805), Bell (1811), Herbart (1825), Johannes Müller (1835), Benetre (1835), E. H. Weber (1846), Du Bois Reymond (1848), Lotze (1852), Helmholtz (1856), Bain (1857), Lewes (1860), Fechner (1860), Broca (1860). Some of these men had visions of the promised land but did not live to enter it.

The scientific and experimental methods of modern psychology, which distinguish it from the philosophical method of the older psychology, originated, largely as we shall see, among physiologists, and were first developed on the physiological side, so that physiological psychology, in the more restricted meaning of the term, may be considered the real basis of all modern psychology.

Among the more important discoveries which furnished Wundt, and others, bases and methods and material for experimental work and investigation were the following:

1. The Weber-Fechner psycho-physical law that sensation varies, within limits, in arithmetical ratio as the stimulus varies in geometrical ratio.

2. Reaction time, or the measurement, by Helmholtz, of the rate at which sensory and motor impulses travel along the nerves. These two laws were demonstrated to the confusion of Kant's dictum that psychology could never become a science because, he says, "neither can mathematics be applied to conscious processes nor can one work experimentally with the mind of another." Just two years before Helmholtz made this discovery the great physiologist Du Bois Reymond had said that nerves were too short and the impulse too rapid ever to be measured. To-day there are instruments that measure and



record the rate of a nervous impulse to the one-thousandth of a second.

3. The principle of the specific energy of nerves, *i. e.*, that the stimulation of the same nerve always produces the same sensation no matter how stimulated. If the optic nerve, for instance, is stimulated by pinching, by heat, by an acid, or electricity, or by light it responds always and only by a sensation of light. This principle is said to have meant to psychology what Newton's law of gravitation has meant to physics.

4. Wundt found at hand a mass of very careful work in the investigation of the senses by physiologists and psychologists such as Johannes Müller, Du Bois Reymond, Lotze, Helmholtz and others.

5. Some early studies in brain localization such as the center of speech, located by Broca in 1861.

The names connected with the above discoveries, together with the work done and impetus given by Wundt and his students oblige us to brand the modern psychology "made in Germany." Wundt is sometimes called the Darwin of psychology.

At this point we may ask what definitely are the ends of psychological study and investigation, and what the methods?

I suppose we may say the immediate end of the study is to acquire a knowledge of the various mental processes and contents, the sum total of which constitute consciousness. This involves an investigation of mental processes with a view to finding the cause of each process, the laws governing it, its myriad relations to other processes antedating and accompanying it, an analysis of the complex into its elements, and finally its issues or the conclusions to be drawn. So far the end is purely scientific, a knowledge of the mind for its own sake. But this may be followed by ulterior ends, such as, first, the service which such knowledge of the mind can render to the other sciences and to philosophy, the latter of which especially depends so largely on the validity of the mind's testimony: second, the service which such intimate knowledge of the mind

can render to all studies that are humanistic. Dr. Felix Kreuger, a pupil of Wundt's, professor of psychology at the University of Halle, Wittenberg, lecturing at Columbia University this year as Kaiser Wilhelm exchange professor, says:

"The developments of the humanistic sciences demand and prepare the way for a new psychology. As history ceased to be a mere study of fact and became a study of relationships as well, it came naturally to be a psychological study; as political economy ceased to devote itself to concrete conditions and treated of cause and effect it, too, became a psychological study. Ethnology presents many problems that are purely psychological, and ethnology and psychology are closely related."

A third field of opportunity for still more direct service and application includes education, where mind deals directly with mind. Less clearly and yet surely, it is related to law and medicine and finally industry.

Now the question of methods of psychological study. These are of course self-observation or *introspection*, and *experiment*, the estimate of the validity and efficiency of either, as compared with the other, being determined largely by the fundamental viewpoint. We may as well say right here that however necessary the experimental method, and important its contributions, in the words of Titchener, it came into psychology, "not to oust the introspective method but to fulfil it."

There is ample opportunity and need for both methods. A man can lay bare another's brain and watch it by the hour without seeing there the suggestion of a *thought*. Another can sit and think by the hour without discovering by his thinking that there is a brain.

The introspective psychologist will observe a mental process as, for instance, an emotion, pass slowly across the stage of his consciousness. He will look at it with the mental eye, look for its cause, analyze it as well as he can, describe it, classify it and probably theorize about it. This is the only method by which we can have *direct* knowledge of any mental process or state of consciousness. But this method has too many shortcomings to be able to build up a science alone.



Only a mentally mature person is competent to make observations of the working mind. Thus psychology can, by this method, get no knowledge of the child mind, of the abnormal mind, or of animal intelligence all of which have great significance.

A man can only look into and observe his own mind and as his opinion can count for no more nor less than another's this method affords opportunity for different opinions and controversies.

So much material has been stored, so to speak, in a mature mind that the observer is no longer able to see facts of consciousness in their pure state. As Mill says, "Hardly has consciousness spoken when its testimony is buried under a mountain of acquired notions."

Again, as Dr. Rauch says in the first psychology written in this country as early as 1840, our mental life is so closely bound up with our bodily life, especially the brain and nervous system, that we cannot properly understand one without knowledge of the other. The most fruitful source of information is in the relation between the two, which constitutes physiological psychology. In this department of psychology the brain, as the central organ of sensory, motor and mental activity, has been investigated to such an extent that we know the exact location of the center of each of the senses and of speech. We know what section of the brain controls the movements of each part of the body so that if the hand were paralyzed the surgeon would know where in the brain to find the clot of blood that caused the paralysis. The centers of the higher mental activities such as imagination, reasoning, etc., and the paths connecting them, have also been fairly well located.

Probably every mental activity, from the simplest to the highest and most complex, has a physical basis in the brain and nervous system. Psychical states can therefore be investigated through physical processes which are amenable to modification, test, analysis, measurement, etc., that is, to experi-

ment, with results, about many of which there is no more room for individual opinion or dispute than there is in the fact that 2 plus 2 makes 4. So fruitful has experimental psychology proved that over a hundred universities have established laboratories fully equipped with all sorts of instruments of recent invention and unpronounceable names. A number of the better institutions for feeble-minded have also established laboratories for use in their work and for research. One instrument for instance is the chronograph which can measure reaction time to a thousandth of a second. Another is the sphygmograph which records the degree of variation in the brain pulse produced by mental effort, or emotion of different degrees of intensity. The sensitiveness of this instrument as shown by the marked variations of the recorded curve on the slightest mental effort, or suggestion affecting the feelings, is really remarkable. Another is the ergograph used to investigate the character, extent and effects of mental fatigue. Many more instruments of similar kind might be enumerated by means of which, together with ever-improving methods, we can now investigate sensation, perception, association, attention, volition, emotion, memory, imagination and to some extent the highest forms of intellectual activity. The invention of instruments and experimental methods has, according to Titchener not only revealed a mental complexity and made possible a degree of analysis that was before undreamed of, but "has changed the whole face of psychology from sensation to self-consciousness." The character of this change may perhaps be crudely and partially illustrated by comparing knowledge gained through the naked eye with the more detailed knowledge gained by scientific methods. The naked eye knows water as a liquid. The methods of the chemist reveal it as a union of two gases. The naked eye knows the gross structure of the body, but the microscope of the biologist knows it as composed of ultimate cells. The naked eye recognizes in a general way the fracture of a bone, but the X-ray reveals the character of the fracture in detail. The formulas



of the chemist cannot give me the idea of water, the microscope cannot give me the general idea of the human body, the physicist's theory of matter cannot give me the idea of an object, which my own common sense observation can give me. If I had to choose between the two, I would choose the latter. Yet it must be recognized that practically all the advancement made along such lines as medicine, hygiene, the sciences and the various industries has grown out of the contributions of the former methods. Scientific experimental methods have not only changed psychology and deepened it but also broadened it infinitely beyond the dreams of thirty years ago and have made possible its application along many lines in practical activities. The supplement to the New Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia lists twenty-four different kinds of psychology. Just a few of these will suggest the present scope of the subject: Abnormal psychology, animal psychology, educational psychology, experimental psychology, folk psychology, functional psychology, genetic psychology, professional psychology, physiological psychology, social psychology. Many of these terms suggest service both to the problems of other sciences and to the problems of practical life. I shall endeavor in the rest of this paper to discuss briefly the promise there is in present-day psychology of service to a few problems or activities of present-day life.

For the first twenty or twenty-five years the results of the psychological laboratories remained book knowledge. Psychologists seemed reluctant to relate the results of their discoveries to practical life. They were investigating the relation of body and mind, the nature of the mental processes and the laws governing them, for their own sake. Psychology was not a "Brot und Butter Wissenschaft."

Meanwhile, however, all that was brought to light in the laboratories of the physicists and the chemists, the physiologists and the pathologists, was promptly turned to the service of physical and chemical industry, of medicine and hygiene, of agriculture, mining, transportation, etc., and besides, every



practical application reacted and stimulated research. In the words of Münsterberg,<sup>4</sup> "The pure search for truth and knowledge was not lowered when the electrical waves were harnessed for wireless telegraphy, or the Roentgen rays were forced into the service of surgery." Likewise will the science of psychology be dignified and stimulated by the practical application of its principles and discoveries. The suddenness and rate at which the idea of the application of psychology developed is illustrated by the number and standard of the magazines recently founded and the books published in this field. Of equal significance is the character of the courses in psychology offered at many of the larger universities to-day.

The first aim of a new science is to discover typical facts and general laws. Early experimental psychology was therefore engaged in discovering the facts and laws of the typical or common mind. But a man is specially fitted for a certain task, or vocation, or a position, because he has certain mental characteristics different in kind or degree from the average mind. We succeed in dealing with an individual or a certain group of individuals as we appreciate their peculiar mental divergence from the average mind. For instance, the *difference* in children's minds, and not the things they have in common, furnishes the difficult problems in education, as we shall later see. It was only, therefore, as psychology advanced beyond the facts and laws of the general mind to the study of individual variations or differences that any considerable application of psychological experiment to practical problems became possible. Furthermore, the earlier tendency was to borrow facts and principles from the laboratory and apply them to practical problems. Now the practical problems of every day life are taken into the laboratory, and with larger results. Both methods must, however be used, depending upon conditions.

The service or application of psychology to practical problems may become possible through purely mental tests, of which there are very many, or through physical tests with

<sup>4</sup> *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, p. 6.



devices or instruments, or a combination of both methods. There are, for instance, dozens of carefully prepared and well-tried tests for practically every mental act. Whipple, in his "Manual of Mental and Physical Tests," gives 8 tests of physical and motor capacity; 9 tests of sensory capacity; 7 tests of attention and perception; 2 tests of description and report; 7 tests of association, learning and memory; 5 tests of suggestibility; 5 tests of imagination and invention; 2 tests of intellectual equipment and 3 tests for mental development. The statement of these tests, with directions for their use, fills a volume of over 500 large closely printed pages. These tests can render service wherever the human mind is used from the judge on the bench down to the man who operates a machine that makes pins. The following are two very simple illustrations of these tests, the first physical and the second a combination of mental and physical. The reaction time to different stimuli, or in other words the mental and physical alertness of a man before taking intoxicating liquor were carefully measured and recorded with the chronoscope. The man was then given intoxicants in varying amounts and again tested with the result that the chronoscope revealed a distinctly slower mental reaction. This experiment has been made on thousands of men, mostly in Germany, the results being invariably the same. A man may feel mentally more alert after taking liquor, but here is one instance of a number where the feeling is deceptive and the instrument tells the truth. It was on the testimony of this experiment that ex-president Eliot of Harvard changed from his former attitude tolerant of the moderate use of intoxicants, to a position squarely against it.

A combination of a mental and a physical test may be used as a means of mental diagnosis as to whether a certain consciousness, as of guilt for instance, is in a man's mind. The mind is so organized that any single word mentioned by an experimenter to his subject will call up a related word. Ice might suggest cold to one man, skates to a boy, money to a dealer, damage to a man living at Safe Harbor, etc. This is



called the law of association, and the time between the mention of the suggested word and the response of the associated word is called the association reaction time which can be measured with the chronoscope. This test is based on the theory that disquieting ideas will reveal themselves in variations in the reaction time, and in the nature of the associated word. The sphygmograph, if applied, will at the same time record the variations in the brain pulse caused when any disquieting word is suggested. A great many experiments to test this theory have been made in American and European laboratories, and with impressive results. A good illustration is the following experience of Dr. Jung, the distinguished neurologist of Zurich, Switzerland, who used the method to good effect in trapping a thief:<sup>5</sup> "One of Dr. Jung's patients had confided to him his fear that he was being systematically robbed of small sums of money by his nephew, a young fellow of eighteen. It was arranged that the young man should be sent to Dr. Jung, ostensibly to undergo a medical examination. On his arrival he was told that in order to test his mental state he was to respond, as quickly as possible, to a list of one hundred words, which Dr. Jung read to him one by one. Most of these words were quite trivial, but scattered among them were thirty-seven which had to do with the thefts, the room from which the money had been taken, or possible motives for robbery. As measured by the chronoscope, the difference between his reaction time to the harmless and to the significant words was startling.

Dr. Jung said "head," he responded—or, to put it technically, associated—"nose"; Dr. Jung said "green," he associated "blue"; Dr. Jung said "water," he associated "air"; and so on, the average reaction time being 1.6 seconds. But it took him 4.6 seconds to find a word to associate with "thief," 4.2 seconds for an association with "jail," and 3.6 seconds for one with "police." In other cases there was an abnormally quick reaction to significant words, followed immediately by a tell-tale slowing up in the reaction to the next

<sup>5</sup> *The Outlook*, June 25, 1910, p. 406.



two or three trivial ones. When he had gone through the list, Dr. Jung sternly told the young man that he found his health excellent but his morals bad, accused him of stealing from his uncle, and, basing his assertion on the character of the reaction words, charged him with having dissipated the proceeds of his thefts in extravagant purchases, such as a gold watch. The young man, dismayed at the seemingly supernatural knowledge of his doings displayed by Dr. Jung, broke down and made a complete confession."

To the layman this may not seem very convincing, partly because he lacks the experience to appreciate the significance of the variations in reaction time and the character of the associated response, partly because he fails to feel the cumulative force of thousands of experiments and partly because he can imagine attendant vitiating factors of which, however, the psychologist is more fully aware and for which he is more ready to make allowance than is the layman. This test, or certain modifications of it, has been urged upon courts for use in the examination of defendants in trials. Similarly there are psychological principles which are helpful in interpreting the testimony of eye witnesses of an incident. Minds of different types or different degrees of maturity will be impressed by different features or factors of an incident. If the type of mind of the witness and the psychological principles involved are appreciated it is frequently possible to harmonize apparently contradictory testimony. For instance let individuals of varying maturity and differing mental type take a brief look at a picture that is full of objects and action and color and then describe it. One type of mind will see and enumerate the objects in the picture; another will be impressed by and describe the action; still another will observe relations. The attention of one observer will be attracted by a certain point from which he will orient, and another observer will orient from quite a different point and is likely therefore to interpret the picture differently. The observation of an incident by the witness who testifies in court was usually incidental and hasty



and not deliberate and careful with a view to an accurate report, therefore the testimony of such a witness in large measure duplicates the description of a picture just mentioned. It is important therefore that those who elicit and interpret the testimony should do so in the light of the psychological principles involved if they sincerely want to get at the actual truth which they ask the witness to give under oath instead of warping the evidence into a certain shape with a view to serving one side or the other of a case. I think however that the legal profession is likely to get less help from these rather concrete and superficial applications, than from some more profound and fundamental work such as that of Hans Gross for instance in his *Criminal Psychology*. If there are any who are skeptical about the possible service of psychology to the legal profession I would refer them to this book. Some may take it up to scoff and lay it down to pray. The translation of this book is from the press of Little, Brown and Company, of Boston, costs five dollars and is worth the price. The author served for some time as an examining magistrate in Czernovitz, Austria, and is at present professor of criminal law at the University of Graz, Austria. One of his previous works has reached five editions and has been translated into eight foreign languages.

In the general introduction William W. Smithers, secretary of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association, compares the present status of the application of law to the criminal, to the status of medicine when the old doctor had a few remedial agents of universal efficacy, calomel and blood-letting being the two principal ones. A larger or a smaller dose of calomel, a greater or less quantity of blood-letting. So the law, machinelike, says a smaller or a larger dose of the same medicine with practically no individualization of the treatment. But crimes, like diseases, have causes which, together with methods of remedial treatment, need to be studied. Medicine has diligently experimented and investigated with remarkable results in methods of treatment and especially in



sanitary and preventative medicine. Somewhat similar work has been going on in the subject of criminology, in Europe for forty years, and recently in limited fields in this country. "All the branches of science that can help have been working—anthropology, medicine, psychology, economics, sociology, philanthropy, penology. The law alone has abstained. The science of law is the one to be served by all this. But the public in general and the legal profession in particular have remained either ignorant of the entire subject or indifferent to the entire scientific movement. And this ignorance or indifference has blocked the way to progress in administration."<sup>6</sup>

*Criminal Psychology* has been translated and published largely in the interest of this reform and will, no doubt, prove a thorough-going and effective contribution.

A very striking book on *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, by Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard, came from the press of Houghton, Mifflin & Co. recently.

Within recent years a great cry has gone up for the conservation of our natural resources. This has turned the attention of some men to the almost limitless waste of human material, a waste going on everywhere in the world, but nowhere more widely than in our own country. The feeling is growing that no waste of valuable possessions is so reckless as that which results from the distribution of living force by chance methods instead of examining carefully how work and workman can fit one another. In the words of the author, a more careful adjustment of work and worker will insure not only greater success and gain, but above all greater joy in work, deeper satisfaction, and more harmonious unfolding of the personality. Dr. Münsterberg's book represents a sort of pioneer effort to use psychology as a means to bring together the right workman and the right task. He goes on the theory that the mental make-up and equipment of an applicant for a position and the special mental requirements for the task can both be determined and the two compared. I shall cite here a few illustrations from this book to show the definite promise of

<sup>6</sup> *Criminal Psychology*, by Hans Gross, p. 7.

service to economic and industrial problems the present-day psychology gives in this direction:

The type for a great newspaper is set up by linotype operators. Some operators can never get beyond a speed of 2,500 ems. Others in the same time and with no more effort will develop a speed of 5,000 ems. This difference of ability is a fundamental one and can be discovered by a psychological test before the applicant has ever set a line. If this test were made so that the 2,500-em man would not work alongside of the 5,000-em man the work could be done in less hours, for better wages and under better conditions. The chances are that the 2,500-em man would be more useful and more happy at a job that called for a different psychic make-up. A striking illustration is the story, given in Dr. Münsterberg's book, of Mr. S. E. Thompson's work in a bicycle ball factory where a hundred and twenty girls were inspecting balls.<sup>7</sup> "They had to place a row of small polished steel balls on the back of the left hand and while they were rolled over and over in the crease between two of the fingers placed together, they were minutely examined in a strong light and the defective balls were picked out with the aid of a magnet held in the right hand. The work required the closest attention and concentration. The girls were working ten and a half hours a day. Mr. Thompson soon recognized that the quality most needed, beside endurance and industry, was a quick power of perception accompanied by a quick responsive action. He knew that the psychological laboratory has developed methods for a very exact measurement of the time needed to react on an impression with the quickest possible movement; it is called the reaction-time and is usually measured in thousandths of a second. He therefore considered it advisable to measure the reaction-time of the girls, and to eliminate from service all those who showed a relatively long time between the stimulus and reaction. This involved laying off many of the most intelligent, hardest-working, and most trustworthy girls. Yet the effect was the possibility of shortening the hours and of reducing more and more the num-

<sup>7</sup> *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency*, pp. 54 ff.



ber of workers, with the final outcome that thirty-five girls did the work formerly done by a hundred and twenty, and that the accuracy of the work at the higher speed was two thirds greater than at the former slow speed. This allowed almost a doubling of the wages of the girls in spite of their shorter working-day, and at the same time a considerable reduction in the cost of the work for the factory."

In the illustration just given the principles and instruments of the laboratory were taken into the factory. In the following illustration, from the same book, the practical problem to be solved was taken into the psychological laboratory. Dr. Münsterberg says there are electric railway companies in this country which have as many as 50,000 accident indemnity cases a year. The payments of indemnity imposed by the court have, in the case of some companies amounted to 13 per cent. of the gross earnings per year. If some man could invent a mechanism which would either eliminate the accidents or reduce the companies' operating expenses by, say 10 per cent., that inventor's fortune would be made. If psychology can effect the same result it will render an immense service. Last year the American Association for Labor Legislation called a meeting of vocational specialists and street railway men to discuss the problem of these accidents. Much attention was given to the questions of fatigue, the hours of labor, the time of day the accidents occurred and practically every other factor which seemed to have any bearing on the question. Since all motormen work under the same conditions and some had numerous accidents while others had few or none, though they might be equally faithful, it was finally concluded that probably the most important factor was the mental make-up of the motorman. Dr. Münsterberg was therefore requested to undertake the task of analyzing the mental requirements which the motorman's work demands and to devise a test which might be applied to a motorman to discover to what degree he possessed the psychic equipment which the position required. He concluded that the really central or vital mental process of this



problem of accidents was a particularly complicated act of attention and imagination by which the manifold objects, the pedestrians, the carriages, the automobiles, etc., are continuously observed with reference to their speed and direction in the quickly changing panorama of the street. There are some men whose impulses under such circumstances would be too much inhibited and therefore would never learn to run a car on schedule time under difficult conditions. Others would tend to have their attention fixated by one object and thus not comprehend continuously the complex moving situation. For testing the motormen Dr. Münsterberg devised an apparatus which called for the same mental equipment as does the running of a car on the street. This device included a cardboard nine half inches broad and twenty-six half inches long with two heavy lines half an inch apart lengthwise along the center to represent a track. The space between the track and the edge of the card is divided into half inch squares and in many of these little squares are placed figures, some black and some red, the black figures representing objects moving along the street without crossing the track and the red figures, objects going at various angles so that they cross the track. The red figures are numbered 1, 2 and 3, 1 representing a pedestrian who moves 1 unit of space in a given time, 2 representing a horse and wagon which moves two units in the same time, and 3 an automobile which moves three times as fast, or three units in that time. The device has a crank by means of which the motorman reproduces the movement of a car through the field of twelve such cards, the speed of the car being determined by the rate at which the motorman turns the crank. As he drives the car through the field he is required to call out in advance as he goes along the figures which will collide with the car. The man to be tested is, of course, allowed to experiment under instruction for some time so that he may be thoroughly familiar with the apparatus before the real test is made. Efficiency is indicated by the ability to combine the greatest possible speed with the smallest number of oversights. These two



factors are averaged and on this average the efficiency of the man is judged. The result of the experiment is expressed by three figures: (1) the speed of the car in the number of seconds required to move over the 12 cards; (2) the number of accidents, that is, failures to call out the right figures that would collide with the car; and (3) the number of figures incorrectly called out as colliding which would not really collide.

A street railway company which coöperated with Dr. Münsterberg furnished a large number of motormen to take the tests, some with poor records and others with excellent records, some men new in the service and others old—Dr. Münsterberg not having any knowledge of the status of the men in advance of the experiment. The value of the experiment as a test of efficiency was proven by the fact that the results of the test corresponded remarkably well with the records of the men in their actual service on the car. There are, of course, a number of accidental factors which may modify the value of the test, but the psychologist will appreciate these more fully than the layman, and will be able to make allowance for them. The experienced motormen testified that they went through the experiment with the same feeling which they have on the car. "The necessity of looking out in both directions, right and left, for possible obstacles, of distinguishing those which move toward the track from the many which move along the track, the quick discrimination among the various rates of rapidity, the steady forward movement of the observation point, the constant temptation to give attention to those which are still too far away or to those which are so near that they will cross the track before the approach of the car, in short, the whole complex situation with its demands on attention, imagination and quick adjustment," was felt to be practically the same in the experiment as it is in the car on the street. The experiment needs, of course, to be repeated a number of times and the results averaged in order to eliminate the influence of accidental conditions. Dr. Münsterberg thinks that in time this test can be much refined, but even as it is he claims that he

can eliminate from the service the 25 per cent. of the motor-men who are likely to have 75 per cent. of the accidents.

Dr. Münsterberg made a somewhat similar test for the Bell Telephone Company which employs some 16,000 operators. He found that from the time when the speaker takes off the receiver to the cutting off of the connection fourteen separate psycho-physical processes are necessary in the typical case for each call, and there are certain hours in the day when one girl may have to handle as many as 300 calls per hour, or sometimes even as many as 10 per minute. Of the girls who enter the service more than one third leave during the first half year and many older employees are obliged to leave on account of nervous breakdowns which result from a lack of proper mental make-up for the task. In this case the girls were examined with reference to eight different psycho-physical functions connected directly or indirectly with memory, attention, intelligence, exactitude and speed. For these tests the company also furnished Dr. Münsterberg with all grades of employes from the poorest to the best and the results of the tests were so satisfactory that he feels that by means of a test of a few minutes per applicant thousands of applicants might be saved long months of time and effort which are completely wasted and which might be devoted to efficient and profitable work along some other line for which they are better fitted.

The above experiments clearly show that successful achievement does not by any means depend only on good will and faithfulness and experience, for none of these can correct a lack of the mental equipment which a position may demand. It is often ill-adaptation that makes the task hard, the position insecure, joy in the day's labor impossible and the economic output short of what it should be to bring really good wages, whereas mental fitness is likely to bring joy to the task, confidence to the worker, better wages, and better relations between employer and employe. If psychology can help the employe to find the kind of task for which he is gifted and the employer to find a means of employing efficient labor instead of cheap



labor, it ought to become a factor in the problems between capital and labor. We have called upon capital to do justice to labor on ethical grounds, but on the whole the plea has not been very effective. A large department store will still use its horses in relays so as to work each only six hours because if the horse wears out the loss comes to the owner, but the same store will work its employes for ten hours or more, often under pressure, because if the employe wears out the loss is his and the store can employ another for the same money. It seems to me the best hope for better conditions is to be found in substituting adaptation and efficiency for exhaustive driving and long hours, thus adding an economic factor to the ethical one in the effort to improve the relations between capital and labor.

As evidence of the faith and promise there seems to be in the possible service of psychology along the lines indicated in the illustrations just given it may be of interest to note here that in the book from which these illustrations are largely taken Münsterberg quotes from, or refers to, some sixty different pamphlets, monographs or books (about one half of which were printed in the last two years), dealing more or less directly with the application of psychology along the lines indicated.

While the service of modern psychology is felt along numerous lines of human thought and endeavor it is, perhaps, nowhere else so much needed and has nowhere such possibilities as in education. The sculptor needs to know not only lines and curves and proportions and visions but also the quality and texture and eccentricities and possibilities of the marble. But no material with which any artist deals is in any way comparable to the complexity and delicacy of the child mind. Much more does the teacher therefore need to know not only the subject matter and methods of instruction but still more should he know both by natural instinct and by earnest study the phenomena and laws and eccentricities of the functioning of the child mind; and especially the peculiarities of the indi-

vidual child's mind. Dickens appreciated the need and the difficulty of this as we see repeatedly in his novels.<sup>8</sup>

He criticized the blindness of those who saw boys as a class or in a limited number of classes, distinguished by external and comparatively unimportant characteristics, in Mr. Grimwig, "who never saw any difference in boys, and only knew two sorts of boys, mealy boys and beef-faced boys."

He exposed the ignorance of vast numbers of parents and teachers who indignantly resent the suggestion that they need to study children, in Jane Murdstone. When Jane was interfering in the management of David, and, with her brother, totally misunderstanding him and misrepresenting him, his timid mother ventured to say:

"I beg your pardon, my dear Jane, but are you quite sure—I am certain you'll excuse me, my dear Jane—that you quite understand Davy?"

"I should be somewhat ashamed of myself, Clara," returned Miss Murdstone, "if I could not understand the boy, or any boy. I don't profess to be profound, but I do lay claim to common sense."

Many Jane Murdstones still claim that it is not necessary to study so common a thing as a boy. Yet a child is the most wonderful thing in the world, and, whether the Jane Murdstones in the schools and homes think it necessary or not, people are beginning to study the child with a view to finding out what he should be guided to do, in the accomplishment of his own training.

Richard Carstone had been eight years at school and he was a miserable failure in life, although a man of good ability. Concerning him Dickens says:

"It had never been anybody's business to find out what his natural bent was, or where his failings lay, or to adapt any kind of knowledge to him." Esther wisely said: "I did doubt whether Richard would not have profited by some one studying him a little, instead of his studying Latin verses so much."

<sup>8</sup> *Dickens as a Teacher*, by J. L. Hughes.



In a recent novel, "The Major's Niece," there is a passage which seems to me quite significant. It reads about as follows:

"You'll find," said Meldon—"in fact, I expect you've observed already—that it's the people who haven't got any children who take the keenest interest in education. All the authorities on the subject—those who invent the new theories—are either unmarried women or confirmed old bachelors."

This gives expression to the feeling that we do not have a sufficiently definite basis for our system of education. Such system as we do have seems to be based largely on a priori judgments from which we draw deductions and spin theories which are unscientific and to a certain degree unstable as was our knowledge before scientific methods and apparatus and induction made it definite. Some ten or twelve years ago the writer had the privilege of studying pedagogy for two years as a graduate student at a university under probably as good teaching as could then have been found at any university in the country. While this work was interesting, suggestive and inspirational it was after all disappointing. There were important conclusions based on centuries of experience, and yet they could never be so conclusively demonstrated but what they could be disputed by the experience of another individual, or school, or nation, or period. It was evident that there was no science of pedagogy with definitely established facts, such as he found, for instance, in the laboratory of psychology at the same institution. It seems reasonable to believe that the higher the stage of development and the finer the organization the more definite, though subtle, the laws governing the organism and its activity. If effective control and direction of material forces is dependent upon accurate and scientific knowledge of the nature and laws of the forces, much more does it seem necessary that effective control and direction of the mind in its development through education should be based upon a scientific knowledge of the mind and of the laws inherent and operative in it. Professor Paul Hanus, of Harvard, who is spoken of as "probably the leading authority in the country on the

art of teaching and on the practice of schools," who headed the commission which spent two years and \$50,000 to investigate the school system of New York City, says in his report "there are as yet no universally accepted standards whereby the adequacy of educational aims and practices can be judged." Through the skill of its champions many an injurious fad makes its way into education and is eliminated only by years of experiment upon pupils to their loss. This is going on to some degree all the time. If psychology can furnish a really scientific basis for the methods, the organization and the content of education many a proposed fad will be ruled out immediately just as surely as the ignis fatuus of perpetual motion has been ruled out by the laws of physics.

Over the entrance of the New York Public Library are inscribed the words "On the diffusion of education among the people rests the preservation of our free institutions." This is our ideal for popular education. To what extent is it realized? Dr. Ayers, of the Russell Sage Foundation, says that in the United States less than one half the children reach the eighth grade and only one in ten graduate from the high school. Furthermore, over 50 per cent. of the pupils in school are for some reason behind their natural grade. Each year about 10 per cent. of the twenty millions of children in our schools are repeating the previous year's work. These repeaters cost the nation about \$80,000,000 annually. In the words of one investigator, the financial loss is small compared with the spiritual loss. "The retarded pupil loses that fine spirit of initiative, of progress, of growth, of self-reliance, and of eagerness to achieve which constitutes the chief glory of youth, and which sends him from school into life an effective member of society. By allowing him to become retarded the school system trades that birth-right of the American boy for the pottage of idleness, failure and self-distrust."

I believe that both observation and psychology will bear me out in saying that one of the most powerful influences for good in the making of a boy is doing a hard task accurately and in



good spirit; doing it indifferently is not only no gain but is actually demoralizing. The real loss to the retarded pupil is much more in this failure to develop robust character than in the failure to acquire knowledge.

In a recent address before the National Educational Association Dr. Draper said,<sup>9</sup> "When but one third of the children remain to the end of the elementary course in a country where education is a universal passion, there is something the matter with the public schools." Why does our system fail to educate the masses as it is supposed to do? Why do these children drop out of school? The answers are, "to go to work," "to help at home," "visiting," "lack of ability," etc. But these are only superficial reasons that would not operate if there were proper interest in and zeal for what the school offers.

There are those who say that the failure of our public school system to educate the masses as it should is due, in part at least, to the fact that the schools do not offer the right thing, that the courses require too much of an intellectual tight rope walking. Those of us who believe in culture as one of the ends of education are reluctant to give ear to such a statement, but let us see whether there may not be some truth in it. Ninety-six per cent. of the world's work is manual or industrial, about four per cent. is professional. Our courses meet fairly well the needs of the four per cent. How well do they meet the needs of the other 96 per cent. of workers? Would not fewer subjects better done be more acceptable to at least a considerable proportion of parents and children? Might not a certain proportion or type of children, especially the laggards and those who fall early by the wayside of education, be helped if, for some of the subjects at present studied beyond the three R's we would substitute some work connecting up more directly with the future life and work of the 96 per cent.? Let us see what recent psychology and experience suggest in this connection.

<sup>9</sup> *Psych. Clin.*, Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 70.

Our education, in method and content, has been planned for a typical, general child mind, but literally there is no such thing. Children's minds are even more different than their faces and the individual differences must be more fully recognized both in the methods and the organization of our work if we would reach the children more effectively and more universally. The potential mental capacity of the child is determined by a physical basis in the structure of the nervous organization. Different capacities require the presence of different kinds of neurones or nerve cells. It is worse than useless, therefore, to try to develop a child mentally along a line for which there is no basis in the nervous organization. If there is even a poor basis for a certain capacity this can be improved by education and training, but if the basis is lacking a teacher can no more develop a child along that line than a farmer can cultivate corn if there are no seeds in the ground to start with. The education of the individual child must be determined, therefore, not only by some ideal imposed from without but still more by its own peculiar, inner limitations. A wrong demand upon the child will inevitably result in discouragement which will lead to loss of interest in all study and in dropping out of school. Psychology points out, for instance, that many children have no ability for knowledge that must be acquired by symbols but are apt in acquiring object knowledge, and if the latter form were to be adopted the object pupil would be the brighter one and the bright symbol pupil would prove the slow one. This suggests the need for more variety in the content of education since at present knowledge must be mostly acquired through symbols. Both classes mentioned above are likely to respond well and to develop favorably if their peculiarities are recognized. But there is another class of abnormal pupils which constitutes a very large proportion of the boys and girls in the schools of the country who, under existing conditions, not only fail to be educated themselves but very materially stand in the way of the most effective education of the normal and especially the brighter children.



In the words of Münsterberg<sup>10</sup> "their attention cannot adapt itself, their perception is defective, their memory is uncertain, their associations are slow and uniform, their judgment is helpless, their feelings are utterly unstable, their will is weak and suggestible, their instincts unusually impulsive and generally their bodies show disabilities.

Such children must be recognized as unfit for instruction in the common schools. If their presence in the schoolroom is ignored, they themselves must from year to year have less chance of becoming useful members of the community. They sink down through their inability to follow, become utterly discouraged, and do not profit at all from school. On the other hand, if the teacher adjusts the instruction of the classes to their inferior psychical make-up, the whole class is held back and must suffer unfairly."

In some instances this deficiency is not mental, but may be caused by physical defects which should be discovered by some specialist whose business it is to find them and have them corrected. Pioneer work in the interest of this class of defectives was done by Dr. Witmer, the head of the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, whose laboratory and psychological clinic are now rendering very material service not only to the schools of Philadelphia but to our whole educational system.

Superintendent Bryan, of Camden, with whom the writer worked for several years in the psychological laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, as a part of that work, was one of the first to collate careful statistics of retardation among school children.<sup>11</sup> He found that in the elementary schools of Camden 47 per cent. of the children were retarded one year or more, 26 per cent. two years or more, 13 per cent. three years or more and 5 per cent. four years or more. There are in the United States some 300,000 mentally defective children and over 5,000,000 retarded children. Dr. Witmer's clinic has for years been investigating the mental, physical

<sup>10</sup> *Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 228.

<sup>11</sup> United States Bureau of Education, Bulletin 461, p. 13.

and environmental causes of this defect and backwardness. The importance of this work can be appreciated when we realize that the bulk of the people who fill our prisons, almshouses, insane asylums, etc., comes from this backward class, many of whom would have improved instead of degenerated if our educational system had made provision to meet their needs. I cannot refrain from quoting here a statement, in part, made by the teacher of a class of defectives at a round table discussion in the clinic after the class had been dismissed.<sup>12</sup> "One cannot decide very often that a case really is hopeless until the child has had every chance, until every effort has been made to train him. While there is life there is hope. We cannot grow a second arm, but in the developing mind, who can tell what is going to happen? We know that much is possible in the rebirth of adolescence; there is much to hope for at that time.

There is going to be a great change when this work spreads throughout the country, and you are the people who are going to spread it. We want you to get the point of view of special class work, and go back to your community, and help to mould public opinion there. The problem will present itself in some way like this. You will have some children in your class who don't belong there. They will stay year after year and learn little. Some one will say, What are you going to do with them? You will have to take a step forward and say, Put them in institutions. Then the people will say, But that costs money, and these children could earn a living; let that boy go to work, he could sweep streets, and let this girl go to work as a servant. You will answer, That's all very true, but he's going to get married, and she's going to get married, and here I am teaching school, and I am going to have their children to teach. And it will all be gone over again, and those children will marry and have children. The community is spending its money to educate them, and they are getting no good of it. It is spending money on them in prisons, and

<sup>12</sup> Elizabeth E. Farrell, in *The Special Class for Backward Children*, by Lightner Witmer, Ph.D., pp. 185 ff.



almshouses, and hospitals,—more and more money. Then your friend will say, Let us put them in institutions. And you will find that the institutions are full and have long waiting lists. They will have to build more institutions. And even when the children do at last get into an institution, an ignorant or greedy parent can come and get them out and put them to work. After a while the people will not leave it for a feeble-minded father or mother to say, “No, he shan’t go into an institution. I can take care of my own boy.” As sure as the sun sets to-night, the day is not far distant when in New York State we will have a commission to pass upon our mentally defective children and send them to an institution, just as we have a commission to pass upon criminals and small-pox cases, and other persons dangerous to the public. And here I will be a prophet. I believe that within ten years in New York State we will have definite compulsory care for children unable to get along in school. A great scheme has been worked out to provide for almost any contingency which may arise while custodial care is being brought about.

Now if each of you will go home and teach and show the wastefulness of feeble-mindedness, make your school boards and your community see how much money is wasted by letting these feeble-minded persons run at large and have children,—that is what will impress them, the extravagance of it. I want you to get the right point of view. These particular children do not matter so much, if we can use them as laboratory material to demonstrate the problem, to show the facts. Remember that we have 150,000 to 300,000 idiots in this country, and less than 15,000 in institutions. Where are the rest of them? About the country-side, marrying and having children. Come back to the question of cost; the state takes care of them anyway. The almshouses are full. The jails are full. The lunatic asylums are full. That could all have been wiped out if the teachers had been intelligent enough. The day will come when I (as a teacher of defectives) will not have a job and you ought not have a job. We ought to work

ourselves out of our jobs, if we are good for anything. If we could lock up all the feeble-minded in New York State to-night, in thirty years we would have very few feeble-minded persons living. We would take care that the next generation would have very few feeble-minded persons in it. There would be a few sporadic cases, of course. If you will remember that you are to work yourselves out of a job, you will be doing a great work. You will be following out the doctrines of the great biologists, and preparing the way for the future perfect man and perfect woman."

Those children whose defects are really mental (and this class is large) should by all means, in justice to themselves, and to the normal pupils, be taught in special classes or special schools. This will not only give the weaker ones a chance but it will mean a saving of time and an increase of efficiency in educating the brighter ones. In continental Europe a child will reach the end of our High School course in two years less than our children do here. The reason for this is not that the European child is brighter or even the teacher more efficient, but class or caste classifies the children in a rough way along the lines of study for which each is fitted and close classification is still further effected by a large number of special classes or schools both for the abnormally weak and for the abnormally bright pupils. We do not want here a class or caste classification, but it is not necessarily in the interest of democracy to "keep bright pupils in quarantine with mental mediocrity." Psychology furnishes tests which can be used in classifying children at least to some extent according to their natural limitations or their special ability. It can test separately each one of the mental elements just mentioned in describing the weaker pupil and it seems now to be standardizing a test, the Binet test, which in a general way reveals all of them and can be used as a means of classifying the children of a school on the basis of their actual mental capacity, into a number of different classes. Special classes and special schools have been provided for



years in some of the European countries and are lately being organized in some of the cities of our own country. Some of us will live to see the day when many a city will have its psychological laboratory and specialist as a part of its educational system just as it now has its city chemist and its health department. Mental welfare and economy is no less important for good citizenship than physical and material welfare, and it is much more difficult to secure.

The school system of Chicago has such a psychological clinic which examines every subnormal child and prescribes definitely both the intellectual and the physical training which it is to receive in the special schools maintained for subnormal children. Several other cities have recently made similar provision.

On the basis of the data issued by the U. S. Bureau of Education, there are in the schools of a city of 50,000 probably thirty or more pupils of such defective mentality that the schools should not admit them. They cannot be served and they are a hindrance. They should be in special institutions for defectives, most of them permanently. There are about 300 more sufficiently weak mentally to be classified as feeble-minded. These might develop into self-supporting citizens if cared for in special classes or a special school. They are not helped by the regular school curriculum. Then there are a thousand or more who are not mentally deficient but still are too slow to succeed alongside the normal pupil. These should be taught in special classes or sections in their respective schools, or they will become repeaters and drop out of school without getting the education the city owes them, and can give them with proper management. Finally there is a group of 5 per cent. or more who are distinctly above the normal child in ability. In proportion to their ability these are the most neglected pupils in the school. Any teacher realizes, or should realize that if he or she had an opportunity to expend the same effort on this group that is expended on the lower fourth of a class these abnormally bright pupils might get twice the educa-

tion they now get in the same time. In order to make our educational work really effective these various classes should be defined and provision made according to their needs. Much of the classifying can be done on the basis of school records while in doubtful cases the Binet test can serve as an X-ray machine to get at the child's mental capacity. We hope that the stimulus which psychology is giving along this line may lead to much needed improvement, yet we cannot hope for much so long as the public is willing to invest only twenty cents per pupil per day while education at private schools averages at least one dollar per pupil per day. Perhaps when the public learns that the lower third of our schools is a serious factor in our social life in that it furnishes most of the class which through our almshouses, hospitals, asylums, prisons, and various immoralities is costing us about \$100,000,000 per year, we may come to realize that it would pay to invest some of this money in forming this class while it is young instead of trying to reform it when it is too late.

I can merely give a suggestion of the possibilities in psychology for the teacher in determining methods and revealing the nature of development. Even the most concrete and simple laboratory experiments are making their contributions. For instance, the relative merits of different methods of teaching reading may be better determined by reason of a simple experiment on the movement of the eye in reading. A small lever may be attached to the eyeball in such a way that it records the slightest movement of the eye. By this device it was discovered that in reading the eye does not move steadily along the line but jumps to a point in the line, rests there while it takes in a part of the line and then jumps on to another point, resting there again a moment while the reading is done. The number of stops and the length of the periods of rest are determined by the ability of the reader. This suggests that we naturally do our reading not by seeing parts of words or even individual words but parts of sentences or even short sentences. This information is of value when we come to examine the relative merits of teaching reading by beginning with the



alphabet or using the phonic system, the word method or the short sentence method.

One of the best contributions of the Montessori system which has in it many things that are excellent and some things not so excellent, is its method of motor training in writing. Writing should no longer be taught by slow and painful imitation of a set copy but by developing the muscles and free motor action by movement exercises which, so far as the child is concerned, need not have any relation to writing. The first step in the Montessori method is to trace a geometrical figure from an object laid on paper, as, for instance, a circle with a smaller circle inside, leaving perhaps a quarter of an inch between the two and then having the children fill in the space with a pencil moving around or back and forth in the open space and thus developing both muscle and motion. The same development is also secured by having children trace rapidly with their fingers letters which are cut out of sandpaper and pasted on cardboard. Thus a child will develop skill in making the movements and some day be surprised to find itself able to write quite freely without knowing that it ever learned writing. That which is best in her method Madame Montessori got from teaching defective children and from years of work in a psychological laboratory.

A number of experiments or tests which have contributed to methods in teaching other subjects might be mentioned but time does not allow.

The more important thing, however, is not pedagogic methods but the efficient teacher. In the words of another "the really vital spark in teaching is something you can't define or hand on from one to another. It is something we have in us. We have it or we have it not, and if we have it not we are not teachers," and neither pedagogic knowledge nor pedagogic methods will make us teachers. It is true, however, that the best teacher with the finest intuitive insight will welcome the added insight and understanding of mental processes and individual development which psychology can give. Native intuition should therefore be supplemented by a knowledge of the



laws governing the mental processes common in the schoolroom such as interest, attention, memory, suggestibility, association, fatigue, etc. They should also know something about the way in which individuals learn or develop in their learning. For instance if the progress of a child in a certain subject were plotted in a curve this curve would rise rapidly at the beginning, then for some time move almost horizontally, then rise again to be followed by another horizontal line. Though the effort may be steady the apparent improvement will not be continuous but will correspond to a series of rapid rises and plateaus, the rise representing a period of acquisition and the plateau representing a period of assimilation. Unless properly understood the period indicated by the plateau may cause discouragement since the development at that time is not apparent, but the assimilation represented by the plateau is as essential as is the acquisition indicated by the rapid rise. Close observation will make this same phenomenon evident in physical development. Professor James expresses this phenomenon by saying we learn to skate during the summer and to swim during the winter. It is important that this intermittent character of development be appreciated since the period of acquisition and the period of assimilation should have somewhat different kinds of training. The value of expression, as over against the traditional importance placed upon impression as a force in the process of mental development, is also definitely established by the psychological interpretation of development. This suggests the important contributions made by physiological psychology in establishing the fact that education or the development of our mental powers depends upon the systematic training or development of the living substances of our nervous organism, especially the brain. In this organism we have some 9,000,000,000 nerve cells, all having in them the capacity of being developed into functioning neurones and being organized into the activity which represents our various mental processes. These neurones, as already indicated, are in groups like the trees of the forest and for those which are present mental capacity can be developed



whereas it is utterly useless to try to develop any mental ability for which the corresponding neurones are wanting. One basic principle suggested by this physical basis of the mental life is that education must not go counter to the laws of nature but must take nature into partnership. Professor James says, "The great thing in education is to make our nervous system our ally and not our enemy." This same truth is stated as follows by another: "Natural organization must not be interfered with unless that organization is known to be positively abnormal." Here is a suggestion for the teacher and the parent who are always too ready to repress the childish activity which is so different from the disposition of the more mature. There is a tendency on the part of many to turn the child into a little mature individual. A noted neurologist says, "Do not stop a child's movements unless you know why you do so." The child's instinctive actions should usually be encouraged and made the basis or the occasion of training instead of being inhibited and lost. The story is told of a gosling that was reared in a building away from water; when it was some months old and was taken to a pond, it not only refused to go into the water, but when thrown in, scrambled out again as a hen would have done. The swimming instinct was entirely suppressed.

We have a remarkable illustration of the loss of capacity from disuse in the following statement of Darwin. Writing of himself in 1876 he says:<sup>13</sup> "Up to the age of thirty or beyond it, poetry of many kinds, such as the works of Milton, Gray, Byron, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelly gave me great pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare, especially in the historical plays. I have also said that formerly pictures gave me considerable, and music very great, delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures and music. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part

<sup>13</sup> *Life and Letters.*

of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive."

Many similar illustrations of the suggestiveness of a knowledge of physiological psychology could be given but space forbids.

In conclusion I may say that recent psychology doubly emphasizes the importance of early training and habits by calling attention to the plasticity of our nervous organization in childhood as compared with its fixedness later. Radical changes can rarely be made in mature life or only with the greatest effort. "We can plant corn in the autumn but nature will refuse us a harvest." This finds expression in the following lines of Romanes:

"No change in childhood's early day,  
No storm that raged, no thought that ran,  
But leaves a track upon the clay,  
Which slowly hardens into man."

Baldwin concludes a lengthy chapter on "The Mind of a Child" in the following words:

"Finally, I may be allowed a word to interested parents. You can be of no use whatever to psychologists—to say nothing of the actual damage you may be to the children—unless you know your babies through and through. Especially the fathers! They are willing to study everything else. They know every corner of the house familiarly, and what is done in it, except the nursery. A man labors for his children ten hours a day, gets his life insured for their support after his death, and yet he lets their mental growth, the formation of their characters, the evolution of their personality, go on by absorption—if no worse—from common, vulgar, imported and changing, often immoral attendants! Plato said the state should train the children; and added that the wisest man should rule the state. This is to say that the wisest man should tend his children! We hear a certain group of studies called the humanities, and it is right. But the best school in the humanities for every man is in his own house."



#### IV.

### POLITICS OUT OF OFFICE.<sup>1</sup>

EDWARD EVERETT HALE, JR.

It will not surprise you if I take this evening as a subject for our thought some topic not merely scholastic. As members of this oldest of American college societies you are well aware that philosophy is the guide of life—and everybody knows that life is not a matter of books alone. As friends of this distinguished foundation you have always before you the great example of Franklin. You must by this time have been informed of every characteristic of that great man, who made a great impression upon his generation. Yet it would be hard to say whether he made the greatest impress as a scholar or as a public man. The famous epigram, *Eripuit fulmen caelo sceptrumque tyrannis* (He snatched the lightning from the heavens and the sceptre from the tyrant), refers first to his scholarly and then to his political work. He was a great scientist, but he was no less great as a public man. And though as a public man he often held office—indeed his fellow-citizens would never cease calling upon him to take charge of their and his joint affairs—yet Franklin does not make the most impression upon us as Clerk of the Assembly of the Province, as Commissioner to France, as President of the New State, but as a public-spirited citizen alive to anything that might serve the welfare of his fellow citizens, and the originator of almost all modern improvements in his native city. I am sure that were he here with us tonight there are few matters to which he would like better to give careful consideration, few matters on which

<sup>1</sup> The Phi Beta Kappa address delivered in the chapel of Franklin and Marshall College, at Lancaster, Pa., on June 11, 1913, by Professor Edward Everett Hale, Jr., of Union University, Schenectady, N. Y.

he would be more competent to advise than the topic which I have taken for this evening's discourse. That topic is a question of politics, of such politics as may and ought to engage the attention of all citizens, but in a peculiar way of all who have the advantage of a higher education. I have called it "Politics Out of Office."

The public duty of educated men is no new theme for a gathering such as ours. More than fifty years ago that striking example of elegant scholarship and public spirit, George William Curtis, in speaking to the literary societies of Wesleyan University, upon a subject such as this, felt the need of an apology. "I know well," he said, "that a conventional prejudice consecrates this occasion to dull abstractions and timid, if not treacherous, generalities. It would allow me to speak of the scholar and the American scholar in his relation to Greek roots and particles, but would forbid me to mention his duties to American topics and times. I might speak of him as a professor, a dialectician, a dictionary, a grammar, but I must not speak of him as a man." Such were the words of a Commencement Orator in 1856. How old-fashioned, how archaic those words sound today. We have gone far beyond them. If I thought tonight that I needed apology for my subject, it would not be because it was something new, but because it had been worn threadbare, not because it was a paradox, but because it was a truism. We do not need to be told that the scholar has a duty to politics, that he should have a place in political life. Those are not ideals, they are facts. And to tell the truth my message today is not directed to academic hearers alone. It is meant for all those persons who are conveniently grouped under the name of "good citizens," "citizens of the better sort," and such like. It is more particularly needed perhaps by the specifically academic class—persons in college or just out of college or closely connected with college, because such people are apt to have nothing to do with politics at all. It is needed a little more particularly by educated men in general, men with intellectual interests, because such people



are more apt to neglect their political duties than men of commercial or material interests. But in the main the exhortation to think of politics out of office might be addressed to ninety-nine per cent. of our citizens without finding one who could say, "All that is familiar to me and unnecessary."

Politics in America are far too closely connected in the public mind with office. Many people cannot think of one without the other. Politics with them always means office, and office to their mind always means politics. This should not be. Offices are necessary, but after all not the only thing to be considered. Politics is the carrying on of public business. To carry on public business we, of course, need office and officers. But there must be much in politics beside office, much which has no close connection with office. To one man office is merely the question, How can I manage to keep my position of clerk of the board of supervisors? To another politics is merely a question of, How can I manage to gain the election as assessor? Yet the really important thing about office is not how to get it, but how to carry it on. And the really important thing in politics is not how to get the votes, but how to get the right spirit, the right public opinion. It is true that we cannot, unfortunately, neglect the other thing. We cannot say, Do the duties of office well and the election or appointment will take care of itself. We know it will not. We cannot say, Get the right spirit in a community, the right public opinion, and the votes will be all right. We may wish it were so, but we know there is more to do than that. Still those are the fundamental things. No one will complain at a certain amount of drudgery and machinery. But let us never go so far as to think that the drudgery and the mechanism are the main thing. Let us realize that the real thing of importance in regard to office is how to administer it for the best interest of the people, and the real thing of importance in politics is how to get the people to think rightly and seriously of their own public interests.

But before I go farther will you pardon me for a preliminary word of a personal character? To many people the

idea of a college professor dealing (as one may say) with politics is a humorous one. They think that college professors must be theorists, visionaries, doctrinaires, impracticable people who live their lives reading books and never meet any one in the real world. Their idea of a theory is of course of an ill-founded theory, of a vision as a misleading vision, of a doctrine as a false doctrine. But—not to stop at that—they feel that a college professor can never count in real politics, can never know anything about them. It is true that such ideas have received something of a shock of late. We have recently seen the inauguration as our chief magistrate of one who stepped directly from the academic cloister to the Executive Mansion of an important commonwealth. And we have seen his predecessor, having finished his term of office in the loftiest position in American public life, turn to a university professorship as a congenial and profitable occupation and means of expression of the public wisdom he had gathered from many years of worthy service of his country. The university professor became president and the president became a university professor. The last year has been quite a year for college professors in public life. Still I shall cheerfully admit that I do not believe that, in the main, college professors make very good politicians, just as I do not believe that, as a rule, they make very good citizens. They are in several ways exempt from some of the ordinary duties of citizenship. In a good many cases they are practically exempt from taxation. In most, they are exempt from jury duty. They often live on a special place away from their fellow-citizens. In all there is something of a barrier, a something of a gulf, between them and people in general, coming, perhaps, from the very early time when the university was always a body of strangers in any university town. But this is something which is being remedied in slow degrees. In my own city we are at the present moment working with some fair expectation of success for a non-partisan administration of municipal affairs. We are at the moment starting a



“citizen’s movement” in preparation for the municipal campaign. I mention this merely to note that the chairman of the citizen’s committee is a professor of the college, the professor—of all things in the world—of philosophy. He, you see, at least believes in philosophy as a guide of public life as well as private.

If then I may add a word of a directly personal character I should say I have chosen this subject, not as a matter of theory but of practice, not because I have read and talked about such matters but because I have had a little political experience and know a little something of them. Not much experience, but, I venture to think, of the right sort. After all, in such matters it is not quantity that tells so much as quality. We do not need to eat a whole cow to know something about beefsteak. I have worked through a primary campaign in a local election district and an election campaign in a congressional district; have seen both from the inside. I have been a worker in a ward committee and a delegate to a presidential convention. I have been a candidate for the lowest of offices and for almost the highest. It may be thought something of a reproach to one that I should speak particularly of politics out of office, because I have never known anything personally of politics in office. It is certainly true that I have never held public office, and I cannot bring myself to have much ambition to do so. But instead of considering that fact a reproach, I believe it to be rather a testimonial. I speak of politics out of office, because that is the kind of politics I know about and believe in.

So, then, to turn more specifically to my topic. I began by allusion to the teaching and example of George William Curtis. In one especial respect his words and his life are worthy of our most careful attention, for with the entire acceptance which has been given to his general idea, they represent also something which has been only gradually making its place in the public mind, which has even now not succeeded in making itself an active factor in our thought and action.

In a commencement address at Union College almost half a century ago, in speaking of the public duty of the educated man, he said: "By the words public duty I do not necessarily mean official duty, although it may include that. I mean simply that constant and active practical participation in the details of politics, without which, upon the part of the most intelligent citizens, the conduct of public affairs falls under the control of selfish and ignorant, or crafty and venal men. I mean that personal attention—which as it must be incessant, is often wearisome and even repulsive—to the details of politics, attendance at meetings, service upon committees, care and trouble and expense of many kinds, patient endurance of rebuffs, chagrins, ridicules, disappointments, defeats—in a word, all those duties and services which when selfishly and meanly performed, stigmatize a man as a mere politician; but whose constant, honorable, intelligent and vigilant performance is the gradual building, stone by stone and layer by layer, of that great temple of self-restrained liberty which all generous souls mean that our government shall be." No words of the great orator bear better the test of fact. Were it needful to say the right thing but once, and be done with it, sure that it would bear its due fruit, I need say no more tonight.

And now that we may get right at our subject, let me at once specify what are some of the forms of politics out of office, which may hold the interest and should have the coöperation of those who are called "all good citizens."

We are inclined to think that the chief thing in our politics is election day. That is the day that makes or breaks. Before election day there are things to do,—but the average citizen does none of them except read the newspaper and talk to friends as he goes down town in the trolley. What is there to be done? Why everyone knows that before the election comes nominations; before the campaign comes the primary. It has for some twenty-five years been gradually dawning upon the American people that the primary is as important as the election. All through my earlier days "attend the



primaries" was a sort of watchword. But there must have been millions of Americans who did attend the primaries and who found when they did attend them that they were as powerless at the primary as at the election. One had to go even farther back.

What then is the very first thing in the course of events that leads to election? The first official act is registration and enrolment. Now the process of registration and enrolment seems a very simple one. Most citizens consider themselves very virtuous if they register and enroll themselves. But the registration itself is the place where the very first political work should be done. Let me simply mention one possibility connected with party enrolment. Let us imagine an election district where both parties are organized by men who believe that politics and office are one, and indivisible. What can they do in the matter of registration? Why this. If in one party there is any doubt as to the organization carrying the primaries, the other party can lend them a certain number of helpers. Suppose the Republican organization in the district be threatened by a movement of independent voters within the party. A number of Democrats may enroll as Republicans; the enrolment is at first secret, who is the wiser? Then when the primary comes round the Republican leader has so many solid men to count on and the independent citizen has so many votes to cast before he even gets a start. This is one of the simplest manipulations of the enrolment. To beat it somebody must be on the watch. Who will take the time and trouble to look out for such a thing? Very few, indeed; it takes an organization. Hence if the independent citizen wants his rights in his own party he must take some part in the organization of that party. He must be willing to do a little work at the beginning, to save himself from much complaint at the end.

But suppose no enrolment: next the primary. What happens then? Why whatever the primary law, the organization will have a candidate. And who will that candidate be?

In ordinary cases somebody who, recognizing the necessity of organization, will act in the main as the organization desires. What can be done against such candidates? Primary laws differ in different states and I am not familiar with those of Pennsylvania, but it is clear that in any state two things can be done. The good citizen can either control his local organization, or he can fight it. Whichever he does, the result is better nominations. If you can get a really public-spirited man to act as your party committeeman you will do well; but if you cannot do that you can often force good nominations by the threat of opposition.

Then comes the primary. A primary is nowadays in most states as formal a matter as the election. The organization workers of the district are present as a matter of course. They will like nothing better than to have no one else present. But citizens in general ought to be there, not merely to vote but to watch the others vote. What can they do? Let them read the election law and find out. You will perhaps laugh at that and say that they are not lawyers. But a man does not need to be a lawyer to construe the election or any other law. He has as much right and duty to construe it as anyone else. True his construction may be overruled, but so may a lawyer's. We have one of the worst election laws in New York that I know of. I believe that it was drawn especially to beat the man who wants to act against the organization. But I have had the opportunity of working through a primary campaign under that law and in four weeks' experience have discussed and heard discussed the provisions. And the experience has shown me that any clear-headed citizen who knows the law and has a copy in his pocket will generally succeed against anything but physical force.

Well we get to the primary. It is easy to see, though not generally recognized, that a primary is often more important than an election. In many districts a party nomination is equivalent to an election. Then, as a matter of course, the primary practically is the election. But even where there



is no party preponderance, where the nomination is not equivalent to the election, the primary is an important matter. Too often an election is merely a choice between two poor candidates, a choice of evils. It is possible in the primaries to make it just the reverse, a choice between two strong candidates, a choice between the good and the better. If it is known that one party is bound to have a strong candidate, the other is bound to have one equally strong. With the interest of citizens aroused to the importance of the primary the work of the election is half accomplished.

And after the primary there is still work to do. There is public opinion to be made, meetings to be held, voters to be visited from house to house, registration to be made, as well as the more particular work of carrying on the campaign. And in all this the average citizen can play his part and that no unimportant one. If he does not himself care for public meetings he can at least make one in the general display of interest without which nothing good can be accomplished, if he always registers himself he can also make it a point to see that his friends register, if his own mind be pretty well settled as to candidates and policies he can certainly aid in the general diffusion of ideas and interest if only by talking with those with whom he comes in contact, and if he does not always make his own views prevail he aids in creating that atmosphere of good ideas and right thinking that is essential to the best results of any popular movement.

And here I am led to say a word on a subject which is always to be found, if generally in the back-ground, in discussions of this sort, namely the matter of political organization. At the present day in America there is a strong feeling against political organizations. While almost everybody has a feeling, often unconscious, in favor of political parties, yet very many have a feeling equally strong against political organizations. Party organization is represented in our minds by such words as boss, machine, slate; it stands too often for corruption and crookedness. But some sort of organization is an absolute



necessity in political life, except in the very smallest units, or in the very largest interests. A fairly small election district, like a New England town meeting, may often get on very well without much permanent organization. A very great public interest, like the feeling for tariff reform, will generally express itself without much direct organization. But for the carrying on of politics in general in ordinary places and on everyday issues some sort of organization is almost a necessity. It must always be remembered that, whether or no good citizens will continue for the public interest, those citizens who are not so good will be sure to conspire for their own interests. So I believe in organizations, from those of the national parties down to those in wards and districts. And if there are to be organizations, a man who means to make himself felt even as an individual must take his part in them. Your own Franklin with his famous junto is a good example. No man in America was more able to accomplish good results as a purely private citizen. His autobiography, which is one of the most illuminating of books for the American citizen, shows us how in a purely private way he was able to set on foot great movements. The paving and lighting of his native city, its fire department, its library and its university were all started by him, at a time when such things were by no means matters of course, and started by him as an individual. But even Franklin saw the advantage of an organization and the junto with its proposed continuation of subordinate societies was an example of what may be done by citizens acting together instead of alone.

It is true that organization involves some trouble. If there be no wide interest in an organization it easily falls into the hands of a few. And when an organization is managed by a few, then the many are naturally prejudiced against it. Suppose a man gets the idea that he will join the political clubs in his district. He joins and goes round to a meeting, and what is the result? Perhaps he finds a number of routine matters put through by half a dozen present who are obviously those who run the organization. No one asks his opinion; indeed



he has no opinion, for the matters are not of any real importance. He goes from the meeting feeling that nothing much is to be accomplished and that he might as well leave those routine matters to people who are willing to deal with them. Of course there is a great deal of routine in any organization, and of course too there almost always will get together a set of men who are willing to handle routine matters. But if there are not others to take an interest and exercise a supervision over their proceedings, such a group—though it start with the best intention in the world—easily degenerates.

But we shall easily be led to spend too much time upon this very matter-of-fact phase of our subject. Granted that an individual citizen *can* do something more in politics than he does it still may be asked what is the use of so doing. I myself do not believe that the average citizen has any idea of what he really can do. I do not believe that he has any true idea of the many ways in which he can make his influence felt. Many men really feel that there is nothing for them to do. But suppose it be not so, suppose a citizen see clearly that he can do something in political life without running for office or helping anybody who does. Yet life has many interests. To everybody today, to the educated man in particular, come many calls. The church is insistent today that the work of religion must be done not by the clergy alone, but by the combined effort of clergy and layman. Social service calls to everybody who will help to do something, even though it be but a little, to carry through the great philanthropic reforms which will be one of the distinguishing marks of the century. The different private interests of each individual broaden out today to a degree that would have been undreamed of fifty years ago. And a man naturally wants to make his work count. Suppose he recognize, as most college men do, that society has some right to his effort and his help, yet it is still a question where his work will be most effective. One man is a strong church worker, one is in the board of trade, one is absorbed in the affairs of his union, each is doing something and each can see

some result of what he does. What can the political organization say to such a one?

I cannot pretend to do more than indicate the general lines of such an answer. One must first, I think, view the negative side, though such views are rarely inspiring. One must say that without participation by those who make it a duty, our politics will surely remain in the hands of those who now make it their business. Unless we have a wide-awake voter we are sure to have a boss. Unless we have a good organization we shall have a machine. Unless we have a true democracy we shall have an oligarchy, if not a tyranny. I don't think this view is inspiring. I don't think it will arouse people. But I am sure it is true.

More interesting, however, are some positive views. A man is more truly a citizen if he will do something beside vote, and there is always a satisfaction in being something worth while. One will certainly find it worth while to be a real worker in the commonwealth, to feel that one is, to some degree, at the bottom of things, that one is surrounded by actualities and not statements on paper. Nothing is more curious to me than to see how little the average voter knows of the very commonest matters of political routine, how slight an idea he has of the practices and duties of the different officials who carry on public business. A year or so ago when the citizens of my home county inspected the party enrolments they found that in some districts many enrolments had been thrown out and that many voters would be unable to vote at the primaries. It was curious to see how few of those who were indignant at their disfranchisement so far as the primaries were concerned took steps even to find out why they had been disfranchised. It needed only a visit to the election commissioners and an inquiry. To most of the voters the election commissioners of the county were merely official politicians with whom one could do nothing. Practically they were very well-meaning men who tried to carry out their duties as nearly according to the letter of the law as was possible. I looked up some cases. The com-



missioners (although political opponents) were most obliging. They looked up every ballot and showed it to me. They showed me the election law, they showed me the opinions from the county attorney and the attorney-general under which they had acted. Everything was made plain. It was not just, but it showed how justice could be obtained. And so it will generally be. If people want actually to understand our politics they must take a part in them. And if we want to determine what our political life ought to be we must, I am sure, know what it is. That view surely ought to appeal to the scholar. If it do not he is surely the kind of theorist, visionary, doctrinaire, that too many people think he is.

So really to be what he thinks he is the good citizen should take a more active part than is usual in political life. The hard-headed business man is apt to laugh at the college professor as an empty theorist, as we have said. But I do not know any more empty theorist than the average American citizen, whether hard-headed business man or not, who believes in a general way in the theory of American government, in the theory of democracy, and yet will do nothing really to know how it actually works, and just why it is that the practice is so different from his theory. He is an empty theorist of the worst type, for he holds an empty theory about something that vitally concerns his everyday life. (A college professor may be foolish who holds to some theory or other that has no close connection with his everyday life—say the theory of survival of the fittest.) But in a broader way some personal knowledge of politics is of a practical value to any man—or I might better say some personal knowledge of politicians. I do not believe that the time will come when every one will be able to take a considerable part in public affairs. There will always be a comparative few who will give more time and attention to politics than their fellow-citizens. And these people will always tend to make politics a business, to find in politics a means of support. We cannot hope, we should not desire, to have, as is the case in England, a large class of men who do

not have to work for a living, who are willing to conduct, for nothing, the public business of their fellow-citizens. We shall probably always pay our political workers and officials, and thus we shall always have, probably, a class of persons more or less dependent on politics for a livelihood. We have such a class now, but as a rule people in general are very slightly acquainted with them, and in general as politicians I doubt if they have a high respect of the community. I will not say that the politician today stands in the same estimation with people at large that the publican stood in among the Jewish people in the day of our Lord. But I don't believe that many of us who are gathered here this evening have much knowledge of politicians, either as a class or personally. Now this is not as it should be. I don't hold a brief for the professional politician, but I am sure it is for the best interest of all that people should be well acquainted with him. And the educated man, especially the college-bred man, I believe, will gain by knowing more than he does of those who are carrying on the public business of the country. Doubtless he may not like them all when he does know them, but in the main I believe the knowledge will be of use to both parties. We are far too apt to have in our minds a picture of the ward politician, founded upon sketches in the comic paper or gossip in the daily press. Let me give a personal illustration. A little while ago I became associated politically with a man who had previously been closely connected with the party organization which I had commonly opposed. The last few years you know have been years of plentiful changes in politics. Well, my friends rallied me a little in the matter. "What are you doing with so-and-so?" said they. "He has certainly pulled off some pretty raw political deals." I said only that every citizen has a right to work in politics, whether he was corrupt or not. But I got to know this man rather better than my friends, and I was surprised that with all his political sharpness there was in him a genuine desire to improve political conditions. He was a Hebrew, and he had the strong feeling for family that dis-



tinguishes that race. One night he said to me, "You see, professor, I've got children, boys growing up. I want that they should have a better chance in politics than I had. I've had to take hold in the only way a man can take hold here in America and I guess I've done a good many things that people think I'd better not have done. But I want to have my boys have a better chance than I had." Of course a thing like that doesn't make a man an idealist, but it makes you understand him better. So not only from the general standpoint of an improved body politic, but from the more particular view of better individual citizenship do I feel that every citizen should try to participate more actively in public affairs. Let me add a more practical consideration. It was President Taft, I believe, some time ago, in speaking for some of the current proposals for political reform, who said that they imposed about four times as much work upon the average citizen as the present methods, when it was well known that even the present opportunities were very slightly used. I believe that remark was correct in both respects. Current political propositions—the direct primary, the initiative, the referendum, the recall, etc.—do impose a good deal of actual work upon the average citizen. And there is little doubt that the average citizen now does not by any means do all he might do for the best management of public affairs. But I am not sure of the inference that because a man does not do a little well, he may not under different circumstances be able to do a good deal. It is true, I think, that our citizens generally do not take much part in politics. They vote at elections and they read the papers and talk politics at other times. But they do little else. But I believe that one reason why they do little is because they do not know how they can do anything effectively. It is true that, as a rule, few voters participate in the primaries. I believe the reason is that few voters feel that they can *do* anything by such participation. When a man feels that by attending a primary he can only indorse the choice of somebody else, I do not much blame him for staying away. But if he saw

that he could do anything at a primary that would count he would be likely to try to do it. Americans are a practical people and a busy people. They do not like to put energy into things that will not show result. If, however, they become convinced that by a fuller participation in politics they can really do something in politics that they want to do, the chances are that they will take the opportunity.

So anyone who would have the college man take a fuller part in politics must be able to show him that by that fuller part he can succeed in bringing to pass some of those things which he thinks worth while. If it be a question of going to a meeting, he must feel that something will be done at that meeting. If it be a question of writing to his assemblyman or senator, he must feel that his representative will pay some attention to his letter. If it be a question of subscribing to a political organization or taking part in its work, he must feel that that organization is really accomplishing something more than having a constitution and by-laws and appointing committees. Well in this case I cannot offer myself as an example and say, "Take my case: I went into politics and see what I have accomplished." I wish I could do that, but as a fact I don't know but I could have got more so-called "practical" results in some other way. Let me tell you how I came to take a more active part in politics than I had been in the habit of doing.

Yet, such as it is, I am well satisfied with my experience, and I think anyone else will be who works sincerely. Sometimes one will be able to do something definite. A friend of mine, for instance, was chairman of the social service committee of the Men and Religion Movement. He became interested in housing conditions, did a lot of work, got expert assistance, drew up a report. It took time and money. Then when the common council of the city was about to adopt a housing code he went to the public hearing and showed up the failures of the proposed code in such a way that it was definitely tabled and work was begun on the lines that he indi-



cated. And as a result of his work we shall have a good housing code. I might add other instances, not so very many, I am sorry to say, as one would like, but enough to count. And I may say as the general result of some years' political experience, I feel sure that with some exceptions it will be found that political organizations will be glad to avail themselves of the work of men who will work, and that politicians will at least pay attention to the advice of those who have any advice to give.

There is one part of my topic which now, as time has flown, I must touch on very lightly. I have so far aimed to show that, aside from the question of office for himself or for anybody else, the public-spirited man should busy himself in politics in a practical way. He should not only register and vote at election. His duty is not even accomplished if he enroll and vote at the primary. He should take some active part in some political club. He should be on hand at political meetings. He should keep a lookout on the action of his representatives in state and nation, and write to them to express his opinion. He should do something to form public opinion by taking around petitions among his fellow-citizens or at least by discussing with them what is going on. He should, when he can, take an active part in the campaign; it is not everybody who will want or be able to get up on a soap-box and address a crowd at a street corner, but there are very few who cannot help the district captain by taking a list of names of voters on his own street and seeing where they stand.

But I want to add one other view of this subject. Even if the citizen do all this, he will still have but a partial grip on the matter if he feel that all is done when he has elected mayor or governor, alderman or representative in congress, or even if he keep an eye on them when elected. There is still one further responsibility; suppose his candidates do not get elected, there is still the responsibility of the minority. We desire to accomplish certain political ends. We try to elect men who can carry through those ends in a practical way.

But suppose we do not succeed? Shall we then give up our effort and acquiesce in the action of the majority. No, certainly not; a practical man who really wants to *do* something will see in failure only a stimulus to harder work.

And it is from this standpoint that I would urge upon the citizen the necessity for the parties who are not in power, still accepting the responsibility of doing what they can to make their ideas prevail. In my own state the party with which I acted was defeated in the last election. The measures for which we strove were put in the background. But we did not feel that we were thereby absolved from farther effort, save as directed to the next time. There was organized a legislative committee to put in definite form what we thought could really be accomplished in the matters of interest to us. I had the honor of serving upon a sub-committee to which was entrusted the question of employer's liability, a matter of current importance with us. We drew up a bill embodying our ideas and tried to get it adopted. We failed in that important particular, but we did accomplish a much better understanding of the principles and possibilities in the case.

And such action is typical of the whole case. Men should not go into politics merely that certain men be elected to office. They should not go into politics merely to carry through certain measures that appeal particularly to them. There is an old political proverb—measures, not men. But I do not believe that citizens should participate in politics either for measures or men. They should participate in politics because it is right that all should pay attention to public affairs and not a few only, because the American government is not an oligarchy but a democracy.

For let us remember that this is a matter of fact that we are talking of, and not a matter of talk alone. And let us remember that however much we may call our American government a democracy, a government by the people, yet it will never be really such unless the people do something about governing. Unless they will govern themselves somebody else



will govern them. Public business, the joint affairs of you and me and the others of our fellow-citizens, will certainly be attended to. If you and I will not attend to them somebody else will. And it is doing little and often nothing merely to vote,—one must do more if one means to do anything. If our American democracy is to be a democracy, we the American people must make it one.

SCHENECTADY, N. Y.

## V.

### THE IDENTITY OF CHRIST.

HIRAM KING.

The avowed enemies of Christ, in seeming contradiction, help Him more than they harm Him. Thus, they sought to destroy Him by putting Him to death, but they assured His exaltation instead, since the cross was in order to the crown (Phil. 2: 8-11). They seek to overthrow His Kingdom by martyring His people, but "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" and they sow it broadcast in persecution.

The Socinian<sup>1</sup> friends of Christ, on the contrary, harm Him more than they help Him. They exalt Him for faith, it is true, but, unlike St. Paul, they neither "preach Christ crucified" (1 Cor. 1: 23) for sin (15: 3), nor do they affirm His Godhead (Col. 2: 9). They, in fact, eliminate the divine nature from His person and thereby annul His saving function, since a mere man, although godlike, could not, under any proper conception of moral principle, atone for the sins of his fellow men. They can, therefore, commend Him to the sinner at the best, as only a righteous example for his *imitation* instead of proclaiming Him as the spiritual Progenitor of the race (Rom. 5: 14; 1 Cor. 15: 45) through whom the natural man becomes righteous in a *new birth* (1 John 3: 9).

The sum of the Socinian contention, accordingly, is, that Christ is a mere man, but that, unlike other men, He did not imitate the sinful example of Adam and become unrighteous, and that, on the other hand, the sinner becomes righteous by believing on Him and imitating His sinless example. Salvation, according to the Socinium creed, is therefore obtained by contemplating Christ and adopting His virtues.

<sup>1</sup> The term "Socinian" is used comprehensively and is meant to characterize all forms of disbelief in the proper divinity of Christ.



It is the purpose of this paper to establish the divinity of Christ and to demonstrate the lamentable failure of His Socinian friends from the sixteenth century to the present, to correctly identify Him.

Any proper attempt to ascertain the identity of Christ, it is plain, must be preceded by the question, From what source is the *true* knowledge of Christ derived? Is it from tradition and history filtered through the reason? or is it from revelation accepted by faith? It is the consensus of the friends of Christ, orthodox and heterodox, that He exemplified the virtues of a perfect life, that His character was unblemished and that His knowledge was unexampled. The assumption is, accordingly, justified, that His Socinian friends will admit the correctness of His own answer to the preliminary question. When the disciples replied to his inquiry concerning the popular opinion of His identity, that some said He was John the Baptist and others that He was Jeremiah or one of the Prophets, He asked them: "But who say ye that I am?" and when Peter answered: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," He said to Him: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah: flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven" (Matt. 16: 13-17). The incident was typical. The popular judgment was based on natural and historical conditions and the resultant identifications of Christ, although in the light of promise and prophecy, were not only diverse but also, in every case, incorrect. And all subsequent attempts to identify Him from historical data have likewise failed. His identification by Peter, however, was not thus conditioned on His person, His life and His works. It was, necessarily, a *revelation*, since Christ Himself, whose truthfulness the Socinians concede, said: "No one knoweth who the Son is save the Father" (Luke 10: 22).

It is plainly, then, through *divine revelation* that the identity of Christ is established. It was made known to Peter by direct revelation; it is made known to the world through the inspired record of revelation.

The Scriptures teach:<sup>2</sup>

1. *The Preëxistence of Christ.*—St. John very significantly states the advent of Christ in the terms, not of a birth but of an incarnation. “And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us,” he says (1: 14). Incarnation implies the prior existence of its subject, and the writer distinctly affirms the preëxistence of Christ in the declaration, that “In the beginning was the Word” (1: 1). Should, however, the testimony of St. John to the existence of Christ prior to His birth be deemed insufficient, that of Christ Himself, in His plea to the Father for His reinvestment with the glory which He had with Him “before the world was” (17: 5) and His frequent declarations that the Father had *sent* Him (5: 36; 12: 49; 14: 24), is certainly conclusive.

As Christ, then, existed *before* His birth and as men come into existence *in* their birth, it clearly follows that He is not an ordinary member of the race. As the Word became incarnate in the birth of Christ, it follows, moreover, that the Person of Christ is the constituent union of the Word and man. Since Christ, as the Word, had “the glory” with the Father “before the world was” and existed throughout the countless intervening ages from “the beginning” (of creation) to His birth, it may be assumed, finally, that He is higher on the scale of being than mere man. While, therefore, He is the “man, Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. 2: 5) by birth, He is also more than a man by incarnation.

2. *The Creative Agency of Christ.*—St. John asserts of Christ, as the Word, that “all things were made by him” (1: 3). St. Paul wrote to the Colossians, that “in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers,” that “all things have been created through him and unto him,” that “he is before all things” and that “in him all things consist” (1: 16, 17). The writer

<sup>2</sup> The writer acknowledges the benefit of suggestions from “The God-Man” in *The Fundamentals* and from critical comments by Dr. Lange.



of the Epistle to the Hebrews declares of Him, not only that it was through His agency that God "made the worlds" but also that it is His function to uphold "all things by the word of his power" (1: 2, 3).

It is self-evident that the Creator is superior to the creation and that He not only sustains it but that He also *comprehends* it in all its magnitude and intricacies. Man, on the contrary, is not only the work of the Creator but he is also a midget in the interior of the universe. He is, moreover, local to the earth and cannot possibly traverse outlying space to ascertain the character and dimensions of the Creator's works. He cannot hope, even, to ascend a score of miles above the earth's surface in his recently invented devices for aerial transportation. He has discovered, however, that the earth is not only a heavenly body, swinging in space, but also that it is a planetary sphere in a solar system, so vast that its outermost planet revolves about the sun at the incomprehensible distance of two billion, seven hundred and ninety-two million miles. His inference, too, seems justified, that the fixed stars are solar centers, each with its planets a constituent of the material universe. His telescope, moreover, has disclosed the astronomical marvel, that the Milky Way is really an elongated mass of suns, so dense and so remote as to appear to the naked eye a gray band across the sky.<sup>3</sup>

Well may the astronomer stand appalled at the practical

<sup>3</sup> The French astronomer, Camille Flammarion, says: "We know that each star is a sun, and that the one nearest to us is 25,625,000,000,000 miles away. Sirius is more than twice as far, Aldebaran three times, Altair four times, Vega five times as far. Beyond these are stars that are millions of billions and billions of billions of miles from the earth. We know that there are more than 100,000,000 suns in the visible universe, and that they are all moving at the rate of from 50 to 200 miles a second." It takes light, which moves 186,000 miles a second, over four years to reach the earth from the nearest star and a through-trip ticket on a supposed railroad from the earth to it, at a cent a mile, would cost 256,250,000,000 dollars, which is more than sixty times the amount of coined gold in the world.

infinity of the outstretching heavens and, vast as it is, summarize man's solar system thus:

Sun, Mercury, Venus, earth and Mars,  
A planet burst by explosive jars;  
Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, stars—  
Totius coeli minima pars.

On the one hand, now, is man, a creature, who is restricted to the diminutive planet, earth, and is unable, accordingly, even to trace out the boundaries of the natural order in which he is involved, or to affect it in the least. On the other hand is Christ, the Creative Agent, in whom "all things consist." That the distinction between man, thus in bonds on the earth, and Christ, the Author of the universe, is absolute, becomes a demonstration in a comparison of the impotence of the former with the omnipotence of the latter. Or may, perchance, the former Gnosticism which, although it robbed Christ of His divinity, magnified Him, nevertheless, have, Proteus-like, assumed, in Socinianism, virtually the *form* of the present Agnosticism? At all events, the Socinian friends of Christ do not seem to *know* that He performs the creative function, although the Scriptures attribute it to Him in unmistakable terms.

3. *The Universal Sovereignty of Christ.*—The crown of the world was decreed for Christ before His birth (Ps. 2). The Prophet Daniel foretold that His Kingdom would be worldwide and perpetual (7: 13, 14). Christ Himself admitted to Pilate that He was a King (John 18: 37) and subsequently assured His disciples that the dominion of heaven and earth had been given to Him (Matt. 28: 18). After His assumption of sovereign power, St. Peter asserted that "angels, authorities and powers" were "made subject to him" (1 Peter 3: 22). While St. Paul declared that in His name "every knee should bow, of things in heaven (angels) and things on earth (living men) and things under the earth" (dead men), that "every tongue should confess" that He is Lord (Phil. 2: 10, 11) and that "he must reign, till he hath put all his



enemies under his feet" (1 Cor. 15: 25), the last enemy to be abolished being death (v. 26).

As, now, Christ was exalted, at His investiture with sovereign authority (Ep. 1: 20), "Far above all rule, and authority, and power, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come" (v. 21), and as He thus became "Lord of lords and King of kings" (Rev. 17: 14), it is plain that His sovereignty is wholly distinct from the sovereignty of men. The distinction between the two sovereignties is, indeed, one of *class* in all essential particulars. Thus, men become kings while they live; Christ became a King after He died. Men reign over national units and their kingdoms are political; Christ reigns over "heaven and earth" and His Kingdom is spiritual (John 18: 36). The kingdoms of the world are dynastic and the Crown Princes succeed to the sovereignty of their ancestral predecessors; the kingdom of heaven is mediatorial and Christ, the mediatorial King, had no predecessor and can have no successor. Men become subjects of earthly kingdoms through natural birth; they become citizens of the kingdom of heaven through the birth of "water and the Spirit" (3: 5).

The distinctions between the sovereignty of men and the sovereignty of Christ, now pointed out, have not only the sanction of revelation but they are also exemplified in history, and they clearly demonstrate the functional infinity of Christ. The Socinians, however, reject the proposition, that while Christ is human by birth He is also superhuman by incarnation. They thus commit the colossal crime, against faith, of mutilating Him on the Procrustean bed of the reason to reduce Him to the stature of a mere man.

4. *The Divine Sonship of Christ.*—The fact of Christ's divine sonship is not in doubt, since it is attested at first hand. God called Him His Son (Matt. 3: 17) and He called God His Father (John 5: 17).

The relation of father and son is established, not by *creative act* but in *generative process*. The divine sonship of Christ is,

accordingly, due to His eternal generation from God. Not only did Christ refer to Himself as the “only *begotten*” Son of God (John 3:16) but He was so designated also by His most intimate disciple (John 1:14, 18). St. Paul, in affirmation of the priority of His generation, ranked Him as the “*first-born* of all creation” (Col. 1:15).

5. *The Equality of Christ with God*.—It has been pointed out that the creature is *inferior* to the Creator. That offspring, however, is *equal* with progenitor is a self-evident fact of biological science. Thus, for example, the descendants of Adam, from the birth of Cain to the present, have been *identically human*. The propagation of the race in natural generation is, in fact, the *reproduction* of the race, in the sense, that the successive generations of men are the *duplicates* of their predecessors. Not only is the *identity* of the race maintained, thus, through the equality of offspring with progenitor but their equality is, *necessarilly*, exemplified, continuously, in the *perpetuation* of the race. As, moreover, all life is *generative*, the dual equality is not peculiar to the human order of life but is exemplified, everywhere, among the inferior orders in the reproduction of their *species* (duplicates).

The equality of Christ as the *Son* of God, with God as the *Father*, on the scale of being, is plainly the logical deduction from the equality of offspring with progenitor in the order of earthly life universally. Is it also the teaching of the Scriptures? Yes. Thus, Christ did not disavow the charge of the Jews, that He “called God his own Father, making himself equal with God” (John 5:18) and St. Paul not only wrote that He was “in the form of God,” in His preëxistent state, but also that He “counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God” (Phil. 2:6). In His preëxistence, it appears, Christ did not consider His equality with God as a prize to be seized by Himself. Although He was in the “form of God,” and, therefore, “on an equality with God,” He not only refrained from exercising equal prerogatives with Him, but He



“emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.”<sup>4</sup>

6. *The Divinity of Christ.*—As Christ was thus in the “form” of God prior to His birth, did He possess the essential attributes of God? As He took the “form” of a servant at His birth, the question suggests the plainer one, did He acquire the essential attributes of a servant? All affirm the latter interrogative proposition and the parallel between the “form” of God and the “form” of a servant absolutely compels the affirmation of the former. As, then, the essential attributes of humanity must manifestly be accorded to Christ in the “form of a servant,” it would not only be inconsistent to deny Him the essential attributes of Divinity in the “form of God” but it would also be absurd.

Of what, now, did Christ, as the Word, “empty” Himself as He “became flesh”? As the “form of a servant” is exclusive for His incarnate state and function, it is not doubtful that He relinquished the “form of God” (mode of existence) to be “found in fashion as a man.” As, however, the “form” itself was not the essential being of Christ but only its manifestation, it follows that, in putting it off, He did not “empty” Himself of the divine nature.<sup>5</sup> Do the Scriptures sanction

<sup>4</sup>Men, too, are generated from God (1 John 5: 1) and are His sons (Heb. 12: 5). Why, then, are they not, like Christ, equal with God? Why is offspring not equal with progenitor in the order of the spiritual humanity as well as in the order of the natural humanity? Men, as the natural race, it is answered, are *preexistent* at their generation from God and it is in a “new birth” that their filial relation to Him is established. The prior-existing human nature is not abolished in spiritual birth but it is regenerated, and the “new man” (Ep. 4: 24) is human as well as divine. The new-born man, moreover, partakes of the “divine nature” (2 Peter 1: 4) only as it is modified in the incarnation. Men are thus the sons of God as a “new creation” (Gal. 6: 15) and, although they are “born of water and the Spirit,” they are not equal with God. On the other hand, Christ, in His eternal generation from God, was *not* pre-existent. As the Son of God, He was generated in the Divine Being, becoming thus a distinct Person in the Godhead. Unlike men “begotten of God,” He is, accordingly, the *natural* Son of God and therefore “on an equality with God.”

<sup>5</sup>Godhead, like manhood, is not transferable, and even the World-

the conclusion of logic? Yes fully. "For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily" (Col. 2:9), is the fashion in which St. Paul sets Christ over against the predatory teachers of his time (v. 8) and it seems quite impossible for His Socinian friends to repudiate the writer's comprehensive ascription of divinity to Him without denying his inspiration. He, furthermore, asserts that, in Christ, men are "made full" (v. 10) and prays that they "may be filled unto all the fulness of God" (Ep. 3:19). The Scriptures distinguish, thus, between Christ and men and set them in contrast, teaching that Christ bears the *divine nature* ("all the fulness of the Godhead") but that men only receive *divine grace* ("all the fulness of God").

The author of Hebrews, in affirming the supreme exaltation of Christ in the realm of being, declares that God "of old time" spoke to men "in the prophets" (1:1) but that He "hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son" (v. 2), "who being the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had made purification of sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high" (v. 3). By way of climactic contrast, he then pointed out that God makes "his angels winds, and his ministers a flame of fire" (v. 7), but that He says of the Son "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" (v. 8).

It is well-known that this Old Testament ascription of divinity (Ps. 45:6), applied thus under New Testament conditions, loses its specific emphasis on the divinity of Christ in its translation from the Greek original into the English language. In the Greek text, however, the word, *ho*, placed before *Theos* (the term for God) attributes absolute divinity to Him. *Ho* is the definite article, *the*, in Greek and the literal translation of *ho Theos* into English is, therefore, *the* God. As, moreover, the article *the*, is exclusive, Christ is designated in the ascription Builder (the Demiurgos) of Plato and the World-Fashioner (the Demiurge) of the Gnostics could not be thus equipped for their colossal tasks. The Godhead is, in fact, the divine nature itself.



tion, not only as *the* God but also as the *one* God. "My Lord (ho Kurios) and my God (ho Theos)," is Thomas's confessional identification of Christ (John 20: 28) and as he confessed faith in Him as *the* Lord and *the* God, it follows, not only that his confession is conclusive for His divinity, like the ascription just considered, but also that it is superior to the earlier confession of Peter. Thus, while Peter identified Christ as the *Son* of God, Thomas identified him as *God*. The confession of Thomas, accordingly, complemented the confession of Peter in the evolution of the orthodox Christian creed.

Thomas's identification of Christ is, however, not only the one, explicit apostolic confession of faith in His divinity but it was also made an *incontrovertible proof* of His divinity by His implied sanction of the divine appellation in not *disclaiming* it. The Socinian friends of Christ will agree that, if He were a mere man, as they allege, He could not possibly have accepted Thomas's adoring ascription without losing His moral integrity. As they, moreover, concede that He maintained His moral uprightness throughout His earthly career, it follows that they can not possibly *deny* that His acceptance of the ascription is conclusive proof of His divinity.

The dilemma which here involves the Socinians is this: Christ either rightfully, as God, accepted the ascription of divinity and is *divine*; or He accepted the ascription wrongfully, as a mere man, and was an *impostor*. Under the logic of the former alternative, they can not deny His divinity; under the logic of the latter alternatives, they can not affirm His moral integrity. As, now, they plainly can not hope to avoid impalement on the sharp horns of the dilemma, it seems reasonable that the natural craving for mental comfort as well as the chivalrous spirit of logical fairness in the arena of discussion ought to suggest the restoration of Christ's eliminated divinity, which has now been logically established from the tenet of His moral integrity in their own creed.

The writer of Hebrews cites the divine sonship of Christ in

proof of His exaltation above the angels (1:5) and, in relation to His second advent, he quotes from the mouth of God the *climactic* proof of His divinity: "And let all the angels of God worship him" (v. 6).<sup>6</sup>

If, now, it will appear that the worship of men and angels and all other real and imaginary objects is idolatrous and that the worship of God alone is lawful, it will follow that Christ, the Son of God, whom the angels are here directed, by the Father, to worship, is *divine*.<sup>7</sup>

"Thou shalt have none other gods before (beside) me" (Ex. 20:3), is the absolute restriction, by divine statutory enactment, of worship, by man, to God alone. The prohibition was persistently reiterated in the progress of the Old Testament economy (2 Kings 17:35, 36) and the observance of the restriction was most dramatically exemplified in the primitive church. Thus, when Peter entered His presence, "Cornelius fell down at his feet and worshipped him" (Acts 10:25). The Centurion very properly regarded the Apostle as an ambassador of God, but, being a pagan, he could not know that, in the true religion, divine honors must be paid *directly* to God. Peter promptly rejected the proffered worship, as idolatrous, bidding the Roman to stand up and saying: "I myself also am a man" (v. 26). "Sirs, why do ye these things? We are men of like passions (nature) with you" (14:14, 15), protested Barnabas and Paul, with rent garments, at Lystra, against the purpose of the priest of Jupiter who "brought oxen and garlands unto the gates, and would have done sacrifice with the multitudes" (v. 13). "And I fell down before his feet to worship him" (Rev. 19:10; 22:8, 9), wrote St. John, concerning his angel instructor on Patmos. The angel, however, also being a creature and therefore not an object of wor-

<sup>6</sup> If Christ were not divine, His worship by the angels, here enjoined, would plainly be idolatrous. Must not His Socinian friends, then, under stress of the logical situation, charge God with instituting idolatry in the spirit world?

<sup>7</sup> The assumption is justified, on general principles, that worship by angels as well as by men is restricted to God alone.



ship, made peremptory protest, saying: "See thou do it not: I am a fellow-servant with thee and with thy brethren that hold the testimony Jesus: worship God" (v. 10).

Unlike these men and their "fellow-servant," the angel, who rejected divine honors as due to God alone, Christ, whose integrity is unquestioned, ACCEPTED the adoring homage of the disciples (Matt. 28:17) and the logic of the dual situation clearly demonstrates His divinity.

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## VI.

# THE SOURCES OF THE GOSPEL OF LUKE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GOSPEL OF MARK.

LEE M. ERDMAN.

A careful comparison of the synoptic gospels reveals a marked difference in literary style and method of treatment of the materials at the disposal of their authors, or we might say editors. Mark, the shortest and earliest of the gospels, is a terse, vivid account of the public career of Jesus. Its author is ever conscious of His power, and in a few bold artistic strokes paints the picture of the majestic figure of Jesus as teacher and healer, and as the suffering, dying, and risen Lord. The Gospel of Matthew is throughout informed with a stately, solemn style representing Jesus especially as the promised Messiah, the fulfiller of Old Testament prophecy. The third Gospel, however, the last of the three to assume its present form, exhibits characteristics which strikingly differentiate it from the other two. Renan calls it "the most literary of the Gospels" and "the most beautiful book in the world." Luke's Greek, especially when free from the influence of Aramaic sources, is nearer to classic Greek than any of the Synoptists. He is the only evangelist, as Plummer has stated, "who writes history as distinct from memoirs." He writes "in order" and connects his narrative with the history of Syria and Rome. He reveals throughout his interest in emphasizing the universal aspect of the Messiah. His descent is traced from Adam, the father of the human race, rather than from Abraham, the father of the Jewish race. His ministry extends to all men. In this gospel He is especially represented as the friend of publicans and sinners. The parables of "The Good Samari-



tan," "The Lost Sheep," "The Prodigal Son," are found only in this gospel and emphasize the abundant grace of God.

These characteristics of the third gospel are undoubtedly due to the personality of its author, Luke the Gentile Christian physician and companion of Paul. The drift of modern critical opinion under the leadership of Harnack ("Luke, the Physician") has been toward the acceptance of the Lukan authorship of the third gospel and the Book of Acts on the ground of linguistic and historical evidence. Our present task is to attempt to point out the sources, oral or written, which were employed by the author of this gospel, paying special attention to the Gospel of Mark. In doing so we must bear in mind the literary methods of the age that gave birth to the Gospel. To incorporate other writings in one's own work, without mention of such action, was quite the order of the day. The gospels consist of compilations of oral and written material. Luke explicitly states that he is indebted to others "who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word" for the sources of his information. He himself was not of that fortunate number. But in view of the fact that many have written narratives, Luke having had special opportunity to trace all things accurately from the first, will also draw up his account for the edification of Theophilus. Unless Luke had had at least some additional information at hand, and a consciousness that he could improve upon the narratives already written, we cannot well imagine any justification for his writing. "No other gospel is throughout so full, for of the 170 sections contained in the Synoptic narrative 48 are peculiar to Luke."<sup>1</sup>

When we attempt to penetrate the present form of Luke in order to discover the sources which have entered into its composition, the entire synoptic problem confronts us. In dealing with this question I have found no book so helpful, so thorough and sober in its methods of criticism as the recent volume "Oxford Studies in the Synoptic Problem" written

<sup>1</sup> Plummer, *Commentary on Luke*, p. 4.

by members of the University of Oxford under the editorship of the great New Testament scholar Dr. Sanday. The views particularly of Dr. Sanday and Sir John Hawkins in so far as they bear on the present subject, appealed to me with greater weight because of their simplicity as contrasted with the complex theories of Dr. Streeter and Dr. Allen, and in this paper we shall occupy in the main the position of the former rather than the latter.

In accounting for the sources of Luke we assume what is commonly known as the "Two Document Hypothesis." We assume that the marked resemblances are due to the use of common documents, and that the fundamental documents are two in number: (1) A complete Gospel practically identical with our St. Mark, which was used by the evangelists St. Matthew and St. Mark; and (2) a collection mainly, but not entirely, of discourses which has been termed "Q," which furnishes the common matter found in Matthew and Luke, but not in Mark. In addition Luke had lesser oral and written sources to which he was indebted for the matter peculiar to his gospel.

A long line of ancient tradition beginning with Papias<sup>2</sup> testifies that the second gospel was composed by John Mark, the companion of Paul and afterward of Peter, who recorded the reminiscences of Peter concerning the words and deeds of Jesus, paying more attention, however, to accuracy than to order. This gospel of Mark, substantially in the form in which we have it today, was the first and chief source for Matthew and Luke. "Rather more than three-fourths of St. Matthew's Gospel, viz., 816 verses out of 1068, and rather more than two-thirds of St. Luke's Gospel, viz., 798 verses out of 1149 may be taken as generally supporting the now prevailing opinion that the compilers of these two gospels used the Gospel of St. Mark—pretty nearly, if not quite, as we have it—not only as one of their most important sources, but as a framework."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Quoted by Eusebius, *H. E.*, III, 39.

<sup>3</sup> Hawkins, in *Oxford Studies*, p. 29.



This general statement, however, does not apply to what forms nearly a quarter of the first gospel, viz., Mt. 8 to 13, containing 252 verses, nor to what forms nearly one-third of the Third Gospel, viz., Lk. 9:51–18:14, containing 350 verses. In these sections the Marcan arrangement is put aside.

Examining now more particularly the Gospel of Luke we find that we must account for the divergence from the Marcan source, not only in the disuse of the Marcan source in 9:51–18:14, but more particularly for what is known as “The Great Omission” by Luke of the matter contained in Mark 6:45–8:26, and also for the many changes from the Marcan order found in Luke’s passion narrative 22:14–24:10.

The section in Lk. 9:51–18:14, is generally called “The Great Interpolation,” because of the striking variations from the Marcan account which this section exhibits. Hawkins after a detailed investigation concludes that Mark’s Gospel was entirely disused as a direct authority for this section. This conclusion is also accepted by Dr. Sanday. Let us point out briefly the arguments which Hawkins advances.

There is a section of Luke preceding “The Great Interpolation” extending from 6:20–8:3 which indicates that Luke here also laid aside his Marcan source, and therefore lends weight to the opinion that he did so in “The Great Interpolation.” In this section we find that the setting is completely different in Luke and Matthew from what it is in Mark. For instance, we find that the words “with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you” are identical in Mk. 4:24, Mt. 7:2 and Lk. 6:38. But when we look at the context, we find that it is the same in Matthew and Luke, this saying occurring in connection with the injunction concerning judging and giving; however in Mark we find that it follows the command concerning hearing, “Take heed what ye hear.” “Here as sometimes elsewhere in reports of a discourse, it is the Marcan connection which gives the impression of being the less original.” This seems to be the case also in the quotation from Mal. 3:1. “Behold I send my messenger before my

face," which is recorded in Mt. 11:10 and Lk. 7:27 as spoken by Jesus after the message from John in prison, but which Mark 1:2 uses as an introduction to his account of the Baptist's preaching in the wilderness. There is a third case of parallelism between all the Synoptists in the description of the anointing of Jesus by a sinful woman in the house of the Pharisee, Lk. 7:36; and in the account of the anointing by Mary at Bethany, Mt. 26:6 and Mk. 14:3 ff. "But these resemblances between the two narratives are so very largely outweighed by the differences between them, as to the time and place of the action and the teaching founded upon it, as to make it clear that any influence of the one upon the other can only have been very indirect."

The disuse of the Marcan source, as seen in this section, is more strikingly evident in the section 9:51-18:14. This section, we remember, contains material found only in Luke, such as the parables of "The Good Samaritan," "Prodigal Son," "Lost Sheep," etc. But, in addition to these narratives, peculiar to Luke, this entire section exhibits certain phenomena which indicate that the author broke away from his Marcan framework and drew upon other sources. To substantiate this Hawkins furnishes a striking argument as the result of a minute investigation showing that of the eleven doublets occurring in the Gospel of Luke, nine have one member in this section, although it is only one-third of the length of the whole gospel. This in itself indicates that the author was using an additional and independent source, for one who like Luke laid claim to accuracy and orderliness, would not repeatedly let himself use twice over materials derived from a single source. This assumption is substantiated by the evidence that the member of the Lucan doublet, which corresponds to Mark in position, is also considerably more similar to Mark in wording than is the member which occurs in the interpolation. In the same way Hawkins furnishes a list of short sayings (p. 38) found in this section which are placed in entirely different position from that which is assigned to them in Mark. The



verbal similarities are found also to be greater between the Marcan and Matthaean, than between the Marcan and Lucan versions of these sayings. As to the nature of the particular source to which Luke was indebted for this part of his gospel, we cannot be very certain. Hawkins is not inclined to believe that he incorporated an entire section of the Logia (Q) exclusively of all other authorities, but rather that Luke laid aside the Marcan account at this point to follow the accounts of some who were still living in Caesarea or Jerusalem, and who had been "eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word," on this last journey of Jesus. But this distinction, which Luke himself draws between the narrators of whom he was one and those who were their informants, forbids us to accept a tradition which placed Luke among the seventy disciples who accompanied Jesus on this journey.

But in addition to explaining the motives that led to the "Great Interpolation" into the Marcan framework, the student is confronted in the next place with the task of accounting for the omission of an important section of Mark, viz., the matter contained in Mk. 6: 45-8: 26. This omission forms a startling contrast with the way Luke has dealt with Mark's gospel up to this point. From the commencement of the Baptist's ministry he has closely followed the order of Mark, supplementing it occasionally with fresh material, but here he omits entirely, nor does he at any later point introduce the matter contained in Mk. 6: 45-8: 26, which contains 74 verses, or almost exactly one-ninth part of the 661 genuine verses of our Second Gospel. Three theories have been advanced to account for this.

(a) The omission may have been unavoidable because this whole division of Mark may not have been inserted into that Gospel when Luke used it. In other words, that this section belonged to a deutero-Mark. But this theory is entirely refuted by the proofs, lexical and grammatical, which Hawkins submits (pp. 64-66) and which demonstrate the unity of authorship of the Second Gospel. Luke used the Greek form

of Mark, substantially as we have it to-day. And this Greek form was the work of one man throughout.

(b) A second theory advanced is that this division of the Second Gospel was omitted by Luke accidentally. Some suppose that he was misled into doing so by passing on in his manuscript from the mention of the feeding of the multitudes in Mk. 6: 42-44 to that in Mk. 8: 19-21, or from the name Bethsaida in 6: 45 to the same name in 8: 22. This does not commend itself to me. We cannot imagine Luke to have had such a slight knowledge of Mark, to have read it so few times. He might have overlooked in on a certain occasion; but we cannot think that he could have forgotten this section entirely. We rather feel that Luke was acquainted with this section, and that in accordance with the third theory:

(c) Luke omitted this section intentionally. The material was not of the kind that commended itself to Luke, as we shall see.

This section contains two passages which are absent from Matthew as well as from Luke—two accounts of miracles of healing Mk. 7: 31-37 and 8: 22-26. These narratives are the only ones in the Synoptic Gospels in which any other means than the laying on of hands is used by Jesus, and the means used in both of them—the application of saliva was so familiar in magic and medicine that it might seem to detract from the exceptional character of the miracles. "Something of the same effect might be produced by the gradual process of the recovery of sight by the blind man at Bethsaida as contrasted, for instance, with the case of the man or men at Jericho who immediately received their sight."

When we keep in mind one of Luke's striking traits, that which has been expressed by the German word "*Sparsamkeit*," we can understand why he avoided the selection of a number of incidents reported in this section of Mark. He was ever desirous of avoiding repetitions. Dr. Sanday (p. 25) makes a suggestion to account for this trait of Luke. He states that Luke may have been limited by the length of his roll of



papyrus. The length of a book or of the subdivision of a book was determined by the length of a roll of papyrus. It has been shown that the length of the rolls on which were written many of the ancient classics was from 24 to 28 feet. It has been calculated that the length of the text of Mark would require 19 feet of an average sized roll; John would require 23 ft. 6 in., Matt., 30 ft.; the Acts and Luke, about 31 or 32 feet respectively. The last figures are larger than those for any existing manuscripts. Doubtless Luke was pressed for space and had to economize his materials. Whatever, we can conceive, brought no new teaching was omitted. Thus we can understand why the miracle of "The Feeding of the Four Thousand" (Mk. 8: 1-9) coming so soon after that of "The Feeding of the Five Thousand" (Mark 6: 30-46) is omitted. The miracle of "Jesus Walking on the Water" (Mk. 6: 47-56) is omitted because of its similarity to the "Stilling of the Tempest" (Mk. 4: 35-41) which is recorded. Luke limits in like manner the account of miracles worked on the plain of Gennesaret (Mk. 6: 53-56), because he has preserved a somewhat similar narrative in 6: 17-19 founded on Mk. 3: 7-11. There is a like tendency to limit the amount of anti-Pharisaical material. Thus Mk. 7: 1-23 is omitted. These denunciations appear in different form in a number of other places.

The omission of the section Mk. 8: 10-21 is accounted for on the ground of one of Luke's peculiarities, his tendency "to spare the twelve"—to say comparatively little of their faults and failings. Thus Luke passes over both the prediction that they all should be offended (Mk. 14: 27, Matt. 26: 31), and the fact that after their Master's arrest they all left him and fled. He omits the attempt of Peter to "rebuke" his Master, and the stern repulse with which it was met (Mk. 8: 32 ff., Matt. 16: 22 ff.); he has no record of the ambitious request of James and John (Mk. 10: 35-45, Matt. 20: 20-28). So likewise this section (Mk. 8: 10-21) is omitted as it includes the rebuke of the disciples because of their dulness and hardness of heart.

The section lastly containing the account of the cure of the Syrophenician woman's daughter (Mk. 7: 24-30) is omitted, because the manner in which the cure of a pagan is effected is so exceptional, as to have the effect of proving the rule that the Lord was not sent forth but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel. It would seem to be repellent rather than attractive to Luke's Gentile readers, so far as it was taken as bearing on the mutual relations of Jews and Gentiles in the Christian Church. It seems probable therefore, from what we know otherwise of Luke as an author, that he was disposed to pass over the varied matter contained in this entire section (6: 45-8: 26).

The third of these limitations of Luke's use of Mark is of a different kind from the first and second which we have just noticed. In the passion narrative extending from Lk. 22: 14 to 24: 10 we find that Luke does not desert the Marcan source as in the previous case, but that he uses it with a freedom which we find nowhere else in those portions of Luke which have a Marcan basis. Hawkins (p. 78) has shown by comparing the 123 verses of Luke's Passion-narrative with the 130 verses of Matthew's parallel narrative (Matt. 26: 20-28; 28: 6) in their respective agreement with Mark that 51 per cent. of Matthew's words agree either wholly or in part with the words used in Mark, but on the other hand only 27 per cent. of Luke's words show such an agreement. That is to say, Matthew adheres to Mark's language almost twice as closely as Luke does. In the Lucan account of the ministry of Jesus, which appears to be founded on Mark, we find about the same percentage of verbal agreement with Mark as Matthew shows, viz., 51 per cent. "In other words, the verbal correspondence with the Marcan source is about twice as great in the Lucan account of the ministry as it is in the Lucan account of the passion."

But another and more remarkable distinction is found in the transposition or inversion of the material of the passion narrative. The twelve digressions from Mark's order are the following:



1. In Lk. 22: 15–23 the reference to the coming betrayal is recorded before the institution of the Lord's Supper.

2. (a) If the short Western text used by Wescott and Hort is adopted in Lk. 22: 17–20, the only cup mentioned is given before the bread at the Last Supper and not after it, as in Mk. 14: 22–24 (so Matt. 26–28).

(b) If the usual and longer text is there followed, there is a transposition of another kind, for the saying "I will not drink from henceforth," etc., in Lk. 22: 18–20 precedes, while in Mk. 14: 22–25 it follows the words of institution.

3. In Lk. 22: 21–23 the condemnation of the traitor precedes, in Mk. 14: 19–21 it follows the question of the disciples as to which of them should be the traitor.

4. In Lk. 22: 33 Peter's denial is foretold before, in Mk. 14: 29–32 after the departure from the upper room.

5. In Lk. 22: 56–71 Peter's denials are recorded before the examination by the high priest and the mockery by the soldiers there, but in Mk. 14: 55–72 after these incidents.

6. In Lk. 22: 63–71 the mockery is related before, but in Mk. 14: 55–65 after the examination.

7. In Lk. 23: 35–38, the superscription on the cross is not mentioned until after the reviling and mockery by the rulers and soldiers, in Mk. 15: 26–32 it precedes the same.

8. Mark mentions mockery from the soldiers only at an early stage of the passion (15: 16–20), referring to the Prætorium. Luke in 23: 36 mentions it in connection with the offering of vinegar to Jesus on the cross. He also speaks of Herod's soldiers as mocking.

9. In Lk. 23: 45 the rending of the veil is recorded before, in Mk. 15: 37 ff., after the death of Jesus.

10. The time of the request of Joseph for the body of Jesus and its burial, viz., the evening of the préparation, is only mentioned by Luke (23: 50–54) after the account of the request of Joseph and the entombment, but it is named before these incidents in Mk. 15: 42–46. In Luke the notice of the time however may have reference to the following statement about the women.

11. In Lk. 23: 56 the preparing of spices and ointments is mentioned before the Sabbath is named, and if we had no other information, we should have supposed that this work was done on the eve of the day of rest; in Mk. 16: 1 the spices are said to have been brought when the Sabbath was past. Matthew has no mention of spices or ointments.

12. Luke in 24: 1-10 does not mention the names of the women until after he has described their visit to the tomb; Mark in 16: 1-8 commences his account by naming them.

The consideration of these remarkable variations, both linguistic and in the use of material from the Gospel of Mark, call for an explanation. It is self-evident that these variations were the result of reliance upon oral rather than upon written tradition. We cannot imagine a copyist consciously or unconsciously making so many digressions. It is inconceivable that any original source ever existed to which Luke was indebted for the form of his passion narrative. By what process then, we ask, did the passion narrative of Luke assume its present form. Hawkins makes a suggestion which seems to account satisfactorily for all the facts involved (p. 90 ff.). Luke was a disciple of and a fellow-worker with St. Paul. He must have been a preacher of Christianity after the Pauline type, and must have been mainly occupied with the Pauline range of subjects. We know from the extant epistles of Paul and from the account of his preaching in Acts that there is a remarkable coincidence between the Pauline conception of the passion and the passion narrative of Luke. Paul, as far as we know, seldom quoted teachings of Jesus or related His miracles. The Cross and the Resurrection were the great themes. Paul and Luke must have frequently therefore proclaimed the facts of the passion, and when Luke came to write this part of his Gospel, he relied upon his memory to reproduce the familiar story, rather than upon written sources, with the result that his narrative showed the very variations which we might expect under these circumstances.

But, besides the Gospel of Mark, Luke used two additional



sources: an early document commonly called "Q," which contained the matter common to Luke and Matthew, and (as some suppose, although this is questioned by others) of which Mark was ignorant; and lastly special written memoirs, in which were included the matter peculiar to Luke.

Concerning the substance and extent of the rather elusive document called Q, we cannot speak at length in this connection. It is formulated differently by various scholars and the character which this document is made to assume is due, we cannot help but feel, to no little extent in each case to the theological prepossessions of the writer.

A school of critics represented by Harnack<sup>4</sup> and Sanday<sup>5</sup> defines this Q source of Luke as being practically identical with the source employed by Matthew. Another school represented by J. Weiss, Dr. V. H. Stanton, Dr. Bartlet, and Dr. Allen<sup>6</sup> conceives the Q source of Luke as being different from Matthew and containing imbedded in it the special narratives peculiar to Luke.

We prefer the position of the first school as being on the whole more satisfactory and the explanations more simple. We cannot enter here upon an explanation of how the substance of Q assumed a slightly different complexion in the narratives of Matthew and Luke.

Concerning the character of the special sources we may refer to Harnack's suggestion<sup>7</sup> that the special information of Luke was derived from Philip and his prophesying daughters. Luke met Philip and his daughters at Cæsarea<sup>8</sup> and probably later in Asia. Papias, who himself saw the daughters, expressly states that they transmitted stories of the old days.<sup>9</sup>

This view is rather substantiated when we remember how

<sup>4</sup> *Luke the Physician*, p. 128.

<sup>5</sup> *Oxford Studies*, p. xxiii.

<sup>6</sup> The last two in *Oxford Studies*.

<sup>7</sup> *Luke the Physician*, pp. 153 ff.

<sup>8</sup> Acts 21: 9.

<sup>9</sup> Eusebius, *H. E.*, III, 39, 9.

large a part of the matter peculiar to this gospel deals with the feminine element. In his "Commentary on Luke" Plummer states:<sup>10</sup> "It is a detail, but an important one, in the universality of the Third Gospel, that it is in an especial sense the Gospel for women." All through this gospel they hold a prominent place, Elizabeth, the Virgin Mary, the prophetess Anna, the widow at Nain, the nameless sinner in the house of Simon, Mary Magdalene, Joanna, Susanna, the woman with an issue, Martha and Mary, the widow with the two mites, the "daughters of Jerusalem," and the women at the tomb are all given a prominent place for the first time by Luke. Prophesying is the gift of some of these women. Elizabeth and Hanna and the women are the first evangelists of our Lord's resurrection, according to Luke 24:10. When we remember that another collection of stories in Luke is distinguished by the interest shown in the Samaritans, villages of Samaria in which the Gospel was preached are mentioned only in Luke (9:52-56 and Acts 8:25) and that Philip's great achievement was the evangelization of Samaria (Acts 8:14), "it seems probable that we have here a body of tradition which rests upon the authority of St. Philip and his daughters."

Harnack speaks slightly of this element in our gospel. He says: "Its authenticity is almost entirely dubious and it must be described as for the most part legendary." It is here that we dissent from Harnack's judgment. The unique charm of the Gospel of Luke is the presence of the prophetic element in his feminine characters. A highly poetical form of literature is not necessarily unhistorical. No one could have composed the Magnificat as a work of pure fiction. We prefer to say with Plummer, "Nothing that has come down to us of that age leads us to suppose that any writer could have composed these accounts without historic truth to guide him, any more than an architect of that age could have produced the Milan cathedral."

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<sup>10</sup> Intro., pp. xlii ff.



## VII.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

From Plato's *Republic* to the middle of the nineteenth century the world's social utopias, whether French, English, German, Italian, Greek or Roman in conception and national coloring, were predominantly communistic in character. Those of the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth clearly reflect the marked change of interest from communism to socialism and anarchism as schemes of social reform. To be sure, communism lends itself more readily to utopian treatment than either socialism or anarchism; for it usually springs from a spiritual enthusiasm, which, while very sure of its end, feels little concern for the means of attaining a proposed end; nor have its speculative and idealistic tendencies suffered any material check through the various experiments in practical communism which were inaugurated in the first half of the nineteenth century, particularly in the United States. Socialism and anarchism, on the other hand, despite the fact that they have never been tried anywhere, have hewn closer to the line of feasibility. The further fact that they stand for governmental enterprise on a colossal scale, in the one case, and the abolition of all government, in the other, has compelled them to take serious account of the question of means. And, again, inasmuch as both socialism and anarchism at least profess to be based upon a scientific analysis of forces now at work in society, not only have they been less favorable to ideal schemes of social regeneration, but for a time their influence appears to have completely suppressed all social speculation of a utopian character. This was the case when the European revolutions of 1848 promised a speedy realization

of the world's hopes of a radical transformation of human society politically and industrially. Men were then engrossed with the prospect of an immediate social betterment. A better social order seemed within their grasp, and they left off dreaming. Until well into the ninth decade of the century no utopias of importance made their appearance, and until the beginning of the eighth there were none at all. But with the complete subsidence of the revolutionary uprisings leaving no tangible results in the way of social betterment, men began to realize that their hopes had been premature and that the changes which they had so confidently regarded as impending were still far off. And as the prospect of social regeneration grew dimmer hope gave way to despair, and men took once more to dreaming of the time when "all would be better than well." The consequence was a new wave of social utopias, which set in a quarter of a century ago, and which has not yet exhausted itself.

These recent utopias may be divided into four classes:

a. Socialistic utopias, represented by Rossi's *Un Commune Socialista* (1884), and Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888) and its sequel, *Equality* (1897). The first bases its socialism on contract, the other two on the state.

b. Anarchistic utopias, of which Morris's *News from Nowhere* (1890) and Bode's *Indivi* (1892) are the best representatives, the one representing communistic anarchism, and the other anarchism of the individualistic type.

c. Coöperative utopias, based on the principle of individualistic coöperation, and represented by Hertzka's *Freiland* (1891); *Reise nach Freiland* (1894), *Entrückt in die Zukunft* (1895); Secretan's *Mon Utopie* (1892); and Flürscheim's *Money Island* (1896).

d. Scientific utopias, which utilize modern scientific and technical discoveries in the construction of ideal societies, and which are transitional between full-fledged utopianism on the one side and scientific socialism and anarchism on the other. Representatives of this class are Lytton's *The Coming Race*



(1871); and Wells' *Anticipations* (1901), *A Modern Utopia* (1905), and *New Worlds for Old* (1908).

The best known of socialistic utopias is *Looking Backward*, to which belongs the distinction of being the first American utopia. Its author, Edward Bellamy (1850-1898), was a native of Massachusetts, who, after completing his education in Germany, returned to the United States and was admitted to the bar. Having no taste for the practice of law he soon drifted into journalism. Besides writing for various newspapers he was for a time an associate editor of the Springfield (Mass.) *Union* and later an editorial writer for the New York *Evening Post*. His first ventures in the field of pure literature were four novelettes, all of them dreamy fantastic romances, which attracted no attention, although not without merit in the judgment of competent critics. William D. Howells was so impressed by their power that he declared that "the mantle of Hawthorne has fallen upon Mr. Bellamy." Then came *Looking Backward*, which was first published in 1888, and which again attracted little attention at first, though highly commended by the critics. It was not long, however, before it began to sell rapidly, owing in part at least to a marked revival of interest in social problems which its earnest spirit materially abetted. For a time it was the talk of the hour both in Europe and in America. In the United States alone 500,000 copies have been sold. It has also been translated into most of the European languages.

The book had its origin in the purpose of the author to write a fairy tale of social felicity which should picture an ideal humanity organized in a world-state. At the time he conceived his dream Bellamy, as he himself tells us, had no particular sympathy with projects for social or industrial reform, not that he was indifferent to the miserable condition of the mass of humanity, but because a more or less clear recognition of the depth and depth of the social problem and the utter inadequacy of proposed solutions had made him a thorough skeptic. The idea of applying to the problem of industry the



principles of military organization and discipline was suggested by the existing military establishments of Europe. More and more it was borne in upon him, as a result of his residence in Germany, that if the organization of an entire people on the basis of universal service for fixed and equal terms is the only just and efficient system of public defense, it must be also the most just and efficient system for the business of production. It was Bellamy's original purpose to locate his picture of an ideal humanity in the thirtieth century. But as he worked out the details of his scheme he became more and more impressed with the real virtue and potency of its governing principle. He recognized in the modern military system as he had not done before, "not merely a rhetorical analogy for a national industrial service, but its prototype, furnishing at once a complete working model for its organization, an arsenal of patriotic and national motives and arguments for its animation, and the unanswerable demonstration of its feasibility drawn from the actual experience of whole nations organized and manœuvered as armies." This idea led him to a complete recasting of the work. His purpose was no longer to picture a "cloud-palace for an ideal humanity" but rather the portrayal of a thing of beneficent and immediate possibilities. So impressed was he with the feasibility of his scheme that he placed its complete realization in the twentieth century instead of the thirtieth. He retained, however, its original romance form in order to secure a wider hearing for his ideas.

*Looking Backward* is in form the personal narrative of one Julian West, a young man of wealth and culture living in Boston, who because of chronic insomnia was accustomed to sleep in an underground stone chamber. When this seclusion from the noises of the street failed to bring sleep, as frequently happened, he sometimes called in a professional mesmerizer to put him into an hypnotic trance. This was the case on the night of May 30, 1887. That night the house was completely destroyed by fire. The remains of Mr. West's valet, who



knew how to resuscitate his master at a fixed time, were discovered in the ruins. The mesmerizer had left Boston that very night to locate in a distant city. No other besides these two knew the secret of the underground chamber, which, buried in ashes and debris, remained undiscovered until 113 years later, when a body of laborers engaged in digging the foundations of a new building brought it to light. Its sleeping occupant was resuscitated and introduced at a single bound into the midst of a marvellous social order, which had completely established itself during his long sleep, and which he proceeds to describe as it slowly reveals itself to him either through his own observations or the explanations of others.

The manner of the transformation from the civilization of the nineteenth century to that of the twentieth is quite in accord with the principles of evolutionary socialism. The progressive absorption of industry by increasingly larger combinations of capital, which was the most distinctive industrial feature of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had persisted until every industry had fallen under the absolute control of a few powerful syndicates. These syndicates had not only throttled competition and fixed prices at their pleasure, but they had also clearly demonstrated the superior efficiency of industry conducted on a large scale, under consolidated management, and without the wastes inseparable from the competitive principle. To be sure, the benefits of this increased efficiency had gone mainly to the rich and had served only to widen the gap between rich and poor. To secure still greater efficiency, and at the same time avoid the accumulated evils of an inequitable distribution of wealth, it was only necessary, so the social renovators of that day reasoned, to carry the process of combination one step further by consolidating the entire capital of the nation, and placing it in the hands of a single syndicate representative of the people to be used in the common interest. When this was finally accomplished, as it was without violence or revolution, the era of trusts had ended in The Great Trust. The nation organ-

ized as a gigantic business corporation had become the sole employer and capitalist, and had superseded the many irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons who conducted business at their caprice and solely for their own profit. That the transition from the old to the new order was not attended with violence was due to the gradual enlightenment of public opinion, which, when it once recognized the great advantages of consolidation and the real significance of the era of trusts and syndicates as a necessary step in the evolution of the true industrial system, inevitably led the people to the point where they resolved to assume control of their own business; and when public opinion was once brought to this point opposition to the change on the part of the small class of beneficiaries under the old order of things would have been futile. No change in human nature was required either to establish or maintain the new social order. The only change needed was a change in the conditions of human life and the motives of human action. Unlike the old system, which places officials under a constant temptation to misuse their power for the private benefit of themselves or others, the new system by touching the nobler springs of human character and action rendered greed and selfishness motiveless.

The nation, having assumed the responsibilities of capital by taking over the ownership of all the means of production and the conduct of all industry, is the sole employer, and all the citizens are by virtue of their citizenship its employees. These employees are organized and disciplined after the manner of the military establishments of the nineteenth century. As it was then the duty of every citizen not mentally or physically incapacitated to contribute his military services to the defense of the nation, so now it is equally the duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of intellectual or industrial services to the maintenance of the nation. The period of industrial service is twenty-four years, extending from the age of twenty-one to forty-five. The years before twenty-one are given to education. There is no child labor problem,



therefore, to vex the nation. The period after forty-five is designed for culture and recreation. In cases of industrial emergency, however, arising from sudden and great increases in the demand for labor, the citizen remains liable to special calls ten years longer. The 15th day of October is the great day of the year. It is known as Muster Day when those who have reached the age of twenty-one are mustered into the industrial army and those who have completed their period of industrial service are honorably mustered out.

The problem of properly apportioning the labor force of a nation among the various industries has proved a troublesome one for modern socialism. But in *Looking Backward* the process is simple in the extreme. Each one is free to choose that particular trade for which he is best fitted by his natural aptitudes. It is only in this way that his service will be most profitable to the nation as well as most satisfactory to himself. To this end teachers and parents are under obligation to watch indications of special aptitudes in children in order that a wise choice may be made. And, furthermore, the rudiments of all the principal trades are taught in the schools, which greatly aids each one to find himself industrially; and the consequence is that the trade has usually been selected long before the close of the period of education. It is necessary of course that the supply of volunteers in each trade be adjusted in some way to the demand. This is accomplished through the principle of relative advantage. When the supply exceeds the demand in a given trade the inference is that that trade offers greater attractions than others. Its attractions are diminished, therefore, and in the reverse case where the supply of volunteers falls short of the demand the attractions are increased, until all trades are equally attractive to persons having natural aptitudes for them. This equalization is made possible by adjusting the hours of labor to the degree of attractiveness, so that fewer hours are required for a day's labor in the more arduous trades and more hours in the less arduous ones. The adjustment is not, however, determined

in accordance with any *a priori* principle, but simply follows the fluctuations of opinion among the workers themselves as these are indicated by the rate of volunteering. While no precaution known to modern science and calculated to secure the health and safety of the laborer is neglected, yet if there is any industry, which, because of unavoidable difficulties and dangers, should fail to command any volunteers, no matter to what extent the hours of labor should be reduced, it would only be necessary, in order to secure an overplus of volunteers, to take such trade out of the common order of occupations by declaring it "extra-hazardous" and those who pursued it especially worthy of the national gratitude. If, on the other hand, the supply of volunteers should exceed the demand in a given trade, despite all reasonable attempts at equalization, preference would be given those who had acquired the most knowledge of the trade in question, and the others would be assigned to their second or third choice of occupation. This principle of second and third choices is important in view of the constant necessity of readjusting supply and demand promptly by transferring laborers from one part of the industrial field to another. Such necessity might arise in various ways through a sudden failure of volunteers, a sudden need for an increased force of volunteers, unforeseen changes resulting from the progress of invention, changes in the relative demands for various commodities.

The problem of securing an adequate supply of unskilled or common labor, another difficult point with modern socialism, is solved by the simple device of requiring from all that the first three years of their period of service be given to that kind of labor. This is a time of severe discipline when young men are taught habits of obedience, subordination and devotion to duty. Every form of excellence receives some distinction, and every piece of negligence incurs a penalty. In this period, too, the laborer may be assigned to any work at the discretion of his superiors; and it is only at the end of the three years that he makes his formal choice of occupation.



Should he have no choice then, or be so stupid as to be unfitted for any trade, he would remain permanently in the ranks of unskilled labor. The choice of a trade is not necessarily final. While frequent and capricious changes are discouraged it is permissible under certain conditions to volunteer for another occupation on the same terms as before. Professions are chosen in the same way as trades, with this difference, however, that the opportunity for a professional training remains open until the age of thirty. To permit any one to enter a professional school after that age would leave too brief a period of service before the age of discharge. When any one finds himself unable to meet the severe requirements of the professional schools it is evidence that he has mistaken his vocation, and he is forthwith returned to the industrial service.

Having served three years in the ranks of unskilled labor, the young man enters the trade which he has selected, or which has been selected for him, as an apprentice. At the end of his apprenticeship he becomes a full workman and a member of his trade guild. Here again, as in the case of unskilled labor, detailed individual records are kept to indicate ability and industry, on the basis of which distinctions and penalties are meted out, and the standing of each workman determined. In each trade the workers are divided into three grades on the basis of merit; and in the larger ones these grades are again divided into first and second classes. The grade to which the full workman is assigned is determined in the first instance by his general record as an apprentice. Then at periodic intervals there is a regrading in which each one's standing is determined by his record in the preceding period. The results of each regrading are gazetted in the public prints, and those workmen who have succeeded in winning promotion receive the nation's thanks and are publicly invested with the badge of their new rank. Each industry has its distinctive style of badge which is the same in form for all grades. The only distinction between the badges of the several grades is in the material from which they are made,

that of the third grade being of iron, the second of silver and the first of gold. For excellence less than sufficient for promotion, and also for special feats and single performances, honorable mention and various sorts of prizes are awarded. Then there are also in the highest grade certain immunities with respect to discipline, and certain special privileges, among them that of electing a particular branch of a trade to be followed as a specialty. The entire system of grades and preferments is based on the principle that no form of merit shall wholly fail of recognition. On the other hand, if any one persistently refuses to render any service, though able to do so, he is sentenced to solitary imprisonment until he is ready to do his part. When a workman becomes an officer his rating is no longer determined by his work, but by the work of the men under him. He has every inducement, therefore, to hold every one subject to his orders to his full duty. And doing one's full duty means simply doing the best that he can. Those who do their best are equally deserving, regardless of what they accomplish. This is fundamental. It is to be emphasized, however, that a man's livelihood is in no sense dependent on his rating. Those who are too infirm in body or in mind to do much are organized into an invalid corps, and assigned tasks fitted to their strength. They do what they can, but whatever they do they receive the same income as those who are able.

Above the several grades of privates found in every industry are the various orders of officers: first, lieutenants or assistant foremen; then, captains or foremen, colonels or superintendents, major-generals or heads of guilds, under whose immediate direction all the operations of particular trades throughout the nation are conducted, lieutenant-generals or heads of the ten great departments into which all industry is divided; and, finally, the general-in-chief, who is the President of the United States, and who must have passed through all the lower grades of the industrial system, including that of unskilled labor. Promotion from the rank of private to that of officer,



or from one inferior grade of officer to another, is by appointment from above, and is strictly limited to those having the best records. The general of the guild makes all appointments to all the grades below his own, but he is himself chosen from the superintendents by the vote of those who have served their time in the guild and received their discharge at forty-five, and who are known as honorary members of their respective guilds. The active members of the guilds have no voice whatever in the election of their chiefs. The heads of departments are in like fashion elected from the heads of guilds by vote of the honorary members of all the guilds in their departments. The President of the United States is chosen by all the men of the nation not connected with the industrial army from former heads of departments who have been in retirement for a certain number of years. The purpose of this hiatus in service is to enable these former heads of departments to reach broader views, and approach industrial questions from the viewpoint of the entire nation rather than from that of the industrial army or particular parts of it. The President is usually about fifty years of age when elected, and serves five years. He is an honorable exception, therefore, to the rule of retirement at forty-five. At the end of his term of service a national congress is called to receive his report and express its approval or condemnation of what he has done. If his work meets with the approval of Congress he is usually elected by that body to represent the nation for another period of five years in the International Council, which exercises advisory powers over the nations which have adopted socialism, and which have organized themselves into a loose federation to promote their common ends. Congress also passes on the reports of the outgoing heads of departments and again approves or disapproves. The effect of a verdict of disapproval is to render the department head against whom it is entered forever ineligible to the office of President. The whole governing system is designed to afford every recognition to merit as a means of securing for the nation the highest talent and effort

in every walk of life. The tests by which a man rises are so various and severe that only those of exceptional qualities can hope to reach positions of responsibility. And to attain such positions he needs above all else the esteem of his fellows. There is every inducement, therefore, to faithfulness. Corruption is impossible for there is neither poverty to bribe nor wealth to bribe with. Intrigue for office is equally out of the question because the conditions of promotion are based entirely upon merit.

The liberal professions are not an integral part of the industrial army, and their members, while vested with the duty of electing the President, are not themselves eligible to that office. The reason for their ineligibility is that since the chief duty of the President is to exercise a general supervision over all industry, it is essential that he should have passed through all the grades of the industrial system. Each profession has its guild, the government of which is vested in a board of regents chosen by the honorary members of the guild and responsible to Congress. The President is *ex-officio* chairman of the several boards of regents, and has a casting vote at their meetings. While the nobler minds have less need of such special incentives as prizes and honors, which are so necessary to call out the best endeavors of the average man, the professions are not without their decorations and distinctions to indicate the honor in which their members are held by their fellows and by the nation. Membership in the various literary, art and scientific societies is greatly prized. But the highest honor that can come to a member of a liberal profession is the red ribbon which is bestowed by vote of the people upon the great authors, artists, engineers, physicians and inventors. A lesser degree of excellence is indicated by a blue ribbon.

The radical change which was inaugurated in the system of production when the nation was made the sole producer necessitated no less radical changes in the conditions of exchange and distribution. In fact there is no exchange at all, as that term is understood in competitive systems of industry with all



its vast and complicated mechanism of banks, money, credit, middlemen. Exchanges between individuals, while not impossible, are unnecessary. Every one works for the nation, and gets what he wants from the national warehouses through a system of direct distribution. Goods are delivered to the consumer from these warehouses on orders of the stores, which are distributed over the territory of a town or city in such numbers that no one is required to go more than three or four squares to reach one. These stores do not have goods for sale, but merely keep samples of all the different kinds of commodities made or imported by the nation; and from these samples, with the help of cards attached to them and containing their prices and brief descriptions of their qualities, the shopper is enabled to make an intelligent and convenient choice. There is no advertising of goods in newspapers or shop windows or by commercial travellers; and the sole function of the store is to take and transmit orders.

Each one's purchasing power, if it can be so called, is measured by the amount of his credit, which represents his share of the national income, and which is given to every citizen on the public books at the beginning of each year. By means of a card which indicates the amount of his credit he can procure whatever he desires whenever he desires it to the extent of his credit. These credit cards are reckoned in dollars and cents which are but algebraic symbols, since money is no longer in actual use. Such credit, being purely personal in character, is not transferable, save in exceptional instances, and only after the proper authority has inquired into all the circumstances to determine its equity. Ordinarily there is no occasion for any transfer of credit. Gifts might conceivably be exchanged between relatives and friends, but there cannot possibly be any buying and selling between individuals. These are inherently anti-social, being absolutely inconsistent with that mutual benevolence and disinterestedness and community of interest which ought to prevail among the citizens of a free

and enlightened commonwealth. If any one is under the necessity of exhausting his credit before the end of the year through extraordinary expenditures, he may obtain a limited advance on his next year's credit. But this is not encouraged, and a heavy discount is charged to keep it within narrow limits. An unexpended balance at the end of the year is ordinarily turned into the general surplus on the presumption that it was not needed. But in particular instances, again, where a special outlay is anticipated of which due notice has been given to the proper authority, such balances are permitted to accumulate to a certain extent. There is, therefore, no incentive to thrift which is so important a consideration in a competitive system of industry; nor is there need of any, since the nation guarantees the nurture, education and comfortable maintenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave, so that no one need have any care for the morrow, either for himself or for his children. Each one's credit ceases at death with a fixed allowance for funeral expenses; and what he has accumulated during his lifetime he disposes of as he pleases. This will be limited in amount for the reason that land and capital are not subject to private ownership, while accumulations of personal property become burdensome the moment they exceed the demands of comfort. To provide the room and personal attention necessary to their care will only deplete their owner's credit without any commensurate advantage. For similar reasons his heirs and legatees will accept no more than they can use or give away, resigning the rest. The resigned chattels are taken over by the nation, and whatever is of value is turned once more into the common stock.

The principle according to which the national income is divided among the body of citizens is that of absolute equality. Each one's title to an equal share of the national income is based on the fact that he is a man; and all that is required of him is that he do his best. Those who do their best are equally deserving, regardless of the results of their labor. The amount



of work done is a mechanical thing and cannot measure desert which is a moral quality. It may have some bearing upon social distinction and official power, but these are determined primarily by diligence and faithfulness. The degree in which one does his best, if the expression is permissible—the author is not altogether logical at this point—indicates his social rating, but does not determine his share of the national income.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

AS OTHERS SAW US IN THE MAGAZINES 1840-1860.

A LIST OF TITLES AND BOOK NOTICES RELATING TO THE  
REFORMED CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES, APPEARING  
IN PUBLICATIONS NOT ISSUED BY THAT CHURCH.

The following list of titles of articles, of book notices, and quotations was gathered for the purpose of studying the outside sources of information concerning the Reformed Church. For the magazines covered, it aims at completeness between the years of 1840 and 1860, but contains a number of articles before and after those dates. Because of the great variety of sources consulted, the confusing number of series in certain publications, and their change of names, there is no attempt made to keep the form of page, volume, or year references uniform, but simply to avoid confusion on the part of those consulting them. Many of the references will seem very brief and trifling, but some of the shortest ones tell the most pointed stories, so all that were found were included.

*American Catholic Quarterly:*

Wolff, G. D., "Mercersburg Movement, The," III, 151.

*American Presbyterian Review:*

Harbaugh, H., "Schlatter, Michael, Life of," 1857, VI, 171.

"True Glory of Woman," 1859, VII, 157.

"Union with the Church," 1857, V, 696.

Nevin, Alfred, "Guide to the Oracles," 1858, VI, 694.

Nevin, J. W., "Mystical Presence," 1854, II, 663.

Rauch, F. A., "Inner Life of the Christian," 1857, V, 520.

*American Quarterly Church Review*—See *Church Review*.

*American Quarterly Register:*

Lancaster, Pa., Academy, May, 1833, 314.

Marshall College, February, 1839, 334.

Mercersburg Theological Seminary, do.

"Ministers of the Reformed Church in France, List of," from  
*Boston Recorder*, August, 1835, VIII, 69.

"Reformed Church in the United States," I, 197; II, 182;  
III, 251; IV, 226 (containing Dr. Mayer's estimate  
of the strength of the Church), February, 1832; V,  
317; VI, 201.



"Theological Seminaries of the Reformed Church in the United States," I, 121, 234 (giving curriculum); III, 306 (death of David Young in Georgia); V, 317; XI, 334.—Most of the references from this magazine are of but a few lines each, but have an interesting series of facts. The last one reads: "Theological Seminary, Mercersburg, Pa., Rev. Lewis Mayer, Senior Professor, Founded 1825—The students are all in the Junior Class and number nine." (Quoted in full.)

*American Quarterly Review:*

Nevin, J. W., "The Claims of the Bible urged upon the attention of students of Theology," opening address at the Western Theological Seminary, spoken November 8, 1831, IV, 229.

*Biblical Repository:*

Helfenstein, Jr., Samuel, Pastor of the German Reformed Church, Gwyned, Pa., "The Church of God," 2d series, 1839, II, 308–320.

Mayer, Lewis, "The Agony in Gethsemane," 2d series, April, 1841, V, 294–316.

"Expository Lectures," 3d series, July, 1845, I, 570.

"Law and the Prophets Fulfilled in Christ, The," an exposition of Matt. 5: 17–20, 2d series, April, 1839, I, 328–341.

"The Scriptural Idea of Angels," October, 1838, 356–388.

"The Sin Against the Holy Ghost," Book Notice, April, 1838, 506.

"The Sonship of Christ," as Taught in Rom. 1: 3, 4, Strictures on Hodge's Commentary on Romans, January, 1840, 138–174. See also the editor's note of doubt, pp. 166–67.

"The Wine Question," October, 1839, 408–439. See editor's notes refuting his position, 424 and 430.

Nevin, J. W., "Psychology of Rauch," October, 1843, 418–431.

Rauch, F. A., "Ecclesiastical Historiography in Germany," October, 1837, 297–317. Reprinted in the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW, July, 1905, 380.

"Psychology," noticed, July, 1840, 243–47. This review refers to the author as "Dr. Rauch, who is already familiarly known to our readers."

"Psychology," 2d edition, also notice of Rauch's death and reference to Nevin, July, 1841, 246–7.

Schaff, P., "The Church Question," January, 1846, 79–138.

*Bibliotheca Sacra and Theological Review:*

- Gerhart, E. V., "The German Reformed Church," Vol. XX, January, 1863, 1-78.
- Schaff, P., "America," review, Vol. XIII, January, 1856, 217-8.
- "Brethren of Christ, The," Vol. XXI, 1864, 855-869.
- "John Calvin," Vol. XIV, January, 1857, 125-146, review of Bonnett's "Letters of J. Calvin."
- "Church History," noticed, Vol. XVI, April, 1859, 454-6.
- "The Conflict of Trinitarianism and Unitarianism in the Anti-Nicene Age," Vol. XV, October, 1858, 726-744.
- "Constantine the Great and the Downfall of Paganism in the Roman Empire" (review of Burkhardt's work). Vol. XX, October, 1863, 778-798.
- "General Introduction to Church History," Vol. VI, August, 1849, 404, 409-441.
- "German Literature in America," Vol. IV, August, 1847, 503-521.
- "History of the Christian Church," notices, Vol. XXIV, 1867, 397-8.
- "Hymn Book" noticed, Vol. XVII, 1860, 233-4.
- "Kirchengeschichte," Vol. IX, January, 1852, 223-4.
- "Progress of Church History as a Science, The," Vol. VII, January, 1850, 54-91.
- "Rise and Progress of Monasticism," Vol. XXI, April, 1864, 384-424.
- "Tercentenary Jubilee of the Heidelberg Catechism," Vol. XX, July, 1863, 670-75. Bibliography, 674-5.
- "Tercentenary Monument of the Heidelberg Catechism," notices, Vol. XXI, January, 1864, 216-7.
- "Theological Schools in the United States, Enrollment," Vol. VIII, April, 1851, 458, July, 1851, 666.
- Williard, G. W., "Translation of Ursinus' Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism," Vol. X, April, 1853, 418.

*Boston Review:*

- Schaff, P., "Catechism for the Sunday-school and the Family," noticed, Vol. III, January, 1863, 111-2.
- "The Person of Christ," noticed, Vol. V, September, 1865, 515.

*Boston Quarterly Review:*

- Rauch's "Psychology," 2d ed., Vol. V, April, 1842, 254.
- A most appreciative comment in which the author says he had not seen the first edition, also that he purposes to return to the volume in a later issue, but this



was the last volume of the magazine. A number of editors promised such returns about the same time, but failed to keep their promises.

*Brownson's Quarterly Review:*

"The Church an Organism," January, 1858, 102-127. See pp. 112 sq.

"Mercersburg Hypothesis," XI, 253.

"Mercersburg Review," VII, 1850, 191.

"Mercersburg Theology," VII, 1850, 353.

*Catholic World:*

"Mercersburg Philosophy," V, 253.

"Mercersburg School in the German Reformed Church," XXIV, 459. A discussion of Dr. Nevin's position.

"Mercersburg Theology," XII, 1.

Schaff, P., "Church History," VIII, 417.

"Creeds of Christendom," review, XXVI, 284.

*Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany:*

"Germans in America,—reference to Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund," S. O., November, 1851, 350-359.

"Rauch's Psychology," 2d ed., noticed, XII, 385-8.

Schaff, P., "On Protestantism," translated by Nevin, noticed, 1845, 220.

"German Transcendentalism," 1845, 223, Prof. Stowe, 224.

"Der Deutsche Kirchenfreund," noticed, May, 1848, 467-9.

"History of the Apostolic Church," noticed, 1854, 155.

"Life and Labors of Augustine," noticed, 1854, 461.

"Church History," 1859, 438.

*Church Review*—same as *American Quarterly Church Review*:

Bomberger, J. H. A., "Infant Salvation," XXI, July, 1859, 495.

Gerhart, E. V., "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, An," XI, April, 1858, 163-4.

Harbaugh, H., "Heaven and Heavenly Recognition," XI, April, 1858, 162-3.

Kœppen, A. L., "The World in the Middle Ages," VII, January, 1855, 620-21.

Mercersburg Review, IV, July, 1851, 303.

Mercersburg Review, V, October, 1852, 460. This notice begins thus: "We have for years spoken of this work in a tone of caution. . . ."

Nevin, J. W., "Antichrist," I, October, 1848, 456.

"Proposed Liturgy of the German Reformed Church," XI, April, 1858, 48-63.

Schaff, P., "History of the Apostolic Church," VI, January, 1854, 607. The notice contains a peroration on

Mercersburg Theology and probable union between the Reformed and Protestant Episcopal Churches.

"History of the Christian Church," April, 1859, 329.

"History and Mercersburg Theology," October, 1859, 369-386.

"Life and Labors of St. Augustine," April, 1854, 134.

"What is Church History?" April, 1850, 137-138.

*Congregational Quarterly:*

"Ecclesiastical Statistics, German Reformed," Vol. II, April, 1860, 222.

*Congregational Review:*

"Schaff's Church History," Vols. I and III, reviewed; Vol. VII, July, 1867, 468.

*Eclectic Magazine:*

Schaff, P., with portrait, LXXXVII, 504.

*Evangelical Quarterly Review:*

"Church Question, The," Vol. II, 58.

*Littell's Living Age:*

"Schaff's Recollections of Neander," translation from Schaff's "Kirchenfreund," XXX, 163-169.

*Lutheran Quarterly:*

"Mercersburg Theology,—an Explanation," J. A. Brown, IV, 443.

"Schneck's Mercersburg Theology," reviewed by J. A. Brown, IV, 251.

*Methodist Quarterly Review:*

"Berlin Conference of 1857, The," July, 1858, 427; October, 1858, 538.

Gerhart, E. V., "An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy," April, 1858, 329-30.

Harbaugh, H., "Heavenly Recognition," notice, January, 1852, 154.

Kœppen, A. L., "The World in the Middle Ages," April, 1855, 320-1.

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CLAYTON HAVERSTICK RANCK.

THE EISENACH GOSPEL SELECTIONS MADE READY FOR PULPIT WORK. By R. C. H. Lenski. Two Volumes bound in one. Vol. I. Advent Sunday to Trinity Sunday. Pages 664. Vol. II. First Sunday After Trinity to Thanksgiving. Pages 451. 1910. Lutheran Book Concern, Columbus, Ohio.

The traditional selection of gospel and epistle lessons, which was accepted with some changes by the Reformers from the Catholic Church, has been considered unsatisfactory. One of the chief reasons is that the lessons present a disconnected and fragmentary view of the Scriptures. The omission from the original series of the texts for Wednesday and Friday widens the gap between the pericopes of the succeeding Sundays and, also, accounts for the fact that many choice sections of the Bible do not now appear in the old series.

To remedy this and other defects the leaders of the different state churches of Germany have published new pericopal selections. Among these are the selection of Weimar, 1825, of Baden, 1857, of Saxony, 1840-42, of Hamburg, 1843, of Rheinpreussen, 1846, and of the Conference of Eisenach, 1897. The last of this series is probably the most satisfactory and has been chosen by the author of these volumes for exposition. Whatever one may think about the relative merits of the traditional and of the modern selection, one will welcome, in the interest of variety and breadth of view, this truly monumental treatise of a new series of lessons adapted to the church year.

The author is a Lutheran pastor and expounds the Scriptures from a conservative Lutheran point of view. He has "undertaken to work out *the Eisenach Gospel Selections* in a way to meet as fully as possible the necessities and requirements of the Lutheran pulpit worker of to-day. He has handled these and other newer series of texts for some years in his own pulpit work, and his pleasure and profit have grown steadily."

According to the Eisenach Selections the year is divided into six cycles, extending from the Christmas to the Trinity cycle. Each cycle is complete in itself and is, also, an advance, in the unfolding of the plan of redemption, upon the preceding cycle. In a general introduction to each cycle the author discusses the formative ideas which run through all the lessons. Each lesson is then exegetically and homiletically expounded, closing with a series of eight to twelve themes with outlines for sermons. About



18 pages are given to each lesson. In the words of the Introduction, "An exegesis of the text is presented as thorough and sound—with a constant eye to the pulpit—as the author is able to furnish. He has embodied in it a multitude of *the gems of Lutheran expositors and preachers*. They will stimulate thought, suggest lines of treatment, and many of them—like those from Luther—will bear direct quotation in the sermon. *The Lutheran Confessions* have been used to a considerable extent for the same purpose. They are a store-house, full of rich treasures for the pulpit worker—a store-house, sad to say, untouched by many. *A little spiritual food for the preacher's own soul* has been introduced here and there as occasion offered. We preachers all need it. In the Homiletical Hints *suggestive thoughts, illustrative matter*, and other good things have been gathered. And finally for each text a series of *sermon outlines* has been added."

The author, who apparently is a busy Lutheran pastor, deserves to be congratulated upon the completion of so ponderous a work, covering about eleven hundred pages. We are sure that both he and his congregations were enriched by his patient and exact studies. In this country expositions of the pericopes are so rare that preachers will welcome this addition to the exegetical and homiletical literature. The book will appeal especially to the ministry of the churches which follow the order of the church year—the Lutheran, the Reformed, the Moravian, the Episcopalian. There is a growing tendency in the other churches to make use of the pericopal lessons as at least one rational plan for expounding the great facts and ideals of the kingdom of God. Even Congregationalists, Methodists and Baptists may find a work of this kind helpful.

We should prefer the expositions to be briefer. The size of the work is both its strength and its weakness. We are waiting for a short volume on the pericopes in which the genetic relations between the several cycles of the church year, between the gospels and epistles from Sunday to Sunday, and between the gospel and epistle of each Sunday are clearly and concisely presented. In addition to this a page or two of suggestive hints for the preacher would suffice. So much of the material in Nebe's work or in this book can be found in the current exegetical and homiletical commentaries. An exposition of the pericopal lessons should confine itself more directly to the relation of the specific season to the lesson and of the several lessons to one another.

The author confines himself more closely to Lutheran sources than the general reader may desire. This too is an element of strength and weakness. It will be lauded by the Lutherans; it may be regretted by American protestants generally. Of course no room is given to the critical and historical interpretation of the Scriptures. The modern note is lacking. The Lutheran con-



fessions are accepted as the standard of orthodoxy and all the expositions are colored by Lutheran dogma.

We commend this work to all pastors. It presents a new series of scripture lessons which have been carefully selected by German scholars and pastors. It contains valuable exegetical and homiletical material. For many a pastor it will be a new approach to the contents of the gospel.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

**THE HUMANITIES IN THE EDUCATION OF THE FUTURE.** By William Baxter Owen, Ph.D., Litt.D., Professor of the Latin Language and Literature in Lafayette College. Boston, Sherman, French and Company. Pp. 6 + 187. \$1.25 net.

This volume contains a series of addresses and talks given by the author on different occasions, and the treatment of the topics is sometimes in lighter sometimes in more serious vein. But it is easy to discern in all of them one dominant note which gives a certain unity to the series. The note is that of the scholar, the teacher, the educator, and in every case the topic is treated with literary skill and incisive clearness so as to present what is well said and what deserves to be said.

There are two memorial addresses, the one on Dr. Francis A. March and the other on Dr. W. C. Cattell. Then there are some which afford pleasant glimpses of college life: "Town and Gown," "College Fraternities" and "Freaks of College Sentiment." The larger portion, however, deals with questions of general interest to all educators and especially to college men. The author strongly advocates thorough discipline, literary culture, and the study of the humanities for their general human interest. The book is of general interest, a source of inspiration to every teacher, and a valuable contribution to the best educational thought of the day.

JOHN S. STAHR.

**WORLD EDUCATION.** By the Rev. Walter Scott, D.D. Boston, Mass., W. B. Clarke and Co. Cloth. 125 pages. Price \$1.00 net.

The author of this interesting and instructive little book has for some years been the secretary of the New England Education League, and of the International Education Conference. These positions have afforded him rare opportunity for the study of the subject dealt with in these pages, and for gathering the vast array of facts by which his discussion of the favorable conditions now prevailing for a world campaign of education is illustrated and illuminated. The important additions to the sum of knowledge, the commercial activities, the discoveries and inventions, and the social changes incident to such progress during the nineteenth century, have greatly facilitated, he argues, the possibilities of placing at the disposal of multitudes in every land who have



hitherto been deprived of it, a chance to learn not everything, of course, but anything within the limits of their powers. International relations, the diffusion of literature, the recognition of the universal brotherhood of man, the enlargement of missionary efforts and their more intelligent direction, and the progress of civilization—all are at present united in making this a time extraordinarily opportune, he thinks, for undertaking the campaign of world education according to the plans here suggested, and for the promotion of which these pages have been written. The scheme proposed, the statistics given, and the opportunities so forcefully pointed out, should prove of great service to the cause which Dr. Scott has so closely at heart.

A. S. WEBER.

PROBLEMS OF MODERN EDUCATION. By William Seneca Sutton. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. 260 pages. Price \$1.35 net.

An eminently successful pedagogical expert of wide experience—the occupant of the chair of educational administration in the University of Texas—in these addresses and essays makes a very valuable contribution to that branch of current literature which has to do with questions concerning instruction in secondary schools, colleges and universities, and the practical management of such institutions of learning in our times. Born, as all these papers have been, of a desire to meet the requirements of actual practical situations, they are concerned not so much with the presentation of abstract ideals, as with the application of thoroughly-tested and approved educational principles to the solution of the school-problems which abound at present. It is this that gives Professor Sutton's discussions the peculiar interest with which one reads them and the particular profit one derives from them. There is not a dull or uninformative page in the entire collection of these addresses, and an incalculably important and rewarding service, therefore, is sure to be rendered, not only to those that properly weigh the value of its suggestions, but, likewise, to the schools with which such persons may be connected as administrators or instructors. The concrete and practical idealism, which should be the characteristic and controlling principle of everyone that is responsible for either the administrative or pedagogical conduct of schools, is here duly accentuated and enforced, and in the light of this new incentive and direction should be found for the betterment of educational opportunities and for the more effective management of secondary schools and institutions of higher learning. These essays well deserve the attention they are certain to receive throughout the country.

A. S. WEBER.



AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF CHINA. By Herbert H. Gowen, D.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. 208 pages. Price \$1.20 net.

Owing to the political revolution which so recently has given birth to the youngest of republics, and to the new missionary interest which has been awakened in the people of that oriental nation, the appearance of this historical outline just now, is at once timely and welcome. The author, who is the lecturer on oriental history in the University of Washington, writes with competent historical knowledge and insight, and affords his readers, in brief yet comprehensive outline, an adequate narrative of the important historic events of China from the earliest times to the period of the Manchu Conquest in 1644 A. D. If a volume more satisfactory in its contents or better suited to the needs of ordinary students of Chinese annals than the present one is available in the English language, it has not been brought to the notice of the reviewer. It is cordially commended to preachers and Sunday-school teachers, to missionary societies and others, who desire authoritative information about China and its early history.

A. S. WEBER.

THE BOOK OF JOB. By Homer B. Sprague, Ph.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Flexible cloth. 243. pages. Price \$1.25 net.

The present study of the Book of Job is of a literary or poetic, rather than theological character. Its aim is to popularize it as a portion of the world's greatest literature, which, although its author is unknown, his nationality doubtful, his period undetermined, and even his purpose conjectural, is of perennial interest, as well to students of literature in general as to those of biblical documents in particular. In view of the fact that its versified portion constitutes more than nine tenths of the whole book, and of the fact that its introverting thoughts are expressed in poetic imagery, our author describes it in Dr. Genung's felicitous phrase as "The Epic of the Inner Life." His "explanatory notes" throw much light upon the language of the text, but are not submitted to sustain theological prepossessions or to supersede thought, but to create literary interest and to stimulate critical thought and inquiry. From this viewpoint of the author, this work carries and justifies the belief that the Book of Job is the greatest poem in the world's greatest literature, and supports Bates in saying that "no reader less dull than a clod can remain unreverent and unthrilled in its presence." This work of Dr. Sprague is entitled to a place in ministers' libraries side by side with the great Commentary by Dr. Barton on the same poem.

A. S. WEBER.



SONGS OF SEVEN YEARS. By Sydney Rowe. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Boards. 60 pages. Price \$1.00 net.

A collection of nearly fifty short pieces of poetry, many of which are as beautiful in sentiment as they are faultless in artistic construction, are gathered into these pages. The author evidently possesses many of the natural endowments and has cultivated many of the literary requisites needed for successful work in the field represented by these "Songs." The book is attractively gotten out by the publishers, and is suitable for presentation to younger and older lovers of verse.

A. S. WEBER.

SEEING THE INVISIBLE. The Swander Memorial Lectures, 1912. By the Rev. John P. Swander, D.D., Ph.D., F.S.Sc. Philadelphia, Reformed Church Publication Board. Cloth. Pages 258.

This volume is the latest as it is the ripest literary product of the venerable founder of the Swander Memorial Lectureship in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States at Lancaster, Pa. Theologian, philosopher, poet, scientist, Dr. Swander is one of the most remarkable men the church in America has produced. The Nestor of Reformed authors, his mental vigor is unabated, and so far from having fallen into the "sere and yellow leaf," he retains to a wonderful degree the bloom and freshness of his prime. If fruitful years have brought the "philosophic mind" and sunset clouds take on a "sober coloring" to his eye, the enthusiasm and fire of his youth, for all that, are with him yet. His long series of books are compact of wit and wisdom. His gift for copious expression is astounding. He has Johnsonian volubility, the sonorousness and splendor of Burke. The incisiveness and trenchancy of his criticism, the raciness and piquancy of his style, remind one now of De Quincey, anon of Swift or Lamb. During the twelve-month past, we have read all of his volumes comprised in the series bearing his distinguished name, and, while not always in perfect agreement with him, in all of them we have found entertainment, instruction, stimulus and permanent profit. Dr. Swander deserves well of the Reformed Church. He will take rank in our history as one of our most independent thinkers and foremost scholars. Above all, his name will always be revered and loved for his generous benefactions to the Church and her institutions, for whose sake he has given almost to the point of impoverishment and restricted himself to a Spartan simplicity of life. A savant of international reputation, a member of the London Society of Art, Science and Literature, whose gold medal crowned one of his meritorious works, the bearer of ecclesiastical honors and learned titles, he wears all these gathered laurels lightly and with simple dignity, a man to whom



may not inaptly be applied the ancient phrase: *Antiqua homo virtute et fide*.

"Seeing the Invisible," the significant and richly suggestive title of Dr. Swander's latest book of lectures delivered before the faculty and students of the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, represents, perhaps, the best of its author's observation and reflection, the thought and experience of a lifetime come to its ripeness. It could have been written only by a sage and a seer. It is a more new and later version, more simple and free from the technicalities of science, of the author's earlier works, "The Substantial Philosophy" and "The Invisible World." Standing on the mystic borderland of the visible and the invisible worlds, of matter and force, nature and spirit, he asseverates in the twentieth century, and from the standpoint of his scientific conviction, what was asserted by an apostle of the first century, giving the old, old truth a new meaning and a new application: "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal."

In his scientific, philosophic and religious inquiries after the various elements and phenomena in the comprehensive constitution of all finite being, the author starts with the assumption that all knowable substances are divisible into two classes, viz., material and immaterial entities. He holds that the immaterial elements in God's great creation, such as odor, gravity, magnetism, electricity, heat, sound, light and life, are not only just as real as the various forms of matter, but also the force elements by which matter is manipulated and made to serve its purpose under the divine plan of the ages and in the economy of the universe. It is claimed that to surrender the above mentioned position or postulate is to abandon the very Gibraltar of all sound reasoning by analogy in favor of the reality and immortality of the human soul as an organic entity distinct from and independent of the body. In other words, if the physical forces above mentioned are generated in the womb of matter and made to play the part of mere molecular motion, as advocated by the most popular of the world's leading physicists, there is no testimony from Nature's great book confirming the teachings of our direct revelation from Heaven that death does not end all that there is of man and for man. If, for example, electricity, heat, light, and sound have no existence distinct and separate from matter and motion, what unimpeachable evidence has reason to offer in support of our dearest hope that the soul of man will survive the throes of his physical dissolution?

Professor Swander has displayed much painstaking diligence in the development of his adopted principle and in the illustration of his somewhat unique position in science and philosophy. He acknowledges himself largely indebted to the incisive writings of



Dr. A. Wilford Hall in "The Problem of Human Life, Here and Hereafter." Yet he claims to have advanced in method and details beyond the position of that distinguished investigator. These lectures are now given to the public in the volume herein under review.

GEO. S. BUTZ.

THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM, Historical and Doctrinal Studies. The Swander Memorial Lectures, 1911. By George W. Richards, Professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States at Lancaster, Pa. Philadelphia, Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States. 1913. Pages xiii + 363. Price \$1 net.

The celebration of the Three Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the publication of the Heidelberg Catechism, during the current year, has furnished the fitting occasion for a new literary appreciation of this ancient symbol of the Reformed faith. This book was written "in response to a request from the Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States to prepare a pamphlet on the historical and doctrinal aspects of the Heidelberg Catechism for circulation during the anniversary year." But the work far outgrew the limits of a pamphlet and was put into book form, on the Swander Foundation, at the request of the Faculty of the Theological Seminary at Lancaster.

Readers of the book will rejoice that its rich contents were saved from submersion in the bottomless pit of pamphlets. They deserve the permanency, the dignity, and the wider publicity that are assured by their present form. This book easily takes the front rank among the contemporaneous contributions in English to the literature on the Heidelberg Catechism. It embodies, in its historical articles, the results of the scholarly researches of German and Dutch specialists. And it presents, in its doctrinal studies, the original and independent labors of the author.

The book consists of three parts, the first and second containing the historical and doctrinal studies suggested by its subtitle, and the third being a reprint of the first edition of the Heidelberg Catechism with the English translation of the Tercentenary Edition. The historical part covers five chapters, in which the author presents sketches of the Catechumenate before the Reformation, of the Evangelical Catechisms before the Heidelberg Catechism, of the Reformation in the Palatinate and the Conversion of Frederick III. to Calvinism, and of the Preparation, Publication, and Reception of the Heidelberg Catechism. These sketches cover wide areas of history. Many interesting facts, old and new, winnowed from many fields, are here woven into a lucid narrative. The sections devoted particularly to the history of the Heidelberg Catechism fully establish the claim of the author that this catechism "is not simply the work of a man, but the



ripe product of an historical process of two generations, yea, in a measure of fifteen centuries." They form a tribute to his painstaking historical scholarship. The reader will find in them a concise and an authoritative résumé of all the known facts concerning the genesis of the Heidelberg Catechism. In the main these facts have been known to scholars for ages, and they were incorporated in the articles of the Tercentenary Monument, published in 1863. But more recent investigations have thrown new light on a number of interesting details, and have compelled a revision of traditional opinions. Dr. Richards' work marches abreast with the age, and we know of no other book that presents the exact historical facts more concisely or more attractively. Simply for its historical merit this volume deserves a place in the library of every member of the wide household of Reformed Churches, and of those of that wider household who value great human documents that have helped to mould mankind.

Most readers, however, will find a deeper interest, if not a greater merit, attaching to the second part of the volume, entitled *Doctrinal Studies*. Here the author devotes four chapters to a discussion of the present significance and value of the catechism as a standard of Christian doctrine and as a text-book for the religious instruction of youth. In the first chapter he differentiates the distinctive doctrines of the Heidelberg Catechism from Catholicism, Radicalism, Lutheranism, and High Calvinism. The mild, but consistent, Calvinism of this Reformed symbol never appears to greater advantage than when thus contrasted with Catholicism and with the various forms of Protestantism. In the second chapter the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to contemporary theological thought is subjected to a searching analysis, and in the closing chapters we have an illuminating discussion of the relation of the Heidelberg Catechism to religious education.

In this second part one finds a rare blending of intelligent appreciation with discerning criticism. The author is neither a medievalist nor a modernist. There is an obnoxious modernism to-day, deficient both in historical knowledge and in religious insight, that would consign all the theological standards dating from the age of the Reformation to the limbo of outgrown superstitions, even as there is a blind medievalism, equally deficient, that regards the symbols of the past with a veneration akin to superstition. These false extremes of iconoclasm and of bigotry are happily avoided in the book under review. It will appeal neither to those who condemn the Heidelberg Catechism as a speculative hallucination nor to those who adore it as a divine revelation, though both classes might profitably read and ponder it. But it will be welcomed by all who believe in progress without radicalism; who can discriminate between fact and form, religion and theology, life and letter; who receive the noble heri-



tage of the past not as a dead weight but as wings to stimulate higher and nobler flights in the present. It might have chosen for its motto Goethe's saying, "Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern, erwerb es um es zu besitzen."

The author does not, indeed, mince matters. He shows clearly that in its premises and conclusions, in its doctrines as well as in its practical teachings, the Heidelberg Catechism belongs to the age of the Reformation and reflects the medieval thought-world. He contends that in form and substance, as a catechetical manual and as a confessional standard, it is inadequate to the needs of the twentieth century. "It was the 'flower and fruit of the whole German and French Reformation,' but it was none the less a child of its age. It does not anticipate, directly or by implication, the theological thought of our day." But jointly with this critical note, the author constantly sounds the note of sincere appreciation. This catechism, like all the confessional symbols of the past, was the outgrowth of vital Christian experience. It was forged in the fiery furnace of life, not in the secluded haunts of scholars. Its questions and answers are not the idle speculations of philosophers, but the honest efforts of earnest men to give a reasoned and reasonable explanation of their vital experience of redemption from sin by the grace of God through Jesus Christ. In its religious essence the catechism is neither medieval nor modern, but simply Christian. Without addition, without subtraction, and without mutilation it presents the great facts of the universal Christian experience: Sin, Salvation through Christ, Gratitude expressed in Life. It is against the formulation and interpretation of these facts in the terms of Calvin, Augustine, and Paul, rather than after the mind of the Master, that the criticism of the book is directed.

This is frank and fearless criticism, but not radicalism. It is the sane verdict of a constructive thinker. It reflects the mood of many who, with the author, prize the Heidelberg Catechism as part of a precious ancestral heritage but who also discern its historical limitations and its theological defects. The author concludes his studies "with a problem rather than with a panegyric." The problem is how to be worthy sons of the men of the sixteenth century, who were great "because they had the courage to protest and to progress." "Loyalty to the fathers of the Church of the Heidelberg Catechism means far more than to repeat their formulas and to assent to their doctrines. It is to seek truth, to love righteousness, to obey the voice of the Spirit, and to devote one's life to the glory of God in the service of humanity." One can only add to this the expression of the fervent hope that the wide circulation and the unprejudiced perusal of this book will prove to be material aids in the solution of that pressing problem of modern Christendom.

THEODORE F. HERMAN.

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### THE TEST OF A PERMANENT CIVILIZATION.

CORNELIUS WOELFKIN.

By civilization we mean that state of society which has been redeemed from savage impulses and barbaric dominance. The tyranny that obtains among uncivilized peoples springs from two primary sources. First, there is the survival of the brute inheritance,—the animal instinct of self-preservation. This instinct assumes the form of aggression in the prowess of physical strength; and again it will be manifested in the timidity, retreat, or the subtle cunning of attack. But whatever the form, the instinct always acts in the interest of individual self-preservation. Second, there is the imposition of false belief,—a mental tyranny enslaving the better self through superstition. When truth emancipates the mind from the darkness and fear of irrational notions, and the better and generous impulses of the affections are given the controlling place in life, then the genius of civilization is born. The acquisition of knowledge, without an attending mastery of selfish propensities, is not civilization. And it is at this point where civilization is in danger of relapsing into a refined barbarism, and taking the backroad to decadence. Civilization involves the subjugation of the individual and selfish propensities, in



the interests of the social and communal good of our neighbors. Civilization is not born fullgrown. It is an evolution. It begins in the gradual movement of mind and heart. It begins in the individual who, discovering the luxury of light and love, begins to key life to the nobler impulses. Such a life becomes both repellant and attractive: it challenges both martyrdom and imitation. Having discovered the law of gaining the higher through losing the lower self, its spirit of sacrifice and service becomes contagious and begins to dominate the community. There is a subtle advantage which gathers about a man or community who follows the higher clue. This superiority is not physical or material,—though it may include that: but it is primarily moral. Many a vantage ground in history has been attributed to superiority of physical forces, which a keener analysis would reveal to be due rather to moral supremacy. Material force without spiritual reinforcement is shortlived.

When the genius of civilization is once born it grows. Its momentum knows no boundary, of clan, tribe or nation. Its spirit conquers area after area, until the race is baptized into its light. Today we do not think of civilization in the terms of a people or nation. We have no distinctive German, English, French or American civilization. We think of it in terms of hemispheres, and talk of "Western civilization." In this all our western nations are contributors and common heirs. The fruits of our western civilization are world-wide. The Orient has seen its benefit on the material side. The riches springing from commerce and industry; the advantages accruing from the genius of invention; the superiority through armament and military forces, have impressed the semibarbaric peoples of the East. We could earnestly wish that the spiritual dynamics, which have worked within our progress, had been just as apparent. It may be that they would never have inquired concerning the real spirit of civilization without these crass advertisements. But this is certain, the East is ready to sit at the feet of the West, to learn these higher arts of civilized

life, though they do not as yet inquire, concerning the motive power which gave our modern progress its history. With this attitude in the Orient, civilization may be said to belt the globe.

But is our civilization permanent? The question may seem preposterous. And yet it is worth while inquiring concerning those elements which make for strength and growth, and discover any tendency toward disintegration. We are very apt in assuming that our modern advancements cannot possibly fall upon decay. Any reactionary movement would simply indicate some little eddy in the tide. The stream itself cannot be dammed back. The progress may be transferred to others,—but to become lost seems unthinkable. Yet many wise men have grave fears, and are asking significant questions. We read our histories as echoes of the past, and seldom discover in them warnings for the present. Could we have heard the youth in ancient Memphis and Thebes converse, we never should have dreamed that modern explorations would have to dig through sand and rock, to find the relics of their onetime glory. Who among the Chaldean people ever supposed that the majesty of Babylon would be destroyed beyond our finding? The minstrels of history are sadly silent concerning the civilizations which flourished in Egypt, Chaldea and Tyre. A few monuments, tablets, curios and inscriptions are all that is left to kindle in our imaginations a fancy concerning those national glories, which the pride of their days deemed indestructible. Greece and Rome are much nearer to us, not in point of time, but in respect of knowledge. Their languages survive, and as in a mirror we see the dim outline of their proud yesterdays. Wherein were they behind us? The arts, philosophy and literature of ancient Greece, though buried for centuries in neglect and forgetfulness, found a resurrection in the renaissance. The genius for Law and the military strength of Rome made her sovereign of the world. Which of the Cæsars could have prophesied the dark ages? Yet luxury, selfish indulgence, tyranny, corruption and sin undermined it all, and the glory of the ancients was swallowed up in shame.



Why did not these civilizations maintain themselves, and keep their achievements in the currents of progress? Their ideals were high enough to insure permanence, if they could only get themselves into the lives and hopes of the people. But they were divorced from the daily strivings and regarded in splendid isolation. They ceased to inspire and only became forms of thought,—minus power. They were no longer the genius of life. They were the wardrobe, in which a dissolute and vicious age masqueraded their vices under the ideals of the virtuous men of old. Forms cannot long survive the life that gives them birth.

The laws that make for progress or decay are unchangeable. Unless we can avoid the sunken rocks on which the ancients struck, our modern civilization will also founder. The light of true worth flashes on many a page of our history, and we are not lacking in noble ideals. But are these the beacon guides of our path and the inspiration of our lives? Our forms alone cannot save us. We have laws enough on our statute books,—broken laws enough to make a millennium. There is no power in a law. A law is often framed and passed, not with a view of becoming operative; but with the purpose of throwing dust in the eyes, and detracting attention from the demand to the statute. Law has no power without public sentiment, and sentiment is often anesthetized by dead-letter law.

Is it not possible that civilization may be self-destructive? The very genius which slowly builds up a society may be employed in the interests of evil. The forces which blast out our rocks in the progress of engineering and building, may be diverted in making bombs for the destruction of buildings and lives. The very wisdom which can formulate law, can also be utilized in the circumvention of law. No sooner does legal skill discover a way of dissolving an institution or monopoly, than the same kind of skill anticipates the verdict by plans of reorganization, with enlarged powers of control. The powers of control and prohibition are always some years behind the

game, and the creative forces of selfishness seem always in the lead.

Our modern civilization is able to point backward, and assure us that many of the ancient evils, while not entirely banished, have nevertheless so fallen under the censure of social opinion that the practices are confined to the "under-world." But we are slow to recognize and deal with those new forms of evil which may invade and infest the "upper-world" for a generation, before we even awaken to their danger. The interdependence of our form of life has put many of our interests out of our hands. We no longer raise our produce in our own gardens. We no longer make our own garments. We have become dependent upon the markets and manufacturies. This interdependence has created opportunities for imposition. The selfishness of man has advantaged by these new conditions. As a means of protection we appoint commissions and officers of inspection. We have food inspection, factory inspection, tenement inspection, machinery inspection, insurance inspection, endless inspections. But what do all these inspections mean? They signify that the same impulses which live in forms of brute force among uncivilized society, survive in more refined and subtle forms in cultured society. Again the inspection itself becomes the occasion for added dishonesty, until the majority of inspection has fallen under suspicion of having been corrupted. So general has this practice become, that the social conscience has lain dormant, public sentiment fallen asleep, and the situation accepted as inevitable. "We are delivered to do these offenses." Consequently some sincere men are inquiring whether we have not gone over the brow of the hill and begun the decline.

It is true our intellectual renaissance is continuing. But unless our moral and spiritual redemption can keep pace with our mental growth, we build upon decaying foundations. Much of our intellectual advance is in a bulkhead compartment, isolated from any daily advantage, save being mental stimulus. Wherever it may be harnessed to the practical benefit of man



in material ways, it is at once in danger of being infected by selfishness and commercialized. In our law we designate crime by its peculiar forms and manifestation, rather than by motive. The old forms fall under censure and condemnation. Meantime the old motives are continually inventing new forms of sin, which it takes one generation to recognize, and another to condemn. The sneaking pickpocket, the bold burglar, the brutal knifebrawler, the angry or revengeful murderer, these form of criminality have fallen under the general ban, and a code of sanctions metes out punishment to such as are not clever enough to escape or circumvent the law. But the secret rebate, the dishonest rakeoff, the criminal neglect and legal violation with respect to safety-appliances on dangerous machinery, the adulterations in food and medicine, which sicken and kill, these new sins are not so vigorously and universally denounced in society. They work their havoc a long time before enough sentiment can muster to secure the recognition of law. Many of these sins cannot be overtaken at all. Just as public sentiment becomes focused to strike them, our very cleverness invents some new device of profiting self at the expense of society. Much of this modern sin is stretched out over so many agencies, that the matter of locating blame is next to impossible. Today we sin by syndicates. Stockholders own the corporations; directors demand dividends; the manager must achieve the desired ends; employees must submit to conditions; then something goes wrong, and where shall the jury lay the blame? There is so much of modern sin that can be termed "long-distance" sin. The victim is not near at hand; he is struck afar off. The manufacturer of adulterated and deadly foods and drugs never comes in contact with the invalids whom he undermines. He does not see the drug habit fastening the fangs of death in his victims, nor does he hear the lamentation of broken hearts over the untimely dead. If the owners of over insured boats could be near when the "coffin-ship" goes down; or if the proprietor of dangerous machinery could be by when the employee is hurt, there might

be some reaction and amendment. But long-distance sins lose an important dynamic of repentance.

There is no personal malice in these sins. In one street a man is in the pathway of his neighbor, who, annoyed and angry, shoots him down. In another street is a woman confused before an automobile going twenty miles an hour through a city thoroughfare. The one falls before the hot blood of anger, the other before the warm blood of speed. There is no malice in the second case. It is careless indifference. But the result is the same to the victims and family. The law may hang the murderer with pistol, and not even arrest the man-slayer with car. It lacked the momentary impulse of malice. The majority of new modern sins have no mark of Cain branded upon them, and consequently some of the greatest sinners are considered conventionally good people, and maintain good standing in polite social circles. Their sins are impersonal and pass into vague society. The guilt is veneered in so-called "acts of Providence." Many new sins are directed, not against persons, but institutions,—the very institutions which are the fruit and conservators of civilization. Wherever sin can flourish, civilization is threatened.

But cannot our religion save us? Religion is designed to redeem us from sin, and has not our religion sufficient power to insure the permanence of our civilization? History reminds us that modern civilization sprang out of a revival of Christianity; and if the genius of Christianity could only become vital in modern life, we should not hesitate to assert the permanence of civilization. But religion is either being ignored, or shelved in the realm of impracticable fancies. We are doing with it what the ancients did with their ideals. Early Christianity was a transforming power. Its environment was hard upon it, and therefore its vital forces were developed. It had a power of exclusion toward all that was false and wrong. But it had also a power of inclusion toward all that had a right attitude in matters of truth and right. The resistance which it met in the selfishness of man, was more



than compensated in those allies which dwell in the conscience and affections in man. But modern Christianity has had no shock from the outside world for eight centuries. This unassailed supremacy has worked two evils. Assuming its own exclusive and sovereign monopoly in truth, it has denounced all other forms of faith as error and superstition; and refusing its inclusive genius, it has lost its own perspective. Second, being free from external onslaughts, it has fallen into numerous and endless factions and strifes within itself. These bitter internal feuds have developed many contradictory forms, while slowly strangling the true life. In the primitive days, when we would have anticipated its being snuffed out by persecution, we behold it conquering. In the modern day when we naturally expect its triumph, we find it questioned, ridiculed and quietly ignored.

Many serious men are questioning the supremacy of Christianity in its present day form, and wondering whether it is not at the crossroads. Milton could not use the Copernican theory in his poetic theology, and much of our Christian theology is still Miltonian and fails to readjust itself to our latest renaissance. Consequently we are confronted with a non-Christian civilization, which is questioning the supremacy of Christianity. Today there are more Buddhists in the world than Christians. Have we ever looked this fact in the face, and tried an honest comparison? We need have no fear of such comparison,—but it needs to be made. The so-called “Yellow Peril” is something more than one of numerical strength. Why do we fear it? They are not Christians, but Buddhists mainly. Can Buddhism produce a supremacy that will threaten our western civilization?

The little empire of Japan has been a great surprise to observing people. That Japan should conquer the Chinese army occasioned no wonder among us. A regiment with modern Winchesters could demoralize the army of Xerxes. Japan had some of the tricks of western invention, and hoary China was unequal to the struggle. But when Japan tried her

strength against the Russian Bear, the surprise came to the world. And here it was not a question of numbers, and implements, but of strategy and, above all, moral force. There was no play to the gallery nor catering to a sensational press. She did not advertise herself to the nations. Army in the field, navy at sea, loyalists in home, all quietly patriotic, were united in one determined purpose. In the hours of trial, they were heroic; in the moment of victory selfcontained. And when it came to the settlements of peace, they exhibited a highmindedness never surpassed in history, and so magnanimous that many sympathizers among Christian nations were chagrined that they did not put the screws to the fallen foe. This was not a mere incident or crisis in Japan's national history. Such a nation is not born in a day. The religion of Japan was one element in her strength. Buddhism has some things common with Christianity. It is cosmo-centric. And with the Japanese, this thought did not paralyze the interest and ambition of the individual, but enabled him to rise above all personal regard, appreciate the higher and universal good, and submit himself to this exalted ideal. Selfsacrifice for the common good is a cardinal principle with them. Education in Japan is not only compulsory, but it includes morals and ethics. The "Bushido" is the ethical ideal set before enlisted men in the army. Frugality, fealty and filial piety are combined with a spirit unmercenary, and indifferent to fate. Four cardinal virtues are inculcated and practiced: the sense of oughtness, gratitude, disinterestedness and loyalty. Art is the refining element in their education. Art is not a luxury with them, but a common possession. It is not an esoteric taste, but common to all. Their picturesque scenery and glory of flowers make it available everywhere. Hence they are not restless, discontented, and envious. They are content without rushing round for possessions and pleasure. Morality and art, a disciplined will, with the love of the beautiful, make for the strength of a people. And these are characteristic of the Japanese, not in spots, but as a nation. Here lay the secrets of her strength in the hour of her trial.



Contrast with this condition the fact that with us religion is largely ignored or idealized; our educational systems afraid of the intrusion of moral and ethical training, the love of art confined to classes, our lack of national ideals and the decay of will power in our cities, and we have some occasion for serious consideration.

Is then Christianity at the crossroads? Has it lost its one-time power which inspired our modern civilization? No, the Christian genius is the same. But it has been substituted by forms which cannot save us. Our theological jealousies and ecclesiastical schisms have made us trust to doctrinal patter to form our moral manhood.

Civilization, if it is to be permanent, needs constant regeneration. In ignoring or departing from the vital forces of Christianity, it is cutting itself off from the source of its power. Like a train switched from its drawing motor, it may run a while on the momentum of the past, but it must come to a halt. No civilization can stand without a supreme emphasis upon spiritual ideals. And apart from the Christian faith, western civilization has no such ideal. Lacking such an emphasis what goal can there be for civilization? Here we have no answer. The deepest questions are neglected by secular learning. And if civilization has transcended our Christian faith, it should have better answers for inquiries of the soul.

But has our Christianity power to quicken our modern day? Is it not often like salt that has lost its savor? And if so, wherewith shall it be salted? So then religion must rejuvenate itself. It too must experience the new birth. The new birth of religion will not come by either revivals of the old theology or clever restatements of a new theology. Theology is the mental dress of religious ideas. But if the religion itself is not vital and living, the theology, old or new, is only its shroud. Religion must come to its rebirth by a new vital experience of its life in every generation. The youth of every age must discover it for themselves, and work it out in the tests of daily life. Our elders and parents may give us tra-

ditional forms of religious experience, which have verified themselves in their experience. But these at best can only be clues for us, putting us on the trail. But at last, what becomes religion, real religion for us, must issue from working out our own salvation with reverent earnestness. True religion is a fact in human life. And facts must ever submit themselves to test. In our modern world no scientist will rest upon an untried theory. Hypotheses must stand the strain of facts. Truth survives the hardest tests possible. Nothing has value that cannot abide the test of honest experiment. It is so with religion. And religion welcomes this test. It asks to be taken out of the classroom of theology, and be subjected to the strain of daily life. The Christian formula to be tried in the laboratory of daily experience is very clear. "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know the doctrine." An attitude of openmindedness and a willingness to know and do the divine will, shall be rewarded with knowledge. This knowledge must then be incarnated in humility and service toward our fellow man.

Modern civilization can only be permanent, as the spirit of Jesus infuses it with his own life. He went about doing good. In so doing he humbled himself and took on him the form of a servant. It was the spirit of God, living and serving in the form of man,—divinity clothed with humanity. Anyone could be a god beyond the stars. But to be godlike in human flesh is to achieve abiding glory. In humble service, Jesus was following some profound law of the kingdom of God. There can only be one law for Master and disciple. The common people heard Jesus gladly, because he humbled himself to understand and serve them, and this attitude is the law of reconciliation and progress.

Everywhere we find society segregated. Some arbitrary conditions of modern life make us interdependent. But beneath this order, we have classes with clashing interests. The religious, industrial, political and social worlds are divided, and antagonistic. Our selfinterests and vanity keep us from under-



standing one another. As men differ from us we call them queer, peculiar, cranky and even enemies. Humility and service is our only hope of reconciliation.

In religion, for example, a man belongs to a narrow, arbitrary, and dogmatic sect. I may regard him as prejudiced and bigotted. But I can never bridge the gap by telling him so. But if through an act of vicarious imagination I can think myself through his antecedents and into his place, my sympathy will awaken. If I will humble myself to learn of him I will get his point of view, and then I may serve his highest good. The same rule avails toward a man in the liberal wings of religious espousals. Every man, conservative or radical, orthodox or liberal, believer or infidel, is what he is because of certain antecedents. We never can help him until we sympathetically understand these. And we never can know them unless in humility we are willing to be taught, and ready to help.

This same law must be applied to one of the vexing problems within our nation, that of immigration. The immigrant complicates all our conditions and relations as a people. He modifies our industrial, political and religious situation. What shall be done with him? We have not been able to keep him out, and we do not wish to do so now. But we cannot let him come without assimilating him. In this process both he and we will have a hard time of it. He must be readjusted. And we must humble ourselves to understand and serve him. His heredity, traditions and temperamental makeup, cannot be shaken off in a day. Let us think ourselves into his place, and we will appreciate the difficulty of his situation and of our task.

All the institutions of modern life are beset with similar difficulties. And the spirit in which we deal with them will determine whether our movement shall advance or retrograde. Arbitrary force and dogmatic opinion cannot establish our growth. Permanence can only be secured, as a spirit of sympathetic and brotherly regard becomes the genius of all life and

effort. Selfishness is the instinct of savagery and barbarity. And if it prevails under the guise of culture, it is still the survival of our brute inheritance, despite its more artistic forms. And when its yoke becomes unbearable, the passions of a plebeian mob can overthrow in a month or year, the civilization that was centuries abuilding.

The test of a permanent civilization will be the possession and dominance of a spirit which knows the divine birthright in the human soul, and ever reaches up and out for the realization of the divine image in the human heart. On the downward side, that same spirit reaches out hands of sympathy toward all men, and seeks their transformation into that same godlike strength and beauty of character. It is that spirit which loves God and seeks first his kingdom and righteousness; and loving the neighbor as ourselves, daily waits and serves, in the spirit of Jesus' prayer, "Thy kingdom come: Thy will be done in earth as in heaven." Here is the law of permanence; and the test of our civilization will turn upon our ability to perpetuate the mystery and marvel of the Incarnation, along the line of human history and experience.

NEW YORK.



## II.

### THE MINISTER'S TASK IN THE FIELD OF THEOLOGY.

R. F. REED.

The minister's work is not confined to the field of theology. There are a number of other well-defined duties to which he must attend. The minister who would be of help unto men in spiritual things certainly needs to be a pastor. One of the underlying reasons for his interest in this feature of the office lies in the fact that he must know his people in order to be of service to them in the sanctuary.

Then again in our day the minister is supposed to be an organizer. Whatever names may be given to the various organizations, modern conditions in church life call for a division of every congregation into a certain number of groups of people, young and old, every one of which is to occupy a distinct sphere in the life of the congregation, and to attend to its own special work. After a congregation is thus grouped, sometimes with the consent or at the suggestion of the minister in charge, as frequently against his better judgment or even actual protest, he is looked upon as the one man who is to direct all this machinery, and to see to it that, at all times, it runs smoothly and without undue friction. This of course means that in a peculiar manner he must possess administrative ability. Thus is constituted at once quite a task for many a one. For only too often the various parts of such a mechanism are gotten up and put together very hastily. Hence the machinery nearly always runs only a short time until it is worn out. Then necessarily it breaks down. This marks the beginning of trouble and in some instances also the beginning of the end. For unfortunately for the minister many people

as yet fail to appreciate the situation thus brought about in the work of a congregation. Only a few weeks since when a certain minister left his charge—a man whom the church at large regards as successful—it was said frequently in the community where he served, “he is a poor manager and no financier at all.” Nevertheless in our day there seemingly must be quite a number of organizations within every congregation, a certain number of movements, all of which in large part are dependent upon the minister for their success if not for their very life.

But whatever else the minister may have to do he certainly is to make known unto men the will of God. He is a man who comes from God, who knows God, who associates with God, who can take his people by the hand and lead them into the presence of God and enable them to look upon life together with all the problems that belong to it in the light of heaven with the assurance that their Father is interested in them and all the affairs of their life. The minister's social powers may rightly help him in his work, but his success is after all only temporal and superficial, so long as it is built upon any other foundation than upon the powers that are his as a man of God. In relation to his people he is primarily not a social factor but the pastor, and his office owes its power to his familiarity with, and efficiency in, spiritual matters.

Again the minister has no right to lend his influence to organizations that now exist, or help create new ones, to fall in line with new movements no matter how they originate or what is claimed for them, until he is convinced that by so doing he will be instrumental in making the will of God known more fully to those who know it only in part, and make it known more readily unto a larger number of people. He is a man of God even here and cares not for organizations or movements as such, but only as they serve to bring in more and not less speedily the kingdom of God.

The minister is a messenger come from God. In the degree that he employs efficient methods of work, knows the people



whom he is to serve, and then has a message for them that comes to him from God, or in other words a message that he is certain is vital and one that his people must hear, and thereupon goes about his work as one who recognizes the importance thereof, in this degree will he succeed in his calling.

What now is to be the minister's message? How does he obtain it? Was it delivered once for all unto men? Is there as it were a reservoir of truth pertaining to God, man, the world, and these in manifold relations? And if so what more therefore does the minister need to do than to go to this reservoir and dip into it and hand out unto men vessels filled with its contents? Or, on the other hand, instead of being static and for many a one lifeless, is the message not a growing, vital, dynamic one? Does it not come anew to every generation of men? What part does the servant of the Lord have in formulating it? Is it not essential for him to fulfill certain conditions in order to become one of God's chosen workmen?

These questions indicate that the minister has his task to perform; that there is a task for him in the field of theology. Either before he takes up his work, or after he has entered upon his chosen calling, he must answer questions such as these for his own satisfaction at least. He is supposed to think upon the eternal verities: work out the problems of life as he knows it in relation to time and eternity with the help that the revelation of God in the fullest sense affords him. In a word he must think, think often, think constantly, think deeply upon the subject of God in his relation to man and the world in which he lives. Otherwise he certainly will not have a vital message for his people. And such thinking makes him a theologian, at least after a fashion. But there is a disposition on the part of a certain class of men to-day to make light of theology, pretending in this way to magnify the cause of religion. It is true, religion is primarily a life lived in the presence of God. But at the same time it is difficult to see how any one can go on very far in religion without thinking about it. And thus we have the germs of theology. All think-

ing people therefore have some sort of theology. And the minister of the word who Sunday after Sunday speaks upon some phase or other of the great subject of religion cannot help but be a theologian. His theology may be old, it may be new, in either case it may be crude, the various parts may not fit into one another, but nevertheless the very fact that he preaches makes him a theologian.

Ever since the first appearance of religion therefore, *i. e.*, ever since God manifested his presence unto men, and they in turn reflected upon the revelation thus granted, theology had its beginning; but no more than its beginning. Since then it has undergone development. If men from age to age were surrounded by the same influences, had to contend with the same difficulties, were asked to solve identically the same problems, and received no light in addition to that granted unto others before them, no help from their environment, made no intellectual and moral progress, were altogether stationary, then very likely the theology of the age of King David, *e. g.*, would be largely the theology of the age of Jesus Christ, and no doubt also that of the twentieth century. But men are influenced by their environment. They study the deep things of God in the light of the harm or the help they receive from their surroundings. Therefore every age has in a certain sense its own peculiar theology. And it may rightly be assumed that the minister of the gospel in view of his recognized religious leadership be thoroughly familiar with the theological ideas and the religious ideals prevalent in his age.

What then is to be the minister's task in the field of theology? There are at least two answers to this question. The one is this. He is to examine and master the theology of the past, that of the fathers, the theology that was tried and found not wanting, the theology that served its day well and stood the test of time. This is to be his foundation. While he is not to preach it, nevertheless it is to be the background of his thinking, and intelligent people who hear his sermons are to recognize the skeleton upon which his ideas are built. Then



he is also expected to guard the treasure that he has inherited from the past against all encroachments from without, due to newer light and modern discoveries and advanced methods of study, all regarded too often as so many devices on the part of the powers of evil. According to this view truths were revealed unto men in past ages; after that they were worked out by giant minds into a system; finally they were collected in the classic works of theology. Hence we now have a reservoir of truth that the minister is called upon to protect from pollution. He is to satisfy his own thirst by making use of its contents, and after that when tested and approved by him he is expected to hand them out to the children of men of his day. Thus he will help not only to maintain the Kingdom of God, but will also be an instrument in God's hand whereby the cause will be advanced. In a general way this is a picture of the conservative theologian, and I meant to be altogether fair. Great many men, too many I am certain, feel called upon to assume such an attitude in the field of theology. They believe it to be their duty to guard jealously that which they have received from the past, and they look upon all suggestions coming to them from without as unfriendly and prompted not by the spirit of the author of truth, but by that of the enemy of all good. For such men there is indeed a task in the field of theology—one altogether too difficult for any being whether man or angel.

The attitude of mind just sketched can be justified only on the claim that as in the case of the literature of revelation there was a creative period, so in the case of theology there was a time when by reason of special gifts from God, or exceptional qualifications of heart and mind, men were peculiarly endowed to work out and pass on to future generations a theology that was absolutely perfect from the first, and that for this reason it cannot be improved and therefore ought not to be tampered with. But such a thing has happened in connection with none of the other sciences. And it is a very difficult matter to persuade men who are of a scientific bent

of mind that it has happened in theology. A distinguished man of science has been quoted as saying to the graduates of a technical school: "We old fellows have hard work to keep up with the advances of this generation in scientific theory and technical practice, and we strain every nerve to maintain our place as learners." And to the harm of not only theology, but I believe, religion as well, the impression is abroad that in the sphere of theology there is no room for a wide-awake mind; that the attitude above set forth is the prevailing one; that the answer given as to the task of the minister is the only one there is.

However there is another and, I am confident, a better answer. It is to be found in the position of the scholar who while he appreciates the great value of the past in the sphere of religion and theology nevertheless does not believe that God was partial to former generations of men as over against men of this day. The fundamental assumption of present-day thinkers is that God is a God that moves onward in his great work among men and in behalf of men and that therefore his final and most helpful word to man is to be looked for in the present and in the future rather than in the past. This age does not want to dispense with the revelation of the past. For it, the records of the past are rich treasures. The Bible is unique in the realm of religious literature. No students in the sphere of spiritual things have turned back more eagerly and more hopefully to the sources of the Christian religion than those of to-day, or have done more to bring out the permanent value of the contributions of Jesus to the religious life of mankind, or have esteemed more highly the records that contain the story of the life and works of Jesus. "Yet," as has been said, "the documents of revelation are nothing but the deposit of some part of the characteristic impulse of personality, the reminiscence of it, the interpretation of it, the comment upon it, with such fidelity as earnest men are capable of, but with such errors also and idiosyncrasies as nothing human ever quite escapes." In spite of all the uncalled-for criticism



hurled against the modern Biblical student he yields second place to no one in his sincere appreciation of the word of God. His view as to the origin of the Bible, many of its authors, date of composition of the various parts, occasion, relation of the several portions, relative importance of one part of a book as compared with the remainder thereof, what is essential and what only incidental even though found in the Bible, may be very different, very often is very different from that entertained by students in days gone by. His sense of proportion is different from that of the fathers. But he believes that he has at least as much right to his view as men formerly had to theirs. Furthermore he has the firm conviction that he has penetrated the heart of the matter—that he has come as near to the teachings of the Bible as men have ever approached them. He does not glory however in this as though it were entirely due to his own efforts. He realizes that he has been able to attain unto his position only because of the labors undertaken and carried forward to a relatively successful end by predecessors in the work. He therefore gives due credit to such men, but cannot get away from the fact that to be true to himself it is necessary for him to insist on his own interpretation. And all this is nothing more nor less than the firm conviction that God carries on his great work of revelation and salvation in and through consecrated men of this generation as He in past generations carried on that work with the help of the same kind of men: that God speaks unto servants of his to-day who are willing to listen to Him as He spoke unto his servants in the eighteenth century, the sixteenth century, the sixth century, the first century, as well as He spoke to his servants among every generation of men from the very beginning. It means that God is never idle, and that his labor is not in vain, but ever growing. And thus his power, love, and excellency are being unfolded more and more from age to age. And therefore the task of the minister is certainly not that merely of a custodian of the oracles of God, a jealous guardian of the things delivered unto the saints. It is not that of a worshipper

of the past. But it is that rather of an honest and consecrated workman of the Lord who while truly mindful of the past and its contributions, labors faithfully and patiently in the present and is certain of God's presence and benediction upon him and his efforts.

As a man with his own task the minister has peculiar qualifications. First of all comes spiritual mindedness; not only a liking for spiritual things but in a marked degree an aptitude to know and appreciate them; a heart attuned to God; a mind open to religious truths. As the historian has a historical sense that enables him to discover facts of historical value from among the many that would only serve to confuse another lacking this qualification so the minister needs a sympathy with or a sense for facts of religious value. This power can of course be cultivated. It is a pity that too often the cry is made on the part of men who see danger in what is known as the liberal view that such spiritual mindedness is absent from the men who uphold it. In some communities a man's spirituality is heavily discounted when he is known to be in sympathy with liberalism. But barring a comparatively small number of present-day writers on theological subjects as a class it would be difficult to find a group of men more deeply spiritual or more sincerely devoted to what they believe to be their God given work. Among the professors with whom it was my privilege to associate—pardon this personal reference—and I had a larger number of such instructors than the student as a rule has, none impressed me and others at the time as more genuinely spiritual than one who was accused of heresy and practically driven out of his church. It is folly for any school of thought in the theological world to raise the cry that only such men as are identified with their views are pious and that all others lack piety. To be pious in all cases demands of the Christian that he seek after God, and that he desire to see Him as He is and not as any one particular established faith portrays Him. And from this viewpoint piety certainly is not wholly to be found with either the one or the other party in theology.



Secondly, in order to accomplish his task the minister is in need of mental alertness. The student of theology must keep awake, and have eyes that see and ears that hear and a heart that feels. As men who succeed today in any line of work must make use of all their faculties so the minister needs to be equally active and alert at all times, fertile in resources, quick to learn, and ready to apply what he has learned. Jonathan Edwards as a young man wrote, "I observe that old men seldom have any advantage of new discoveries, because these are beside a way of thinking they are used to. Resolved, if ever I live to years, that I will be impartial to hear the reason of all pretended discoveries, and receive them, if rational, how long soever I have been used to another way of thinking." Some such attitude of mind the minister of today more especially is in need of. For to my knoweldge no student of Edwards accuses him of being mentally indolent. Men have a right to demand of the minister in things spiritual, things that he claims are vital to all men in time and through eternity, that he be mentally awake and keep abreast of the times. The value of such eager, active, wide-awake personalities endowed with initiative has for some time been fully recognized in all other spheres of activity. Why not then in the sphere of religion? It is not essential that the minister should be a genius but highly important that he should be at least a live man.

The world permits the physician who makes his rounds from one patient to another year in and year out, hardly ever varying his prescriptions, always administering the same pills and nostrums when the same symptoms are supposed to be at hand, not trying in any way to keep up with the times in his profession, paying no attention to the startling discoveries in medicine made year after year, letting many a one die before his time whose life undoubtedly might have been spared had he moved along with the times in his chosen calling, content to make a living, and keeping the benefits of the advancements made from time to time in his profession entirely out of the reach of the patients among whom he moves and who have learned to

place confidence in him largely because they know him for many years as a regularly authorized physician, the world in which he moves permits such a one to go unmolested. While he does some good and helps mankind in a limited way he after all does not take the place among men that he ought to take. He should really quit his profession and let some one else take his place who would gradually let the people have the benefit of the steady advancement made in the medical world. If not this, then it is high time for him to arouse himself. But unfortunately for his people too often he is not conscious of his short-comings professionally. This age demands of its physicians that they give to the public the very best service of which they are capable, however lenient in their demands the particular communities in which they practice may be.

Why should the demand upon the ministry be any less? Why should the world be satisfied with a minister who is professionally asleep? Men are amused at the character who finds it difficult to keep awake. Yet for some men it appears an impossible task to keep awake theologically. Why should not a servant of the Lord of this type feel himself wholly out of place in his office? Why should any one ever dream of arriving at conclusions early in his ministry that will stand the test of his entire period of service? Yet is it not true in the case of at least some men that for them the days of study came to an end simultaneously with the Seminary days? It is absurd to think that even the very best teacher whom the world has ever known is able to send out into active life his students with their theology so well fashioned that it may be regarded as complete and final; to send out his students not so well but so peculiarly equipped that they are forever afterwards exempt from all independent efforts, that men and women unto whom they preach will sit in the pews and listen to them Sunday after Sunday and be mentally and even spiritually contented, men and women who themselves are active, energetic and mentally alert. Theological professors in this age know their place and work so well that it becomes more



and more difficult to find any who look upon their calling in such a light. They of this type used to exist, but happily they are fast dying out, if not already extinct. The minister young or old who seems to think that the books he studied while in the seminary will answer his and his people's purpose unto the end of his ministry has no one but himself to blame if the end comes closely upon the heels of the beginning. Better for him to sell such books when leaving school, or at least shortly afterwards, and from time to time buy new ones treating of the same subjects, and work them over. And unless a man knows of what value old books are this process will have to be repeated very often in the course of a life time. For in theology very few books if any at all are final, have said the last word that can or will be said on the subject of which they treat. It has been said: "This age does not look back upon the past as the golden age, and calls that institution or doctrine most pure and helpful which can be shown to have changed least from the time of its birth or its promulgation. It looks forward to the future for the clearest manifestation of truth, and puts the absolute at the end of the world process rather than at the beginning." But it does not follow that the minister who wishes to keep abreast of the times must, for example, buy all the works in dogmatic theology that leave the press. That were an impossible task. But it does follow that at least every few years some well-selected representative work in dogmatics be gone through by him as carefully as ever he studied the text-book on that subject while at school. Of course the same procedure is called for also in connection with all the other branches of theological thought, such as ethics, apologetics, old and new testament interpretation.

Thirdly, the minister who desires to wield a power for good among thinking people must be honest, fairminded and sincere. His mind must be unbiased, free from prejudices. He needs to be honest in his search after the facts of theology and having found them he must be equally honest in sharing them with his people. Theology is a science. It is called, used to be,

the queen of the sciences. It is the very nature of a science to be open to all facts pertaining to it. Men have no more right in theology than in connection with any other branch of knowledge to shut out fresh facts discovered from time to time, no matter whether they may or may not fit in with the sum total of knowledge already accessible to man in that particular field. Such new facts may play havoc with the system of truth that men have built up with the help of the facts previously known to them. They frequently compel men to begin anew some part of the work that they up to that time regarded as built upon the solid rock of eternal truth. But sooner or later such a work would totter and go down, and unquestionably it is better that men should see their mistake in time and tear down the structure already reared upon a false foundation and build it upon a more permanent basis than that they should dwell contentedly in a building whose foundation is laid in the sinking sand. We all admit that it is very inconvenient to be obliged after a time to tear down and begin the work over again; and in addition to this it is very costly. But a structure that is to last, or to be safe while it does last, must rest upon a solid foundation. At least the builder would hardly ever be forgiven were he to put the building upon a foundation known by him to be unsafe. And his act in doing so would be no less than criminal.

The minister ought to walk in the new light that from time to time appears upon the horizon of the theological world. And as an honest man if that light is a blessing to him he must let his people share it with him. The chances are that he has among them those who are already enjoying the same light. While no doubt there are some in the flock to whom it will come for the first time and perhaps be more or less disturbing. But whether or not so, what has come home to the messenger of the gospel as the truth it is not for him to withhold from any one out of fear that it will do him more harm than good. That matter rests with the Author of all truth, and He always takes care of his own. Even von Hartman "expresses a pious



belief in a Providence which will take care that the anticipations of the quiet thinker shall not disturb the course of history by giving premature currency to them."

The minister of the gospel is a shepherd. The shepherd looks after the flock. It is his duty to see to it that the sheep have an opportunity to find pasture that will afford nourishment. Therefore he leads them into green pastures. Some plants, very few though, are harmful to the flock. What now is to be his attitude toward them? Is he to root them up? Or more practically is he to keep his sheep away from the places where they grow? He does neither of these things. As a rule either by experience or by instinct the sheep will let alone, strictly alone, the weeds that afford no nourishment for them, nibbling the herbs all around it but never touching the dangerous plant. It is folly for the shepherd to have any concern about his sheep in this regard. For the sheep are provided by nature against danger from this source. The shepherd's duty is to lead them forth where the pasture is green, into the best field available at the time according to his judgment, and then let them feed upon what their animal nature tells them is wholesome.

Again the minister is a sower and deeply interested in rich harvests. Certainly he sows what has been tested for many seasons, and has been found of value. However there is no use, for example, in holding on to a particular brand of wheat after his neighbors all about him, or even only one of them, have found another that he too may have at a nominal cost for the asking, one that is in every way superior to the old.

But on the other hand to be honest as a thinker along theological lines does not imply that the man of God must accept as final every discovery, or supposed one, in the field of theology; that every view of God in his manifold relations to the world and man advocated by any and every writer must at once be accepted and hailed as superseding all others, and therefore must be proclaimed from the pulpit upon the first opportunity. Such a procedure would be far worse on the

part of the preacher than for him to become thoroughly grounded in a few fundamentals and hold on to them in spite of all new light, real or supposed, coming in from time to time. The pulpit is not to serve as an opportunity for the preacher to let his people, the public, know what he reads day by day. Yet as an intelligent person, a man of culture and one who enjoyed and still enjoys rare privileges as a student, he is to use his God given powers as a thinker, exercise his judgment, and with the help of the spirit, in the light of his own experience and that of others he is to determine whether or not the new truths are really such or merely the wild fancy of some person who from all appearances is bent more upon creating a sensation in the world of theological thought than upon letting men have the benefit of new light. Only after he is certain in his own heart and mind of the truth, *i. e.*, after he has assimilated it, is he to offer it without hesitation to the flock.

Questions of criticism I am certain have no place in the pulpit. Such questions, for example, as to whether the Patriarchs were individuals or merely tribal names are as a rule of more than ordinary interest to the studious minister of the word, but they have no claim upon the pulpit alongside of the gospel of God. Even the question as to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, which has ceased to be one among the best students of the Old Testament, is not a subject for the preacher to discuss from the pulpit. The same principle applies in connection with similar questions pertaining to the New Testament. When in the pulpit it is the preacher's privilege to make clear to the people before him the great spiritual lessons taught by the men of whom the Pentateuch treats; teach the lessons the characters of the several books illustrate with all the powers he can command; preach the eternal truths that the books of the Bible set forth with all the passion and persuasive force he possesses. The Pentateuch, for example, teaches valuable lessons for all time, no matter who wrote it. In the pulpit however there is no need of discussing its author.



But if in the class room, at the teacher's meeting, in the training class, in conversation with an individual who reads and thinks, he is asked for his opinion it is his duty to give his view, what he in his own heart honestly believes and has accepted and finds helpful, and then have no fear of results. So also when called upon to write for secular papers or theological quarterlies. It is certainly a mistake for any minister to go on the assumption that while it may be perfectly proper for him to entertain certain views of the Bible, of God, or of any subject pertaining to religion in his study, or in the presence of his colleagues, it would not do to maintain the same views in the presence of cultured laity, especially not if they are of his own flock. Just at this point some men give occasion for the accusation of insincerity that now and then is brought against the ministry.

But unless the minister studies and keeps himself informed he has no right to pronounce as unfounded and even ridiculous if not ludicrous the conclusions of men whose work commends itself as worthy of serious consideration on the part of thinking people. And unless he has actually studied the particular question concerned he ought to have the grace and the courage to acknowledge his want of sufficient information to express an opinion that might have value. It is not good judgment to say the least for the busy minister who has but limited time and ability and equally limited opportunity for study to take a stand for example either for or against the currently accepted relation between the Synoptic gospels and the fourth. When asked for his opinion the only fair position for him to take is not to make light of the problem and thus try to belittle those who make an effort to solve it. But he ought to state the case as well as he can, give fairly as far as he is capable the arguments pro and con, indicate his own preference at the time if he has any, and then gracefully acknowledge however his inability to decide permanently either one way or the other.

History teaches that the men of the past who had a message for their day were those who did more than simply hold on to

that which they received from their predecessors. They did this. But they also more or less freely criticized the religious product of preceding ages and emphasized and held out unto men as worthy of claim upon them only such portions of tradition as according to their view were adapted to the needs of their own generation. The prophets of the Old Testament are conspicuous examples of this class of men. The greatest of all teachers followed this course. So did also his disciples, notably St. Paul. The prophets, St. Paul and the men associated with him in early Christianity were all heretics—so regarded in their day. And nearly every prominent teacher since the days of St. Paul has been a defender of only such elements of the faith once delivered unto the fathers as appealed to him as such, and on the other hand freely criticized other portions thereof and added thereto such new interpretations as he felt certain it was his duty to offer as a servant of God. Only in this way can there be progress.

We have a comparatively recent illustration of what will happen when theological leaders, men who are called into the ministry, refuse to keep step with the world of thought in which they live. I refer to the New England Theology. The theologians of New England, and among them were active pastors, took for granted that their theology was substantially final, as the Germans say “fertig.” Yet this wonderful system of thought collapsed. Today it is a matter of history—no longer of life. Why this passing feature? For this reason. It was a theology that failed to adapt itself to new conditions. It saw fit to ignore almost all new light that came to men of that day. Its advocates had no room for the freedom of the will and man's responsibility for his deeds as emphasized by the Armenian theologians. Nor did they find a place for the doctrine that calls man an inalienable child of God as taught by the Unitarians. Nor again could they see any value in the teaching of the Universalists who insisted upon the doctrine that God loves man with a love that will not let him go. These defects together with others kept the New England theology



stationary while thinking people were rapidly moving on. Of course in time it was left behind and men now view it as a system of thought that had its day but for us has ceased to be.

But what of the theology that has taken its place? They say that the religious life of the New England States today, especially the organized life as it comes to view in the various churches in the way of attendance upon divine services, is not at all flourishing. In the days of the New England theology on the other hand the churches were filled. Jonathan Edwards, Joseph Bellamy, Nathanael Emmons and others preached to crowded houses and the people who came to services knew how long they would continue. We are assured that today the services throughout Eastern Pennsylvania are well attended as compared with those of the New England States, though only a very few of us are obliged Sunday after Sunday to turn many worshippers away. The fathers were interested, the children are not. Now the question arises: Is it not better after all to have a theology that will interest the people and from all appearances at least help them in their daily walk and life, than to have one that is modern but has no or but little interest for the laity and seemingly is of help unto but a small circle of people?

This is a question more or less involved and no less difficult. We have no right to assume however that if the former theology were still in power that the children of the parents of the days when it held sway would be interested in it as much as were the parents themselves. There are reasons to believe that the children would take a deeper interest in religion than they do if it were not for the conviction that the position held and so strenuously, confidently, dogmatically defended by their fathers was an erroneous one. May not the religious condition of things in New England today be explained as a reaction? At least it will not do for the conservative element to put the blame upon the new movement. The advocates of the progressive ideas might claim that the theology that served

its day well was held on too long; men championed it when it had become inadequate to meet the wants of another time.

Of course I am not unmindful of the fact that the change that took place in the theological thought of New England was inevitable. The very presence of the theology that prevails there today proves that the Puritans and their descendants kept pace with the onward march of the times. The fathers did their part—the only practical thing they could do. The children in turn are doing their part, *i. e.*, they think and speak well of the fathers, but at the same time look and must look at the great spiritual facts of life in the only light in which God permits them to see such facts. And therefore no effort at adaptation on the part of the really great New England theologians would have fitted the theology of Calvin and Edwards into the religious life of the twentieth century. And from this viewpoint we cannot blame the fathers as having failed in their task. We simply have to record the great change that took place in the world of thought among the same people after the fulness of time had come.

But what is to be the attitude of the minister of Christ to the tendencies in the thought world at this time? What is his task at present? There are men in our day who have no interest in discussions relating, for example, to the miracles of the Bible, the genuineness of the accounts of creation, man's descent from Adam and Eve. They care not whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch; nor whether the book of Isaiah was written by the prophet whose name it bears, or by any number of different authors. They even care very little for the question as to how much of the gospels is legendary, and what modifications our views as to the earlier as well as to the later life of Jesus must undergo because of such legendary material in the records. But they are intensely interested in the reality of the spirit and in the possibility of a free, real and saving communion between the spirit of God and that of man. That is, such men question the very foundation upon which all religion rests. Now what help may the minister bring to men



of this type? I answer unhesitatingly not any until he himself is certain of his ground. He of course knows that spiritual things now as of old are spiritually discerned. Therefore while history and psychology, these two apparently more so than heretofore, and philosophy now as always, have their place in the study and development of religion they after all are not the instruments with which one may completely accomplish the task of explaining the phenomena of religion. And it will be to the credit of the religious leader if he frankly admits that he has no knowledge of spiritual facts in the sense in which men speak of scientific knowledge. But on the other hand the minister fails well nigh completely who does not take a decided stand in behalf of such facts. For as spiritual facts may be known he does know them and is therefore as positive of them as one can be of any facts definitely known to exist. He is God's representative; the prophet of the Lord unto the people of this age. He needs to speak as one having authority.

There may be agnostics. But their sphere is not the Christian pulpit. The Unscrutable very likely does not reveal himself in a sufficiently clear manner to any one to enable him to bear a definite and helpful message to men. The Christian minister has no right to speak thus, for example, to his flock. I come to you in the name of God, if there be a God. This is his message if there really be a God and if I do not misinterpret the same. No, he needs to be as certain of God and His message unto man, and as sure that he is commissioned of Him to deliver the message he carries in his mind and heart as were the prophets of old. Yet in the sense in which men know facts in the chemical laboratory the preacher does not know them. I do not wish to leave the impression that I claim that the minister may not have skeptical moods at times. It is difficult to understand how one who does real thinking can from first to last steer clear of such gloomy periods. But such seasons must be the exception and should by no means be the rule. And it goes without saying that he ought not to take his doubts with him into the pulpit and permit his people to

look upon their nakedness and hideousness. They have doubts enough of their own. Furthermore he owes it to himself and his people, if after due time he cannot dissipate or dispel his doubts as to the essential verities, to resign and leave the ministry. Skepticism exists, but the Christian pulpit was created, not for the dissemination of skepticism, but for the spread of the gospel of our Lord. The minister has a definite task at this time as over against agnosticism and open infidelity. He is to be certain of the ground whereupon he stands in the only sense in which he may be, and then proclaim and keep on proclaiming the gospel of God's fatherhood and love for all the children of men.

It seems to me there is no need of arguing the interest that the live minister takes in the great epoch-making thought-movements in the sphere of religion and theology. How can he possibly escape, for example, the study of Ritchlianism, pragmatism and the religionsgeschichtliche method of today? Not that an interest in their productions obliges him to approve of all the deductions on the part of the leading theological writers. Not even of only a part of them. But the founders of these several isms deal with matters that touch him vitally and therefore he wants to study them and in fact cannot refrain from being deeply interested in them. He is a religious teacher and leader among at least a small company of God's people, and most assuredly they have a right to look to him to keep himself informed with reference to matters that belong to what is distinctly his province. This is axiomatic. It is commonplace. So are facts that occasionally are overlooked. Are there not men in the active ministry today, and they not by any means men who all of them entered the profession thirty or more years ago, who have hardly even as much as a bowing acquaintance with the great isms that sway the theological world at the beginning of the twentieth century? Such men preach and pray after a fashion. But their voice sounds strange to thinking men who consciously or unconsciously have imbibed the spirit of the present time.



The minister needs to study the works of the giant minds of our age in addition to those of former days. Contact with such minds will stimulate him to fresh thought and will guarantee to him a power that is very essential to one who would lead men in the realm of spiritual things. He however does not study the works of men of this character in order merely to become familiar with the so-called new in theology as contrasted with the old. He is not interested in the new as such any more than he is interested in the old as such. What he seeks primarily is the truth of God. Wernle says: "Gott ist aber weder mit dem Altem, noch mit dem Neuem, sondern mit der Wahrheit, und derjenige Forscher dient Ihm, der ohne Menschenfurcht und Menschenglauben allein der Wahrheit die Ehre geben will."

Yet there is some danger that one who takes up the theological works of today may be carried away by the new to the extent that he will minimize what is old and to a degree likewise true. There is however a counter movement. Contact with men and women who wrestle with the problems of life as these come to view day by day will counteract to some extent such influences. For example, sometimes when groping his way through the philosophy of prayer the minister begins to wonder how much is left? Why men after all ought to pray? But just then he is confronted by a problem in his own life, or that of the congregation, and before he is aware of it—before he has really had time to lay his theories aside in an orderly manner—he discovers himself on his knees praying as if all depended on prayer.

In like manner in the hour of sorrow when called upon to bring comfort to wounded hearts, while his conclusions reached in the study appear to him impregnable in theory he very often, though no doubt from habit, turns to the truths that have been tried for ages upon ages and learns that they still meet the wants of those who seek comfort. Thus present-day experiences are among the means that bring about mitigations of our theology.

I trust, we are reminded that the ministry of today as that of yesterday has its task—a task that is never finished. He who sees this most clearly and in his own way works hard to do his part, be that part never so small, may not be appreciated. Such has frequently been the case in the past. But it is undoubtedly the duty of the laborer in this field, as it is that of laborers in other fields, to attend to what he knows to be his God-assigned task, and then leave results with him who has in mind a perfect whole, and who in some way will bring together the many men-made parts that we oftentimes call very imperfect and produce out of them a unit that He deems worth while—and He knows.

FREEMANSBURG, PA.



### III.

## THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

THEODORE F. HERMAN.

The Reformed Church is known as an educational church. From the beginning of our history we have sought to propagate the Christian religion by an educational method. Our main reliance has been upon intelligent instruction, rather than upon emotional revivals. For three hundred and fifty years the Heidelberg Catechism has been our text-book in religious education. We have taught its doctrines in catechetical classes, and we have preached them from our pulpits. And in this anniversary year, which commemorates the publication of the Heidelberg Catechism, three hundred and fifty years ago, we offer no apologies for the Reformed Church, neither for her educational method, nor for her catechetical manual of instruction. The one was right and sound in principle. It is being adopted generally in our time. And the other, our historical catechism, was the flower and fruit of the Reformation age. Its defects, in form and matter, are shared by all other contemporaneous catechisms, but none possesses so many distinctive evangelical merits.

And yet, while we are far from the apologetic mood in this anniversary year, we feel that the eulogistic mood is equally inadequate and inappropriate. We do not offer apologies for our past, but neither are we content with the present. A nobler and more serious mood than either carping criticism or complacent satisfaction is upon us as a Church, the magnificent mood of St. Paul, who said: "Brethren, I count not myself yet to have apprehended: but one thing I do, forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal unto the prize of the

high calling of God in Jesus Christ." Let those glory in the past, and rest content with the victories and achievements of bygone days, whose work is done. Let that be the privilege of old age in the Indian Summer of life. But we, as a Church, have not yet run our race, nor finished our course. Our work for God has scarcely begun. And that mood is thrust upon us by the logic of events. It is not the idle musing of a few teachers, who live in their cloistral retreats far from the madding crowd. It is the temper that expresses the noblest religious yearning, and the deepest Christian aspiration of our age; the yearning to promote the kingdom of God upon earth and the aspiration to make the Christian religion a vital force, the great constructive force in our modern life.

And thus it has come to pass that in this anniversary year two dominant notes have resounded throughout the Reformed Church, the one appreciative and the other constructive. We have been exhorted by voice and pen to appreciate our historical heritage, and we have also been challenged to appraise our present need of religious education, and to meet that imperative need by reconstructing and adapting our theological and pedagogical heritage. These two notes belong together, and they should be intoned jointly by those who wish to remain loyal to the historical method of the Reformed Church for propagating the Christian religion. This may be disputed by theological standpatters, "who have stopped and can't start"; or it may be denied by theological insurgents, "who have started and can't stop." But it will be granted by the large and ever increasing number of sane progressives, who are neither rooted immovably in the past, nor running away from it blindly. They will appreciate our noble, historical heritage, but they will also seek to give value and power to the rich treasure inherited from the Reformers by coining it into current gold and silver.

We have a certain type of liberalism today that looks with disdain upon the old creeds and catechisms. Its champions speak with pride of modernism, and with deprecation of



mediævalism, especially of mediæval theology. But that attitude is both pseudo-scientific and pseudo-religious. It betrays not only a profound lack of insight into the historical genesis or ancient forms and symbols of faith, but, what is more grave, it manifests a lack of appreciation of the genuine religious experience which underlies and permeates every creed and catechism of the past. The former is a mental defect, but the latter is a moral weakness. These theologies, and creeds, and catechisms of past ages are not conglomerates of superstition, not idle speculations that originated in the minds of a few men. One and all, they were born of experience. They were forged in the furnace of eager, earnest life. They registered the convictions by which men lived, and for which they gladly died. They may record these profound convictions in language that has become unintelligible or unacceptable to us. Nevertheless, they must not be dismissed contemptuously as antiquated relics of a superstitious age.

Consider, for instance, the two great principles of the Reformation, justification by faith and the normative authority of the Scriptures, which in some form or other were wrought into all the creeds and catechisms of that period. Why did Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin make salvation by faith, through the grace of God, the very cornerstone of their confessions? Why does the Heidelberg Catechism devote its second part to the exposition of that doctrine? That man must be ignorant of history and of the heart of mankind who does not know that this great Reformation doctrine records the vital religious experience of that age. Luther had sought salvation in the cell of his monastery and in Rome. He had sought to earn forgiveness by penance and by works, but all his efforts at self-help were in vain. They led but to deeper self-condemnation and distrust. Then, one day, Paul showed him the way to peace. He saw that the only way to find forgiveness and peace was to abandon all hope and effort at self-righteousness and trust in God's eternal love revealed in Jesus Christ. And it was this profound and genuine religious experience of Luther, shared

by thousands like him, that led to the formulation and acceptance of the material principle of the Reformation. We read their confessions, and we discern that the form in which they expressed that great faith of the sixteenth century, and the philosophy by which they explained it, are no longer adequate to the Christian consciousness of today. Beneath the incidental form, which grew out of the thought and culture of the age, lies the eternal fact, that salvation is by the grace of God, and that men are saved only by faith in that marvellous grace. We do not accept their theory of the atonement, but we do share their faith that through Jesus Christ men may experience the forgiveness of sin. As theologians we may dissent from the theologians of the sixteenth century. But as Christians we know ourselves to be at one with them in our conviction that salvation is by faith.

Or consider the other great principle of the Reformation, which made the Bible the only source of authority for faith. Again we find this doctrine imbedded in every creed and criticism of that era. But why did men elevate this book to such a place of exclusive normative authority for Christian faith? Why did all the churches of the Reformation accept the doctrine of verbal and plenary inspiration? Was it because the Bible itself claimed that authority or because ecclesiastical assemblies passed decrees which pronounced it inerrant and infallible, dictated by the Holy Ghost himself? Again, I say, that man must be blind to history and ignorant of humanity who does not know the true answer. It was the rediscovery of this Holy Book that showed the men of the Reformation times the way to God, in whom they found salvation and peace. It became to them the Book of Books, not by any ecclesiastical decree or theological doctrine, but by a profound religious experience. It was the fountain to which they turned with parched hearts from the cisterns of scholasticism, and in which their souls found the water of life. It flashed light upon the dark mystery of sin. It poured love into consciences stricken with guilt. It arched the dark tomb



with radiant promises and assurances of immortal life. And it was this sacred experience that led to the doctrine of the exclusive and normative authority of the Scriptures. We read the confessions glowing with this noble faith in the Bible, and, again, we know that the form in which it is expressed belongs to the sixteenth century. We can no longer use their language, nor accept their interpretation of the authority of the Bible. But the fact is as true for us as it was for them. The Bible is the Book of Books. As the record of God's self-disclosure, beginning in primeval darkness, continuing through the ages, and culminating in Jesus Christ, it possesses supreme authority for Christian faith.

And what is true of these great principles of the Reformation is likewise true of every Christian doctrine of the past. They enshrine profound convictions, born of genuine religious experience, in forms and formulas that grew out of their times. The incidental forms may lose their significance and pass away, but the convictions which form their Christian content abide. And these abiding convictions form the living bond between past and present. Their mutual recognition and appreciation is the common ground on which conservative and progressive Christian thinkers may meet.

But we are also familiar with a certain type of conservatism today that constitutes as real and as great a menace to the Christian religion as radical liberalism. Its champions speak of the faith once delivered to the saints as of a quantitative deposit of doctrines, that must be kept intact, and passed on from age to age, without addition, subtraction, or mutilation. They are forever reminding men that in theology the new is not true, and the true, not new. If liberalism needs to be taught a sincere appreciation of the noble heritage of the past, this immovable traditionalism has still more to learn, not only of the past but also of the present. It needs to learn that the Christian religion is not primarily a series of doctrines, which must be taught and believed, but a life of filial communion with God. This life will precipitate doctrines, even as it will

become incarnate in forms of worship, in ecclesiastical organizations, and in ethical programs. But its essence is spiritual and not intellectual, political, or moral. And this spiritual life is the constitutive element in the Christian religion, and its only constant factor. Everything else is variable.

These theological standpatters will necessarily regard all our modern efforts at reconstruction as destructive. But even as the conservative Christians of today have a right to expect an appreciation of the forms of faith, which are precious to them, from those who no longer accept them as adequate, so, it would seem, the progressive Christians of our times have an equal right to expect, if not appreciation, at least an intelligent estimate of their efforts and a fair presentation of their sacred convictions. Their attempts to restate the abiding Christian convictions and to reconstruct our Christian theologies may be tentative and sophomoric, but they are not destructive of faith nor subversive of the Christian religion.

In this spirit this article on the *Essential Elements in Religious Education* is conceived and written. It claims to be neither radical nor traditional. And its primary aim is to point out the common ground on which men of conservative and of progressive tendencies may stand shoulder to shoulder in the religious education of our youth.

The topic "Religious Education" is large, and as complex as it is large. Henry F. Cope, the General Secretary of the Religious Education Association, in a recent address said: "It will scarcely be disputed, that ten years ago, the phrase signified, except to a few thoughtful leaders, formal instruction in the categories of religious knowledge. It meant systematic impartation of information regarding the Bible, religious history, and doctrine. Its range of ordinary activity was confined to Churches and Sunday Schools and other distinctively religious institutions. It was not education, but instruction; it was not necessarily 'religious' although it dealt with the history, literature, and philosophy of religion. It was concerned primarily with methods of arranging information into



suitable packages for storage in youthful minds." Thus, only a decade ago there was practical unanimity and uniformity in the essence of religious education, while today there seems to be no agreement at all as to the means, the method, and the content of religious education.

But, to begin with, there can be no disagreement, it would seem, as to the AIM of religious education. Its sole aim must be the development of Christlike personalities. Its curriculum must give us "a program of life development that is religious in aim, in method, and in its conception of the person being educated." The aim of all modern education is the making of men. In the past, our educational policy has been controlled largely by two ideals, the one English and the other German. The aim of English education was culture, and the aim of German education was scholarship. But we have come to realize that the true aim of education is neither the making of gentlemen, nor the making of schoolmen, but the making of men. Manhood, not mere culture nor scholarship, is the aim of education. Thus the aim of religious education is the making of Christlike men. Whatever the means and the method of religious education may come to be, if it is Christian, it must propagate the religion of Jesus Christ by producing Christlike persons.

What, then, are our educational assets, and what our educational liabilities? What have we got, as a Christian Church, to make men Christlike? What ought we to do, as a Christian denomination, to realize our supreme aim?

Our educational assets are not new. We are living in an age of educational novelties and specialties. In our colleges, we have cultural and technical courses, fixed courses and electives, things old and things new. Not so in the Church. Our assets are old. They date back to Christ. They are the things which are distinctive and characteristic of the Christian religion. The first is a doctrine; the second, an experience; and the last, a duty. And these three originated with Jesus Christ. It is he who gave mankind a new doctrine,

who opened the way to a new experience, and who set a new task. And so the Church, from the beginning, has called him prophet, priest, and king. As a prophet, he revealed the truth of God; as a priest, he manifested God's power for the salvation of the world; and as a king, he declared His eternal purpose.

And here lies the significance of the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. It was the protest of Christian men against that stupendous Church, which Luther called the anti-Christ, and which all the Reformers agreed had dethroned Jesus as the prophet, priest and king of mankind. It was a heroic effort to return to Jesus Christ and find in him, in his Gospel and life, the truth, the power, and the purpose of God for the salvation of the world. And today we start, precisely where they started, with the eternal Gospel of Jesus Christ. We go with them the full length of their journey, from Romanism back through the ages, to the truth as it was in Jesus Christ. But we cannot, dare not, stop where they stopped four hundred years ago. It is they, the great Reformers themselves, who make it so absolutely impossible for us today to stop, and rest content in the sixteenth century. For four hundred years the mighty impulses have been at work which they set in motion. Christ has reigned and his Gospel has been studied and practised. He has been humanity's prophet, the truth teller whom God sent in the fullness of time. He has been humanity's priest, the sin bearer who alone has manifested the divine power, by which men are saved. He has been humanity's king, the sovereign who slowly, but surely, is establishing his supremacy over all the kingdoms of this world. The Holy Spirit of God has not been inoperative since he revealed mighty truths to the Reformers, and wrought great deeds through them. He has continued to take the things of Christ and show them unto us. We believe, with Luther, Zwingli and Calvin, that in Jesus Christ the truth, the power, and the purpose of God are manifestd for the salvation of the world. But, we say it reverently and firmly, we believe that today we



know more of the essence of that truth, understand better the meaning of that power, and see more clearly the majestic sweep of that divine purpose. Hence, when we survey our educational assets, the things which God has given us, as a Church, for the making of Christlike personalities, we say that our one incomparable asset is Jesus Christ himself, that mighty, mysterious, creative personality, who, nineteen centuries ago, in little Palestine, founded the Christian religion. Not the confessional or catechetical writings of past ages, not even the New Testament itself, but Jesus Christ, of whom the New Testament bears record, and whose significance the confessions and catechisms of the Church seek to interpret. This Jesus, as the prophet, the priest, and the king of humanity, is our one educational asset. What does that mean?

Jesus is our prophet. Nicodemus was right, when he said: "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God." Jesus is the truth teller of the ages, the greatest teacher mankind has known. He has given us a doctrine which forms part of our educational assets. Now the truth which Jesus taught was spiritual truth. He did not teach mathematics, science or history, nor even theology. In all these things Jesus was a child of his age; in spite of his divinity, a child of the first century, who believed what other men believed, and who taught what others had taught him. But what he knew of God, and man, and of their relations; of man's sin and salvation; of the soul, its ground and its goal, that no school and no man had taught him. That was the fruit of his personal fellowship with the Father. And so the Master went up and down through Palestine teaching of God the Father and of man, His child, preaching the glorious news that though men were sinners they were yet precious to God; though they were living in rebellion and dreary alienation, yet God was seeking to win their hearts and wills with all the measureless love and patience of His divine heart. And the common people heard him gladly. They said, "He speaks with authority and power." They called his truth the Gospel, a glad tidings. They felt

that this Jesus laid bare the heart of God, and that he disclosed the great spiritual realities of the universe, as they had never been disclosed before.

And this truth which Jesus taught is one of our educational assets. It is not identical with any theological system that men have wrought out; nor is it found, in its fullness, in any creed of Christendom, nor in any confession or catechism of Protestantism. Precious and significant as these are, one and all, they are only the efforts of men to spell out in lisping accents and with stammering tongues the truth as it was in Christ Jesus. And though we believe reverently that God has given us a deeper insight into these truths than any previous age possessed, we are equally sure that many future generations of earnest and devout Christian men must become disciples of Jesus before the world will understand the full glory of God as it was revealed in the teachings of Jesus Christ.

Jesus is also our priest. We say with Nicodemus, that he is a teacher. But we also say, with the whole of the New Testament, that "His name is Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sin." As he gave us new truth, so likewise Jesus has given us a new experience. He brought men to God. He not only showed men the Father. He also showed them the way to the Father; a new and living way into the Holy of Holies, where sinners found acceptance, forgiveness and peace. It was not the way of the lawgiver of former times, who had said: "Keep the commandments and thou shalt live." Men knew that way. They had trodden it through the ages, and it had not led them into peace. They were treading it in the days of Jesus with weary feet, and with hearts and consciences burdened with the sense of failure and guilt. Nor was it the way of the priest of former times, who had said: "Offer sacrifices to God, peace offerings, and burnt offerings that you may satisfy His justice and appease His wrath." Men knew that way. The highway of history was marked with sanctuaries and smoking altars where priests performed ceremonies, and where high priests made atonement for the sins of the people.



But that way had not led to peace. Men who had trodden it had the spirit of slaves, they worshipped God in fear and trembling. Jesus showed men a new way to God. Come home, he said, to your Father in heaven. Go to Him in the filial spirit, and cry abba, Father. Leave behind you your meritorious works, and your sacrificial offerings, and go to Him in penitence. Trust God, and surrender to Him, and you shall live.

And, mark it well, it was not so much his teaching, as his life that opened this new way to the Father. Others before Jesus had shown men the Father, but they had never brought men to God. But in Jesus Christ the Father came to earth. God in Christ dwelt among men. Men began to realize that even as Christ was Godlike, so God was Christlike. As Christ received sinners and ate with them; as Christ looked with infinite compassion upon sinners and sacrificed himself for them, the just for the unjust, so the Christlike God stood ready to receive sinners that said in the spirit of penitence and trust, "I will arise and go unto my Father." There is deep spiritual insight, and eternal truth, in the saying of Peter: "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God." It was not primarily his teachings, but his life, that had redemptive power. It was his divine life of service and sacrifice for sinners that brought men to God. In him men found a new way to the Father.

And thus Jesus Christ has become humanity's high priest. Beginning in his life, and continuing through all the subsequent ages, men have entered into the presence of God with boldness by the new and living way. They have come to God in the name of Jesus Christ. In the place of all the external and legal devices for securing the divine favor, they have put the spiritual principles which he revealed in his life and work. They have come in childlike penitence and trust and they have found in God a gracious and forgiving Father. And this is the specific and distinctive Christian experience of salvation: to come to God, not with meritorious works, not with external

sacrifices, but in penitence and trust; to surrender to the love of God revealed in Christ, and to let this divine love save one from the guilt and power of sin.

And this new experience of salvation, which Jesus Christ brought into the world, is the second of our educational assets. All the Christian ages have magnified it and so do we. One vast anthem resounds through the centuries praising God for His gracious love manifested in Christ, whereby he saves men from their sins. It is intoned by Paul and John; it is taken up by Origen and Augustine; it swells to an exultant pæan of victory when the Reformers sound it forth anew. And we of today know of no other song to take its place. We stand humbly and gratefully with the apostles and saints, and confess that we are saved by the grace of God revealed in Jesus Christ. And yet, though we sing the old song of salvation, we sing it with new lips, for we believe that this new experience of salvation by the power of God's love is vastly deeper and richer than any explanation or interpretation of it, which has been given by men. I believe with all my heart in the forgiveness of sins, but not in the theory of the atonement taught by the Reformers; I believe thoroughly in regeneration, but not in the explanation made of it in the past; I believe it is God who saves men, God who justifies and sanctifies men, but I do not believe that He performs these gracious acts for the reasons assigned in our Heidelberg Catechism. Even as the Spirit of God, working through the ages, has given us a deeper insight into the truth which Jesus taught, so, I believe, the same Spirit has given us a truer apprehension of the salvation which Jesus wrought.

Jesus is also our King. Not only the prophet who has revealed the truth to us; not only the great high priest who has brought us to God; but also humanity's king who has proclaimed the eternal purpose of the Father. And the Master himself tells us what this divine purpose is. Beginning his ministry with the proclamation of the kingdom of God, he devoted his life to the establishment of this kingdom in the



hearts of men. He said that, like a leaven, this kingdom should permeate the life of mankind in all its relations, and that, like a mustard seed, it should extend and fill all the spheres of the life of the world. And this kingdom was a spiritual kingdom. It was the rule of God in the hearts of men. It consisted of those who accepted God as their Father and men as their brethren and who lived their life in this filial and fraternal spirit.

Calvin was right when he called God a mighty king of sovereign power. But he was wrong when he taught that it was the purpose of this omnipotent King to save a certain number of elect persons out of the whole human race to show His mercy, and to condemn all the rest of mankind to satisfy His justice. He misinterpreted the purposes of the King. He failed to understand that this Almighty King was not a capricious tyrant, but a Father. Only the Son knew the Father and it is he who has told us that it is not His purpose to select and save a few men, but to bring all mankind under the sway of His benign spirit. This eternal purpose of God, which Jesus proclaimed, is our third educational asset.

And thus, when we appraise our educational assets, the means which we possess to produce Christlike personalities, we find that they center in Christ. He is our one asset, our prophet, priest and king; the truth-teller, the saviour, and the leader of our race. It is the truth which he reveals, the experience into which he leads, and the duty which he proclaims, which constitute our educational assets.

What then ought we to do to make men Christlike; what are our educational liabilities; what is the task that confronts us in religious education? The answer is obvious. If I have given a correct statement of our educational assets, then it follows inevitably that in order to realize the supreme aim of religious education we must show men the Father, that they may believe in Him; we must bring men to God, that they may experience salvation; we must proclaim His purpose that they

may learn to do His will. However difficult it may be for us in this age to translate this educational theory into practice, to devise ways and means of imparting this religious education to our youth, the theory at least is clear, and it is with that I am here concerned. We must help men to understand the truth, to trust the power, and to share the will of God.

God has laid a prophetic task upon us. As a Church, we must teach and preach the truth which Jesus Christ has given us. I do not hesitate to say that the proclamation of the truth is the most imperative need of our times and the supreme educational task of the Church. For there lies our fatal weakness. Our age does not know God and man and their relation as Jesus knew them. We have lost our grip on the eternal realities, which he laid bare. There are those among us who say: "there is no truth, no revelation, no certain knowledge concerning these eternal things, concerning God and man, and the soul. All is fancy, not fact; speculation, but not revelation." And so they proclaim their melancholy message of doubt and denial to our distracted age. There are others who say: "Jesus is only one of many prophets. There were truth tellers before him; there have been others after him." So we have our Dowies, and Eddies and Sanfords, our imported Saviours from India and Persia, who delude and deceive men with their philosophies. There are still others who tell us that men care nothing for the truth which Jesus has revealed. They say our age is tired of philosophies and impatient of theologies. They claim that we want deeds not creeds. There are teachers, and preachers even, who echo this cry and seek to minister to our age by organizing crusades, by leading reform movements, and by becoming advocates of socialistic programs. But truth and life, creed and deed, are joined together by God and can never be safely separated. If we want men to live a Christlike life, if we want them to live here on earth as the sons of God and as the children of their heavenly Father, then we must show them the Father, and teach them to know and to understand what our great prophet has taught us concerning



the things of the spirit. To expect Christlike deeds without a Christian creed, is as foolish and futile as to expect to reap fruit without planting roots.

Therefore, I repeat, what our age needs most is a knowledge of the living God and of the great religious truths, which Jesus Christ lived and taught. And the supreme educational function of the Church is her prophetic task to preach and teach that truth. The most pathetic passage in the Old Testament is the lament of Job, "Oh that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his seat! Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand, when he doth work, I cannot behold him: He hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him" (Job XXIII: 3, 8-9). That is the sob of a human heart in the midst of the perplexities of life. That is man's cry for the living God. And that cry is loud today. Men have gone forward into business, but God was not there. They have plunged back into pleasure, but God was not there. They have sought Him with microscope and telescope, but God hideth Himself from the mind of man. And so mankind cries today with Job, "Oh! that I knew where I might find him."

That is Eucken's message to our age. That great modern prophet lays bare our deficiencies, and points to the only adequate remedy. He tells us that we are rich at the circumference of life, but abjectly poor at its center; that we abound in possessions, but are destitute of profound spiritual convictions. And, therefore, in spite of our marvellous civilization, a paralyzing doubt saps the vitality of our age. There is no pervading sense of confidence and security as to the meaning of life, and as to its value. And the one remedy which Eucken commends to mankind with so much earnestness of conviction is the recognition of the supreme spiritual realities which alone give life its meaning and value, and the vital response of the individual to the nature and requirements of the spiritual life. That is the philosopher's way of interpreting the pressing

demand of our age. Translated into religious language it means: show men the Father and it sufficeth them.

Let the church arise in her strength and gird herself for the prophetic task of showing men the Father. We must do for our age what the Reformers did for theirs. We must set forth the truth which Jesus Christ has taught us in new catechisms and manuals for the instruction of our youth. It must be evident to thoughtful observers of our times that there are today two new theology movements, or, rather, two phases of the one great movement. The one is patiently constructive, and the other blatantly assertive. The one conducts careful historical investigations. It gives us critical analyses of doctrines, and tentative restatements. It aims at a gradual reinterpretation of our Christian religion in forms of modern knowledge and thought. The other flourishes in popular magazines and in sensational pulpits. It aims to build a new Temple of Faith for humanity, not indeed, without the clamor of hammer or ax or any tool of iron, but in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye. And its extravagant assertions and startling predictions throw men into confusion, and tend to discredit the cause which it professes to serve. But these spasmodic theologians and dogmatic scientists, whose zeal is greater than their light, are only the circling eddies on the broad stream of modern theology that is silently flowing onward in a deep bed and with life-giving waters. The only uncertain factor in its onward flow is time. It cannot be stemmed, for it wells up irresistibly from the deep fountain of truth. But men may divert its course and impede its flow by continuing to build walls of tradition and bulwarks of apologetics around their congregations and denominations. They are only postponing the day when the Church shall convince the world that in the Gospel of Christ she possesses the treasure of the wisdom of God, and, in this wisdom, the most rational, the most satisfactory solution of the riddles of the universe.

God has also laid a priestly task upon us. Our priestly task in religious education is to give men the Christian experi-



ence of salvation from sin, which Jesus Christ has given us as our great high priest; to lead men to the Father by the new and living way, which Jesus has opened to us, that they may come to God, trust the power of God's love, surrender to Him, and be saved from their sin. Do we fully understand the meaning and the magnitude of this priestly task?

In Jesus' time, the world, roughly speaking, consisted of Greeks, Romans and Jews. The Greeks believed in philosophy. They taught that men are saved by education. "Virtue," said their great teacher, Socrates, "is knowledge." The Romans believed in force. They held that men are saved by legislation, by laws backed by strong military authority. And the Jews believed in morality. They taught that salvation must be won by good works. Heaven, according to their faith, was the reward of the law keepers, and hell the punishment of the law breakers. Then Jesus came and preached salvation by the love of God, a divine love, given freely to the least and the lowest among men, a love proffered to publicans and sinners, a love that would lift men and cleanse them from the guilt of sin and free them from its power. "Come to God," said Jesus to sinful humanity. "Come in penitence and trust, surrender your hearts and wills to the Father, and He will save you and give you the abundant life." Is it any wonder, then, that such a proclamation was foolishness to the Greeks, weakness to the Romans, and a stumbling block to the Jews.

The world has not changed much since Jesus' day. Greeks, Romans, and Jews are still with us, men who expect to save mankind from their sin by education, and legislation, or moral culture. We are familiar with them. We know their aims, and we sympathize with many of their aspirations. And yet, as Christians, we say to them, one and all: You are wrong, and doomed to certain failure. Greece failed; and so did Rome, and Judaism. You also must fail. It is not education, not legislation, nor moral culture will save the world from its sin and heal its sorrows. There is only one power can do that, the power of God's love. And it is only when men come to

God by the new and living way which Christ has shown them, and find in Him their gracious Father, that they experience salvation.

And today, as of old, this Gospel is foolishness and weakness and a stumbling block to the masses of mankind. And how shall we convince a skeptical, scoffing world of our claim? How shall we perform our priestly task and lead men to God? How shall we induce men to surrender to God's love in penitence and trust? There is only one answer to this question: **THAT** faith cannot be taught, it must be caught! Caught, by those who doubt or deny it, from those who preach and practise it. If our age needs prophets, it also needs priests. If our times call for manuals of truth, they call even louder for men who are priests, as Christ was a high priest,—men who embody and exemplify in their daily lives the power of God's love for our salvation. Thus salvation came to men. The gift of God's love was Jesus Christ; not a book, but a life; not a message but a messenger; a man who served, suffered and sacrificed himself that he might bring men to God. And thus salvation has continued to come to men through the ages. The real victories of the Church have not been won by her politics or liturgies, by her theologies or her philosophies, but by the men who have borne witness to Jesus by walking in his steps. And thus only will salvation come to our age. Give us Christlike men in pulpit and pew, Christlike teachers and parents in school and home; give us personalities who live and work in the spirit of the Master, who love men as Christ loved them, who are willing to serve and sacrifice and suffer as Christ did, in order to save men from sin! Give us men who know that the bottom fact of this universe, its inmost being, is not matter but spirit, not mind but heart, not law but love! Give us men who have experienced this redeeming love personally, and through whom it flows out in a gracious ministry of service and sacrifice! Give us such men, and we will solve the problem of religious education. The world will come to believe in Jesus' truth when it sees it practised. And men will trust



and try Jesus' way of salvation, when they see it exemplified in the lives of those who profess it. Life will beget life and spirit will kindle spirit. Such living creeds, such vital catechisms will be read and understood and believed by all men everywhere.

Finally, God has laid a kingly task upon us. That task consists in getting men to share the divine purpose. Religious education, as viewed in this article, will give truth to men; it will impart life to mankind; and it will give that life its task. And that task will be the establishment of the kingdom of God. When Jesus Christ launched this kingdom of God, nineteen centuries ago, it seemed like a magnificent dream. In an age which knew nothing of empires, save those founded by force and cemented with blood, our Lord proclaimed that it was the purpose of God to found a universal empire of love, in which filial trust of God and fraternal love of man should reign supreme. But what has become of it during these ages? Has the dream been fulfilled or has it been forgotten? "It was indeed a dream," we hear men say, "the beautiful fancy of a pure man, but nothing has come of it." Like all dreams, it has dissolved into nothingness. The world today is what it has always been. Beneath the thin veneer of our so-called Christian civilization are the greed and lust, the cruelty and selfishness of ancient paganism. And alas! there is much in the life of Christendom to lend force to such statements. Nevertheless, the kingdom of God is not an iridescent dream. Rather, let us say, it was a heavenly vision too high and holy for the comprehension of men. In proclaiming it, Jesus spoke the language of heaven, and it has taken his Church ages to spell out his message, letter by letter, and syllable by syllable. The Church may have been slow of heart and dull of understanding to comprehend the Gospel of the kingdom in all its fullness, but never has she doubted or denied it. Throughout all the former ages of her history she has attempted to be faithful to the divine purpose of redemption which Jesus proclaimed.

But now these former ages are past. A new time is upon us, a new fulness of time. As never before we understand God's gracious purpose. The same Spirit who has given us a deeper insight into the truth which Jesus taught, and a truer apprehension of the salvation which he wrought, has also given us a nobler conception of the divine purpose which he proclaimed. Today we realize that God is at work here and now to extend His rule upon earth through Christ, and that He will not rest from His labor until the kingdoms of this world have become the kingdoms of Christ, until His will is done on earth as it is in heaven. Formerly it was said: Watch and pray until the Lord comes to establish his kingdom! But now we know that he is here. He has already come. He is present in the hearts of men and mightily at work in society. Formerly it was said: Come into the Church, the ark of the New Testament, and be saved from the corrupt and doomed world! But now we challenge those who are in the Church, to go out and save the world from its corruption. Formerly it was said: Repent and believe and you shall go to heaven when you die! But now we say: Repent and believe and God will save you from your sins here and now, and give you a foretaste of heaven upon earth.

"Heaven upon earth!" You hear that cry on every side. It is one of the insistent demands of our age. It resounds through the whole world. Give us heaven here and now! We hear it in broken accents from the submerged classes and in hoarse and frenzied shouts from the lips of revolutionaries. We hear it in serious lay sermons in many a marketplace. Silence this great cry we could not if we would. It grows ever louder. And silence it I would not though I could. For I believe that it is an echo of Jesus' Gospel of the kingdom. I believe that these prophets of a new social order speak the language of Jesus Christ, albeit they speak it in strange accents, and often in ignorance and confusion. They need above all things the coöperation of the Church, the sympathetic interpretation of their human longings for righteous-



ness, justice, and peace in the light of Jesus' Gospel of the kingdom. They need to know that we of the Church of Christ understand their aspirations for a new world order, in which all men shall live as brothers, and that to us this is not a Utopian dream, not an ungodly scheme, but the will of our Father in heaven.

And this is our kingly task: To get men who know God in Christ, and who have tasted and tested His infinite love in the forgiveness of sins, to share in His great redemptive purpose. To get men to help Jesus Christ win the victory over the sin and selfishness in this world. To regenerate the life of humanity in all its phases, and to bring it into harmony with the divine will. I call it our kingly task, for it was proclaimed by the kingliest of men, and it requires men who are kings, as Christ was a king: Triumphant men, lords of the spirit and masters of their soul, who seek first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and who give a subordinate place to all the harvests of fame, pleasure, and riches of the kingdoms of this world.

The duty of getting men to share God's redemptive purpose does not necessarily impose upon the Church the task of adopting definite programs of social reform. There is a great difference between teaching and preaching the principles of the kingdom of God, and between prescribing the precise methods by which they shall be embodied in the structure of society. The one task requires a prophet with spiritual insight and religious convictions, and the other, a statesman with political sagacity and practical experience—gifts and graces which are rarely found united in one personality. It behooves us to remember that we are blazing our way on paths untrodden by human feet. We can follow no precedents, and we can cite no examples of the past for our guidance and instruction in these matters. Yet we have the example of our Lord, who was a prophet, and not a social reformer. He proclaimed the ideals, he furnished the motives and convictions, and he trained disciples. Thus we are on safe ground in maintaining that the

proper task of the Church, like her Master's, is to inspire and not to direct. She must look with intelligent Christian sympathy on every attempt to incarnate Christian ideals in our social order; she must have a warm heart for all the genuine reform movements that challenge her to turn the pulpit into a platform for their advocacy. But her unique and supreme task is to proclaim the ideals of the kingdom and to train men and women who will espouse them at every cost of personal inconvenience and material sacrifice. Possibly, the day will come when, in addition to this inspiring function, the Church will be qualified and prepared to give men "manual training in altruism" (in the felicitous phrase of Shailer Mathews); when our Sunday Schools will require the practice of the lessons taught; when our policy in religious education will be brought into full accord with the modern axiom of pedagogy, that "we learn by doing." But that addition of experimentation to our present function of information and inspiration must needs come gradually and tentatively. It cannot safely be left to the individual pastor or to a single church, here and there. It must come through some collective body, such as the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, whose united wisdom and combined endeavor will be required to direct the zeal, and to shape the policy of the awakened conscience of the Christian Church. Meanwhile, the unique task of the Church is great enough to tax all her energies, and holy enough to enlist all her wisdom and piety. She must inspire and train men who, as individuals or in collective groups, as citizens, employers, or employees, shall be able and willing to incarnate the ideals of the kingdom into corporate society. She must do this by preaching these ideals, by pointing to the person of her Lord, as the embodiment of the wisdom, the power, and the purpose of God, and, above all, by proclaiming the living God as the only adequate architect and builder of the Holy City of our aspirations.

We are planning noble forward movements along many lines during this anniversary year. And our own canvass and cam-



paign for definite Christian service, and for systematic Christian sacrifice, is but a part of a larger movement which is world-wide in extent and deeper far than our minds can fathom. Years ago Thomas Carlyle said "A splendor of God must get itself unfolded out of the heart of these industrial ages, else they will remain distressed, chaotic, and distracted, until they are annihilated." That, I believe, is happening now. God is getting deeper into the heart of mankind. He is pressing forward the conquest of this world. We see the whole earth in tumultuous commotion. We see the smoke of battle, and we hear the noise of conflict. Prophets of despair tell us that the end is nigh. But the prophets whom Jesus has taught know that out of this tumultuous distracted Today, God, through Christ, is ushering in the splendor of His Tomorrow, when His will shall be done on earth as it is in heaven. And the reserve army whom God is marching up to the conflict and the conquest are the youth of the Church. To enroll them as loyal and devoted disciples under the banner of Jesus Christ, we must give them a religious education that will really teach them the truth as it is in Christ Jesus, that will give them a personal experience of the power of God's love, and that will acquaint them with the gracious purpose of their Father, reaching back into eternity, bursting forth on Calvary, and gripping with its omnipotent love all the ages yet to be.

LANCASTER, PA.

#### IV.

### THE FUNCTION OF THE COLLEGE IN THE MAKING OF A MAN.<sup>1</sup>

H. H. APPLE.

It is my privilege to speak to you at this time when we open the doors of Franklin and Marshall College for the work of another year. We have happily joined with us the Theological Seminary which resumes upon this same day and, we may add, the Academy which assembles its students one week later. We form a group which embraces preparatory, college and university forms of education. What I have to say is of concern to each of these parts of a group and has a bearing on all phases of education, for in American life they are strongly linked together. What concerns one concerns all. A change in the form or nature of a college will effect quickly and radically the preparatory school on the one hand and the university on the other. Standing between these two the college in our country has attained a position of special importance. Upon her, I am convinced, rests a large responsibility for the welfare of our whole educational system, even from the elementary schools which look forward to it up to the highest university specialization, which forms an unbroken process to fit men for the activities of effective and useful service in life. It is significant that in spite of all the changes which have taken place in the outward form of courses of study in these various educational institutions and the many new branches which have been introduced to meet the demands and needs of a modern age the purpose of the college course has not changed. It is important that the aim shall be the same for the

<sup>1</sup> The address delivered at the opening of Franklin and Marshall College, September 11, 1913, by President H. H. Apple, D.D., LL.D.



future, for there is a distinctive and essential feature which dare not be lost in the training and discipline offered to young men in the life of a standard college. I shall refer therefore to the chief function of the college, which is the making of a man.

I may be permitted first to express appreciation of the pleasure which I have in greeting you on this opening day—marked as it is by happy reunions of old professors and students who have been reunited in our important work. Whatever may have been our experiences of a summer interim, tinged now with sadness and now with gladness, we are joined again in the happy privilege of new work. I extend at the same time a cordial and hearty welcome to new professors and new students who have come to enlarge our circle and we believe to enrich our service. We welcome you to an institution which is old in years, famed in usefulness and strengthened in equipment to meet the responsibility of education in a vigorous and progressive civilization. We cherish the noble and splendid heritage which has been bequeathed to us by the scholarly and cultured men who occupied chairs in this institution in the past and whose untiring labors continue to bless and inspire us. With keen consciousness of their remarkable achievements, adding luster to history and blessings to students, we shall strive, even with our recognized shortcomings, to emulate their zeal and faithfulness that both of us, faculty and students, may so perform our duties as to hand down in like manner to the future the high ideals and honored traditions which for the time being are intrusted to our hands. Together with other things which might readily be mentioned, we are encouraged in our efforts by the recent successful conclusion of the endowment movement which will place the College upon a firm financial foundation and increase our efficiency. The fact that we are, in comparison with many others, a small college is to our advantage. For, after all, a college is something more than its buildings and grounds, its endowment and its income. Its educational effectiveness is in its

men more than in these. Its traditions and good name, the atmosphere that pervades its halls, and the spirit that dominates all its activity, are largely to be reckoned with in any estimate of its efficiency and worth. One college may have millions to the good in comparison with another and its roster of students may sum up hundreds or even thousands more, and yet its real power, its capacity of influence on the life about it, and of the uplift of its environment, may be incomparably less than the institution of more modest showing in outward prosperity. It is conspicuous that in all our history, running through the one hundred twenty six years since the founding of the third oldest college in Pennsylvania, named after the greatest American of his day, Benjamin Franklin, and the seventy-seven years from the beginning of the classical institution whose patron saint was our scholarly jurist, John Marshall, and combined in a stream of life flowing from the union of these two, the first essential aim of Franklin and Marshall College has been to make men. And with the widened and strengthened curriculum today we justly lay claim to the same purpose and aim, to develop and mould personalities into such manhood as will contribute to noble and serviceable lives. And this is after all the biggest business there is. It is not simply the biggest business in the city, nor in the state but the biggest business in the world. Emerson directed attention to this when he said: "The greatest enterprise in the world for splendor, for extent, is the upbuilding of a man." And certainly creative passion can manifest itself in no higher way than in the manufacture of men whose business it is to express themselves completely in service to their neighbors. The greatness of railways and steamship lines, of factories and buildings of steel, of mines and farms, of schools and churches, of canals that connect the oceans and of irrigation projects which reclaim the deserts from the dominion of the sun, characteristics of material progress, cannot equal the manufacturing plant, if I may call it such, which produces for the world the most precious product in the universe, the bodies and brains



of men. Aristotle proclaimed the perfect life to be the fullest expression of self in service to society. Christ taught the same lesson, and his crucifixion is the most beautiful of all symbols, that the first great task is to build men. Assuredly the very foundation of an educational institution, if not the fullest scope, is to send out into life healthy, self-reliant, service-rendering men.

It must be admitted that at times many things have contributed to confuse this idea of education. The word has been given a variety of meanings according as there has been neglect of some of those elements that go to make up its content or undue emphasis of some in preference to others. A discussion of various methods devised for carrying out the process of education has often led wide of the mark. It is my purpose to mention a few things which contribute to the training and discipline of college education which is the due and harmonious development of all the latent faculties in a human being.

In that sense there is place in the curriculum for gymnastics, or if you please, athletics, to develop the material or bodily faculties of the student. The old saying of "*mens sana in corpore sano*," while glaringly defective as expressing a goal for education, was not wholly in error. The body may be the lowest part of personality but at the same time it deserves consideration in the development of the whole man; body, mind and soul. Walt Whitman thus praises the physical being:

"If anything is sacred, the human body is sacred,  
And the glory and sweet of a man is the token of manhood  
untainted;  
And in man or woman a clean, strong-fibered body is more beautiful  
than the most beautiful face."

The apostle Paul views it in the same sense when he says: "Your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost." This matter of physical fitness must be a concern of the college and we need to emphasize the importance of physical development and increase physical efficiency.

A growing body demands two things, nourishing food and proper exercise. No matter how much nourishing food a man may eat, if he does not exercise properly he will die. Our muscles are developed only through eating nourishing food and taking proper exercise. The man who guides in these is every bit as holy as the man who preaches a sermon to feed our minds and souls.

The claims of hygiene are today finding increased recognition. The great enemy of every country is disease. We are shocked and stunned by the list of killed or injured because of the disregard for the simplest rules of physical safety. Every day hundreds of persons are dropping out of the ranks whose lives and usefulness might have been saved if more attention had been given to proper exercise and recreation. The problem is not too childish for consideration. Even the most simple exercise taken systematically changes a body beyond belief. There may not be great enlargement of muscles but the man becomes supple and upright, healthier and happier, less cross and less nervous. The body must not be made a source of shame but of pride. A college owes its students a full chance to learn healthy exercise and for daily indulgence in such. There are those inclined to think what a man is physically is due to heredity which we cannot change. But we dare not encourage the man who squanders his body and we cannot disregard the means of saving and strengthening it. To our interest in the conservation of natural resources we ought to add a far greater interest in the conservation of physical manhood.

I am free to confess my belief that the best form of physical training is found in games. Military exercise and gymnasium drill are good enough for the student who must be forced to it. These serve to strengthen the muscle and keep the system clean as well as to teach correct habits of carriage and graceful movement. But the game in all its varied forms not only appeals to a boy but by its character stimulates physical courage, individual initiative, concentration of energy, poise, judgment,



quick decision, normal exultation in victory and laudable temper in defeat.

There have been and are today evils in athletics. But there is no one today who is striving harder than the college student to correct these evils. Most of them, the chief evils as well as the smaller evils, are the product of crudity, inexperience, and immaturity. Too often the attitude of the college authorities toward college athletics has been an alternation of indifference, hostility and indulgence. Too often has it taken the form of issuing rules and regulations and too seldom has it involved participation in them. That would be the surest way to secure the fine traditions that make athletics one of the durable influences over youth. One of the reasons that athletics in England has been kept clean by fine traditions is due to the fact that to an extent not yet familiar in this country it is regarded as natural that the same man should be scholar and athlete. If in future years public life in America shall become cleaner, business life more honest, professional life more elevated, it will, in part at least, be due to the training in self control and idealism furnished by clean athletics in our colleges.

Of greater importance is the training of the mind and the development of mental power. The quality and quantity of this power depends upon the mental food and the mental exercise men take. Ideas are food. We eat them, we digest them, we assimilate them. The ideas we feed our mind are the ideas that express themselves in speech and action. Nourishing mental food and proper mental exercise develop the mental muscles, just as nourishing physical food and proper physical exercise develop the physical muscles. Education embraces not only the subject to be educated but also the various means by which the latent faculties are to be developed—science and art and literature; it embraces the imbibing of knowledge and those principles and that discipline by which the character is to be fashioned.

It is clear that merely to impart knowledge is not educa-

tion; neither is he the best educated man who knows most about things. Knowledge, it is true, must be imparted in the course of education—knowledge of facts, knowledge of laws and principles. This side cannot be minimized but it is of little value unless there is such training and discipline of the mind as to render it capable of wise service.

In this respect the college plays a unique part in American life. It forms men who can bring to their tasks an incomparable morale, a capacity that seems more than individual, a power touched with large ideals. The college is the seat of ideals. The liberal training which it seeks to impart takes no thought of any particular profession or business, but is meant to reflect in its few and simple disciplines the image of life and thought. Men are bred by it to no skill or craft or calling; the discipline to which they are subjected has a more general object. It is meant to prepare them for the whole of life rather than some particular part of it. The ideals which lie at its heart are the general ideals of conduct, of right living and right thinking, which make them aware of a world moralized by principle, a world not of interests but of ideals. Such impressions, such challenges to a man's spirit, such intimations of privilege and duty, are not and cannot be found in the work of professional schools.

In any teaching of the experience of the race the sciences have a necessary place. None would advocate the adoption of the unchanged classical course of fifty years ago. Some knowledge of science is a part of a liberal education and should be taught at least so far as to enable graduates to enter the best professional schools. But the age of the classics has not yet gone by. One of the classic tongues, Greek or Latin, is the one royal road to a knowledge of all that is finest in letters and art. The language of the Hellenes in beauty, accuracy and power is unequalled and Latin is essential to a complete mastery of our own native tongue. The college must emphasize to a greater degree the tried classical discipline rather than compete with technical schools. There is room in this



large country for institutions of every kind and there are still people who will give their children an old-fashioned education, that is, a discipline that has been tested, under teachers convinced of its merits.

The popular appraisal of education is commercial—measuring the value of a training by the income it returns, and if every man is to stand for himself alone this appraisal may be right. It is in relation of the individual to the community, however, that this view of education first breaks down. The college has never taught that every man stands for himself alone, nor that the value of education is in its purchasable gratifications. There is a training that should be undergone for the sake of learning and for the benefit of others. This does not eliminate science but emphasizes its value not for a course of technical training but a course in which the culture of science and other liberalizing studies are sought as sound preparation for technical and professional schools and for life. As the college does not look on any man as educated unless he has been taught to interpret the problems of his own day through the lessons of the past and has received a knowledge of classic literature, philosophy and civilization, gaining discipline in the expression of his own tongue through the processes of translation; so it does not look upon any man today as fully trained for modern life who has not learned the methods of the laboratory and laid a secure foundation in science.

In this respect a college curriculum must prove itself. How much language, pure mathematics and philosophy or sociological, scientific and vocational studies should be used, and how to retain the discipline and culture of mind and give equipment for life is the problem to solve. Many experiments are being made and no final solution has been found. Efficiency is the great word of the modern industrial plant. Both man and machinery must work to the top notch of efficiency day in and day out. The training in college is no exception. It is only by careful, conscientious, regular and systematic application, whatever be the studies of the course, that a disci-

pline worth anything can be secured. The college student who seeks mental sloth, carelessness and inaccuracy, which are the antithesis of good education, is counteracting the benefits of a college course and paying too high a price for what he gets out of his four years. A young man under some stern master in office, factory or store, for eight hours or more each day, is part of a carefully organized system, a machine that detects his every lapse and fits him for higher responsibility. The college boy on the other hand is largely accountable to himself as to the use of his time and energy. The mind can be driven but that is not life. Life is voluntary or unconscious. It is breathed in out of a sustaining atmosphere. It is shaped by environment. It is habitual, continuous, productive. After the college authorities have provided the sufficient means in equipment, curriculum, instructors, it nevertheless rests with the student himself as to whether by his own coöperation he secures the desired development.

This leads us a step further into a higher sphere where the will is active and where the college training ought to culminate in the development of spiritual power. Physical strength alone makes the bully. Mental acumen is the tool of the trickster, deceit, crime and sin. Spiritual power, the crown of life, is the determining factor in the highest function of the college in producing perfect manhood. This is undoubtedly the highest test of college life. Physical development and winning athletic teams are desirable but the college which is successful in these and has nothing else to show is in a pitiable plight. To drill students, however well, in language, mathematics, philosophy, economics, sciences and kindred subjects, with no regard to morality or the higher spiritual realities, is no less a travesty on education. We dare not stop short of that discipline of the will which forms not only the driving but the guiding power of personality and makes the useful citizen. This power is invisible and intangible but it is none the less real, although the process of its growth is exceedingly subtle. Students can be driven to physical exercise, and compelled to



undergo mental training but no force or outward restraint can make them moral or spiritual. The college offers this discipline but the student who would profit by it must himself open his heart and soul to its reception and cultivation. This above all other things is genuine college culture. In the four years' course it is the demand of a faithfulness, integrity, honesty, self-sacrifice in play and in work which rounds out the character and spirit of the typical college graduate, fitted for a place of service in life. At every step he meets the moral problem and the manner in which he meets it mars or makes the man. Dishonesty in the class room is as ruinous as deceit on the athletic field. Lack of truthfulness in the routine duties of prescribed work is as disastrous as failure and unfaithfulness in various daily activities.

It is not difficult to realize that the small college is a better field for the cultivation of these qualities than the large institution because the individual touch of students with each other and with the instructors is more intimate. This individual touch is the most valuable thing in college life. To come into intimate acquaintance with a cultured instructor of broad mind and worthy ideals is in itself an inspiration to his whole life. To profit by it students themselves must live in a clean and pure atmosphere. The true life of the college manifests itself not in the class room but in what the students do and talk of and set before themselves as their favorite objects between classes. This is seen in the evening, at the dinner table, in the groups that gather and the men that go off eagerly to their work, where students get together and let themselves go upon their favorite themes—in the effect their studies have upon them when no compulsion of any kind is put upon them. These effects of learning are its real tests alike of its validity and of its efficiency.

Here it is we find the value of student self-government. Students who are being trained for nobler citizenship must have definite part in citizenship. A young man who has had placed upon him the responsibility of self-government will go

into life far better fitted for the responsibilities of citizenship than will the young man who has been governed while in college. If the college exists for the faculty rather than for the student, student government must be a mistake. But if college exists for the student and the faculty are there only as an instrument designed to promote efficiency the result will be a correct development, which is the great end for which colleges exist.

Certainly the moral element of this preparation is not less important than the intellectual. One of the leading engineers of the United States said: "When I wish competent agents to superintend works for which I am responsible, my greatest difficulty is to get good men. I can find twenty who know enough for every one whom I can certainly trust." Uprightness, virtue, Christian manhood, these are sure to tell in the life career. There is no royal road to success in them, but there is a sure road, that begins here, in faithful study and preparation.

I have taken it for granted and implied that moral training is based upon and embraces religion. The earlier colleges in this country were instituted for religious training and religious ends. In a period of reaction students lost spiritual vigor and some were inclined to boast of disgraceful episodes, of lapse in devotion to parents and even dishonor to a heavenly Father. But the college has come into her own again and he is held in highest esteem who leads the clean life, is respectful and tender to his family and friends and is conscious of and faithful in his duties to God. We must believe in something greater than we know. We must have faith in self, faith in the world's need of us, faith in work and a greater faith than these. We must believe that we are unique, that there is nowhere else in the world another man like ourselves; that there is work which we alone can do, that we have been created to render this one service; that this service is discovered to us by our love for self-expression along certain definite channels.

Since we must believe these things—since we must have



faith—why not have the greatest faith it is possible to have? Why not believe that back of this world, which is but a grain of sand in the universe, is the great personality, who is all-wise, all-just, all-loving, who permits no waste to exist in his institution, who is directing all of us in his service, and to whom there are no useless men, no useless institutions? That there are no useless thoughts, no useless words, no useless acts and no useless institutions and that are all doing his work, in his way, in his time—that is faith.

For the sake of success and manhood, lay broad the foundation of education, do not be afraid of learning too much, or of preparing thoroughly for your life's career. It should be the supreme joy of the college man to accelerate progress so that in the generations to come there shall be less of misery, less of iniquity, more of happiness. This is the divine opportunity of the college man; this is the burden imposed upon him. In this work you and I are joined in Franklin and Marshall College and we ask God's blessing upon it.

LANCASTER, PA.

## V.

### THE CHURCH AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

PAUL B. RUPP.

One of the hackneyed complaints upon the lips of the twentieth century pessimist is that "these days are not like the good old times,"—an expression uttered in a tone which intimates that we are on the downgrade in both morals and religion. This complaint is a survival partly of the traditional belief that the man of today is only a degenerate son of his morally perfect Edenic ancestor; and partly of the widespread conception that the "Golden Age" is a thing of the long distant past. "'We are the same that our fathers have been,' and worse," says he of the backward look. Thus many consider the conditions of the twentieth century as socially inferior to, and morally worse than, those of any preceding age.

But we deny the reasonableness of such an assumption. It indicates a woful misunderstanding of the lessons of history. We believe that the twentieth century civilization is on a far higher moral and social plane than was that of two thousand years ago when Jesus trod the uplands of Judea. A mere glance at the Old Testament prophecies, for example, reveals the fact that immorality, vice and unsocial conditions were not unknown in the year 800 B. C., but were probably *more* spectacular, blatant and common than they are today; that they constituted the very burden which lay so heavily upon the hearts of the prophets. God sent them to teach Israel that their ways were not His ways; that He would lead them to constantly higher levels of life if they would only follow. If the "Golden Age" lies behind us, then ancient Israel offers no hope for the twentieth century.

If however we regard history as simply the school days of



the human race, then we are in a position to view calmly and deliberately the moral and religious strides of the past, and to look with hope toward a still more splendid future. There is still much truth in the ancient adage that "distance lends enchantment to the view." For we are so far removed from primeval man that we have clothed him in the garments of perfection; and so close to the men and women of today that we cannot appreciate them because of the evil they do.

We know more about the conditions of today than of yesterday. Our newspapers bring to our supper table the story of the murder or the divorce scandal of the morning. Our magazines and novels present the ills of the times in lurid colors, and sometimes in a grossly false light. But the fact that we are able and willing to read of them is a wholesome sign that we are really awakening to their existence. Our forefathers in their own isolated communities knew of no evils other than their immediate own; we know of them as soon as they spring to life,—whether in our own city or in the farthest isles of the sea. And just because so broad is our knowledge of contemporary conditions, the shallow mind is prone to regard the twentieth century as the worst in all history.

But it is the best. Wrongs which our fathers winked at we unhesitatingly condemn. Bad economic conditions which they regarded as providential, as predestined to be, we ascribe to the greed of men, or as incidental to economic evolution; and we stir up the conscience of men, and set in motion all our legal machinery for their removal.

We are willing to face facts as they are, and not as we think they are. Our scientific trend of mind has banished all preconceived opinions and prejudices, so that we are in a position to investigate sanely and soberly the social life of the twentieth century as it unrolls itself before us. And as we study modern life we at once discover that, though we have ascended moral heights to hitherto unheard-of distances, we nevertheless present the picture of a social "crazy-quilt" in which good and bad are commingled without any semblance of justice or order.

In the first place the most superficial kind of investigation will open one's eyes to a very widespread discontent for which there is just cause. "Things are not what they seem." On the surface America never seemed more prosperous. Her industrial system has developed with unparalleled rapidity, and attained an astonishing degree of complexity. Her corporations which thirty years ago were but infant industries today send their products to the four corners of the globe. Our most familiar advertisements meet the tourist along the caravan routes of the Soudan and near the villages of the farthest north. Industry is so systematized that one corporation can manufacture a hundred and more articles with equal ease and economy. According to the last census \$18,428,000,000 were invested in productive enterprises in 1909, while the products at the factories were valued at \$20,672,000,000. Wages and salaries alone totalled \$4,474,000,000, a sum too large to be appreciated, and yet sufficiently great to lead one to infer that every man should have "enough and plenty." But if we divide this amount into salaries and wages, we find that prosperity is a term with which all too few are familiar. Wages would average \$533.00 and salaries \$957.00; while there is no reckoning the amount which found its way into the coffers of the capitalist. This brings us naturally to the economic problem of the times: a more equitable distribution of wealth, the solution of which will go far in settling prevalent discontent.

The wage earner must face the economic problem in one or more of its various aspects every day of his life. Thus a tariff bill is bad to him because it deprives him of warm clothing, or more nutritious food, or even the commonest comforts of life. A public utilities bill is good or bad because he is largely at the mercy of the corporation which the bill is designed to control. Child labor, female labor, the sweatshop, affect him in whole or in part. For 90 per cent. of all our people consist of wage and salaried workers and their families whose interests are vitally bound up with the economic problem. The wage earner feels



that he is not receiving a fair portion of the products of his toil. The "sweater" may fairly wear out his life in stitching the warmest clothing; but he is never able to *use* it. The mechanic labors ten hours a day in an automobile factory; but the nearest he ever comes to a touring car is in his wild scramble across the city streets as the wheels of the machine just graze him. The textile worker toils many an hour over his spindles; but woolen blankets seldom cover him when night closes his weary eyes. He works so hard and gets so little for all his pains. Moreover, as he goes to his work in the morning or returns home in the evening, he sees his employer, or some other affluent member of his own species, contentedly ensconced in his six cylinder machine, smugly meditating upon his profits and losses. Or he may glance at the evening paper, if he is prosperous enough to subscribe for one, and there read of the latest society ball, at which the dancers wore pumps with diamond-studded heels, and drank enough champagne to have kept himself and family in comfort for a whole year. He knows that sickness will halve his paycheck, and that death will throw his family upon the mercy of a none too merciful world. An angry spirit of revolt surges up within him, and he eagerly welcomes any ism or party which promises him a new arrangement in the social structure. He would receive with open arms any revolution which should guarantee him a more equitable division of that wealth which cost him so much toil and nervous energy, and of which he has received so little. He is inclined to regard society as conspiring against him, in reaping what it had not sown and gathering where it had not scattered. That had been his function, but no bountiful harvest had rewarded his efforts. So he uses one of two weapons at his disposal: the strike or sabotage. In either case, however, he demoralizes industry, while society pays the bill.

But discontent is only one side of the picture, and there is another. It is the positive physical suffering and moral injury

which result from an unjust division of profits. The "speeding-up" system of the average mill and factory so drains the vitality of the wage earner that he has little inclination to cultivate his spiritual powers or develop his mental abilities. In fact the very monotony of his work tends to dwarf both, and initiate a craving for physical stimulation which usually finds its satisfaction in some nearby saloon. His low wage will not permit him to furnish his home with any degree of luxury or comfort. There is nothing to induce him to remain home after nightfall; for it possesses no semblance of real home life. His children—and the wage earner is superlatively prolific—are taken from the school as soon as they reach their earning age, and sent to the mill or the counter to help finance the family. Throughout the day the family is completely broken up into its constituent elements; and, after the evening meal, each must away to the streets, or the cheap theatre, or the dance hall,—and their morals pay the penalty.

This drain upon the vitality of the worker, this dwarfing of his spiritual nature and degeneration of his morals, this breakup of the family life constitute a distinct economic and spiritual loss. No man can do his best work when he is constantly urged to the very limit of his endurance. Nor under the circumstances does he become the most efficient kind of citizen; for his exploitation has created in his mind a lurking suspicion that society is partly to blame for the injustice done him. He knows that society is, or ought to be, his legal partner for life; but he has found that his partner has permitted him to be exploited and browbeaten at will.

Moreover, part of his suspicion has fastened upon the church which, whether rightly or wrongly, he charges with having been arrayed against him for the benefit of the capitalist. He believes that when she should have lifted up her voice in protest against social injustice she has been strangely silent. He labors, therefore, under the impression that the church has complacently taken sides with the capitalist, for he is usually



found upon her roster of membership. So the discontented wage earner avows that if religion tolerates injustice, he will have nothing to do with religion, or with religion's mouth-piece, the Christian church. He indeed regards the church as a potential power for social uplift. He knows that in the past and present, "the church has always been ready to offer comfort in times of distress and illness; she has always engaged in a magnificent philanthropy of which she may well be proud; she has visited the sick and fed the hungry. But she has not gone to the root of social suffering and attempted to cut it." This he well knows; and at the same time he knows that if the church with her millions of adherents were to become really interested in social reform, there is no injustice or oppression which she could not speedily rectify. But because he does not see her using her power in a practical way to uproot the causes which necessitate social reform, the average wage earner holds her partly responsible for social ills. Expecting so much from the church and seeing her do so little makes him suspicious of her sincerity of purpose. So he turns from her spiritual ministrations and pins his faith to a political party as his economic saviour.

That labor has sufficient warrant for its complaint against injustice we have already hinted at. Society seems to be divided into two clearly distinguishable and mutually hostile camps. On the one hand is the wage or salaried worker. On the other is the capitalist who usually lives in the greatest luxury, and who considers his wealth as his own, to do with just as it pleases him. The average capitalist, in fact the average man today, is an extreme individualist who possesses no sense of social unity, and who fails to understand that society's welfare is established only when the welfare of every member of society is secured. The wealth per capita in the United States is reckoned at \$1,300. But with wealth being rapidly concentrated into the hands of the few—10 per cent. owning 70 per cent. of our capital—the great majority have relatively little they can call their own.

During the past two decades great corporations have sprung into existence. Now there is nothing inherently good or bad in a corporation or monopoly *per se*; it is only when the corporation or monopoly has been formed for the express purpose of increasing prices and thus enlarging dividends at the expense of the consuming public, that it creates for itself a name which the public recognizes as bad. And that has been the general tendency of corporations during the past twenty years. While it is true that wages are higher today than in 1893, yet they will buy only 49 per cent. as much as they did then. At the same time the wage earner knows that large dividends are being declared, that the "melon has been cut," but no slice came to him. He believes that he has been tricked out of his commensurate portion of the proceeds of the industry; so he uses the strike as the "big stick" to force a more equitable wage agreement. In the meantime the industry is paralyzed, the public suffers as much as the two contending factions, and the real cause of the strife remains unreached and unsettled.

There are other and kindred questions which should receive consideration in a discussion of this character. The liquor problem, for example, is anti-social in its methods and results. Statistics tell us that 85 per cent. of all our crime is directly traceable to the liquor traffic, and that it furnishes 40 per cent. of our confined insane. Just what relation does alcoholism bear to the wearing drain of the industrial system upon the life of the worker?—is a question which could be discussed with profit, but the limits of this paper forbid.

Again, the white-slave traffic should in justice to the women exploited by it, receive consideration in a discussion of social questions. Just what percentage is caused by low wages?—is a question which is at present being investigated by the legislatures of several states.

Or again, the spirit of speculation, of gambling, has an important place in the social question. What percentage of it is due to the feverish methods—many more or less questionable—of our competitive system?



These and other questions are vitally related to the great social problem of a more just arrangement of our social structure, so that the wage earner may become a more efficient citizen and valuable social factor.

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And now what should be the attitude of the church toward this problem, or toward any problem of kindred nature? In a few words we answer: that of sympathetic counsellor and guide. The function of labor organizer the church dare not assume under penalty of losing her birthright of a spiritual mission for the mess of pottage of passing popularity. She might court and for a time receive popular favor by allying herself organically with labor in all its undertakings; she might place upon her bulletin boards: "This is Labor's Church," and perhaps enjoy crowded attendances upon her services. We say *perhaps*, for it is a mooted question whether labor desires especially a workingman's church or one vitally interested in labor's problems. The church for her own sake must not be of and for a distinct class. That bulletin board would lead men to infer that economic questions in which the workingman is vitally interested constitute the burden of discussion by the pulpit. But a frequent attendance upon such a "labor church" would soon pall upon him; for the labor lyceums afford more expert discussions upon economic problems than that which the average minister so academically presents on Labor Sunday, for example. Socialistic ministers do not long retain their crowds. People instinctively associate a religious message with the pulpit, rather than a vapid tirade against the modern social organization. But what the workingman wants, and has a right to expect, is a religious message applied to his own peculiar conditions, rather than a discourse upon the ancient Hittites and Egyptians. The wage earner is living in the twentieth century, and he is being exploited by modern Egyptians who are compelling him to make bricks without straw, to forge the finest tools and manufacture the most delicate fabrics without recompensing him in a man-

ner which will maintain his highest efficiency. He, therefore, looks to the church to attempt a social reform through the promulgation of moral principles which shall be just as binding upon his wealthy employer as upon himself. The average workingman asserts that in past years the church trimmed her message to suit the tender sensibilities of her wealthy pewholder; and he has therefore permitted his own loyalty to the church to grow somewhat cold. While he considers the church to be a moral agency for the promotion of justice which cannot be gainsaid, he yet expects her to make good her claim to bring peace on earth and good will to men.

Now the church is recognizing her responsibility for the promotion of social justice, though she is not always clear as to the best method she ought to pursue to gain her end. During the past twenty-five years she has adopted the institutional idea for directly ministering to those who have been caught in the grip of the social problem. Thus she has built her gymnasiums, her bowling alleys, and swimming pools; she has established her kindergartens, her day nurseries, and training classes; she keeps her reading rooms and amusement parlors open day and night,—in the hope of alleviating misery and suffering, and curbing discontent. And yet, good as these agencies are for the promotion of culture and healthfulness among the people, and for a testimony to the fraternal spirit of the faith, they cannot by any means be regarded as a permanent solution of the social question. In many cases the institutional idea has been adopted solely for the purpose of self-preservation in a rapidly changing community. And in all cases it is simply the method of the physician who treats individual cases of disease without at the same time investigating their causes. Charity must, indeed, be the dominant note of the church's activity; but a charity which is content with ministering to the externals of poverty and privation, rather than in uprooting the causes which make charity necessary, is only blindness and a "beating against the wind."

In dealing with the social question the church must first of



all hark back to the primary purpose which Jesus ever kept in mind: The preaching of the gospel of the Kingdom of God whose central idea is concerned with two fundamental facts: the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. It required nearly eighteen hundred years for her to learn the lesson of God's Fatherhood; the present age clamors for brotherhood. That must be incarnated in the message of the modern pulpit. This idea of brotherhood she must especially preach to the sons of wealth; the very poverty of the poor compels them to practice brotherhood.

Thus the modern church must lay especial stress upon the stewardship of wealth. This idea she did not indeed forget in past years, but she preached it all too feebly. She was more concerned about the purity of doctrine and correctness of belief than about the application of both doctrine and belief to personal living for both rich and poor. But today people are suspicious of doctrine, unfortunately too much so, and demand a message which shall prove a spiritual dynamic in transforming the topsy-turvy social order.

She must tell men in no uncertain terms that wealth is a good only when it is sought for the sake of the *social good* one can do with it, rather than for its own sake or for one's own personal enjoyment. When churchmen are clothed in purple and fine linen and fare sumptuously every day, while their brothers are rotting out their lives in dirty tenement houses; when rich fools squander a fortune upon a banquet given to pet cats, while men and women are starving in the slums of the same city; when, in other words, wealth owns the man rather than the man the wealth, then it becomes a social evil, and the man becomes a downright sinner, regardless of the fact that a thousand clerks obey his call, or that he holds the office of elder in a Christian church. The Kingdom of God, or the democracy of brothers, whichever one chooses to call it, must be the theme of the modern church as it was of the ancient, or of the Christ. When men can devour widow's houses and then salve their guilty consciences with a check of five or more

figures for some church philanthropy, without any protest from the church herself, then she need not be surprised when the denizen of the slums shrugs his shoulders at the mention of her name, and calls her the little sister of the rich. Her Sunday Schools must promote into the congregation young men and women who are imbued with the supreme ideal of brotherhood, not indeed of the elect, but of both prodigal and elder brother, of rich and poor.

But the church cannot afford to identify herself with any political group for the reorganization of society, much as she believes in the necessity for such reorganization. Political groups naturally use only political methods which at best are only temporary, confined to a decade or a generation. Thus prior to the civil war she allied herself with the abolition party in the north and with the slavery party in the south, and as a logical consequence she was split in twain. But through the foolishness of preaching she must teach her members moral and spiritual principles which have a *social* application. It is true she must still attempt to reach individuals in order to regenerate society, for only out of good individuals can a good society be formed. But her modern task is to transform the natural individualism of the individual into the social conscience of the Christian. In the past men have proved themselves generous brothers to individuals, but did not hesitate to act as grafters and exploiters towards society as a whole. The modern church must attempt to give the individual man a social vision, so to train him in his Christian course that he will adopt the fraternal attitude towards society as well as towards the members of his own household. His individual ethics must be converted into a social ethics. Brotherhood is not individualistic, monastic, ascetic, but social,—else it is not brotherhood. Thus the church must steer clear of social reforms by political methods, for “reforms are for church members, and not for churches.” She must on the other hand prove the agency through which God inspires individual men and women with a social vision, so that they will go out of her serv-



ices into the world, and purge it of its injustice and oppression, and bring to pass peace and good will. Her message is still for the individual to make of him a Christian and a brother.

Again, while she should voice the necessity of social reform she must insist that reform be effected through the inspiration of religious enthusiasm rather than by means of merely legal expedients. In their haste to regenerate society men have ever been inclined to become revolutionists, forgetful of the saying, "they that use the sword shall perish by the sword." In their zeal they lose sight of decency and order, and frequently hold in contempt the law itself. They justify the means by the nobility of their aims and end; they hold their own will and understanding superior to the will and standards of society. Thus we occasionally find reform candidates buying votes for the sake of the good cause they represent; thus rabid suffragettism burns property and defies the law because it so intensely believes in the righteousness of its aims and in its ability to use the ballot; thus the Industrial Workers of the World employ all the methods of the anarchist in order to usher the workingman into his rightful inheritance.

Now, in all her preaching the church must always insist upon the majesty of the law. For a due regard to the law which is only the publicly expressed will of society, is the first guarantee of all progress and legal reform and "of the permanence of the good law which must inevitably replace the bad." There is no organization or individual so fitted by history and training to stand for this fact as the church. Lawlessness marks both the anarchist and the recipient of special privilege. In fact it is the lawless methods of the latter which are largely responsible for the discontent and lawlessness of the former. The lobbyist buys off the lawmaker for the sake of his own personal gain, despite any harmful results which might thereby accrue to the public. But a virile church, which believes in the democracy of man, must sternly set her face against *all* lawlessness, whether by the I. W. W. or the greatest corpora-

tion in the land. She must declare in no uncertain terms that the law is good if men use it lawfully, and that a law-abiding attitude is the only guarantee that the next generation will be law-abiding. The church must still stand upon authority, in dealing with social questions, but upon the authority of the moral law and the legally expressed social will. She must assert without fear or favor that the individual is sovereign only when his will accords with the social will. He should be taught to realize that in addition to his sovereignty he has a social duty to perform; and only as he performs that duty in the spirit of obedience to lawfully constituted authority does he fulfill his high obligations of Christian citizenship.

In the next place the church has it altogether in her power to guarantee sanity in reform. One of the very real dangers and nuisances in any age of transition is the radical, the fanatic, the crank, each with his own pet method and narrow view, and promising a millennial dawn. On the one hand we find the extremist who promises a regenerated society by the selective processes of eugenics; on the other, is no less an extremist who makes the same guarantee, but by the refinements of euthenics. From the free-trader who preaches a reasonable cost of living by the utter demolition of the tariff wall, to the socialist who guarantees an economic redemption by state ownership and operation of all productive enterprises,—one and all they add to the noisy din of social agitators. All are doubtless sincere in their purposes, but many are totally impractical in their methods and impatient for results. Now agitators are necessary for all progress, but “an agitator who is mad with altruism is just as dangerous as any other madman.”

Sanity in reform is the one element indispensable for its permanence. Wholesale iconoclasm and denunciation only add fuel to the fires of lawlessness. That the Christ and the early church fully realized, and that the modern church must recognize. Jesus came to found the ideal social order by preaching the universal doing of God's will; but Jesus declined to hasten its coming by spectacular methods or illegiti-



mate processes. St. Paul knew that the Gospel of Jesus spelled the doom of slavery; but the apostle nevertheless sent the slave Onesimus back to his Christian master Philemon, trusting to the latter's sense of brotherhood as a guarantee of right treatment for the former. Ambrose both aroused and restrained the Milanese; Luther both aroused the German peasants by his preaching and then condemned them for their lawlessness; and down through the centuries the church has ever stood for decency and order in all sorts of reform, which simply must come if the gospel is preached consistently and in its purity.

In the past, and even in the present, the church has been charged with indifference to social wrongs, or with the *laissez faire* policy, because she would not rush headlong into every reform fathered by every hot-headed agitator. But she was probably wiser than she knew. For permanent reform does not come over night, even as the evils aimed at did not spring up over night. But she went directly to the source of the evils, even *inhuman greed*, and denounced it in more or less cogent terms, believing that only the preaching of God's Fatherhood and man's Brotherhood could transform inhuman greed into Christian love. It required years and centuries to make her impression, but she made it; for the social life of today is on a far higher moral plane than it was in the day of her origin. That attitude she must unswervingly maintain, though she must restore to her message what she forgot one thousand years ago: that man's *whole* duty is not performed until he acts as a brother to society at large, as well as to the individual in particular. She is in a position, as the average reformer is not by reason of his lack of perspective, to understand that true reforms come slowly, because the Kingdom of God come slowly, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear."

Finally, she must insist that all her members catch this vision of brotherhood. She is the inspirer through the power of her indwelling Saviour, and her members must act on her

inspiration. In a broad sense she is the fountain, her members are the streams which flow into all of society's bypaths, bringing refreshing and sweetening influences to wearied and burdened souls. Her members are the leaven which will in time leaven the whole social lump. And only as her members do thus live among their fellows according to the fraternal vision which she inspires, will discontent give way to peace, goodwill supplant selfish aggrandisement, and the kingdoms of the world become the kingdoms of the Lord and His Christ.

McKEESPORT, PA.



## VI.

### SHALL WE PRAY FOR RAIN?

RAY H. DOTTERER.

A pastor was visiting a country parishioner, an old man who came over from Prussia a half-century ago. The parishioner's connection with the congregation was somewhat loose. In fact he was not a member in the strict sense of the term, but belonged to the always-present, uncertain fringe of adherents. Having received a fairly good German education in his youth, and being a man of considerable natural ability, he was frankly sceptical concerning some of the articles of belief commonly regarded in the churches as essential. He took great pleasure, too, in airing his doubts, and liked to take the negative side in a friendly debate. At the time of the pastor's visit there was great need of rain; accordingly, the sceptical parishioner suggested in a bantering way that the parson pray for rain. "It can't do any harm, and might do some good," he added. The suggestion made in such a manner deserved no consideration, and received little. But what if such a request had been made seriously and sincerely?

Shall we pray for rain? Is it proper to offer petitions for material benefits? Is it reasonable for a Christian in this day of natural science to seek to change the future by means of prayer?

1. *The Destructive Argument.*—The course of events, at least in the world of material phenomena, is fixed. Effect has been produced by cause, and each cause has in turn been an effect of a preceding cause since the beginning of the series (if there was a beginning), and the same causes will produce the same effects to the end of time (if there be an end). The history of natural science is a record of the triumphant prog-

ness of the human mind in explaining phenomena as particular cases of general laws. There was a time when nature seemed only a small island in the immense ocean of the supernatural. By Copernicus and Newton, nature was extended to fill all space; by Darwin, to include all time. It is no longer satisfactory to divide existence into two parts, and to say of the one, "It is the product of Nature," and of the other, "It is the creation of God." All phenomena are included in nature, and take place in accordance with law. To pray for rain (or for the cessation of rain), in the hope of changing the weather, is therefore a foolish endeavor. No one nowadays thinks of seeking by means of prayer to turn aside a comet; no one thinks of asking God to hasten or retard, still less to prevent, an eclipse. Now there can be no doubt that the weather is just as law-abiding as the movements of comets, planets, and satellites. Meteorology is a science as truly as astronomy. The only reason we are tempted to think of next month's weather as undetermined, while we never think of the eclipses of the next century otherwise than as determined, is the fact that we know less about the former. The principles of meteorology are not so well understood as the laws of astronomy. They are probably more complicated. But it is not too much to hope that some day the science of the weather will reach the stage of definite and sure prediction. When that day comes, will we pray for rain?

When we say that the course of nature is fixed, that eclipses and storms are determined in their occurrence by unchanging laws, we are not denying the omnipotence of God. Natural law is unchanging; yet not, theoretically, unchangeable. The writer believes in human "freedom." He believes also in that "free will" of God which the theologians call "transcendence." God is not the slave of Nature, or a passive spectator of the operation of a system of natural laws. He is the source and ground of Nature. A natural law is not a subordinate or semi-independent deity; a natural law is only a description of God's mode of operation. The problem of "answers to



prayer" cannot be solved, however, by appealing simply to Omnipotence, or by drawing a hazy analogy between God's conduct of the world and a man's working upon his environment. It is not a question of what God *can* do, but of what He actually does. We have good authority for the statement that He sends his rain on the just and the unjust, presumably also on the praying and the prayerless. The tornado takes its course over untilled wilderness and fertile farm and populous city with sovereign impartiality. Conceivably, Omnipotence might prevent the storm, or at least turn it aside so that it would not strike the more crowded abodes of man; but Omnipotence does not "interfere." For some reason God acts in accordance with those uniformities of cause and effect, which we call the laws of nature. No doubt the reason is sufficient in His sight.

By entreaty we may sometimes prevail upon a man to do for us or for others what would otherwise remain undone. With the best heart in the world he may not know our needs. We enlighten him, and, rejoicing in the opportunity to serve, he wills that our petition be granted. His "free will" initiates a new causal series in nature, and we obtain that for which we asked. Or, with full knowledge of our needs, the man may be indifferent or even hostile. By our entreaty we change his heart, and the result is the same. But no one will accuse God of imperfect knowledge of our needs, still less of indifference to them. He knows all that we know and more; His love is perfect. All the prayers of all the saints cannot instruct or persuade Him. Our Father knoweth what we have need of before we ask Him. His love impels Him to seek the best for all His children. If we, nevertheless, pray for rain, or for material benefits in general, are we not in imminent danger of seeking to set up our judgment of what is right and best in opposition to His?

2. *Criticism and Reconstruction.*—In the name of consistent thinking about God and the world we are on the point of suggesting the omission of the "prayer for rain." But can

we stop here? Consistency is a hard master. If we must cease praying for material benefits can we continue to pray for spiritual blessings? We may perhaps assume that the reign of law is less absolute in the realm of spirit than in the realm of matter; yet it may turn out that this assumption is possible only because of our ignorance of the laws of spirit. It may be a case of meteorology and astronomy on a grander scale. However this may be the argument is not fundamentally vitiated; for here too God's love and knowledge are not capable of improvement as a result of our efforts. Are we to suppose that God is made more desirous of saving the world, by the prayers of men? Certainly our intercessions are not necessary. Whether we pray or neglect to pray, He is continually granting His saving grace to all who wish to receive it. Whether we pray or neglect to pray, He is calling men to preach the gospel. Again, in accordance with the same line of argument, the prayer for help in overcoming temptation, or for the conversion of loved ones gone astray, is needless. God certainly desires that men overcome temptation, and we cannot imagine that He will withhold His grace from any erring brother, because someone has neglected to intercede for that brother.

Can we stop even here? Why give thanks? How do we know which is bane and which is blessing? Both sometimes appear in disguise. Moreover why tell Him that we are thankful? He knows before we tell Him. Confession of sin is proved unnecessary by the same argument; for the Searcher of hearts is not ignorant of our penitence. Adoration, too, and praise must now appear quite superfluous, because we can tell God nothing about His power and glory, about His justice, love, and mercy, which He did not know before.

Clearly, then, if the prayer for rain must be given up, with it must go not only all petitions for material benefits, but petition in general, and all the other elements of prayer,—adoration, confession, thanksgiving. The implications of the destructive argument have carried us so far as to suggest a



*reductio ad absurdum*. At least there ought to be a careful search for an erroneous premise, before deciding to rest content with the conclusion stated in the preceding paragraph. And we have not far to seek. The erroneous premise is the assumption, common to many of the opponents and the defenders of prayer, that its efficacy ought to be proved by objective results. The scientist suggests a test analogous to the experiments of a chemical or physical laboratory. The religious devotee labors diligently in the endeavor to collect numerous accounts of "remarkable answers." Even when it is conceded that the primary purpose of prayer is to achieve subjective results, and that the true end to be sought is not the bending of God's will into agreement with the will of the petitioner, but rather to bring the latter's will into conformity with the will of God; it is nevertheless said that unless men *hope* to receive objective answers to their prayers, "there will be little praying done." Even if this pessimistic view were true, it would have no relevancy to our present discussion. The merchant has no moral right to misrepresent his goods, even in the laudable endeavor to increase his trade; the religious leader has no right to teach untruth or half-truth even for the praiseworthy purpose of fostering the habit of worship. Better that prayer should cease than that men should be insincere. But the case is not nearly so bad as the pessimists have thought. Men will continue to seek communion with God, even though petition, in the strict meaning of the term, fall into disuse. It is erroneous to assume that prayer is unreasonable unless it can be proved to effect changes in God and in the world.

Prayer is valuable, and indeed indispensable, not because it effects changes in God and in the world, but because it effects changes in and through man. Difficult as this is to understand, God's work in and through man is conditioned by man's receptivity. Now humble, trustful, submissive prayer is the opening of man's heart, that God may enter and take possession. Dropping the language of theology, and employing that of psychology instead, prayer changes the one who prays, and

through him influences other men, and indirectly changes things. These forms of prayer—adoration, confession, thanksgiving—which do not suggest an answer in the ordinary sense furnish a key to the understanding of the efficacy of petition. They are a potent means of placing the one who prays in right emotional relation to God. When we adore, confess, and give thanks, we are not trying to tell God anything, but we are giving expression to sentiments which well up spontaneously in our hearts and demand utterance. In accordance with a well-known principle of psychology, by thus permitting our religious sentiments to find expression we strengthen them. The reflex effect of petition is similar. As we express our desires in the form of petitions, we strengthen them. Moreover, our desires are purified thereby; for in prayer it is our highest self that speaks. In the realized presence of God, the low and unworthy inclinations of our complex self retreat into the background.

The question remains, however, whether we can reasonably offer petitions, when we do not believe that they have any objective efficacy. We have no more expectation that our prayer will change the weather, than that it will alter the regular succession of day and night. Can we then pray for rain?

If we continue to employ the language of petition our only purpose is "to bring our desires before God." This trite phrase, however, is not quite accurate. Speaking more accurately we put our desires into words in order to compare them with our concept of the purposes of God. Petition is thus a means employed in the endeavor to achieve a God-centered life. Our Father indeed knows all our desires, fears, hopes, plans, and ambitions before we tell him of them. We do not really tell Him; but we act the part of telling Him, in order the better to see our thoughts, as it were, against a background of His thoughts. Thus we teach ourselves to desire only what we think He desires; we train ourselves to submit to what appears to be His will; we bring ourselves to see all life, including our



own little lives, in the perspective of eternity. Thus we approximate more closely to "the mind which was in Christ Jesus," which is the mind of God.

Now this may be done—and, if this article has any point, this is the point—this may be done just as well, and in some cases better, by dropping the language of petition, and employing instead the language of desire, hope, or trust. This suggestion is offered not to those for whom there is no problem of prayer, but only to those who feel the incongruity of petition with their conception of God and the world.

To illustrate what is meant, there is a collect in the office prescribed by our Order of Worship for the Holy Communion which reads thus: "Vouchsafe unto us, we beseech Thee, favorable weather, that the fruits of the earth may ripen and be gathered in for us in due season; and be pleased of Thy great goodness to preserve us from war, pestilence, and famine."

Translated from the form of petition to that of simple desire, or wishing, it might read somewhat as follows:—"O Father, Thou knowest our dependence upon the weather. We desire that it may be favorable, so that the fruits of the earth may ripen, and be gathered in in due season. We hope to be spared from pestilence and famine and from the ravages of war. Yet we wish to receive submissively and without repining, whatsoever may come into our lives in accordance with Thy most holy will."

This is doubtless crude and stilted enough. The original is poetry. The paraphrase is prose. Yet poorly done as it is, it illustrates the idea. The next collect is as follows: "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth unto the ends of the earth; cause the glorious gospel of Thy grace to be proclaimed among all nations, and powerfully incline the hearts of men everywhere, that they may hear and obey the joyful sound." Changed as suggested above, this collect might assume a form such as this: "We know, O Father, that Thou art continually sending forth Thy light and Thy truth into receptive hearts; Thou art causing the glorious gospel of Thy grace to be pro-

claimed among all nations; and we desire that men everywhere may hear and obey the joyful sound."

Though for the sake of convenience the suggestion has been illustrated by paraphrasing two collects of a formal public prayer, such an avoidance of the language of petition is not so needful in prayers of this kind as in so-called free prayer, whether public or private. In the former of the quoted collects the change suggested seems desirable; in the second it seems unnecessary; for even as the collect stands originally the form of petition is for most readers and hearers no more than a poetical expression of a heartfelt wish for the enlightenment and salvation of all men. In liturgical prayer petition usually occupies a relatively subordinate place, being overshadowed by adoration, praise, and thanksgiving; and furthermore, the petitions necessarily have to do, not with the specific boons craved by individuals; but rather with the more general blessings desired by civil and religious communities. Petitions that the gospel be preached, that the poor and afflicted be comforted, that the nation become more truly Christian are in effect no more than expressions of desire on the part of the petitioners. Hardly any one utters them in the sense of literal petition. No one supposes that they increase God's love for the heathen or for the "unchurched masses," or that they cause Him to regard the poor and the afflicted with greater compassion, or that they deepen His solicitude for our nation. Infinite love is not capable of increase.

The phrases "sunrise" and "sunset" remain in our ordinary speech as survivals of the language of the pre-Copernican astronomy. Literally interpreted, they contain an untruth; but they do no harm and cause no misunderstanding, because no one interprets them literally. In the same way certain petitions may be retained in prayer, if they are not misunderstood. But it should not be forgotten that even these petitions are survivals of the pre-scientific view of the world in its relation to supernatural powers. In the interpretation of poetry, "the letter killeth." But if people do not insist on making



prose out of the poetry of prayer, the language of petition may be retained.

In private prayer, however, and in extemporaneous public prayer, the poetry tends to disappear, petition usually occupies a somewhat larger place, and the things asked for are nearly always more specific and material. It may therefore be a helpful suggestion that those at least who feel scruples about petitioning for specific blessings, should substitute for the trite phrases, "Bless, we beseech Thee," "Grant," "Give," "Send down," "Draw nigh," etc., the equally simple phrases, "We desire," "We wish," "We know," "We hope," "We believe," "We trust," and the like. Such a translation from one form of expression to the other might not be carried through consistently. One might find himself frequently slipping back into the old language of petition, and no harm would be done. The point is that the influence of the *Zeit Geist* is unfavorable to prayer in the sense of petition. We are all to a greater or less degree under the spell of the view of the world fostered by natural science. Under this influence we have ceased to pray for many things for which our fathers offered up most fervent petitions to the throne of grace. Prayer ought to be a sovereign remedy for worry; but many a man fails to take his troubles to the Lord in prayer, because petition for specific blessings seems to him foolish as well as presumptuous. Let him now give up the thought of changing things, and think instead of changing himself. If he is unwilling to employ the customary language of petition, let him, taking heart from the sentiment of Phillips Brooks, that "A prayer, in its simplest function, is merely a wish turned heavenward," employ instead the language of desire, wishing, trust and hope.

Shall we then pray for rain? Yes; we believe that God is well pleased to have us bring all our wants and worries to Him. Let us pray, however, not to bring the rain, not in the vain hope of changing the order of nature, but to learn to submit patiently to drought, if that is God's will. In order that

the true purpose of the prayer may not be lost sight of, it may be in this case especially advantageous to substitute a simple statement of desire for the ordinary form of asking. Thus the farmer may pray: "Father, we thy children wish for rain. We hope that it will come in time to produce a bountiful harvest; nevertheless we desire to receive humbly and thankfully as from Thy hand whatever Thy world-order shall bring to us. Amen."

BALTIMORE, MD.



## VII.

# BENEFICIARY EDUCATION IN THE REFORMED CHURCH.

IN TWO PARTS.

### PART I.

CLAYTON H. RANCK.

Much of what has been spoken and written in recent years on the subject before us assumes that the scarcity of ministerial students and the matter of beneficiary aid, are problems now confronting the Church for the first time in her history. To show that this is not the case is one of the purposes of this article. Beneficiary education is not a modern idea. The institution,—if we may call efforts upon one line of work without any common basis of operation such,—dates back many centuries and that there were obstacles to be met in its proper administration appear very early.

Definite plans for rendering aid to ministerial students were in existence at a very early date. Bishop Lightfoot sees them in the schools of the prophets among the Hebrews, Charlemagne had a very definite policy involving beneficiary education for the Christianization of western Europe, Ranke gives several references to the same in his *History of the Popes*, John Knox used this means of supplying the much needed men for the Lord's work, Ursinus was supported in this way, and John Calvin gave an order which the French Synod reiterated a number of times, that "every fifth penny of all our charities shall be set apart" for this object.

Of the early efforts in this direction the society formed in England under the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell was the most elaborately wrought out. In its workings provision was made for five years of preparatory and classical study and three for the theological course. It was maintained by annual

subscriptions, which were to run eight years and demanded in return that, "the scholars must be of eminent parts, of ingenious disposition, and such as are poor, or have not a sufficient maintenance any other way; and it required that a special regard be had to Godliness."<sup>1</sup> (This society assisted worthy students in all departments of study.) In our own land, the principle of aiding indigent students in their courses of study dates back to the beginning of things, and indicates an earnest desire on the part of those concerned, for a thoroughly equipped ministry.

For many years the work was done without an organization of any kind. When students were prepared for the ministry by preceptors they without doubt received many unpaid services, and cheerfully would one record the stories of such deeds were they available. The same kind of service was given by the teachers in the small academy, whose salaries were so meager that their services were almost a gift to the students, but again their deeds died with them. The first records appear when the church began to take action for the welfare of these students.

Synodic action in the Presbyterian Church dates from the middle of the eighteenth century. An early report of their Board of Education says: "As far back as the days of Makemie (?-1708) when our ministers numbered less than the apostles, our church acted upon the two great principles which now govern the Board of Education, viz., that the increase of the ministry is connected with the use of means, and that both piety and learning are essential qualifications for the office."

Dr. Ashbel Green at the laying of the corner stone of Princeton Seminary expressed this sentiment on the subject before us: "I consider the agency I have had in providing ministers of the gospel for the church, and in securing the means for their adequate instruction, and for an attention to their personal piety as the most important service that I have rendered to the Church of Christ." "Supply and demand,"

<sup>1</sup> *Princeton Rev.*, April, 1876, pp. 236-64.



says another, "are not operative, where the greatest want exists the least need is felt," and another cries: "One half to two thirds of the families cannot pay for their sons, occasionally the young man with sufficient ability [to earn his own way] can be found but, success achieved in this way is, in many cases, at the expense of the longest and most useful life."

The policy at this early date and until a very recent period was to assist those who had come forward rather than to try to induce young men to come by offering them assistance.

Then as now each decade seemed to consider itself more in need of ministers than any previous one. "When the American Education Society was formed in 1816," says Barber,<sup>2</sup> "there were in the whole country only about 1,500 liberally educated ministers—one to every 6,000 souls. And this ratio was rapidly lessening."<sup>3</sup> In 1840 Dr. Griffin writes: "There is nothing on earth wanted so much, but the Spirit of God, as an *increase of well educated evangelical ministers*," and Dr. Beecher in 1838 says:<sup>4</sup> "Never was there a time when there was more disposition to receive well-educated and pious ministers. If there were now an addition of 10,000 they could all be settled. But how shall the supply be obtained? It must be mainly through the instrumentality of education societies."

These Education Societies had their beginning in the Baptist Church in the last decade of the eighteenth century. They were not however separate organizations, but a department of Associations working in a number of lines of Christian activity. The Warren and Charleston Associations established Education Funds in 1791 and the latter had expended \$3,397 in assisting young men in preparing for the ministry by 1810.<sup>5</sup> In 1804 a local society was formed by the Congregational association meeting at Pawlet, Vt., and about the same time the Assembly of the Presbyterean Church acted upon the question.

<sup>2</sup> *Princeton Rev.*, April, 1876, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> "The German Reformed Church has (1829) 400 congregations and but 90 ministers, and only 10 students in the seminary." (Quoted from report.)

<sup>4</sup> See Dr. Beecher's address in New York City.

<sup>5</sup> See *Am. Ch. Hist.*, II, p. 381.

In 1815, the "American Society for Educating Pious Youth for the Gospel Ministry," afterwards known as the "American Education Society," was organized in Boston. This organization to which we shall refer later in giving the facts concerning the work at Mercersburg and in the Ohio Synod, is interdenominational and has given aid to more than 8,000 men and about 30 colleges.<sup>6</sup> In 1819 the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church organized its own Board of Education which has aided between 7,000 and 8,000 students for the ministry. A number of congregational societies were formed in our Church in 1827 and the work was taken up by the Lutherans in the early thirties. The "Society for the Increase of Ministers in the Episcopal Church" was formed in 1857 and has helped about 1,100 and in 1862 the "Evangelistic Education Society" of the same Church began its work of helping men, and has aided more than 600.

These organizations for the most part have very definite rules covering the conduct, character, and work demanded of the students. The Evangelistic Education Society accepts on an average but one third of the applicants and the Society for the Increase of Ministers requires a class grade of seventy per cent. and drops those who do not continue to reach this grade.

That those receiving aid were the objects of criticism, some justly but far more unjustly given, seems to have been the case from a very early period, and the reports of the various boards of education take occasion to bring forward all the available facts to counteract the influence of such criticism, and to give the students fair treatment at the hands of the church, and everything but Christian fellowship not to mention charity is often evident in the nasty insinuations from those who have never taken the trouble to look into the facts in the case.

The history of the public actions on beneficiary aid in our own Church dates from the beginning of our educational opera-

<sup>6</sup> See *Am. Ch. Hist.*, III, pp. 326-327. These and all subsequent figures concerning other churches than the Reformed are at least five years old.



tions. In 1826 it was "Resolved, That Mr. B—— receive \$50.00 from the Treasurer of Synod to continue his studies at the Institute at Carlisle."<sup>7</sup> Synodic action on the subject followed in abundance. The following year the committee appointed by the board of directors of the Theological Seminary to lay before the Synod the proceedings of that body reported, that "The Board of Directors solicit the most earnest coöperation of this Synod in providing support for indigent students, as will be seen by referring to the minutes of this Board."<sup>8</sup> Dr. Lewis Mayer reported at the same meeting: "They (the students) would be all willing to remain another year, if they could obtain the necessary support,"<sup>9</sup> and the board of directors of the Seminary urged the Synod "to enjoin on each minister in this connection to collect in his respective congregations at least five dollars annually, or to pay that sum from their own funds, toward providing a fund for the assistance of necessitous students." Synod approved of this action of the Board and it was "Resolved, that it be, and is hereby enjoined on each minister in this connection to comply with the same."

"Resolved, That \$50.00 from the treasurer be loaned Mr. S—— (if he require it), to enable him to continue his studies."

"Resolved, That Messrs. B—— and D—— receive \$50.00 each from the Treasury, on loan, to enable them to prosecute their studies."<sup>10</sup>

The report of the committee on the state of religion for the same year states the following. "Before finishing the narrative of the state of religion, it rejoices us to state, that the church is beginning to awaken to the important concerns of Missionary and Education operations. During the past year 'The American Missionary Society of the German Reformed Church' has been organized and promises great usefulness to

<sup>7</sup> See Minutes of Synod, 1826, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> Min. of Syn., 1827, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Min. of Syn., 1827, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup> Min. of Syn., 1827, p. 23.

the destitute in the midst of us: and, with a view of educating poor and pious young men for the ministry of reconciliation, several societies have, within a few months been formed.”<sup>11</sup>

To those who are interested and familiar with the most excellent work done by the ladies' missionary societies of our own and other denominations during the past generation, it will be a matter of no little interest to note that this work of beneficiary education was fostered during its early years chiefly by the ladies, through organizations known as “Female Education Societies,” a name that would suggest the education of women to our generation. Gifts are on record from female education societies in Chambersburg, Emmitsburg, York, Frederick, Mercersburg, Easton, and Pittsburg. The Chambersburg society seems to have done the largest work, and is credited with gifts amounting to more than \$500 between the years of 1839 and 1850. Gifts from congregations and charges, without naming the society if such existed, are recorded from Easton, Lebanon, Reading, Perry County, and St. Thomas. Of these the Easton congregation was most energetic, contributing more than \$230 between the years 1846 and 1850. Certainly very liberal gifts for that time.

Another movement in the interest of beneficiary education aided our Church at this time. In 1828 a representative of the “American Education Society,” to which reference has been made above, appeared before the Synod and spoke in the interest of that organization. A committee was appointed to consider the suggestions made by the representative and reported “That they approve of the object of the Society, to assist indigent pious, and hopeful young men, of all Christian denominations, who are desirous of devoting themselves to the Gospel ministry: and that they recommend to the congregations in our connection, where it can be done, to render assistance to that Society in their laudable undertaking.”<sup>12</sup> The results of this action are no longer visible, for in 1836 when

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix to the Minutes of Synod, 1827, p. 26.

<sup>12</sup> Min. of Syn., 1828, p. 13.



the Rev. William Patton, agent of the "American and Presbyterian Education Societies," visited Synod and we are told<sup>13</sup> "gave an expose of the principles and operations of the 'American and Presbyterian Education Societies,' a committee was appointed to confer with Mr. Patton which recommended the principles and rules of the American and Presbyterian Societies and that the Board of Education of the Synod be authorized to obtain aid from the Education Society at New York, and to coöperate with said Society." The same committee recommended the appointment by the Board of Education of such an examining committee as the interest of beneficiary education may in their judgment require, also the appointment of an agent who should devote his entire time to this work.

That the assistance received from the American and Presbyterian societies was a large factor in the rapid growth of the student body at Mercersburg, seems to have been overlooked by our historians. In 1838 when thirty beneficiary students were in attendance there, fifteen of them were supported by these boards,<sup>14</sup> and the withdrawal of aid from that source on the following year necessitated a special meeting of the Board of Education at Frederick, "occasioned by the peculiar critical condition in which our education affairs were suddenly placed at that time. The American Board of Education, to whose kindness we are indebted for the support extended to about one half of the beneficiaries at our institutions during the several past years, were necessitated to withdraw their aid from these young men, on account of their own straitened circumstances. It consequently devolves upon our own Board to provide for the support of those who were thus left destitute."<sup>15</sup> But this was not the end of aid from this society for it assisted the work in the Ohio Synod from 1868 to 1875,<sup>16</sup> to which reference will be made later.

But to return to the activities of Synod. Loans not to

<sup>13</sup> Min. of Syn., 1836, pp. 6, 7, and 14.

<sup>14</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1838, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1839, p. 52.

<sup>16</sup> See Minutes of Ohio Synod, 1868, p. 38, and 1875, p. 19.

exceed \$80 were made to two necessitous students in 1828, but the next year Dr. Mayer suggested that as this work required too much time to be managed by the Synod it should be committed either to "a Standing Committee or to the Visitors of the Seminary or to an Education Society. The best appointment perhaps would be to entrust them, with certain restrictions to be prescribed by Synod, to the Visitors of the Seminary, who may be authorized to act instead of an Education Society." This suggestion was approved by Synod and in addition the Board of Visitors were requested "to make some permanent regulations for this purpose, and employ requisite measures to obtain the means; and that they guard especially against appropriations to unworthy applicants."<sup>17</sup>

The work conducted under the Board of Education was not large, but it grew steadily. In 1832 there were ten men to receive aid. In 1833, five, in 1834, seven, and in 1837 when twenty-one men are reported as beneficiaries, but eight were under the immediate patronage of this Board. These men were to have received \$40 and his tuition money each session, but for the want of funds many were paid only in part, due chiefly it would seem from a lack of confidence in the students receiving aid and to the plans of the Board of Education. In 1833 a committee was appointed to examine the rules and regulations of the Board,<sup>18</sup> and to make the necessary suggestions and improvements. The utterances of this committee are very elaborate and searching. Provision is made for an examining committee, including the professor of the Theological Seminary and the principal of the Classical Institution, for a financial committee, to whom each student rendered a satisfactory account of the manner in which the previous apportionment had been expended, for a permanent fund consisting of donations and bequests appropriated for the purpose, and for scholarships when they are provided by bequests. Each beneficiary was to refund without interest as soon as possible

<sup>17</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1829, p. 19.

<sup>18</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1834, p. 49.



all moneys received, and when any of them abandoned the gospel ministry or connected himself with another denomination he was expected to refund immediately with interest. The committee recommended further that every classis in the German Reformed Church form itself into an auxiliary society. A goodly number of classes followed this suggestion. In 1832 Maryland Classis is reported to be sustaining six students. North Carolina Classis' organization is recognized in 1834, East Pennsylvania Classis in 1835 and in 1838 when the Board of Education supported but eight students, the board of Maryland Classis assisted seven others. The minutes of Synod for that year reports also notes the fact that the board of trustees of the College "determined very liberally to give twenty-five beneficiaries free tuition."<sup>19</sup>

All the while the Board of Education was struggling with a debt and complained constantly of the lack of gifts for this cause, and as but half of the year's obligations were met in 1841 it was "*Resolved*, that in obtaining Centenary contributions for Beneficiary Education those sums under five dollars not given for permanent investment, may be applied to meet the current expenses of the Board," also, "*Resolved*, That it be recommended to each of our pastoral charges to assume the education of one or more particular indigent young man, for the ministry."<sup>20</sup>

That the fathers of the church were zealous for the high standing of the ministry is evidenced by a recommendation to refuse admission to the Seminary to all students who had not proceeded as far as the sophomore year in the College course, or done an equivalent amount of work.

In the fall of 1842 Dr. John W. Nevin wrote a series of articles for *The Reformed Church Messenger* (which see, September 7–October 5, 1842), which might with profit be reprinted for our time. A few quotations must suffice here. He says: "The demand for ministers is not changed because some ministers are idle. . . .

<sup>19</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1838, p. 35.

<sup>20</sup> See Min. of Syn., 1841, p. 42.

“It ought not be taken for granted that candidates for the ministry, of the right stamp, and in sufficient number, will arise, simply because arrangements have been made, by which they are invited to come forward. Without much prayer on the part of the Church, and special pains bestowed on the case, it will not after all be rightly met. . . .

“All denominations found it necessary to use the beneficiary system. At the same time it should never be forgotten that the necessity for the beneficiary system, as it is now established in the different branches of the Church, lies in the defective character of the Church itself. A healthful, vigorous spiritual life would provide for the whole case in a different way. . . . They (the candidates) should be the direct spontaneous product of the general piety of the Church. . . . Ministers cannot come from without, they are the outgrowth of the Church. . . .”

He warns us not to leave the system, and calls attention to the demand for such as can officiate in German.

“It would be well to stand rigidly by the rule, that no one should be received as a beneficiary on the funds of the Education Society, without having previously been tried as a student at least six months. . . . It is not fair that this (beneficiary aid) should ever be employed, simply to assist a young man in finding out whether he has a mind that will allow an education, and a heart to carry him through the process.

“Of what avail will any system of theological training be, established under the authority of the Synod, if individual ministers encourage young men to *generalize* the studies of three years into one, and Classis can be persuaded to crown the labor saving process with a commission to go forth and preach. . . . Unfortunately too the young men who are the most likely to suffer by counsel of this sort, are those precisely on whom it is most likely to take effect.”

The chronic indebtedness of the Board of Education has been noted. By 1844 matters had come to such a pass that after a circular on the subject by Dr. Nevin had been sent to



every classis, but ten dollars could be paid on each apportionment of forty dollars, and individual members of the board were borrowing on their private accounts to do even this amount. The board then suggested that Synod consider the advisability of dissolving the board, and a committee was created to investigate the case, but of course the Board was not dissolved.<sup>21</sup>

The year 1844 saw two other suggestions of interest. The Board of Education bargained with the board of trustees of the College to pay them \$800 annually for the privilege of having a number of young men educated, not exceeding forty in number.

The report for that year shows thirty-two men under the board and about ten others supported by classical boards and private individuals, yet many worthy applicants had to be refused aid because of the lack of funds.

The conduct of the men is reported to have been highly commendable, and adds this fitting suggestion: "It should be borne in mind by the private members of the Church, that if the ministers of the word, need the prayers of God's people, much more do those who are *preparing* to be laborers in his vineyard."<sup>22</sup>

That sufficient funds might be available for the enlarged work of these years, all possible sources were appealed to. Former beneficiaries were asked for outstanding dues, but with little success, and the whole outlook was most distressing, especially so because so many congregations and classes seemed to have no sense of moral responsibility for the indebtedness of the several Boards.<sup>23</sup> To help the Church see its own indifferent attitude to the whole educational work, seems to have been one of the chief motives prompting Dr. Nevin to resign his chair of theology in 1851.

The report of the committee in 1853 sounds very modern. "Your committee lament the small number of Theological

<sup>21</sup> Min. of Syn., 1844, p. 41.

<sup>22</sup> Min. of Syn., 1844, p. 41.

<sup>23</sup> Min. of Syn., 1850, p. 39.

Students and in view of this fact, propose the following resolutions:

“*Resolved*, That the Professors in Franklin and Marshall College and the ministers in the Church, be requested to exert themselves in seeking out pious young men, as candidates for the ministerial office; and *further* that it be earnestly enjoined upon our ministers to preach a sermon on this subject in each of their congregations, and that a committee be appointed to prepare papers for publication in our Church periodicals bearing on this point.” The Revs. Frederick A. Rupley, Benjamin Bausman and Elder John Paul were the committee.<sup>24</sup>

Another plan for meeting the needs of the beneficiary students was started in Susquehanna Classis in 1854. It recommended that Synod be requested, “to obtain, either by grant or purchase from the trustees of the College at Lancaster, a piece of ground, and to erect a building on it in which our Beneficiaries could be boarded in common, by which means much expense, it is thought, would be saved to the Church and to the young men.” Synod appointed a committee with the Rev. Henry Harbaugh as chairman, to devise plans to secure the money, purchase the land and erect the building as soon as the means shall be obtained.<sup>25</sup> This project was discussed very fully on the floor of Synod, and the name “Marshall Hall” was given to the proposed building. Funds were sought after, the trustees of the College appropriated two acres of land for the purpose and the cause progressed nicely until 1858 when owing to the financial embarrassment of the country the committee suggested the indefinite postponement of this enterprise, and for a period of years, Marshall Hall was forgotten.

Meanwhile conditions demanding more ministers continued to exist. In 1856 the board of visitors of the Seminary reported “that scarcely a week passes in which there are not applications to the young men to settle as Pastors, and also

<sup>24</sup> Min. of Syn., 1853, p. 47.

<sup>25</sup> Min. of Syn., 1854, p. 32.



that the Classes report an unusually large number of promising young men, who are willing to devote themselves to the work of the ministry provided the necessary means will be furnished them."<sup>26</sup>

The following changes were voted in 1859: That the debt of a certain class of beneficiaries were to be canceled and because of the great difficulty of keeping in touch with the beneficiaries in Academy and College since the removal to Lancaster, a special Board of Education with its seat in Lancaster be created.<sup>27</sup> To meet this condition the committee on theological seminary suggested a committee of their own number to see to this work in connection with the college faculty and suggested the advisability of having all the institutions in one place.<sup>28</sup>

A strange wealth of men appears in 1862 when national events would suggest the contrary. The board of visitors of the Seminary "at the recommendation of the theological faculty suggest to Synod, whether some arrangement could not be made with the Board of Missions, or in some other way, by which fields of labor can be found for the young brethren who enter the ministry from the Seminary."<sup>29</sup>

Synodic action from this time forth has to do for the most part with methods of work. With the coming into existence of the Pittsburgh Synod and the Synod of the Potomac, it would naturally be supposed that after the pattern of the original synod the three would have their respective members of the board of visitors of the Seminary be the Board of Education. This was done by the eastern synod, but not by the others.

Nor is this the only irregularity. In 1887 the Board of Education of the Eastern Synod has but two of the classes within its bounds making use of the board, the others doing this work directly. By 1905 five were using it.

The most helpful one piece of work in bringing to light the

<sup>26</sup> Min. of Syn., 1856, p. 39.

<sup>27</sup> Min. of Syn., 1859, p. 44.

<sup>28</sup> Min. of Syn., 1859, p. 50.

<sup>29</sup> Min. of Syn., 1862, p. 68.

activities of this board was done by the Secretary, the Rev. William F. Lichliter, in 1897 when he collected and issued The Actions of Synod from 1827-1897 and By-laws of the Board of Education.

Some surprising facts were brought to light by this research. More than 300 beneficiaries had received aid, 128 of whom, aided to the extent of \$31,560.30, had died, 67, receiving \$29,170.33, had been excused from making a refund by virtue of the fact that they had served in the ministry for ten years, while of the 10 others, some intend to refund. With more than three hundred having received aid from this board alone before 1897, the total number of those who have received help from all sources in our Church must be not less than twice that number.

The only large recorded gift made to this cause was given in 1873 and is called the John Henry Smaltz fund. An amount of \$5,000, the gift of Mrs. Smaltz in memory of her husband, the income to be devoted to students in the Seminary "who are willing to spend the first three years, at least, of their ministry in preaching the gospel of the Son of God, to the destitute in our own or in foreign lands."

BALTIMORE, MD.

*(Continued.)*



## VIII.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

Economic equality is the corner-stone of the social edifice outlined in *Looking Backward*; and once attained, every other form of equality, and, indeed, every other good, social and individual, follows as a matter of course. Like all material goods the means of culture are equally within reach of all. All have the same educational opportunities to the age of twenty or twenty-one, at which time they are drafted into the industrial army. No distinction is made between the higher and the more elementary forms of education. The former are just as free as the latter, for they cost no more to provide inasmuch as all grades of teachers, like all other workers, receive the same support.

The educational system rests on three grounds: first, the right of every man to the completest education the nation can give him, on his own account, as necessary to his enjoyment of himself; secondly, the right of his fellow citizens to have him educated, as necessary to their enjoyment of his society; and thirdly, the right of the unborn to be guaranteed an intelligent and refined parentage.

Besides schools of all kinds libraries, museums and art galleries are provided with a liberal hand. For those who appreciate music a varied program is provided for every hour of the day and night by music halls properly adapted to the different kinds of music. These halls are connected by telephone with the homes of all who care to pay the nominal charge which is made for the service. Much attention is given to the care of the body, and the result has been a marked improvement in the physical standard of the nation.

With the universalization of education, physical, mental and moral, and the establishment of economic equality, insanity, idiocy, suicide, vice and crime have been practically eliminated, either directly or through an improved heredity. Crime especially is largely the product of unjust economic conditions, which debauch the rich with idleness of body and mind, and sap the vitality of the poor by overwork, bad food and unsanitary homes. Just as soon as want is abolished, so the utopist argues, and the accumulation of riches is made impossible, crime becomes motiveless, except such forms of it as have their genesis in ignorance and bestiality; and the great majority of these are effectively reached by education. Should crime appear, as it does on rare occasions, it is regarded as an atavistic phenomenon and so treated. If the accused declines to plead guilty he is tried by three judges, one of whom presides while the other two state the two sides of the case somewhat after the fashion of prosecuting and defending attorneys. In order to a conviction the three judges, who serve alternately on the bench and at the bar, must agree on the verdict. If they fail to do so another trial must be had. Thus there are neither juries nor lawyers properly speaking, only judges.

The judiciary is partly appointive and partly elective; but in either case it is effectually safeguarded against direct popular control. The inferior judges are appointed by the President from those who have reached the age of forty-five, and serve five years without reëligibility. The superior judges are chosen by the vote of those inferior judges, whose terms are about to expire and who are themselves ineligible to the higher office, from those that are eligible. Both classes are exceptions to the rule of retirement at forty-five.

Besides the control of industry there is little for the government to do; and what it does in the field of industry is almost entirely administrative in character. For there can be little need for legislation where there are no rights of private property to be defined and protected. That there may be no excess of legislation Congress meets only quinquennially; and as a



further safeguard against hasty and ill-considered legislation it is provided that a particular Congress may enact only such laws as have been proposed to it by its immediate predecessor.

Unlike most American socialists, who hold that socialism would not seriously interfere with our federal system of government, *Looking Backward* frankly admits the necessity of abolishing the state governments in order to a central and uniform regulation of industry. The municipal governments, on the other hand, are not only retained, but invested with a considerable measure of autonomy, particularly in such matters as public comfort and recreation. In order that a municipality may make proper provision for its own improvement and embellishment it is permitted to retain a certain proportion of the quota of labor contributed by its citizens to the nation. This proportion is regarded as so much credit and may be expended as each municipality sees fit.

One of the cardinal objections to modern socialism is the fear that to put the control of all industry in the hands of the government would seriously impair, if not destroy, the principle of individual liberty. But in *Looking Backward* this fear is made to appear entirely groundless. There is no interference with freedom of speech, or of the press, or of conscience. While the government does not publish at the common expense all that is brought to it, it does not, on the other hand, print only what it approves. If an author is willing to defray the cost of the printing out of his credit he can have anything printed. This cost is so moderate that to publish a book of average size need not seriously tax an adult's yearly credit. When a book is published in this way it is placed on sale in the public stores at a price determined by the cost of publication plus a royalty for the author. This royalty is whatever the author chooses to make it. He will know of course that its amount will largely determine the sale of the book. Hence it is to his interest, if he is ambitious for a literary career, to be satisfied with a moderate royalty, since it is only for so long a time as his royalties suffice to support

him that he is released from other service. It is, therefore, an author's literary ability as measured by public opinion which alone determines to what extent he may devote his time to literature.

A somewhat similar course is followed in the case of periodical literature. When a newspaper or magazine is to be started the first step is to secure a sufficient number of subscriptions to defray the cost of the printing and indemnify the nation for permitting the editor to be taken away from the general service; and when his services are no longer satisfactory to the subscribers, who have the sole power of election and removal, he forthwith resumes his place in the industrial army.

With varying details the same general principle holds in other fields of original genius, such as music, painting, sculpture, invention or design. In art public opinion is even more controlling than in literature. For the people vote directly on the question of accepting or rejecting statues and paintings for the embellishment of the public buildings, the only market practically for the products of brush and chisel; and if the verdict is favorable the artist is released from other service in order that he may devote himself entirely to his particular art. A free field is thus offered to all aspirants. The consequence is that exceptional talent is readily discovered; and once discovered, it is afforded every opportunity for its exercise and development.

Religion is so free that there is not the slightest semblance of a national church or an official body of clergymen. Any number of persons may associate for religious purposes, rent from the government a suitable room or building by means of their individual credits, and secure the services of a teacher or minister by subscribing out of their annual credits, as in the case of newspaper editors, an amount sufficient to indemnify the nation against the loss of his services in general industry. While people may still go to church in the old way, sermons



are ordinarily delivered in acoustically prepared chambers connected by wire with subscribers' houses.

A similar freedom prevails in the field of industry. With respect to the phenomena of supply and demand the individual is not compelled to consume only what the government is willing to produce, as is commonly supposed by opponents of socialism, but the government is required to produce what the individual consumer demands. In short, production is adjusted to consumption, not consumption to production. The estimates of the probable demand for the various commodities are made up by the distributing department. After being approved by the central administration these estimates are transmitted to the ten great departments, which cover the field of productive industry, and which apportion their shares of the total estimates among their component bureaus. The latter then set the laborers to work. It is clearly beyond the power of the central administration to stop the production of a commodity for which there continues to be a demand however small. It may happen of course that owing to a decreased demand for a particular commodity the cost of producing it may be materially enhanced. In such a case the government will raise the price to the consumer. But as long as there are those who are willing to pay the increased price production must go on. For the production of a new commodity it is necessary merely to guarantee a certain demand. The government in industry as in other concerns is only the agent of the people.

In nothing perhaps does the new order of things exhibit so marked a departure from the old as in the status of women. Whether married or unmarried they are members of the industrial army like men. They receive the same wages in proportion to the time they labor. Their period of service, too, is the same unless interrupted by maternal duties. On the other hand, the work which they do is adapted to their sex and strength. Their hours of labor are shorter. Their vacations are longer and more frequent. Because of these differences

they may be said to constitute an allied force rather than an integral part of the army of men. At the head of this allied force is a woman general-in-chief who with the higher officers is elected by the body of women who have passed their period of service. She has a seat in the President's cabinet and a veto on all measures relating to women's work pending an appeal to Congress. There are also women judges, appointed by the general-in-chief for women, for the trial of causes in which one or both parties are women. When the latter is the case the board of judges is composed exclusively of women. In the former case the trial must be before a mixed court.

A most important effect of the economic independence of women, particularly when reënforced by the principle of the economic equality of all, is that marriages are entered into for love and not for convenience. Under the operation of these two principles there is neither wealth nor rank to dazzle the one or the other party, and divest the attention from personal qualities which should constitute the sole basis of marriage.

Children are no more supported by their parents than wives by their husbands. Men, women and children are alike maintained out of the common stock. The only differences are that women receive on the average less than men, for the reason that their period of service is more liable to be interrupted, and that a child's share is much smaller than that of an adult. But whatever the allowance of a child may be it comes in each case, not from or through the parents, but directly from the government, which maintains a separate account for every person irrespective of age or sex.

*Equality*, the other social romance from the pen of Mr. Bellamy, appeared in 1897, nine years after the publication of *Looking Backward* to which it bears a two-fold relation. It is, first, a philosophic background to the ideal state which is somewhat roughly sketched in *Looking Backward*; and secondly, it completes that picture by refining and elaborating certain of its features and adding some new ones which were omitted from the earlier work.



The new social order and the revolution by which it came to be established are regarded by our utopist as but the visible evidences of a new and higher stage in the evolution of democracy; and for him the word democracy connotes both an economic and a political fact. Thus understood democracy has two main phases. In its negative and earlier phase it is merely a device for getting rid of kings. It is a change only in the forms of government, not in its principles and purposes. The positive phase of democracy, on the other hand, means, not merely a transfer of power from kings and nobles to the people, but the employment of that power in the interest of the common good. It means in short a revolution in the whole idea of government, its motives, purposes and functions. It is grounded on the worth and dignity of the individual which is essentially the same in all individuals. Hence equality is the basic principle of positive democracy. But it is an equality that is more than political. Until there is an economic solidarity by which the common and individual interests are identified, so that no one can hurt another's interest without hurting his own or promote his own without promoting equally all other interests, neither a high degree of material well-being nor a wise and stable government are possible. But the only way of accomplishing such an economic solidarity is to give to each citizen an equal share in the undivided capital of the nation.

The basis of political equality, economic equality is itself rooted in the most fundamental of all rights, the right to live. But to safeguard this right it is not enough for the state to protect its citizens against the assassin; it must protect them also against hunger and cold which constitute a far more deadly and constant foe to human existence than violence and poison. But the right of the individual to his life is not properly protected on the economic side by a bare subsistence, or by anything less than the fullest satisfaction of every legitimate need which it is in the power of the state to provide for all. Now the things which men must consume in order to

live are limited in quantity. It is evident, therefore, that if one succeeds in securing for his own use more than his equal share of these things the rest will not have enough. If then the first right of the citizen is the right to live, and if the first duty of the state is to safeguard that right, the state must see to it as its most fundamental obligation that the means of life are not monopolized by the few but distributed so as to meet the needs of all. Having assumed this obligation the state can fulfil it in no other way than in accordance with the principle of "equality before the law," which means that in so far as the state undertakes any social function it must act absolutely without respect to persons for the equal benefit of all. But the state must do even more than this. It must not only distribute equally among its citizens the wealth of the nation available for consumption, but it must also employ the national resources wisely and economically in the production of more wealth, in order that a continuous supply of necessities, comforts and luxuries may be provided.

Next to the right to live the most fundamental of human rights is the right to liberty. For the proper protection of this right it is not enough, again, that the state safeguard its citizens from chattel slavery, peonage and unjust imprisonment. It must also safeguard them against those economic influences, which are the necessary consequences of inequalities of wealth, and which force men through want to buy their lives by the surrender of their liberties, to become, in short, the serfs of the rich in order to obtain the means of subsistence.

Economic equality finds still another justification in certain ethical considerations. According to this argument the chief cause of the great industrial superiority of civilized peoples is to be found in their superior social organism. The efficiency of this organism is measured by the difference between what one man can produce in association with others and what he can produce as an isolated laborer. Now the social organism not only multiplies the productive capacity of labor many times, but it also minimizes the industrial importance of per-



sonal differences between individual laborers. A difference between two laborers of two to one is important. But when it is combined with a factor—the social organism—equal to one hundred it becomes a difference of 102 to 101 which is negligible. The social organism belongs to no one in particular. It is the indivisible inheritance of all, and, therefore, the proportion of the annual production of wealth which is referable to it, and nearly all can be so referred, belongs to all equally.

Let us leave now these philosophical disquisitions, to which a considerable part of the book is devoted, in order to note yet some of the more important practical implications of the principle of economic equality.

To this principle is to be ascribed first of all the complete transformation of the relations between the sexes. It is obvious that where men have become equal in material well-being the use of gold and silver and precious stones is meaningless, since they can no longer serve as symbols of wealth and means of social ostentation. The same principle holds with respect to dress generally. Because of the economic independence of women with respect to men there is no more need for women than for men to make themselves desirable to the other sex by means of jewels and fine clothes. It is no longer the case as it once was that a woman's face is her fortune, and that a man, because his economic position outweighs matters of personal advantage or disadvantage in commending him to the other sex, can be indifferent as to dress and personal qualities. The effect then of the principle of economic equality has been to make women less and men more attentive to dress, the two being in this respect precisely on the same plane.

This relation of perfect equality continues after marriage. The wife is no more subject to her husband than he is to her. She does not even take his name but retains her own. Her daughters take her name as a last name and their father's as a middle name, while the sons do just the reverse.

Economic equality has universalized education. This does

not mean merely that the schools from the kindergarten to the university are open to all on equal terms. Education is regarded as a life process. To pass through the schools is only to acquire that necessary minimum of education which the state requires of all as a preparation for citizenship. Graduation from the schools means no more than that this minimum has been attained, and that the point has been reached where the individual is presumed to be competent and is given the right to prosecute his further education without the guidance or compulsion of the state. For the benefit then of those who have completed the curricula of the schools elective post-graduate courses are provided in every branch of science, which are free to all and which may be prosecuted as each one sees fit, continuously or intermittently, strenuously or leisurely, profoundly or superficially. Many keep up their studies to old age, and frequently the most enthusiastic and diligent students are those in middle life, whose release from industrial service at forty-five insures them abundant leisure for study, as well as that serenity of mind which is incompatible with material cares and responsibilities.

Less technical forms of education are provided by the opera, the theatre, the music hall, the platform, the pulpit, all of which are free or practically so. Through the perfection of the telephone and the electroscope, the latter a device for seeing at a distance as the telephone is for hearing, these cultural agencies wherever they may be located can be utilized in the privacy of one's home thousands of miles away. The consequence is that mediocrity is effectually suppressed, since only the best thinkers, orators and artists will be in demand when they can be heard and seen just as easily as lesser ones. This is particularly the case with respect to the pulpit. Instead of an army of preachers preaching every Sunday to as many congregations in as many churches a few master minds speak to millions at a time. This is putting in the hands of a few a power and authority far greater than any ever wielded by pope or emperor. It is the creation of an intellectual aristoc-



racy in the midst of an industrial democracy, an aristocracy, however, whose supremacy continues only so long as its power is wisely and unselfishly exercised.

The effect of this supersession of church attendance as a means of instruction has been to emphasize the moral and intellectual elements in religion at the expense of its ritual and ceremonial side. The growth of universal intelligence has tended in the same direction. Lest such radical changes might be thought to spell the decline of religion our utopist hastens to assure us that such has not been the case. Sec-tarianism has declined and must inevitably do so where ceremonialism has lost its power and where each one selects his preacher on personal grounds. But religion far from declining has in reality gained in moral and spiritual power. "There is a more rational conception of religion," we are informed, "owing to greater intelligence, complete intellectual freedom in its study, and freedom from material engrossments. It is recognized that after a century of economic progress the race has reached the goal of its evolution. While the production of wealth has increased, there has been developed a simplicity of taste, which, by rejecting excess and surfeit, needs less and less of the material side of life and more of the mental and moral."

That the influence of intellectual and moral genius may not be limited by national boundaries a universal language has been devised, which every one learns to speak in addition to his national tongue, and by means of which the master minds may address persons simultaneously in all parts of the world. The advantages of this universal language have become so manifest that the smaller nations have entirely abandoned their national tongues. It is only among the greater nations, the nations that have fine literatures embalmed in their tongues, that the bilingual condition has persisted. The effect of the establishment of a universal language and a just social order has been to bind the nations together in an intellectual and moral world order, and by eliminating the various incentives to

conflict between man and man, between class and class and between nation and nation, to usher in the reign of universal peace.

Economic equality has transformed the physical side of human existence no less than the spiritual. The masses are no longer underfed and overworked as they once were. Improved conditions of living and housing, systematic and universal physical culture, the elimination of the social evil through the economic independence of women, advances in medical and sanitary science, a higher general intelligence, and a better physical inheritance to begin with, have greatly limited both the intensity and the frequency of disease. The great progress in sanitary science is particularly evident in such matters as clothing and housefurnishing. All clothing of both sexes, for they dress practically alike, is made of paper or some cheap fibre—the heroine of the story pays only twenty cents for her best gowns; and when soiled, instead of being washed it is thrown away or returned to the mills to be made into something else. Woolen, cotton, silk and linen garments are unknown. Carpets, hangings, bedding, hats, shoes, kettles, dishes and crockery, are made of the same materials as clothing, and when they become soiled they are similarly disposed of. Shoes are seamless. The soles are treated with solutions which make them as hard as iron without interfering with their lightness, while the uppers of those designed for wet weather are also coated on the outside with a lacquer impervious to moisture. The changes in clothing and housefurnishings, we are told, have done more than all other improvements combined to eradicate contagious and other diseases and relegate plagues and epidemics to ancient history.

To the foregoing factors in the physical improvement of the race must be added yet another, namely, the abandonment of a meat diet by which human beings formerly inherited the diseases of the animals they ate. This change was not however wholly in the interest of physical health and well-being. It sprang also from certain moral considerations, from the



passion of pity and sympathy with all suffering, which, if given free play, must transform not merely the relations of men to their fellows but also their relations to the whole world of sentient being. Under the influence of these ever widening sentiments man has come to regard himself as merely an elder brother in the great family of nature charged with the care and protection of the lower orders of being, which formerly he ruthlessly sacrificed to his own comfort and pleasure.

Coincidentally with this change of sentiment with respect to meat the women began to demand a wider life. The immediate consequence of this demand was that the business of providing and preparing food was made a branch of the public service, which materially hastened the transition from a meat to a vegetable diet. If the work of preparing food had continued as an isolated household industry carried on mainly by women and servants, the most conservative and habit-bound classes of persons, it would have been a difficult matter to find a satisfactory substitute for meat. But in the hands of the government the resources of botany, chemistry and other branches of science were freely drawn upon in the effort to find new food materials as well as new methods of preparation. In both respects the quest was eminently successful. It was found that only a small proportion of the natural products capable of being used for food by man had ever been utilized, only those in fact which readily lent themselves to the primitive method of cooking by dry or wet heat. The utilization of the others has been made possible by the discovery of new processes of cooking through the art of the chemist.

Economic equality has solved the problem of the city, one of the knottiest problems with which the nineteenth century had to grapple. The big city with all its evil conditions was clearly the child of private capitalism. In the absence of a nationalized system of industry producers and consumers seeking their own interests were inevitably brought together in haphazard fashion. Buyers and sellers gravitated to the best

markets. Manufacturers located where there were large bodies of consumers as well as adequate supplies of labor. Thus the cities became centers of industry and commerce. This led to the concentration of wealth, and the concentration of wealth led to the concentration of all the refined, the pleasant and the luxurious ministrations of life, all of which attracted the professional and learned classes, also courtesans, thieves and gamblers.

But with the establishment of economic equality the city lost its supposed advantages over the country. It ceased to be a center of commerce, for the simple reason that a nationalized system of industry leaves no room for markets and middlemen and private profits. It no longer afforded greater economic opportunities, since the obligation of the state to employ and maintain all on equal terms is not affected by geographical considerations. It ceased to be a place where greater luxury could be enjoyed or displayed, because wealth confers no distinction where all are economically equal, and because the quality and value of the goods and services furnished by the government is everywhere the same. It lost its monopoly of education, culture and the refinements of life, for by means of the telephone and electroscope the rural dwellers may enjoy the theatre, the opera, the public lecture on equal terms with the residents of the largest cities. The consequence of all this has been that the cities have not only ceased to grow but have greatly declined in population, to the manifest advantage of both city and country. In the city the unsightly skyscrapers and tenements have given way to broad, low, roomy structures. Parks, gardens and open spaces have been multiplied. Dustless and noiseless systems of transit have been installed. And in general the living conditions have been vastly improved.

The country has witnessed an even greater transformation of the conditions of existence. Under the direction of the government agriculture has had the benefit of every scientific discovery and achievement. Machinery and electricity have



completely superseded horses and hand labor, so that even the smallest tool is moved by electricity the worker having no more to do than adjust and guide it. This has not only made farm labor much more productive than formerly, but it has made farming a more attractive occupation. In fact, owing to the elimination, through improved means of communication and transportation, of that isolation and lack of social intercourse which formerly attached to farm life, farming has come to be regarded as one of the most desirable of all occupations. And if the farmer desires larger opportunities for social intercourse during his leisure hours than those afforded by the telephone, the electroscope, the railway, and the air ship, he can live in the city and be carried to and fro between his residence and place of occupation with little loss of time.

It is most evident that where all industry is in the hands of the government and nothing is left to individual enterprise the quality of that government will be a consideration of the first importance. While the chief reliance, in the ideal state portrayed in *Looking Backward* and *Equality*, is placed on the improved individual character, which has resulted from the establishment of economic equality, the mechanism of government has not been overlooked. That the government may be responsive to the popular will the referendum, initiative and recall are provided for, although their practical operation is not explained. The probable reason for this is that these devices are felt to be altogether unnecessary since owing to the principle of economic equality there is neither motive nor opportunity for venality. Opportunities for venality abound only where men are unequal in material well-being, and where the private economic interest of the citizen is constantly pitted against the common interest. And on the other hand, because the only possible object that men can have in accepting public office is to deserve the public esteem, against which all-dominant consideration every other is powerless, there can be no motive for venality.

The efficiency of a nationalized system of industry is a

much-mooted point among social economists. Mr. Bellamy is on that point as on so many others a pronounced optimist. Despite the very limited period of industrial service required of each citizen in his ideal state, he assures us that all are maintained in comfort and luxury. This is in part owing to the intelligence and efficiency of the government and its freedom from venality. But much more is due to the elimination of those wastes which are inseparable from an individualistic competitive system of industry. These are mainly: wastes from mistaken industries; wastes from the cut-throat competition of those engaged in industry; wastes by periodical gluts and crises and the consequent interruptions of industry; wastes from unemployed labor and capital at all times; wastes from military and naval expenditures; wastes from the maintenance of revenue systems, state and national, and their armies of employees and officials; wastes from commercial and financial systems with their markets and middlemen; wastes from crime and pauperism. It is estimated that after due allowance has been made for these various factors the share of each adult working full time is something like four thousand dollars, not in the form of money of course, for there is no money, but in the form of credits or orders for goods and services. But even this generous amount, which is at least six times the present average adult income in the United States, does not fairly represent the economic possibilities of the system. It is the policy of the government to keep well in advance of the nation's consumption of staple and imperishable commodities by maintaining surpluses of these goods which are added to each year, in order to safeguard the nation against a season or two of poor crops, as well as against a sudden and unexpected increase of population by immigration. What makes this large average income still more remarkable is the fact that the purchasing power of a dollar is at least fifty per cent. higher than it was when the new social order was established, and the further fact that the four thousand dollars is a net income for the individual from which the government



subtracts nothing for taxes. On the contrary, it adds a considerable amount to it by providing free or practically so such important services as water, light, music, news, the theatre, the opera, postal and telephonic communication, possibly also railway, water and aerial transportation, all of which under the old order of things had to be paid for out of private incomes. The reason why not all goods and services are provided in the same way is to give free play to the greatest possible variety of tastes in expenditure. Equality is esteemed a good thing but monotony is not.

The scheme of social regeneration outlined in *Looking Backward* and *Equality* holds a unique place among the world's utopias. While it never reached the experimental stage as some did, it inspired as no other did a vigorous and wide-spread though short-lived propaganda for the education of the world up to its principles. In the United States it led to a distinct political movement known as nationalism, the purpose of which was to realize by actual experiment, after a period devoted to education, the principles of the socialization of industry and the brotherhood of man. At first *Looking Backward* was generally regarded as nothing more than a romance. But from the first there were those who saw in it a deliberate statement of a practicable social order. This view was altogether in harmony with that of the author, whose efforts to subordinate romantic interest to philanthropic purpose are quite evident in *Looking Backward* and still more so in *Equality*. He intended the story to be a more or less exact forecast of the next stage of social and industrial evolution, particularly in the United States. He believed moreover that this stage was near at hand, that it would consume little time in realizing itself, and that there was an imperative and immediate need of preparing the masses for it. And so he threw himself body and soul into the nationalist movement to which he devoted the remainder of his life as editor, author and lecturer. The movement took from the first an educational rather than a political course. As a political force it accom-

plished practically nothing. As an organized propaganda it ran its course in a few years, not, however, without having prepared the way for other schemes of social betterment. For its early decline two things were mainly responsible: first, the fact that its membership was almost exclusively composed of the middle class; and secondly, the fact that its immediate program was largely appropriated by the Peoples Party and embodied in its national platform in 1892.

LANCASTER, PA.



## IX.

### EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

#### THE TENTH GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE ALLIANCE OF REFORMED CHURCHES HOLDING THE PRESBYTERIAN SYSTEM.

It can hardly be said that the Aberdeen Council of the Alliance of Reformed Churches was a great council in the sense that it was epoch-making, or had any distinguishing features above other councils of the same kind. And yet it certainly was a notable council, notable because of the place of meeting, notable in the personnel of its delegates, notable on account of its programme, the important papers read, and the discussion of topics of vital interest by men who stand out as leaders in theological thought and in the great religious movements of the present day. The importance and value of such a meeting are to be found less in the direct results in the form of positive action or definite conclusions, than in the far-reaching effect upon the individual members and the constituent bodies in the way of a better understanding, a broader outlook, a deeper faith, a fuller consecration because of the personal touch, the face to face and heart to heart intermingling, discussion, and fellowship which the carrying out of the programme necessarily requires. To bring about such results all the conditions were favorable in the highest degree, and, accordingly, the council may be regarded as of no mean significance in the great movement toward closer union among the constituent members of the body of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Aberdeen, the "Granite City" or the "Silver City by the Sea," has an imposing appearance of solidity if not splendor. It is almost built of granite, and when the sun shines upon it after a rainstorm, it stands out in wonderful brightness and beauty. It is an important industrial center, and the seat of

a University that takes high rank among the universities of Scotland. Formed of King's College in the old city and Marischal College in the new, with its magnificent building that cost about \$500,000, it has about 800 students and is a fitting combination of the old and the new in education. The churches, too, are large and numerous. The city was well fitted, therefore, to receive and entertain the Council, and the good people of Aberdeen did their part grandly, not only in the way of entertaining the delegates, but also in providing for those social features which made room for the close personal touch of acquaintance and fellowship with men whom it was worth while to meet. After the opening services in the plain but dignified Cathedral, St. Machar Church, there was a reception by the Principal, Court, and Senators of the University at King's College, and in the evening of the same day, the delegates were received at the Art Gallery by the Lord Provost, the Magistrates, and Town Council of Aberdeen. On Thursday afternoon a garden party was given to the delegates by Sir David and Lady Stewart on their grounds at Banchory House, and on Saturday afternoon the delegates were taken on a grand excursion up the beautiful valley of the Dee to Ballater, and thence by coach to Balmoral, the favorite summer residence of the English Royal Family, who attend the Presbyterian Church at Craigie during their stay at Balmoral. After a survey of the beautiful grounds and the royal castle, the delegates repaired to the Church, where a short service was held, and then to the manse, where, on the spacious grounds, refreshments were served and a number of entertaining speeches were made. This excursion in the Highlands with the beautiful scenery on every side and Lochnagar, the highest peak, towering above all with a crown of the winter's snow still on its brow, was a feature never to be forgotten, and it afforded still further opportunity for making acquaintance and enjoying social fellowship.

The programme was not only a good one in that it presented a series of topics of prime importance at the present day, but



also in making a suitable arrangement of the order of topics, and dividing them so that the subdivisions come in logical order. The opening sermon was delivered by the Very Rev. George Adam Smith, D.D., LL.D., principal of Aberdeen University on the "Service and Mission of Presbyterianism." After the constituting of the Council, the President, the Rev. David James Burrell, D.D., LL.D., of New York, delivered the President's Address. The first topic for discussion on the second day, was *Authority in Matters of Faith*. (a) "The Authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ," by the Rev. Principal Scrimger, D.D., of Montreal. (b) "The Authority of the Scripture," by the Very Rev. Principal Alexander Stewart, D.D., of St. Andrews. (c) "The Authority of Christian Experience," by Rev. C. M. Steffens, D.D., of the Theological Seminary at Dubuque, Ia. In the afternoon the topic was *The Christian Church*. (a) "Notes of the Church," by Principal J. Iverach, D.D., of Aberdeen. (b) "The Nature and Limitation of its Authority," by the Rev. R. C. Reed, D.D., of the Theological Seminary, Columbia, S. C. In the evening there were *Addresses on the Church*. (a) "The Church as a Witness for Christ," (b) "The Church and the Kingdom of God," (c) "The Church and the Brotherhood of Humanity." On the third day the topic was *Christology*, including (a) "The Deity of Our Lord Jesus Christ," by the Rev. Dr. Wallace Radcliffe, of Washington, D. C., (b) "The Cross and Present-Day Religion," by Rev. Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, D.D., of Edinburgh, and (c) "The Abiding Presence of Christ in the Church," by the Rev. John E. Bushnell, D.D., of Minneapolis, Minn. In the afternoon the topic was *Catechisms*. (a) "The Use of Catechisms," by Principal Williams, of Glasgow, (b) "The Heidelberg Catechism: Its 350th Anniversary," by Rev. Philip Vollmer, D.D., Theological Seminary, Dayton, O., (c) "The Westminster Catechism," by Rev. Prof. Henry Cowan, D.D., D.C.L., of Aberdeen. This was followed in the evening by the topic *Our Church System*. This reference to the detailed arrangement of the first part

of the programme may suffice to give an idea of the general plan. There were, in the nature of the case, important reports on the work of the Alliance, by Dr. Mathews from the Eastern Section and by Dr. J. I. Good from the Western Section, papers and discussion on the youth of the Church, Sunday schools, and the consideration of missionary topics both home and foreign, with reports from missionaries fresh from their respective fields. But it would be tedious to follow out the programme in detail. It is sufficient to refer to some of the more prominent subjects that followed. On Monday the morning was given up to *Confessional Topics*, including (a) "History of the Formulating of Fundamental Articles of Faith," by Rev. Dr. D. S. Schaff, of the Theological Seminary at Allegheny, (b) "The Historical and Present-Day Value of Confessions of Faith," by Rev. Prof. Wm. S. Curtis, of Aberdeen, and (c) "Creed Revision," by Rev. S. J. Richolls, D.D., of St. Louis, Mo. Tuesday's programme was still more practical, the two topics treated being *The Ministry* and *The Congregation*. Under the first head there were papers on (a) "Ordination and its Significance," by Rev. Prof. W. M. Clow, D.D., of Glasgow, (b) "Methods of Theological Instruction," by Rev. Geo. B. Stewart, D.D., Theological Seminary, Auburn, N. Y., (c) "Need for Variety in Training," by Rev. Prof. George Milligan, D.D., of Glasgow. Under the second head there were four papers (a) "The Fellowship and Responsibility of Church Members," by Mr. Robert Whyte, London, (b) "The Value of Public Worship as a Means of Grace," by the Rev. Dr. Wm. C. Schaeffer, Theological Seminary, Lancaster, (c) "The Value of Public Worship as a Christian Testimony," by Mr. W. Rounsfall Brown, Glasgow, (d) "The Mutual Relation of Minister and People," by Dr. Stone, of Chicago, Moderator of the General Assembly.

The papers and the discussions which followed them were, of course, not of equal value. Some did not rise above the level of mediocrity, whilst others were strong, clear-cut, and profound. The proceedings of the Council, when published,



will not only prove interesting, but they will also invite serious thought and profound study. Our own representatives on the programme, Drs. Vollmer and Schaeffer, made contributions of permanent value, and their papers were received with marked attention. Among the other papers that showed marked ability and left a deep impression may be mentioned the following: Principal Scrimger's paper on "The Authority of our Lord Jesus Christ," and the Very Rev. Stewart's on "The Authority of the Scriptures"; "The Cross and Present-Day Religion," by Prof. H. B. Mackintosh; "The Historical and Present-Day Value of Confessions of Faith," by Prof. William A. Curtis; "Ordination: Its History and Significance," by Rev. Prof. W. M. Clow; "Methods of Theological Instruction," by the Rev. Dr. Geo. W. Stewart; and, "Need for Variety in Training," by Rev. Prof. Geo. Milligan. There were other papers of great value, but, as has been said, these were the ones that made the deepest impression. The evening addresses were of a more popular character, and the meetings were held in some of the city churches. Aberdeen, however, did not seem fully awake at first to the significance of the Council, for the audiences were comparatively small. It needed Professor Stalker, of Aberdeen, and Dr. C. W. Gordon (Ralph Connor), of Winnipeg, to draw the crowd that filled the West United Free Church to overflowing on Monday evening.

The general temper and tone of the Council came out perhaps more fully in the discussions than in the papers which were read. And the first thing to be noticed was the spirit of freedom and progress which prevailed. There was indeed not a single instance in which any one manifested a disposition to depart seriously from any essential doctrine of the Christian faith; but with great unanimity growth and advancement in knowledge and doctrine were assumed, and the value and importance of critical scholarship were recognized. The only reactionary notes that were heard came from the American side. The president in his opening address charged

churches and theological seminaries with being responsible for the decadence of interest in religion by their looseness in doctrine and wandering into the unknown wilds of theological speculation. Later in discussing the training necessary for the ministry of the present day it was said that there was entirely too much apologetic teaching instead of a thorough grounding in the faith. As over against this statement, Dr. Iverach, and others, in no uncertain sounds, insisted that the young minister must be trained to understand the issues that will confront him, and that the Church must not ignore but meet the problems raised by the so-called liberal theology if her truth is to be triumphant.

On the whole, then, the Council was both helpful and reassuring. First, it gave evidence that the large body of representative men who stand out as leaders of theological thought have no sympathy with dead formalism or the fetters of narrow confessionalism. The spirit of free inquiry and progress is recognized as necessary to a healthy, virile apprehension of the verities of the faith once delivered to the saints. Secondly, it afforded just as strong assurance of loyalty to the fundamental articles of the old faith, asserting and maintaining the cardinal facts and doctrines without which Christianity would cease to be the religion of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, the Lord of life and glory. The trend of thought evidently is towards the realization of the motto: "In essential things unity; in unessential things liberty; in all things charity."

JOHN S. STAHR.



## X.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE FIVE GREAT PHILOSOPHIES OF LIFE. By William DeWitt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pages 281. Price \$1.50 net.

This book is an enlarged edition under a new title of the author's former volume *From Epicurus to Christ*. The part which treats of the Christian spirit of love as the final philosophy of life has been entirely rewritten in this new volume.

The purpose of the book is to present, interpret and compare the five great philosophical principles which sprang into existence in the centuries from the birth of Socrates to the death of Jesus, viz., the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure, the Stoic law of self-control, the Platonic principle of subordination of lower to higher, the Aristotelian sense of proportion and the Christian spirit of love. The author presents these principles in large part in the words of the great Masters and Founders themselves. These carefully selected quotations, together with the comments, interpretations, comparisons and practical applications of the several philosophical principles, make the book eminently worth while.

Dr. Hyde is not only an idealist in the best sense of the word, and a keen analyst who knows how to thrust his hand through non-essentials to the heart of a problem, but he is also intensely practical. He knows how to take the ancient philosophical systems and apply them to modern times. He knows where to look in our day and generation for the counterpart of the ancient Epicurean and Stoic, and he knows where to find the elements of surviving Platonism and Aristotelianism in the twentieth century.

In his chapter on the Epicurean system of thought, Dr. Hyde presents in a fascinating way the attractive elements in its view of work, play and happiness. He also shows with keen insight its grievous defects. He uses Tito Melema in George Eliot's *Romola* as a striking example of the shortcomings of Epicureanism. In his treatment of Stoicism he translates into simple everyday terms its underlying psychological doctrine, its reverence for universal law and its heroic attempt to solve the problem of evil. With sympathetic spirit he interprets the beautiful hymn of Cleanthes, the grandest expression of the Stoic religion. He shows the elements of permanent value in Stoicism, but gives the reasons too why we cannot rest on this cold and hard philosophy with its abstract universality, as the final guide to life.



He has a fine chapter on Platonism. He shows how vastly deeper and truer the Platonic principle of subordination of appetite to reason is to anything found in Stoicism or Epicureanism. Incidentally, Dr. Hyde's practical interpretation of Plato's scheme of education is one of the most suggestive things in this delightful chapter. The author in speaking of the truth and error of Platonism shows how the very antithesis which this philosophy makes between the higher and the lower in its greatest danger. He says that a great deal which passes for religion in our day is simply Neo-platonism masquerading in Christian dress.

Aristotle is sharply differentiated from the other ancient philosophies in characteristic fashion. Dr. Hyde says: "A man comes up for judgment. If Epicurus chances to be seated on the throne, he asks the candidate: 'Have you had a good time?' The Stoic asks him whether he has kept all the commandments, Plato asks him how well he has managed to keep under his appetites and passions. Aristotle's judgment-seat is a very different place. He asks: 'Have you had a worthy aim and have you used appropriate means to attain it?'" "It is the whole purpose of life expressed in doing that measures the worth of a man." The doctrine of the happy mean is also emphasized.

The crowning element of the volume is found in the chapter on the Christian spirit of love. It is a splendid modern interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount. We have never seen a better application of the principles of Jesus to modern life in print anywhere. The closing pages show how Jesus' spirit of love absorbs into itself whatever is of real value in the systems of ancient philosophy. The Epicurean's joy is enhanced by the Christian spirit. The love of Christ is a deepened, sweetened, softened Stoicism. Christianity, as lofty as Platonism, gets its elevation by a different process. It lifts the lower and transforms it into the higher. So does Christianity gather up into itself whatever is good in Aristotle. Its devotion to a worthy end and the selection of efficient means are characteristic of the religion of love. Because Christianity is higher than the ancient philosophies, the Christian is not warranted in dispensing with them. Dr. Hyde makes a plea for the harmonious unity in the Christian life of the happy Epicurean disposition, the strong Stoic temper, the Platonic mood and the Aristotelian insight, all those crowned by the generous Christian spirit of love as the bond which binds them all together in the unity of personal life.

The book furnishes delightful and helpful reading. We take pleasure in commending it to the readers of the *REVIEW*. It moves on a high plane; it has breadth of vision; it discusses the deep and vital problems of life in a simple, direct and singularly helpful manner. Best of all it brings to the reader in a unique



way, by comparison and contrast, a realizing sense of the essential element in the Christian religion.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

THE NEW TESTAMENT PERIOD AND ITS LEADERS. By the Rev. Frank T. Lee, D.D. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. Pages 360. Price \$1.35 net.

The work represented in this handsomely gotten-out volume has been well done by an author of large learning and competent ability for giving fine and attractive literary expression to it. The contents are divided into two parts. In the first, Dr. Lee undertakes a survey of the providential preparation which was made for Christianity among the Jewish people in particular and the Gentile nations in general. He discusses in a most satisfactory and illuminating way the historical, the political and the religious conditions the new faith had to meet, and the difficulties it encountered on every side. One chapter is devoted to the study of the contribution that was made by "the Forerunner" of Jesus for the "Inauguration" of Christianity by Him who "came forth from God" commissioned to perform this office. The chapter which deals with the "inauguration" furnishes a very satisfactory outline of the life and work of the Nazarene.

The second part of the book takes up the lives and services of the principal "leaders" in the history of the early development and spread of Christianity. Peter, John, Stephen, Philip, Barnabas, Paul, James, Silas, Apollos, Titus and Timothy are taken up in succession, their distinctive and characteristic services considered, and the extent and value of their respective labors and struggles set forth in a most lucid and instructive form. It may be doubted whether anywhere else such a mass of really important learning and information concerning these "leaders" has been brought together and made so readily available to students of the New Testament as is here put within easy reach. For sermonic help and for Sunday School instruction, one knows of no other work that can be more confidently recommended to young preachers or students of the Bible. In the pursuit of a definite practical aim, it leaves critical questions in the background, and thus, all the more successfully, lends itself to the better popular understanding of the origin and establishment of our Religion.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE. By M. V. B. Knox. Boston, Mass., Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. Pages 536. Price \$2.00 net.

More than ten years of time has been given by this well-known author to the historic research which is in evidence in this exceptionally interesting and informing treatise on the important subject which it discusses. Dr. Knox has studied the original sources and documents of the Anglo-Saxons and accordingly offers author-

itative and trustworthy data for the study of the secret forces which lie back of the religious life of the mighty and successful English-speaking race. Restricting himself carefully to the subject in hand, our author has written not another book of church history, but a series of chapters which deal with the secret forces that have been constantly present and vitally active in the various fields of modern civilization,—forces not always distinctly referable to church beliefs, but, nevertheless, potent factors in the elevation of racial elevation and religious progress. In this broad outlook reside the particular value and engaging charm of these luminous pages. One can have but little taste for or interest in Christian history, if he will not be interestedly carried along by the writer from start to finish through these chapters.

Dr. Knox possesses many of the prime requisites of a present-day historian,—talent for original investigation, balance of judgment for weighing the value of conflicting statements, courage for pointing out the direction into which truth requires us to follow, and rare power for interpreting the significance of facts and giving them adequate literary expression. All these qualifications are laid under tribute by him in the production of this inspiring and truly helpful volume, every paragraph of whose chapters is a mine of wealth for historic inquirers. The excellent index to the contents of the book which is given at its end gives added value to it, and makes its wealth of information more easily available to the student for subsequent reference. One takes pleasure in commending the work to the attention of the readers of this REVIEW.

A. S. WEBER, D.D.





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# PROSPECTUS

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## Reformed Church Review.

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The REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW is the lineal successor of the REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW, as that was of the MERCERSBURG REVIEW. And, true to its antecedents, it will continue to be an organ for Christological, historical and positive theology, as this has come to be generally understood in the Reformed Church in the United States. Taking its position in the confessional system of the Heidelberg Catechism, it will endeavor to be true to the historical genius of the Reformed Church; but believing in the principle of historical development, it will not shut itself up to the horizon of any particular place or time in theology, but will have an open vision and a cordial welcome for all truth, new as well as old, from whatever quarter it may come.

The REVIEW will strive to be truly catholic and liberal in spirit. It proposes to serve the cause of pure truth and of pure religion. It will, therefore, not be bound by any party lines. But seeking to serve and promote the truth as it is in Christ, it will endeavor to keep itself free from all forms of theological bondage. Freedom of thought within the limits of Christian truth will ever be its watchword. Hence it retains the old motto, only in a more complete form: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free."

But while the REVIEW will serve chiefly as an organ for the advancement of theological learning, it will by no means exclude from its pages articles on other and more general subjects. It recognizes the truth that to Christianity, and, therefore, also to theology, nothing that is human is foreign. Natural science, philosophy, literature, ethics, sociology and kindred branches of knowledge, are at present engaging wide and earnest attention; and articles along these lines, written in the spirit of this REVIEW, are, accordingly, invited for its pages.

Finally, the REVIEW proposes to meet, as far as possible, the practical demands of the times. This is an eminently practical age. It has not much patience with mere speculation of any kind. What is wanted now is practical activity, applying the principles of Christianity to the daily affairs of life, and making the world better and happier. This tendency of the times the REVIEW believes not to be contrary to the mind of the Master; and it will, therefore, seek to furnish a due proportion of articles on practical subjects along the line of applied Christianity and Church work.

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